Papers by Maude Ouellette-Dube
Philosophie.ch , 2021
L’œuvre Zoopolis1, des philosophes canadiens Sue Donaldson et Will Kymlicka, marque un tournant d... more L’œuvre Zoopolis1, des philosophes canadiens Sue Donaldson et Will Kymlicka, marque un tournant dans la recherche en éthique animale. La proposition de ce livre? Une articulation claire et détaillée des fondations nécessaires pour construire une société multi-espèces : une Zoopolis. Cette proposition, bien loin d’être choquante, comme il peut sembler à première vue, se tient non-seulement debout, mais ouvre aussi des perspectives d’organisation politique qui tombent à point et se font attendre. Alors, qu’est-ce qu’une Zoopolis? Et pourquoi en avons-nous besoin?
L'Encyclopédie Philosophique , 2019
Cet article aborde la notion de compassion en essayant d’en délimiter le concept autour de deux q... more Cet article aborde la notion de compassion en essayant d’en délimiter le concept autour de deux questions : « qu’est-ce que la compassion ? » et « en vertu de quoi a-t-elle une valeur morale ? ». S’il est généralement reconnu que la compassion est un état positif, que nous vantons le plus souvent, savons-nous vraiment en quoi elle consiste ou pourquoi nous y sommes si sensibles ? Sans parler d’une certaine ambigüité terminologique : pour désigner l’émotion qu’est la compassion, la littérature utilise diversement les termes de « pitié » ou de « sympathie », ou encore d’« empathie » et certains utilisent même parfois les termes de « sollicitude », de « miséricorde » ou de « commisération ». Par conséquent, spécifier la nature et la valeur de la compassion exige qu’elle soit distinguée clairement de ses termes parents et, dans le cas de la littérature, devra déterminer dans quelle mesure l’analyse se trouve structurée par un choix terminologique. L’article sera divisé en deux sections : l’une traitant de la nature de la compassion et l’autre de sa valeur morale. Dans la première section, nous verrons que la compassion est une émotion intentionnelle qui porte sur la souffrance d’autrui et que nous avons des raisons de compatir – nous en distinguerons quatre. Nous verrons que ces raisons nous permettent d’établir dans quelles circonstances la compassion est rationnelle. Puis nous verrons que certaines conditions semblent nécessaires pour compatir ; notamment celle de reconnaître autrui comme son égal. Les trois dernières parties de la première section seront dédiées aux distinctions faites entre la compassion et la pitié, la sympathie, la joie malicieuse et l’empathie. Nous verrons que nous pouvons distinguer des phénomènes affectifs différents grâce à ces différents termes et nous verrons que, bien que la compassion ne soit pas de l’empathie, elle est une réponse affective qui souvent en résulte. Ceci-dit, nous verrons que si l’empathie peut agir comme guide pour éveiller notre compassion, elle n’est ni suffisante, ni nécessaire pour y mener. La deuxième section traitera de la valeur morale de la compassion. Nous verrons que cette émotion peut faire deux contributions significatives à nos vies morales : l’une motivationnelle, l’autre épistémique.
Book Chapter by Maude Ouellette-Dube
Feminist Animal Studies, 2023
The feminist Care tradition has established itself with regards to the animal question by
underli... more The feminist Care tradition has established itself with regards to the animal question by
underlining the limits of utilitarianism and rights theory in assessing ethical treatment
of nonhuman animals, being especially critical of their rationalist assumptions which
obscure the role of moral attitudes like emotions, empathy and attention (Donovan and
Adams, 1996, 2007). These attitudes reveal the underlying relational character of
human-nonhuman animal interactions. Nevertheless, the feminist Care tradition has yet
to offer an ethical account of multispecies relations.
This chapter provides a framework from which to build an account of multispecies
relations which takes seriously the idea that nonhuman animals are subjects constantly
growing and developing through relations and interdependency (Haraway, 2008). It
identifies four kinds of human-nonhuman animal relations: relations of utility, relations
of work, asymmetrical relations and friendship relations. It then assesses these relations
through the concept of ‘caring relations’. Fair and unfair treatments are analyzed
through the lens of good and bad Care. Care encompasses attitudes and practices which
ensure that the needs of an individual are recognized and met such that she can flourish
(Held, 2006). Good Care promotes flourishing and bad Care hinders it. Oppressive,
abusive and violent relations are characteristic of bad Care. Once bad caring relations
are identified and remedied, we have conceptual tools to recognize relations which
promote good Care.
