Papers by Michael Sollberger
Sensory Blending: On Synaesthesia and related phenomena Edited by Ophelia Deroy, 2017
Can some synaesthetic experiences be treated as veridical perceptual experiences, i.e. as conscio... more Can some synaesthetic experiences be treated as veridical perceptual experiences, i.e. as conscious mental states in which worldly objects and their features perceptually appear as they really are? Most empirical scientists and philosophers working on synaesthesia answer this question in the negative. Contrary to this prevailing opinion, Mohan Matthen’s ‘When is Synaesthesia Perception?’ (Chapter 8 of this volume) argues that such a dismissive approach to the epistemic properties of synaesthetic experiences
is not mandatory. Matthen claims that there is conceptual room for a more tolerant approach according to which at least one variety of synaesthesia, which he calls ‘direct synaesthesia’, is epistemically on a par with everyday non-synaesthetic perception. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the idea of ‘direct synaesthesia’ and to assess whether the accepted dogma that synaesthesia is always prone to error has to go.
European Journal of Philosophy, 2017
The traditional epistemological problem of other minds seeks to answer the following question: Ho... more The traditional epistemological problem of other minds seeks to answer the following question: How can we know someone else’s mental states? The problem is often taken to be generated by a fundamental asymmetry in the means of knowledge. In my own case, I can know directly what I think and feel. This sort of self-knowledge is epistemically direct in the sense of being non-inferential and non-observational. My knowledge of other minds, however, is thought to lack these epistemic features. So what is the basic source of my knowledge of other minds if I know my mind in such a way that I cannot know the minds of others? The aim of this paper is to clarify and assess the pivotal role that the asymmetry in respect of knowledge plays within a broadly inferentialist approach to the epistemological problem of other minds. The received dogma has always been to endorse the asymmetry for conceptual reasons, and to insist that the idea of knowing someone else’s mental life in the same way as one knows one’s own mind is a complete non-starter. Against this, I aim to show that it is at best a contingent matter that creatures such as us cannot know other minds just as we know a good deal of our own minds, and also that the idea of having someone else’s mind in one’s own introspective reach is not obviously self-contradictory. So, the dogma needs to be revisited. As a result, the dialectical position of those inferentialists who believe that we know about someone else’s mentality in virtue of an analogical inference will be reinforced.
Experiences of thought-insertion are a first-rank, diagnostically central symptom of schizophreni... more Experiences of thought-insertion are a first-rank, diagnostically central symptom of schizophrenia. Schizophrenic patients who undergo such delusional mental states report being first-personally aware of an occurrent conscious thought which is not theirs, but which belongs to an external cognitive agent. Patients seem to be right about what they are thinking but mistaken about who is doing the thinking. It is notoriously difficult to make sense of such delusions. One general approach to explaining the etiology of monothematic delusions has come to be known as the endorsement model. This model claims that the patient holds her delusional belief because she simply trusts her bizarre experience and takes it at face value. The content of the bizarre experience thus plays a central role in the etiology of delusions. Despite being widely discussed with respect to delusions like Capgras and Cotard, an endorsement model of thought-insertion has not yet been formulated. This article seeks to fill this void by fleshing out and defending the endorsement approach to delusions of inserted thoughts. It aims to show that such an approach can be defended against objections that have been raised in the literature. In particular, it will be argued that there is nothing wrong with the idea of being first-personally aware of a thought which is presented in consciousness as being someone else’s. The upshot is that with respect to delusions of thought-insertion, the endorsement model turns out to be a viable account of why patients come to believe that someone else is inserting thoughts into their minds.
Current orthodoxy in the philosophy of perception views indirect realism as misguided, wrongheade... more Current orthodoxy in the philosophy of perception views indirect realism as misguided, wrongheaded, or simply outdated. The reasons for its pariah status are variegated. Although it is surely not unreasonable to speculate that philosophical fashion is one factor that contributes to this situation, there are also solid philosophical arguments which put pressure on the indirect realist position. In this paper, I will discuss one such main objection and show how the indirect realist can face it. The upshot will be a defence of a new structural account of indirect realism which is immune to a number of objections that have been traditionally levelled at such theories of perceptual consciousness.
