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Claudio Calosi

Université de Genève, Département de philosophie, Faculty Member

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University of Maryland, College Park

Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Lund University

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Columbia University

Universita' della Svizzera Italiana

Lawrence University

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Université de Genève

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Papers by Claudio Calosi

Atoms, combs, syllables and organisms

Philosophical Studies

Mereological atomism is the thesis that everything is ultimately composed of atomic parts, i.e., ... more Mereological atomism is the thesis that everything is ultimately composed of atomic parts, i.e., parts without proper parts. Typically, this thesis is characterized by an axiom stating that everything has atomic parts. The present paper argues that the success of this standard characterization depends on how the notions of sum and composition are defined. In particular, we put forward a novel definition of mereological sum that: (i) is not equivalent to existing definitions in the literature, if no strong decomposition principle is assumed; (ii) can be used to argue that the standard characterization of atomism fails, because having atomic parts is not sufficient to be a sum of atoms; and (iii) provides a purely mereological distinction between structured and unstructured wholes, contributing to the ongoing debate on this crucial topic.

The Bound State Answer to the Special Composition Question

Philosophy of Science, 2022

This paper provides the first thorough assessment of a physics-based answer, the Bound State Answ... more This paper provides the first thorough assessment of a physics-based answer, the Bound State Answer (BSA), to the Special Composition Question (SCQ). According to the BSA some objects compose something if they are in a common bound state. The reasons to endorse such an answer, in particular, motivations coming from empirical adequacy and conservativeness, precision, simplicity, and parsimony, are critically addressed. I then go on to compare the BSA to other moderate answers to the SCQ and consider whether objections raised against such answers can be raised against the BSA as well. I finally relate the discussion with mereological pluralism.

Extended Simples, Unextended Complexes

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Both extended simples and unextended complexes have been extensively discussed and widely used in... more Both extended simples and unextended complexes have been extensively discussed and widely used in metaphysics and philosophy of physics. However, the characterizations of such notions are not entirely satisfactory inasmuch as they rely on a mereological notion of extension that is too simplistic. According to such a mereological notion, being extended boils down to having a mereologically complex exact location. In this paper, I make a detailed plea to supplement this notion of extension with a different one that is phrased in terms of measure theory. This proposal has significant philosophical payoffs. I provide new characterizations of both extended simples and unextended complexes, that help re-evaluating the question of whether such entities are metaphysically possible. Finally, I advance several suggestions as to how different notions of extension relate, first, to one another and, second, to mereological structure.

Failure or Boredom: The Pendulum of Composition as Identity

American Philosophical Quarterly

This paper provides new arguments for the following claim: either (i) strong composition as ident... more This paper provides new arguments for the following claim: either (i) strong composition as identity cannot retain the full strength of both the logical principles of one-one identity (namely, Equivalence and Leibniz’s law) and its semantical principles (namely, Coreferentiality) or (ii) it only delivers cases of boring composition in that it entails mereological nihilism.

On the Contingency of Universalism

Erkenntnis, 2021

The paper presents different arguments against the necessity of mereological universalism. First,... more The paper presents different arguments against the necessity of mereological universalism. First, it argues that they are examples of a much more general argumentative structure. It then contends that some of these arguments cannot be resisted by distinguishing different variants of universalism that have been recently proposed in the literature—in contrast with recent suggestions to the contrary. Finally, it provides different ways to resist such contingentist arguments on behalf of universalists.

Fine’s Monster Objection Defanged

The Philosophical Quarterly

The Monster Objection has often been considered one of the main reasons to explore non-standard m... more The Monster Objection has often been considered one of the main reasons to explore non-standard mereological views, such as hylomorphism. Still, it has been rarely discussed and then only in a cursory fashion. This paper fills this gap by offering the first thorough assessment of the objection. It argues that different metaphysical stances, such as presentism and three- and four-dimensionalism, provide different ways of undermining the objection.

Le tribolazioni del filosofare. Comedia metaphysica ne la quale si tratta de li errori & de le pene de l’Infero

recensione a cura di Stefano Canali Non ci è dato di conoscere le origini del poema che con emozi... more recensione a cura di Stefano Canali Non ci è dato di conoscere le origini del poema che con emozione consegniamo qui alle stampe, né ci è nota l'identità del dotto Poeta dalla cui penna uscirono i versi che lo compongono. Altri sapranno dire. Per parte nostra possiamo solo riferire che le pagine che seguono sono la trascrizione il più fedele possibile dell'originale autografo a noi pervenuto, anonimo e senza indicazione di data o luogo di composizione, da mani a loro volta anonime e senza volto. (Varzi e Calosi, 2014, p. IX)

Failure or Boredom: The Pendulum of Composition as Identity

American Philosophical Quarterly, 2018

This paper provides new arguments for the following claim: either (i) strong composition as ident... more This paper provides new arguments for the following claim: either (i) strong composition as identity cannot retain the full strength of both the logical principles of one-one identity (namely, Equivalence and Leibniz’s law) and its semantical principles (namely, Coreferentiality) or (ii) it only delivers cases of boring composition in that it entails mereological nihilism.