Using the human-horse relation, which has received serious scholarly attention
over the past decade (Coulter, 2016; Birke and Thompson, 2018; Bornemark,
Andersson, Ekström von Essen, 2019), as a key example, this paper argues that
relations of good Care are possible within work, asymmetrical and friendship relations
and that only utility relations are oppressive in nature. This implies that asymmetrical
relations, characterized by relations of power, are not intrinsically oppressive and offers
for a better understanding of the exercise of power involved in human-nonhuman
animal relations.
Dissertation by Maude Ouellette-Dube
This dissertation defends an account of moral understanding as the competence to navigate ethical... more This dissertation defends an account of moral understanding as the competence to navigate ethical life. The nature of moral understanding is an object of controversy. Some claim that it can be reduced to a form of moral knowledge. Others claim that moral understanding is a complex moral epistemic good that cannot be reduced to a form of moral knowledge. I argue that this dispute dissolves once we acknowledge that the debate about the nature of moral understanding is one about the kind of epistemic competence a moral agent should develop and exercise. Against the view that moral understanding is an explanatory competence and the view that it is the capacity to gain moral knowledge, I argue that moral understanding is the competence to navigate ethical life. Through this navigation, one forms moral beliefs that speak to one’s agency, such that one successfully figures out what one should do. This competence is characterized by the abilities to be epistemically engaged with humility and to appreciate moral reason. Humble epistemic engagement is primarily guided by an attentional activity— moral attention—deemed the proper mark of the active moral agent by Iris Murdoch. Appreciation follows from normative experience resulting from the emotional experience of the subject. As a result, moral understanding is a necessary, although not sufficient, constituent of moral competence. This account aligns with the intuitions whereby moral understanding is something one should possess oneself—it should not be outsourced—whilst accepting help from peers. It also accommodates the fundamental intuitions that this moral epistemic good implies a systematic grasp of morality and the ability to figure out what one should do. I distinguish, moreover, between two significantly different deficits of moral understanding. Ordinary lack of moral understanding is in cases in which one’s navigation is compromised by one’s lack of epistemic engagement. Failed moral agency is in cases where one does not navigate to live well. Only the former deficit can be remedied. Explaining why ordinary ethical navigation fails, in turn, sheds light on the puzzling reality that people, although active and well-intentioned, are often ill-equipped to find their way in ethical life. Becoming clearer on the nature of moral understanding reveals that moral competence involves as much epistemic as practical engagement. The account also provides a novel set of conceptual tools for thinking about the way ordinary moral experience influences moral understanding.
Talks by Maude Ouellette-Dube
Selon les recherches en épistémologie morale, la compréhension éthique ("moral understanding") es... more Selon les recherches en épistémologie morale, la compréhension éthique ("moral understanding") est une compétence (Hills, 2009, 2011) qu’il est nécessaire de développer et d’exercer pour pleinement s’affirmer comme agent moral. Cette compétence s’appuie sur des habiletés de jugement, mais aussi des habilités attentionnelles et affectives (Ouellette-Dubé, 2022). La compréhension éthique serait un but phare de l’éducation morale (Martin, 2007). Non seulement cette compétence formerait un socle pour le maintien d’un bon vivre ensemble (Walker, 2007), mais c’est aussi à travers son exercice que le sujet apprenant préserverait son intégrité (Ouellette-Dubé 2022). La principale question de cette contribution est la suivante : est-ce que les théories de la compréhension éthique peuvent permettre d’asseoir et d’unifier l’identité de l’enseignement de l’éthique dans les écoles, et donc de préciser sa visée et sa didactique propre? Nous mènerons cette enquête en nous appuyant sur le plan d’étude romand (CIIP, 2010). Nous défendrons l’idée que les théories de la compréhension éthique aideront à préciser l’identité et la visée de l’enseignement de l’éthique dans les écoles, et donc de mieux le situer au sein des autres disciplines scolaires. Ce sera le cas, entre autres, grâce au profil de l’enseignant.e de l’éthique que cette discussion nous permettra d’esquisser.