Defending a form of naïve realism about visual experiences is quite popular these days. Those naï... more Defending a form of naïve realism about visual experiences is quite popular these days. Those naïve realists who I will be concerned with in this paper make a central claim about the subjective aspects of perceptual experiences. They argue that how it is with the perceiver subjectively when she sees worldly objects is literally determined by those objects. This way of thinking leads them to endorse a form of disjunctivism, according to which the fundamental psychological nature of seeings and hallucinations is distinct. I will oppose their central claim by defending a version of the so-called ‘causal argument’, which dwells on ideas about causation and explanation in perception. The aim of this discussion is to highlight that the subjective aspects of perceptual experiences cannot be explained in naïve realist terms. Instead, it will be argued that one needs to appeal to a mental factor which does not involve worldly objects as constituents, and which is common to seeings and hallucinations.
Synesthetes are people who report having perceptual experiences that are very unusual, such as “s... more Synesthetes are people who report having perceptual experiences that are very unusual, such as “seeing” sounds as colors or “smelling” colors as odors. It is commonly assumed these days that such synesthetic experiences must be instances of misperceptions. Against this widespread assumption, I will highlight that there is reason to think that at least some synesthetic experiences can be viewed as truly veridical perceptions, and not as illusions or hallucinations. On this view, which I will back up by conceptual arguments and empirical data, synesthesia does sometimes enable the individual to truly pick up on worldly features. In failing to take this possibility on board, the participants in this debate have thus unduly restricted the scope of dialectical options. Finally, the reassessment of synesthetic experiences that I defend in this paper will turn out to have important ramifications not just for synesthesia research, but also for perception theories more generally.
In the present paper, I shall argue that disjunctively construed naïve realism about the nature o... more In the present paper, I shall argue that disjunctively construed naïve realism about the nature of perceptual experiences succumbs to the empirically inspired causal argument. The causal argument highlights as a first step that local action necessitates the presence of a type-identical common kind of mental state shared by all perceptual experiences. In a second step, it sets out that the property of being a veridical perception cannot be a mental property. It results that the mental nature of perceptions must be exhausted by the occurrence of inner sensory experiences that narrowly supervene on the perceiver. That is, empirical objects fail directly to determine the perceptual consciousness of the perceiver. The upshot is that not only naïve realism, but also certain further forms of direct realism have to be abandoned.
The aim of the present paper is to sketch a new structural version of the Representative Theory o... more The aim of the present paper is to sketch a new structural version of the Representative Theory of Perception which is supported both by conceptual and empirical arguments. To this end, I will discuss, in a first step, the structural approach to representation and show how it can be applied to perceptual consciousness. This discussion will demonstrate that perceptual experiences possess representational as well as purely sensational properties. In a second step, the focus will switch to empirical cases of synaesthesia. In particular, I will stress that certain synaesthetic experiences are well-suited to corroborating a structural account of the perceptual mind. The overall picture that emerges in this paper prompts a new view of perceptual consciousness that is ruthlessly structural.
In this paper, I will ask whether naïve realists have the conceptual resources for meeting the ch... more In this paper, I will ask whether naïve realists have the conceptual resources for meeting the challenge stemming from the causal argument. As I interpret it, naïve realism is committed to disjunctivism. Therefore, I first set out in detail how one has to formulate the causal argument against the background of disjunctivism. This discussion is above all supposed to work out the key assumptions at stake in the causal argument. I will then go on to sketch out several possible rejoinders on behalf of naïve realism. It will be shown that they all fail to provide a satisfying account of how causation and perceptual consciousness fit together. Accordingly, the upshot will be that the causal argument provides good reason to abandon disjunctivism and, instead, to promote a common factor view of perception.