Relational Quantum Mechanics and the PBR Theorem: A Peaceful Coexistence

Foundations of Physics

According to Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) the wave function $$\psi$$ ψ is considered neithe... more According to Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) the wave function $$\psi$$ ψ is considered neither a concrete physical item evolving in spacetime, nor an object representing the absolute state of a certain quantum system. In this interpretative framework, $$\psi$$ ψ is defined as a computational device encoding observers’ information; hence, RQM offers a somewhat epistemic view of the wave function. This perspective seems to be at odds with the PBR theorem, a formal result excluding that wave functions represent knowledge of an underlying reality described by some ontic state. In this paper we argue that RQM is not affected by the conclusions of PBR’s argument; consequently, the alleged inconsistency can be dissolved. To do that, we will thoroughly discuss the very foundations of the PBR theorem, i.e. Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization of ontological models, showing that their implicit assumptions about the nature of the ontic state are incompatible with the main tenets of RQM. T...

A Love Letter on Metaphysics, Poetry and Death, On the 400th year from Shakespeare’s Death, Written by W.H., shortly before his Death

CC A Love Letter on Metaphysics, Poetry and Death, On the 400 th year from Shakespeare's Death, W... more CC A Love Letter on Metaphysics, Poetry and Death, On the 400 th year from Shakespeare's Death, Written by W.H., shortly before his Death. Claudio Calosi edited by Luca Demontis and Mattia Sorgon INTRODUCTORY NOTE. What follows is a love letter that a very dear friend of mine wrote his love shortly before his death. Both their names shall remain untold, for reasons of Piety. And Piety does have many reasons. My friend, he chose the title of the letter 1 himself, and now, the three-timed Death, the three-paced Death, sounds like a chime. He chose Death four times. He signed the letter W.H., if I knew him a little, to play with the dedication of Shakespeare's sonnets. In the presence of Death Silence is Word. So I shall be silent and say only this. He loved much. He was much loved. Nothing else matters. I will miss you my friend, and I shall forget you, often. C.C. And my most beautiful love, It is April, midwinter spring, sempiternal 2 season, the cruelest month, 3 April 23 r d , AD 2016. 4 And I am here, on the south bank of the river Thames, and I am writing you this letter, this love letter, now that you are away. I waited for today and came here. I wanted it to be here. I wanted it to be today. Forty years ago I met you year today, for the first time I saw you here. I still 1 Though he probably added the title later. It is written with the same blacker pen and with the same anguished calligraphy as the final part of the letter is. See footnote 47.

Quantum indeterminacy and the double-slit experiment

Philosophical Studies

Is the world a heap of quantum fragments?

Philosophical Studies

Fragmentalism was originally introduced as a new A-theory of time. It was further refined and dis... more Fragmentalism was originally introduced as a new A-theory of time. It was further refined and discussed, and different developments of the original insight have been proposed. In a celebrated paper, Jonathan Simon contends that fragmentalism delivers a new realist account of the quantum state—which he calls conservative realism—according to which: (i) the quantum state is a complete description of a physical system, (ii) the quantum (superposition) state is grounded in its terms, and (iii) the superposition terms are themselves grounded in local goings-on about the system in question. We will argue that fragmentalism, at least along the lines proposed by Simon, does not offer a new, satisfactory realistic account of the quantum state. This raises the question about whether there are some other viable forms of quantum fragmentalism.

Quantum monism: an assessment

Philosophical Studies

Monism is roughly the view that there is only one fundamental entity. One of the most powerful ar... more Monism is roughly the view that there is only one fundamental entity. One of the most powerful argument in its favor comes from quantum mechanics. Extant discussions of quantum monism are framed independently of any interpretation of the quantum theory. In contrast, this paper argues that matters of interpretation play a crucial role when assessing the viability of monism in the quantum realm. I consider four different interpretations: modal interpretations, Bohmian mechanics, many worlds interpretations, and wavefunction realism. In particular, I extensively argue for the following claim: several interpretations of QM do not support monism at a more serious scrutiny, or do so only with further problematic assumptions, or even support different versions of it.