Le vétérinaire a le droit (légal et moral) de procéder à l’euthanasie d’un cheval, c’est-à-dire d... more Le vétérinaire a le droit (légal et moral) de procéder à l’euthanasie d’un cheval, c’est-à-dire de mettre un terme définitif à ses souffrances en cas de maladie ou d’infirmités, généralement par mise à mort par injection létale. Le vétérinaire peut recommander l’euthanasie, mais la décision revient généralement au propriétaire du cheval. Confronté à la complexité et la diversité des cas, une fois sur le terrain, on peut se demander qui prend vraiment la décision ? Et qui devrait la prendre ? Est-ce que le vétérinaire se voit trop souvent positionné comme autorité experte dans de tels cas, au prix d’une responsabilité démesurée ? Et quel rôle joue ou peut jouer le cheval au sein de cette décision ? L’éthique de l’euthanasie se centre généralement sur le moment de prise de décision, postulant la fin de vie comme un évènement survenant à un temps défini. Dans cette présentation, je vais situer la décision d’euthanasie au sein de son contexte relationnel et narratif, un contexte qui s’étend dans le temps, et qui implique une histoire et des éléments biographiques. En m’appuyant sur la méthode d’analyse propre à l’éthique du care, je vais proposer un cadre relationnel triangulaire où les acteurs clés du processus décisionnel peuvent être justement reconnus. Cela permettra de situer le propriétaire, le vétérinaire ainsi que le cheval comme acteurs se partageant une responsabilité. L’autorité du vétérinaire sera discutée et mise en perspective, ainsi que celle que peut légitimement exercer le cheval à propos de son propre sort. L’analyse proposée sera pertinente pour la prise de décision de mise à mort d’autres animaux, en particulier les animaux de compagnie.
Moral epistemology, similar to epistemology in general, is characterized by a search for knowledg... more Moral epistemology, similar to epistemology in general, is characterized by a search for knowledge and questions such as “does moral knowledge exist and, if yes, how can we gain some?”, “what is good and how can we know?” or again “what is a morally right action?” are central to it. In trying to answer these questions the moral inquiry centers on how and whether we can gain moral knowledge, that is, how we can come to have a justified true moral belief. While it is uncontroversial that moral epistemology echoes a search for moral knowledge, some have questioned whether this needs to be so. Over and above moral knowledge, some defend the view that the primary goal of the moral inquiry should be to gain moral understanding (Hills 2009, 2011). There are many reasons to favor the pursuit of moral understanding over that of moral knowledge. For instance, moral understanding is considered central in an account of morally worthy action. Again when an agent has moral understanding she is more reliable because she has a systematic grasp of the subject at hand and, presumably, an ability to reliably make good judgements about new cases. The account of moral understanding favored in the literature is explanatory understanding or “understanding why”. In this case, the agent is said to understand when she grasps the reasons “why P”. In the case of moral understanding “P” has moral content: “understanding why lying is wrong”, “understanding why an action is right”. I argue that to reduce moral understanding to explanatory understanding is not satisfactory because it does not fully capture what it is to morally understand. I suggest that an account of moral understanding as explanatory understanding makes us fail to recognize another kind of understanding which I will call “experiential understanding” and which seems necessary to a full account of moral understanding. In presenting my account of experiential understanding I hope to motivate the idea that a full account of moral understanding is a type of “understanding how”, namely, understanding how to live well.
Moral epistemology, similar to epistemology in general, is characterized by a search for knowledg... more Moral epistemology, similar to epistemology in general, is characterized by a search for knowledge and questions such as "does moral knowledge exist and, if yes, how can we gain some?", "what is good and how can we know?" or again "what is a morally right action?" are central to it. In trying to answer these questions the moral inquiry centers on how and whether we can gain moral knowledge, that is, how we can come to have a justified true moral belief. While it is uncontroversial that moral epistemology echoes a search for moral knowledge, some have questioned whether this needs to be so. Over and above moral knowledge, some defend the view that the primary goal of the moral inquiry should be to gain moral understanding (Hills 2009, 2011). There are many reasons to favor the pursuit of moral understanding over that of moral knowledge. For instance, moral understanding is considered central in an account of morally worthy action. Again when an agent has moral understanding she is more reliable because she has a systematic grasp of the subject at hand and, presumably, an ability to reliably make good judgements about new cases. The account of moral understanding favored in the literature is explanatory understanding or "understanding why". In this case, the agent is said to understand when she grasps the reasons "why P". In the case of moral understanding "P" has moral content: "understanding why lying is wrong", "understanding why an action is right". I argue that to reduce moral understanding to explanatory understanding is not satisfactory because it does not fully capture what it is to morally understand. I suggest that an account of moral understanding as explanatory understanding makes us fail to recognize another kind of understanding which I will call "experiential understanding" and which seems necessary to a full account of moral understanding. In presenting my account of experiential understanding I hope to shed light on what should be considered the main object of the moral understanding process, namely, understanding how to live well.