In dem hier vorliegenden Text möchte ich zeigen, dass ein naiver Wahrnehmungsrealismus im Lichte ... more In dem hier vorliegenden Text möchte ich zeigen, dass ein naiver Wahrnehmungsrealismus im Lichte der naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse nicht plausibel vertreten werden kann. Im Speziellen werde ich argumentieren, dass Erkenntnisse aus der Neurobiologie, den Kognitionswissenschaften und der Physik im Gegensatz zu der intuitiven Annahme des naiven Realismus stehen, wir seien uns in der Wahrnehmung unmittelbar einer kausal und ontologisch unabhängigen, empirischen Welt bewusst. Folglich kann die Natur von perzeptuellen Erfahrungen nicht die sein, die sie zu sein scheint. Für das Verständnis unserer Lebenswelt hat dies tief greifende Konsequenzen, denn es muss sowohl der metaphysische Status als auch unser epistemischer Zugang zu den phänomenal erlebten Objekten und deren Eigenschaften neu konzipiert werden.
argues in his book for a structuralist theory of representation. He sets three targets that such ... more argues in his book for a structuralist theory of representation. He sets three targets that such a theory should meet: (a) it should explain what turns something into a representation of something else; (b) it should give an account of why a representation provides information about something else; and (c) it should leave room for misrepresentation (17). Bartels conceives the structuralist theory of representation as providing an answer to (b) in the first place. He sets out a structuralist account of the content of representations combined with a functional view of (a) and a causal theory of the reference of a representation. Distinguishing between the account of content and the account of reference in this way is supposed to enable the resulting position to deal with misrepresentation (53). A structuralist theory of representational content links up with the tradition of image theories of representation but is distinct from them, not falling victim to the objections that have discredited that tradition. The representational content consists in an isomorphism between the structure of one entity, the representation, and the structure of another entity, usually the target of the representation. Bartels makes this idea precise in chapter 2.1. He then applies this conception to a broad field, starting with fiction (chapter 3) and moving on from there to representation in scientific models (chapter 4). In particular, Bartels discusses space-time models and the view that what these models represent, space-time, is itself a structure (chapter 4.4). The main part of the applications in what follows concern mental representation. Bartels considers conceptual content (chapter 5), qualia (chapter 6) and representational theories of behaviour (chapter 7). He finally points out that his account is compatible with but not tied to realism (chapter 8).
In the present text, I shall discuss Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of “eternal recurrence”. In pa... more In the present text, I shall discuss Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of “eternal recurrence”. In particular, it will be argued that it is no accident that there are currently numerous incommensurable interpretations of the eternal recurrence on the market. Rather, this exegetical situation is due to an intrinsic property of Nietzsche’s thought in itself. In order to support this claim, I shall look at the idea of eternal recurrence from a new meta-theoretical point of view. Crucially, this meta-theoretical approach will highlight that Nietzsche’s idea is neither a systematic nor a well thought-out doctrine, but rather an opaque and underdetermined intuition.
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 2005
Symposium on his Ontological Point of View, 2006
Dialectica, 2008
argues in his book for a structuralist theory of representation. He sets three targets that such ... more argues in his book for a structuralist theory of representation. He sets three targets that such a theory should meet: (a) it should explain what turns something into a representation of something else; (b) it should give an account of why a representation provides information about something else; and (c) it should leave room for misrepresentation (17). Bartels conceives the structuralist theory of representation as providing an answer to (b) in the first place. He sets out a structuralist account of the content of representations combined with a functional Book Reviews 128
Uploads
Papers by Michael Sollberger
is not mandatory. Matthen claims that there is conceptual room for a more tolerant approach according to which at least one variety of synaesthesia, which he calls ‘direct synaesthesia’, is epistemically on a par with everyday non-synaesthetic perception. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the idea of ‘direct synaesthesia’ and to assess whether the accepted dogma that synaesthesia is always prone to error has to go.
is not mandatory. Matthen claims that there is conceptual room for a more tolerant approach according to which at least one variety of synaesthesia, which he calls ‘direct synaesthesia’, is epistemically on a par with everyday non-synaesthetic perception. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the idea of ‘direct synaesthesia’ and to assess whether the accepted dogma that synaesthesia is always prone to error has to go.