The Multi-location Trilemma

Erkenntnis

The possibility of multi-location—of one entity having more than one exact location—is required b... more The possibility of multi-location—of one entity having more than one exact location—is required by several metaphysical theories such as the immanentist theory of universals and three-dimensionalism about persistence. One of the most pressing challenges for multi-location theorists is that of making sense of exact location—in that extant definitions of exact location entail a principle called ‘functionality’, according to which nothing can have more than one exact location. Recently in a number of promising papers, Antony Eagle has proposed and defended a definition of exact location in terms of weak location that does not entail functionality. This paper provides the first thorough assessment of Eagle’s proposal. In particular, we argue that it cannot account for (1) the location of immanent universals, (2) the multi-location of mereologically changing three-dimensional objects, (3) the multi-location of mereologically complex objects, and that it (4) makes extended simples impossible.

Priority monism, dependence and fundamentality

Philosophical Studies

Priority monism (PM) is roughly the view that the universe is the only fundamental object, that i... more Priority monism (PM) is roughly the view that the universe is the only fundamental object, that is, a concrete object that does not depend on any other concrete object. Schaffer, the main advocate of PM, claims that PM is compatible with dependence having two different directions: from parts to wholes for subcosmic wholes, and from whole to parts for the cosmic whole. Recently it has been argued that this position is untenable. Given plausible assumptions about dependence, PM entails that dependence has only one direction, it always goes from wholes to parts. One such plausible assumption is a principle of Isolation. I argue that, given all extant accounts of dependence on the market, PM entails No Isolation. The argument depends upon a particular feature of the dependence relation, namely, necessitation and its direction . In the light of this, I contend that the argument is important, insofar as it suggests that we should distinguish dependence from other cognate notions, e.g. grounding. Once this distinction is made, I suggest we should also distinguish between two different notions of fundamentality that might turn out to be not-coextensive.

Determinables, location, and indeterminacy

Synthese

Discussions about determinables and determinates, on the one hand, and discussions about (formal)... more Discussions about determinables and determinates, on the one hand, and discussions about (formal) theories of location, on the other, have thus far proceeded without any visible interaction, in substantive mutual neglect. This paper aims to remedy this situation of neglect. It explicitly relates (theories of) determinables and (theories of) location. First, I argue that some well known principles of location turn out to be instances of principles relating determinables and determinates. Building on this I then argue that theories of location present formidable counterexamples to those principles about determinables and determinates. One such counterexample in particular is used as an argument against disjunctivism. Finally, I relate the entire discussion to yet another crucial debate in metaphysics, that of metaphysical indeterminacy.

Interpreting Quantum Entanglement: Steps towards Coherentist Quantum Mechanics

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum entanglement, according to which entangled... more We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum entanglement, according to which entangled systems are characterized by symmetric relations of ontological dependence among the component particles. We compare this coherentist viewpoint with the two most popular alternatives currently on offer—structuralism and holism—and argue that it is essentially different from, and preferable to, both. In the course of this article, we point out how coherentism might be extended beyond the case of entanglement and further articulated. 1Introduction2Quantum Dependence 2.1From entanglement to dependence2.2Relations of dependence3Structuralism and Holism4Against Structuralism5Against Holism6Coherentism 6.1Coherentism: The account6.2Coherentism: The best of both worlds?7Conclusion

Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy

Philosophical Studies

On a wide variety of presently live interpretations, quantum mechanics violates the classical sup... more On a wide variety of presently live interpretations, quantum mechanics violates the classical supposition of 'value definiteness', according to which the properties ('observables') of a given particle or system have precise values at all times. Here we consider whether two recent approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy-a metaphysical supervaluationist account, on the one hand, and a determinable-based account, on the other-can provide an intelligible basis for quantum metaphysical indeterminacy (QMI), understood as involving quantum value indefiniteness. After identifying three sources of such QMI, we show that previous arguments (Darby in Australas J Philos 88: 227-245, 2010; Skow in Philos Q 60:851-858, 2010) according to which supervaluationism cannot accommodate QMI are unsuccessful; we then provide more comprehensive arguments for this conclusion, which moreover establish that the problems for supervaluationism extend far beyond the orthodox interpretation. We go on to argue that a determinable-based approach can accommodate the full range of sources of QMI.

Is parthood identity?

