Papers by Gianfranco Soldati
Center for the Study of Language and Information eBooks, 1994
Phenomenology and Mind, 2016
This paper deals with the experiential basis of deductive reasoning. It concentrates on the case ... more This paper deals with the experiential basis of deductive reasoning. It concentrates on the case of inferential knowledge in the first person. It first describes the specific kind of entitlement involved in such knowledge. A comparison is then made with inferential knowledge involving other indexical and demonstrative concepts. The entitlement involved in those cases is based on the fact that indexicals such as "here" and "now" are associated with experiential concepts. It is submitted that the concept associated to the expression "I" is an experiential concept application of which presupposes a special sensitivity to the identity of the self through time.
Zeitschrift Fur Philosophische Forschung, 1998
Philosophische Rundschau, 1994
Studia philosophica, 2016
Routledge eBooks, Feb 17, 2015
Phänomenologische Forschungen, 2018
This paper deals with the nature of perceptual appearances. It argues that they are objective rel... more This paper deals with the nature of perceptual appearances. It argues that they are objective relational properties of external objects. In perceptual experience, we are acquainted with such appearances. These are not sense data, as usually understood, and they are not identical to the properties we attribute to external objects through the usage of qualitative concepts such as ‘red’, ‘square’ and ‘sweet.’ We use such concepts in order to describe properties that are manifest in perception, not in order to describe appearances. One and the same property, such as the bent shape of a stick, can appear in different ways in different contexts. None of those ways is more or less appropriate, because things simply appear the way they do. The choice of a certain context determines the normal conditions for the possession of qualitative concepts. Standard perceptual illusions are perceptual experiences. They mislead us, not because they are incorrect, but because they prompt us to use concepts that are not appropriate under the obtaining conditions.
Studia philosophica, 2013
Polish Journal of Philosophy, 2015
It is difficult to develop a coherent conception of time on the basis of our experience of time. ... more It is difficult to develop a coherent conception of time on the basis of our experience of time. The philosophical analysis of our experience of time is a central topic in phenomenology. So one might expect phenomenology to deliver a contribution to the solution of the most challenging puzzles of the philosophy of time. This paper deals with some methodological issues related to such an expectation. It opposes two main conceptions of the role of phenomenology in the philosophy of time. On the first conception phenomenology draws conclusions about the nature of time from the description of the qualitative features of our experience of time. On the second conception, phenomenology determines what we are rationally entitled to believe about the nature of time on the basis of the way we experience time. It is argued that if one aims at integrating different approaches in one's philosophical conception of time, then it is the second conception one ought to choose.
European Journal of Philosophy, Dec 1, 2006
Many thanks to Anja Karnein for helpful conversations regarding the topics discussed here. 2 I ha... more Many thanks to Anja Karnein for helpful conversations regarding the topics discussed here. 2 I have tried to explore these thoughts myself in Risse 2003 and Risse 2001a. 3 I argue for this viewpoint in Risse 2001a, section V, and in Risse (forthcoming). 4 On Nietzsche's naturalism, see Leiter 2002.
Dialectica, May 23, 2005
In a theory of representational or intentional states content is generally supposed to play vario... more In a theory of representational or intentional states content is generally supposed to play various roles. It has to be the bearer of a truth-value, it has to determine the way a representation is about something (its mode of presentation), and finally it has to 6e used in order to give intra-and interpersonal psychological explanations. It has been argued that no unique kind of content can play all these roles. What criterion should one adopt in order to draw the dividing line? We suggest that the divide be based on ontological considerations related to the way content depends on external factors. There is a fundamental difference, we submit, between objectdependent and propertydependent contents. The requirements concerning modes of presentation as well as cognitive significance can be met by one kind of content. This content, it will appear, is propertydependent, but never object-dependent. ' Kaplan merely talks of "content" or "proposition". Perry uses terms such as "thought", "incremental truth condition" and "proposition expressed". See Kaplan (1989),
Routledge eBooks, Mar 16, 2017
Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, 2002
Gianfranco Soldati Subjectivité dans la pensée et dans le langage I. Sujets et objets Nous nous t... more Gianfranco Soldati Subjectivité dans la pensée et dans le langage I. Sujets et objets Nous nous trouvons dans un auditoire qui est peuplé d'objets1. Il ya des tables, des chaises, des murs, des haut-parleurs, des bruits, des souliers, des grains de poussière, des molécules ...
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, Apr 1, 2012
Oxford University Press eBooks, Feb 2, 2023
John Benjamins Publishing Company eBooks, 2002
Husserl Studies, Feb 1, 2014
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Papers by Gianfranco Soldati