Care, attention et compréhensions morales Les éthiques du Care, en valorisant la perception, les ... more Care, attention et compréhensions morales Les éthiques du Care, en valorisant la perception, les émotions et certaines formes d'attention dans nos vies morales, nous permettent de deviner l'importance, non plus d'une recherche de connaissance en morale, mais bien d'une certaine qualité de compréhension. C'est cette idée, que le Care ouvre de nouvelles avenues épistémiques, celles de la compréhension morale, que je vais développer ici, à l'aide, notamment, de l'ouvrage Moral Understandings de Margaret Urban Walker.
Iris Murdoch fait partie des philosophes qui, durant la deuxième partie du 20eime siècle, questio... more Iris Murdoch fait partie des philosophes qui, durant la deuxième partie du 20eime siècle, questionnèrent et critiquèrent la place du raisonnement en philosophie morale. Murdoch propose d'insister sur d'autres aspects de notre psychologie morale, qui sauront mettre en lumière notre sensibilité à ce qui est pertinent moralement, mais qui ne relève pas de notre raisonnement. Elle questionne aussi ces philosophies morales qui considèrent que ce qui compte moralement peut se réduire au choix et à l'action. Elle déplore cette approche qui laisse peu, ou pas, de place pour considérer la psychologie et le caractère de l'agent dans son entièreté et sa complexité. Murdoch propose plusieurs métaphores de vision pour montrer de quelle façon nous accumulons, d'une certaine façon, constamment une certaine forme de connaissance morale tout au long de nos vies éveillées. Nous voyons, percevons, recevons, nous sommes frappés par le flow continu de la vie et ceci n'est pas une mince affaire. D'ailleurs Murdoch suggère que bien souvent, au moment du choix, la décision est déjà prise et notre raisonnement y est pour bien peu dans le fait de diriger notre action. Son idée d'attention, ou d'attention morale, sera centrale pour comprendre son propos, puisqu'elle considère cette forme d'attention comme la bonne façon de voir le monde et de se disposer pour se rendre compte de ce qui importe moralement. Dans cette présentation, je vais principalement présenter ce qu'est l'attention morale pour Murdoch, sa pertinence et la place que cette notion tient dans le plus grand contexte de la psychologie morale d'aujourd'hui. Comme nous le verrons, l'attention morale de Murdoch a beaucoup influencé les recherches faites sur la perception morale et en éthique du Care.
There is an ongoing debate between the Care based and the justice based approaches in ethics, out... more There is an ongoing debate between the Care based and the justice based approaches in ethics, out of which a debate specific to animal ethics has developed. With regards to the animal question, the Care based approach meets a variety of criticism. For instance, Alasdair Cochrane (Cochrane 2010) explains that the Care tradition has taken the issue of the justice for animals very seriously and has developed an important and distinctive account of the ways in which we should address our obligations to them. Cochrane nevertheless rejects the Care based accounts as a satisfying way to address the question of animal justice, for one thing, because the Care theories "possess few resources to help us make difficult choices when our sympathies conflict" (Cochrane 2010, 135). I this presentation I suggest that this way of weighing the two approaches and of attempting to choose one over the other is not only misleading, but is, to a certain extent, detrimental to the cause. While, it might be the case that Care based accounts are not ideal to ground our obligations to non-human animals, that is precisely because this approach is not trying to formulate obligations and it is not supposed to be a substitute to traditional justice based ethical theories. As Carol J. Adams puts it, the fundamental question which the care tradition asks with regards to non-human animals is not: What are our duties or obligations to them? Rather it is "How do we make those whose suffering does not matter, matter?" (Adams 2007, 23). The Care approach does not want to replace the theories of justice, it is rather asking for a radical questioning of our ways to relate to other animals. It is the claim that we need to radically review the nature of our relations to other-animals, to shift perspective with regards to our way of considering them, a shift which is necessary to fully attend to whatever obligations we might have towards them. The Care approach asks that we better our relationships with non-human animals and it would precisely do a disservice to the animal liberation cause to overlook this distinction. I will try to reinforce and make clearer the claims of the Care approach by discussing of attention and compassion, two key components of Care. It is the idea that we need a certain kind of attention to develop proper concern for non-human animals and to consider, even recognize them, the way they deserve. Moreover, it is the idea that we need compassion to meaningfully situate ourselves with regards to the suffering of sentient beings.