Synthese

According to a well known, yet controversial metaphysical thesis, Composition is Identity. Recent... more According to a well known, yet controversial metaphysical thesis, Composition is Identity. Recently, Kris McDaniel has articulated and defended a related—and arguably more controversial—thesis, one he calls Parthood is Identity (PI). Roughly the view has it that a whole is, strictly and literally, identical to each of its parts considered individually. At first sight, the view seems rather implausible. However, McDaniel’s formulation and defense are worthy of a serious discussion. In this paper I put forth such a discussion. The result is what we should have expected all along: PI is not only implausible, but arguably false.

Solving a Mereological Puzzle

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

Here is a mereological puzzle. Well, it's not just a mereological puzzle. It's a puzzle about the... more Here is a mereological puzzle. Well, it's not just a mereological puzzle. It's a puzzle about the interaction between mereology, topology and dependence. 1 It is not only interesting in itself. It reveals subtleties about the aforementioned interaction that have gone unnoticed. For these reasons, I believe, the puzzle should be discussed. One of the aims of the paper is to prompt such a discussion. Consider the following plausible claims: Part-Whole Dependence. A whole depends on its parts. Boundaries are Parts. A boundary is a part. 2 Boundary-Whole Dependence. A boundary depends on the whole it is part of. It is assumed that dependence is not symmetric. In fact, let's stipulate that it is asymmetric rather than anti-symmetric. 3 The puzzle has it that the three claims above 1 See Smid (2015). 2 Let me clarifiy things a little. Consider an object o, its mereological complement-the fusion of those things that do not overlap o, that I will write as ∼ o-and their boundary b. b is the boundary of both o and ∼ o. Yet I will assume, for the sake of simplicity, that it is only part of one of them, either o or ∼ o. This thesis is a substantive thesis that traces back to Bolzano. For a discussion see Casati and Varzi (1999: 86-89). 3 So that dependence is also irreflexive.

Atoms, combs, syllables and organisms

Philosophical Studies

Mereological atomism is the thesis that everything is ultimately composed of atomic parts, i.e., ... more Mereological atomism is the thesis that everything is ultimately composed of atomic parts, i.e., parts without proper parts. Typically, this thesis is characterized by an axiom stating that everything has atomic parts. The present paper argues that the success of this standard characterization depends on how the notions of sum and composition are defined. In particular, we put forward a novel definition of mereological sum that: (i) is not equivalent to existing definitions in the literature, if no strong decomposition principle is assumed; (ii) can be used to argue that the standard characterization of atomism fails, because having atomic parts is not sufficient to be a sum of atoms; and (iii) provides a purely mereological distinction between structured and unstructured wholes, contributing to the ongoing debate on this crucial topic.

The Bound State Answer to the Special Composition Question

Philosophy of Science, 2022

This paper provides the first thorough assessment of a physics-based answer, the Bound State Answ... more This paper provides the first thorough assessment of a physics-based answer, the Bound State Answer (BSA), to the Special Composition Question (SCQ). According to the BSA some objects compose something if they are in a common bound state. The reasons to endorse such an answer, in particular, motivations coming from empirical adequacy and conservativeness, precision, simplicity, and parsimony, are critically addressed. I then go on to compare the BSA to other moderate answers to the SCQ and consider whether objections raised against such answers can be raised against the BSA as well. I finally relate the discussion with mereological pluralism.

Extended Simples, Unextended Complexes

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Both extended simples and unextended complexes have been extensively discussed and widely used in... more Both extended simples and unextended complexes have been extensively discussed and widely used in metaphysics and philosophy of physics. However, the characterizations of such notions are not entirely satisfactory inasmuch as they rely on a mereological notion of extension that is too simplistic. According to such a mereological notion, being extended boils down to having a mereologically complex exact location. In this paper, I make a detailed plea to supplement this notion of extension with a different one that is phrased in terms of measure theory. This proposal has significant philosophical payoffs. I provide new characterizations of both extended simples and unextended complexes, that help re-evaluating the question of whether such entities are metaphysically possible. Finally, I advance several suggestions as to how different notions of extension relate, first, to one another and, second, to mereological structure.

Failure or Boredom: The Pendulum of Composition as Identity

American Philosophical Quarterly

This paper provides new arguments for the following claim: either (i) strong composition as ident... more This paper provides new arguments for the following claim: either (i) strong composition as identity cannot retain the full strength of both the logical principles of one-one identity (namely, Equivalence and Leibniz’s law) and its semantical principles (namely, Coreferentiality) or (ii) it only delivers cases of boring composition in that it entails mereological nihilism.

On the Contingency of Universalism

Erkenntnis, 2021

The paper presents different arguments against the necessity of mereological universalism. First,... more The paper presents different arguments against the necessity of mereological universalism. First, it argues that they are examples of a much more general argumentative structure. It then contends that some of these arguments cannot be resisted by distinguishing different variants of universalism that have been recently proposed in the literature—in contrast with recent suggestions to the contrary. Finally, it provides different ways to resist such contingentist arguments on behalf of universalists.

Fine’s Monster Objection Defanged

The Philosophical Quarterly

The Monster Objection has often been considered one of the main reasons to explore non-standard m... more The Monster Objection has often been considered one of the main reasons to explore non-standard mereological views, such as hylomorphism. Still, it has been rarely discussed and then only in a cursory fashion. This paper fills this gap by offering the first thorough assessment of the objection. It argues that different metaphysical stances, such as presentism and three- and four-dimensionalism, provide different ways of undermining the objection.

Le tribolazioni del filosofare. Comedia metaphysica ne la quale si tratta de li errori & de le pene de l’Infero

recensione a cura di Stefano Canali Non ci è dato di conoscere le origini del poema che con emozi... more recensione a cura di Stefano Canali Non ci è dato di conoscere le origini del poema che con emozione consegniamo qui alle stampe, né ci è nota l'identità del dotto Poeta dalla cui penna uscirono i versi che lo compongono. Altri sapranno dire. Per parte nostra possiamo solo riferire che le pagine che seguono sono la trascrizione il più fedele possibile dell'originale autografo a noi pervenuto, anonimo e senza indicazione di data o luogo di composizione, da mani a loro volta anonime e senza volto. (Varzi e Calosi, 2014, p. IX)

Failure or Boredom: The Pendulum of Composition as Identity

American Philosophical Quarterly, 2018

This paper provides new arguments for the following claim: either (i) strong composition as ident... more This paper provides new arguments for the following claim: either (i) strong composition as identity cannot retain the full strength of both the logical principles of one-one identity (namely, Equivalence and Leibniz’s law) and its semantical principles (namely, Coreferentiality) or (ii) it only delivers cases of boring composition in that it entails mereological nihilism.

Relational Quantum Mechanics and the PBR Theorem: A Peaceful Coexistence

Foundations of Physics

According to Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) the wave function $$\psi$$ ψ is considered neithe... more According to Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) the wave function $$\psi$$ ψ is considered neither a concrete physical item evolving in spacetime, nor an object representing the absolute state of a certain quantum system. In this interpretative framework, $$\psi$$ ψ is defined as a computational device encoding observers’ information; hence, RQM offers a somewhat epistemic view of the wave function. This perspective seems to be at odds with the PBR theorem, a formal result excluding that wave functions represent knowledge of an underlying reality described by some ontic state. In this paper we argue that RQM is not affected by the conclusions of PBR’s argument; consequently, the alleged inconsistency can be dissolved. To do that, we will thoroughly discuss the very foundations of the PBR theorem, i.e. Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization of ontological models, showing that their implicit assumptions about the nature of the ontic state are incompatible with the main tenets of RQM. T...

A Love Letter on Metaphysics, Poetry and Death, On the 400th year from Shakespeare’s Death, Written by W.H., shortly before his Death

CC A Love Letter on Metaphysics, Poetry and Death, On the 400 th year from Shakespeare's Death, W... more CC A Love Letter on Metaphysics, Poetry and Death, On the 400 th year from Shakespeare's Death, Written by W.H., shortly before his Death. Claudio Calosi edited by Luca Demontis and Mattia Sorgon INTRODUCTORY NOTE. What follows is a love letter that a very dear friend of mine wrote his love shortly before his death. Both their names shall remain untold, for reasons of Piety. And Piety does have many reasons. My friend, he chose the title of the letter 1 himself, and now, the three-timed Death, the three-paced Death, sounds like a chime. He chose Death four times. He signed the letter W.H., if I knew him a little, to play with the dedication of Shakespeare's sonnets. In the presence of Death Silence is Word. So I shall be silent and say only this. He loved much. He was much loved. Nothing else matters. I will miss you my friend, and I shall forget you, often. C.C. And my most beautiful love, It is April, midwinter spring, sempiternal 2 season, the cruelest month, 3 April 23 r d , AD 2016. 4 And I am here, on the south bank of the river Thames, and I am writing you this letter, this love letter, now that you are away. I waited for today and came here. I wanted it to be here. I wanted it to be today. Forty years ago I met you year today, for the first time I saw you here. I still 1 Though he probably added the title later. It is written with the same blacker pen and with the same anguished calligraphy as the final part of the letter is. See footnote 47.