In recent years, a lot of attention has been given to empathy in moral philosophy. In the field o... more In recent years, a lot of attention has been given to empathy in moral philosophy. In the field of animal ethics, one prominent voice is that of Lori Gruen, who suggests, in her work Entangled Empathy, an ethics of empathy for our relations with animals (human and nonhuman). However, while empathy certainly has some virtues, the concept remains equivocal, so much so, that it can become difficult to see what empathy can contribute to ethics at all. In this workshop presentation, I suggest that only a certain kind of empathy will have significant moral worth. That is, only a certain kind of empathy will have worth to guide our actions and better our relations with animals (human and nonhuman). First, I suggest that empathy, when considered to be a process whereby one takes another's perspective to try to understand her point of view, has limited moral worth. That is, while I think we could say that it has epistemic moral worth, I think it is unclear how this kind of empathy can guide our action and it remains questionable how one can formulate an ethics of empathy based on this process. This is why I then suggest that when discussing of empathy in the moral sphere we should rather turn to the kind of empathy called "empathic concern" (Denham, forthcoming). I will clarify what empathic concern consists in and argue that it is the kind of empathy that can do the heavy moral lifting, especially when it comes to our relation to nonhuman animals. Lastly, I want to say a word about the implications of my view for Gruen's entangled empathy.
Drafts by Maude Ouellette-Dube
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Papers by Maude Ouellette-Dube
Book Chapter by Maude Ouellette-Dube
underlining the limits of utilitarianism and rights theory in assessing ethical treatment
of nonhuman animals, being especially critical of their rationalist assumptions which
obscure the role of moral attitudes like emotions, empathy and attention (Donovan and
Adams, 1996, 2007). These attitudes reveal the underlying relational character of
human-nonhuman animal interactions. Nevertheless, the feminist Care tradition has yet
to offer an ethical account of multispecies relations.
This chapter provides a framework from which to build an account of multispecies
relations which takes seriously the idea that nonhuman animals are subjects constantly
growing and developing through relations and interdependency (Haraway, 2008). It
identifies four kinds of human-nonhuman animal relations: relations of utility, relations
of work, asymmetrical relations and friendship relations. It then assesses these relations
through the concept of ‘caring relations’. Fair and unfair treatments are analyzed
through the lens of good and bad Care. Care encompasses attitudes and practices which
ensure that the needs of an individual are recognized and met such that she can flourish
(Held, 2006). Good Care promotes flourishing and bad Care hinders it. Oppressive,
abusive and violent relations are characteristic of bad Care. Once bad caring relations
are identified and remedied, we have conceptual tools to recognize relations which
promote good Care.
Using the human-horse relation, which has received serious scholarly attention
over the past decade (Coulter, 2016; Birke and Thompson, 2018; Bornemark,
Andersson, Ekström von Essen, 2019), as a key example, this paper argues that
relations of good Care are possible within work, asymmetrical and friendship relations
and that only utility relations are oppressive in nature. This implies that asymmetrical
relations, characterized by relations of power, are not intrinsically oppressive and offers
for a better understanding of the exercise of power involved in human-nonhuman
animal relations.
Dissertation by Maude Ouellette-Dube
Talks by Maude Ouellette-Dube
Drafts by Maude Ouellette-Dube
underlining the limits of utilitarianism and rights theory in assessing ethical treatment
of nonhuman animals, being especially critical of their rationalist assumptions which
obscure the role of moral attitudes like emotions, empathy and attention (Donovan and
Adams, 1996, 2007). These attitudes reveal the underlying relational character of
human-nonhuman animal interactions. Nevertheless, the feminist Care tradition has yet
to offer an ethical account of multispecies relations.
This chapter provides a framework from which to build an account of multispecies
relations which takes seriously the idea that nonhuman animals are subjects constantly
growing and developing through relations and interdependency (Haraway, 2008). It
identifies four kinds of human-nonhuman animal relations: relations of utility, relations
of work, asymmetrical relations and friendship relations. It then assesses these relations
through the concept of ‘caring relations’. Fair and unfair treatments are analyzed
through the lens of good and bad Care. Care encompasses attitudes and practices which
ensure that the needs of an individual are recognized and met such that she can flourish
(Held, 2006). Good Care promotes flourishing and bad Care hinders it. Oppressive,
abusive and violent relations are characteristic of bad Care. Once bad caring relations
are identified and remedied, we have conceptual tools to recognize relations which
promote good Care.
Using the human-horse relation, which has received serious scholarly attention
over the past decade (Coulter, 2016; Birke and Thompson, 2018; Bornemark,
Andersson, Ekström von Essen, 2019), as a key example, this paper argues that
relations of good Care are possible within work, asymmetrical and friendship relations
and that only utility relations are oppressive in nature. This implies that asymmetrical
relations, characterized by relations of power, are not intrinsically oppressive and offers
for a better understanding of the exercise of power involved in human-nonhuman
animal relations.