Quantum indeterminacy and the double-slit experiment

Philosophical Studies

Is the world a heap of quantum fragments?

Philosophical Studies

Fragmentalism was originally introduced as a new A-theory of time. It was further refined and dis... more Fragmentalism was originally introduced as a new A-theory of time. It was further refined and discussed, and different developments of the original insight have been proposed. In a celebrated paper, Jonathan Simon contends that fragmentalism delivers a new realist account of the quantum state—which he calls conservative realism—according to which: (i) the quantum state is a complete description of a physical system, (ii) the quantum (superposition) state is grounded in its terms, and (iii) the superposition terms are themselves grounded in local goings-on about the system in question. We will argue that fragmentalism, at least along the lines proposed by Simon, does not offer a new, satisfactory realistic account of the quantum state. This raises the question about whether there are some other viable forms of quantum fragmentalism.

Quantum monism: an assessment

Philosophical Studies

Monism is roughly the view that there is only one fundamental entity. One of the most powerful ar... more Monism is roughly the view that there is only one fundamental entity. One of the most powerful argument in its favor comes from quantum mechanics. Extant discussions of quantum monism are framed independently of any interpretation of the quantum theory. In contrast, this paper argues that matters of interpretation play a crucial role when assessing the viability of monism in the quantum realm. I consider four different interpretations: modal interpretations, Bohmian mechanics, many worlds interpretations, and wavefunction realism. In particular, I extensively argue for the following claim: several interpretations of QM do not support monism at a more serious scrutiny, or do so only with further problematic assumptions, or even support different versions of it.

The Multi-location Trilemma

Erkenntnis

The possibility of multi-location—of one entity having more than one exact location—is required b... more The possibility of multi-location—of one entity having more than one exact location—is required by several metaphysical theories such as the immanentist theory of universals and three-dimensionalism about persistence. One of the most pressing challenges for multi-location theorists is that of making sense of exact location—in that extant definitions of exact location entail a principle called ‘functionality’, according to which nothing can have more than one exact location. Recently in a number of promising papers, Antony Eagle has proposed and defended a definition of exact location in terms of weak location that does not entail functionality. This paper provides the first thorough assessment of Eagle’s proposal. In particular, we argue that it cannot account for (1) the location of immanent universals, (2) the multi-location of mereologically changing three-dimensional objects, (3) the multi-location of mereologically complex objects, and that it (4) makes extended simples impossible.

Priority monism, dependence and fundamentality

Philosophical Studies

Priority monism (PM) is roughly the view that the universe is the only fundamental object, that i... more Priority monism (PM) is roughly the view that the universe is the only fundamental object, that is, a concrete object that does not depend on any other concrete object. Schaffer, the main advocate of PM, claims that PM is compatible with dependence having two different directions: from parts to wholes for subcosmic wholes, and from whole to parts for the cosmic whole. Recently it has been argued that this position is untenable. Given plausible assumptions about dependence, PM entails that dependence has only one direction, it always goes from wholes to parts. One such plausible assumption is a principle of Isolation. I argue that, given all extant accounts of dependence on the market, PM entails No Isolation. The argument depends upon a particular feature of the dependence relation, namely, necessitation and its direction . In the light of this, I contend that the argument is important, insofar as it suggests that we should distinguish dependence from other cognate notions, e.g. grounding. Once this distinction is made, I suggest we should also distinguish between two different notions of fundamentality that might turn out to be not-coextensive.

Determinables, location, and indeterminacy

Synthese

Discussions about determinables and determinates, on the one hand, and discussions about (formal)... more Discussions about determinables and determinates, on the one hand, and discussions about (formal) theories of location, on the other, have thus far proceeded without any visible interaction, in substantive mutual neglect. This paper aims to remedy this situation of neglect. It explicitly relates (theories of) determinables and (theories of) location. First, I argue that some well known principles of location turn out to be instances of principles relating determinables and determinates. Building on this I then argue that theories of location present formidable counterexamples to those principles about determinables and determinates. One such counterexample in particular is used as an argument against disjunctivism. Finally, I relate the entire discussion to yet another crucial debate in metaphysics, that of metaphysical indeterminacy.

Interpreting Quantum Entanglement: Steps towards Coherentist Quantum Mechanics

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum entanglement, according to which entangled... more We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum entanglement, according to which entangled systems are characterized by symmetric relations of ontological dependence among the component particles. We compare this coherentist viewpoint with the two most popular alternatives currently on offer—structuralism and holism—and argue that it is essentially different from, and preferable to, both. In the course of this article, we point out how coherentism might be extended beyond the case of entanglement and further articulated. 1Introduction2Quantum Dependence 2.1From entanglement to dependence2.2Relations of dependence3Structuralism and Holism4Against Structuralism5Against Holism6Coherentism 6.1Coherentism: The account6.2Coherentism: The best of both worlds?7Conclusion

Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy

Philosophical Studies

On a wide variety of presently live interpretations, quantum mechanics violates the classical sup... more On a wide variety of presently live interpretations, quantum mechanics violates the classical supposition of 'value definiteness', according to which the properties ('observables') of a given particle or system have precise values at all times. Here we consider whether two recent approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy-a metaphysical supervaluationist account, on the one hand, and a determinable-based account, on the other-can provide an intelligible basis for quantum metaphysical indeterminacy (QMI), understood as involving quantum value indefiniteness. After identifying three sources of such QMI, we show that previous arguments (Darby in Australas J Philos 88: 227-245, 2010; Skow in Philos Q 60:851-858, 2010) according to which supervaluationism cannot accommodate QMI are unsuccessful; we then provide more comprehensive arguments for this conclusion, which moreover establish that the problems for supervaluationism extend far beyond the orthodox interpretation. We go on to argue that a determinable-based approach can accommodate the full range of sources of QMI.

Is parthood identity?

Synthese

According to a well known, yet controversial metaphysical thesis, Composition is Identity. Recent... more According to a well known, yet controversial metaphysical thesis, Composition is Identity. Recently, Kris McDaniel has articulated and defended a related—and arguably more controversial—thesis, one he calls Parthood is Identity (PI). Roughly the view has it that a whole is, strictly and literally, identical to each of its parts considered individually. At first sight, the view seems rather implausible. However, McDaniel’s formulation and defense are worthy of a serious discussion. In this paper I put forth such a discussion. The result is what we should have expected all along: PI is not only implausible, but arguably false.

Solving a Mereological Puzzle

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

Here is a mereological puzzle. Well, it's not just a mereological puzzle. It's a puzzle about the... more Here is a mereological puzzle. Well, it's not just a mereological puzzle. It's a puzzle about the interaction between mereology, topology and dependence. 1 It is not only interesting in itself. It reveals subtleties about the aforementioned interaction that have gone unnoticed. For these reasons, I believe, the puzzle should be discussed. One of the aims of the paper is to prompt such a discussion. Consider the following plausible claims: Part-Whole Dependence. A whole depends on its parts. Boundaries are Parts. A boundary is a part. 2 Boundary-Whole Dependence. A boundary depends on the whole it is part of. It is assumed that dependence is not symmetric. In fact, let's stipulate that it is asymmetric rather than anti-symmetric. 3 The puzzle has it that the three claims above 1 See Smid (2015). 2 Let me clarifiy things a little. Consider an object o, its mereological complement-the fusion of those things that do not overlap o, that I will write as ∼ o-and their boundary b. b is the boundary of both o and ∼ o. Yet I will assume, for the sake of simplicity, that it is only part of one of them, either o or ∼ o. This thesis is a substantive thesis that traces back to Bolzano. For a discussion see Casati and Varzi (1999: 86-89). 3 So that dependence is also irreflexive.

(forth.), "The Multi-location Trilemma", Erkenntnis

by Damiano Costa and Claudio Calosi

Erkenntnis

The possibility of multilocation --- of one entity having more than one exact location --- is req... more The possibility of multilocation --- of one entity having more than one exact location --- is required by several metaphysical theories such as the immanentist theory of universals and three-dimensionalism about persistence. One of the most pressing challenges for multi-location theorists is that of making sense of exact location --- in that extant definitions of exact location entail a principle called Functionality, according to which nothing can have more than one exact location. Recently in a number of promising papers, Antony Eagle has proposed and defended a definition of exact location in terms of weak location that does not entail Functionality. This paper provides the first thorough assessment of Eagle’s proposal. In particular, we argue that it cannot account for (i) location of immanent universals, (ii) multi-location of mereologically changing three-dimensional objects , (iii) multi-location of mereologically complex objects, and (iv) mereologically simple but extended objects.

Mereology and the Sciences (Eds, with Pierluigi Graziani)

A systematic and thorough attempt to investigate the relation and the possible applications of me... more

Le Tribolazioni del Filosofare. Comedia metaphysica ne la quale si tratta de li errori & de le pene de l'Infero (con Achille C Varzi)

Un grande poema filosofico, una storia del pensiero attraverso gli errori, un’appassionata testim... more Un grande poema filosofico, una storia del pensiero attraverso gli errori, un’appassionata testimonianza di metafisica militante

Le tribolazioni del ﬁlosofare è il viaggio allegorico di un Poeta attraverso il buio inferno dell’intelletto, nella spirale dell’errore, alla ricerca di una via d’uscita dalla condizione di stallo e confusione diffusa nella quale sarebbe precipitato. Non sfuggiranno le affinità, sul piano dello stile come su quello dell’architettura complessiva, tra questo poema filosofico e l’Inferno di Dante: là Virgilio, qui Socrate; là i peccati, qui gli errori; là i golosi, gli iracondi, gli eretici, i traditori della patria o del partito, qui gli scettici, i dualisti, i realisti ingenui, i fedeli al linguaggio e ai miti facili. Le annotazioni dei curatori ricostruiscono analogie e divergenze con dovizia di dettagli, ma quale sia esattamente il nesso tra le due opere non è dato di sapere. Quel che è certo è che questa ‘comedia metaphysica’ è una testimonianza autentica. È il poema di una vita. È il viaggio ispirato e ispiratore di chi appetisce all’Amore per la Sapienza e, prima ancora, alla purificazione dell’intelletto: quella purificazione liberatoria di cui in fin dei conti abbisogniamo tutti, anche noi, soprattutto noi, filosofi di nascita ma non di costumi, in questa buia contemporaneità.

by Achille C . Varzi and Claudio Calosi

Ratio, 2016

This paper continues the dialogue between A and B initiated by Max Black in ‘The identity of Indi... more This paper continues the dialogue between A and B initiated by Max Black in ‘The identity of Indiscernibles’. Interlocutor A defends the bundle theory by endorsing the (by now popular) view according to which Black’s world does not contain two indiscernible spheres but rather a single, bilocated sphere. His opponent, B, objects that A cannot distinguish such a world from a world with a single, uniquely located sphere, hence that the view in question adds nothing new to A’s original response to Black’s challenge. A is simply denying that there can be worlds with two or more indiscernible entities.

Vol 5, No 2 (2014): Metaphysics

by RIFAJ - Italian Journal of Analytic Philosophy Junior, Claudio Calosi, Matilde Aliffi, Bianca Cepollaro, and Martina Rosola

This special issue of RIFAJ is dedicated to Metaphysics. First Philosophy, as Aristotle called it... more This special issue of RIFAJ is dedicated to Metaphysics. First Philosophy, as Aristotle called it, is certainly the most theoretical enterprise undertaken by our philosophical tradition. Among the huge amount of topics inquired within the last two millennia, this issue aims to provide an outline of this attractive discipline following three different themes.

De li accidiosi che son avversi al possibile

by Achille C . Varzi and Claudio Calosi

Rivista Italiana di Filosoﬁa Analitica Junior, 2014

This is a supplement to "Le tribolazioni del ﬁlosofare". It features an entirely new canto of the... more This is a supplement to "Le tribolazioni del ﬁlosofare". It features an entirely new canto of the poem (originally thought to be lost) along with an extensive commentary. The canto covers the first ring of the circle of the Sullen, which hosts the Adverse to the Possible, and deals with several philosophical questions concerning the metaphysics of modality.

Le tribolazioni del filosofare. Comedia metaphysica ne la quale si tratta de li errori & de le pene de l’Infero

by Achille C . Varzi and Claudio Calosi

Laterza, Rome, 2014

A scholarly annotated epic poem on the pitfalls and tribulations of “good philosophizing”. Divide... more A scholarly annotated epic poem on the pitfalls and tribulations of “good philosophizing”. Divided into twenty-eight cantos (in medieval Italian hendecasyllabic terza rima), the poem tells of an allegorical journey through the downward spiral of the philosophers’ hell, where all sorts of thinkers are punished for their faults and mistakes, in the endeavor to reach a way out of the condition of intellectual impasse in which the narrator has found himself. The affinities with Dante’s Inferno are apparent. Whereas Dante’s poem is about human sins and moral felonies, this one is about philosophical errors and fallacies; whereas Virgil takes Dante through the gluttons, the wrathful, the violent, the traitors to parties and countries, etc., here Socrates takes us through the realists, the skeptics, the dualists, the nichilists, the worshipers of language and easy mythos, etc. And yet this is not just a philosophical counterpart of Dante’s masterpiece, even less a parody. We can’t say exactly when, how, and why it was written, but this is an authentic piece of philosophy, a poem of love, a passionate testimony of militant metaphysics. It is the inspired and inspiring journey of someone, anyone, who is truly moved by the Love for Wisdom and by the grueling purification of the intellect that it demands.