p: precio spot q: cantidad de energía demanda r: tarifa fija c: costo marginal del generación a: ... more p: precio spot q: cantidad de energía demanda r: tarifa fija c: costo marginal del generación a: parámetro de aversion al riesgo del agente Y: beneficio neto del agente U: función de utilidad sobre el beneficio neto Q: espacio de probabilidad neutro al riesgo x(p): portafolio de cobertura F: precio futuro de la energía Comercializadores Generadores Carr, Madan (2001) p: precio spot K: precio de ejercicio de las opciones put K': precio de ejercicio de las opciones call x(p): portafolio de cobertura F: precio futuro de la energía (*) + : función max (*,0) Estrategia de replica Bonos Futuros/Forwards Opciones put, j=1,.., m Opciones call, j=1,…,n Oum, Oren, Deng (2006)
Latin American countries devote insufficient efforts to prevent the impact of earthquakes, floods... more Latin American countries devote insufficient efforts to prevent the impact of earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and other natural hazards on infrastructure. The political cycle introduces the incentive for some politicians and civil works firms to profit from incoming aid and the reconstruction process. Incentives are at the heart of disaster management policy in infrastructure: every time they are misaligned, countries may end up building inadequate infrastructure that have to be totally developed or massively refurbished every few years ("reconstruction of the vulnerability"). Insurance and other risk transfer measures are necessary to handle the exposure of project debt or equity holders, but may fail to internalize the loss of value added to the society: the economy as a whole suffers because infrastructure takes time to rebuild. More fundamentally, scarce resources are endemically invested to just pull through the physical stock, when they could otherwise be invested in other sectors. This paper analyzes the institutional and political economy landscape of disaster management in Ecuador, focused on its road network. It also provides policy recommendations, following the IDB Action Plan in Natural Disasters mandate to identify measures increasing the capacities of national disaster management systems. The recommendations pertain to changes in governance of the national disaster management system in issues related to transportation, as well as strengthening the Ministry of Public Works' role and skills as sector leader in all the country. The proposals, if implemented, should diminish "risk-rent" extraction and provide the context in which risk transfer makes sense. Pietro Masci Division Chief Infrastructure and Financial Markets Division Contents Introduction 1 Evolution of the Ecuadorian disaster management system 3 The impact of disasters in Ecuador The consolidation of a discretionary approach Disaster declaration, national budgeting and incentives to deliver low quality reconstruction Implications and Problems in the Transport Sector Institutional constraints Structural weakness of the public transport sector National disaster programs and sector funding Recommendations Governance Strengthening of prevention and mitigation The role of multilateral agencies Some implementation issues References
... Fondo. ♦ De esta manera se evita el comportamiento oportunista de la firma participante al qu... more ... Fondo. ♦ De esta manera se evita el comportamiento oportunista de la firma participante al querer ganar ... London,. Engel, E., Fisher, R. y Galetovic, A. (1997), InfrastructureFranchising and Government Liabilities, Cartagena. Engel ...
Este artículo aborda diversos asuntos centrales al diseño de arquitecturas de mercados eléctricos... more Este artículo aborda diversos asuntos centrales al diseño de arquitecturas de mercados eléctricos. Primero, se enuncian las características económicas de la electricidad cuyos mercados son inherentemente incompletos e imperfectamente competitivos. Se discuten además el ...
En la presente investigación se analiza la intervención de un operador externo en la prestación d... more En la presente investigación se analiza la intervención de un operador externo en la prestación del servicio de agua potable en municipios menores (numero de suscriptores menos a 8000 ), teniendo en cuenta las variables financieras, técnicas, sociales y políticas. Además se ...
... móviles). Hasta este nivel, la cadena de valor permanece dentro de la red o de la industria d... more ... móviles). Hasta este nivel, la cadena de valor permanece dentro de la red o de la industria de dispositivos. El ... La competencia entre redes, la innovación en segmentos de la cadena de valor móvil y su apropiación por firmas separadas ...
El objetivo de este proyecto es diseñar un mecanismo regulatorio e institucional para el mercado ... more El objetivo de este proyecto es diseñar un mecanismo regulatorio e institucional para el mercado de Internet en presencia de recursos con capacidad limitada; un mecanismo que permita por medio de una asignación eficiente de recursos y una orientación del proceso de ...
Este informe se publica con el único objeto de contribuir al debate sobre un tema de importancia ... more Este informe se publica con el único objeto de contribuir al debate sobre un tema de importancia para los países de la región. Su publicación por este medio tiene como propósito generar comentarios y sugerencias de las personas interesadas en el tema. El informe no ha sido sometido a un proceso independiente de revisión ni ha sido estudiado por el Grupo gerencial del Departamento de Desarrollo Sostenible. Por lo tanto no representa la posición oficial del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.
4 The conclusions put forward in this report are those of the authors, and do not necessarily ref... more 4 The conclusions put forward in this report are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDB, the OECD, or Members of these organizations. ... 1. MOBILE TELEPHONY IN LATIN AMERICA: OVERVIEW ....................... 6 ... COLOMBIA................................................ ...
Redistribution and status quo resilience Reforms needing phases tend to be time Reforms needing p... more Redistribution and status quo resilience Reforms needing phases tend to be time Reforms needing phases tend to be time-inconsistent inconsistent Key stakeholders find it difficult to exchange certain costs Key stakeholders find it difficult to exchange certain costs for expected flows of uncertain gains. Add loss for expected flows of uncertain gains. Add loss-aversion! aversion! The problem does not disappear if reform gains were The problem does not disappear if reform gains were securitized and paid lump securitized and paid lump-sum to compensate "losers" sum to compensate "losers" (Dixit (Dixit-Londregan) Londregan) Problem exacerbated in the presence of cross Problem exacerbated in the presence of cross-subsidies, a subsidies, a recipe for political capture and manipulation (Guatemala, recipe for political capture and manipulation (Guatemala, Foster and Foster and Araújo Araújo). Entrenchment of vested interests). Entrenchment of vested interests
On August 14, 2003, in a matter of minutes, the lights went out, affecting around fifty million p... more On August 14, 2003, in a matter of minutes, the lights went out, affecting around fifty million people in the northeastern United States (allegedly most powerful nation on the planet), Ontario, and Quebec. This constituted the biggest blackout in North American history. Only a couple of weeks later, commuters in London (UK) were affected by a power outage in the underground. In September in Copenhagen and southern Sweden almost four million users were left in the dark. After alternative explanations were ruled out and the expected political game of passing the blaming around receded, many began attributing these all too common problems of brownouts and blackouts on systemic, underlying conditions. The processes of liberalization and privatization of the power sectors ended up under negative public scrutiny. This is the kind of time in which von-der-Fehr and Millan's book saw the light.
p: precio spot q: cantidad de energía demanda r: tarifa fija c: costo marginal del generación a: ... more p: precio spot q: cantidad de energía demanda r: tarifa fija c: costo marginal del generación a: parámetro de aversion al riesgo del agente Y: beneficio neto del agente U: función de utilidad sobre el beneficio neto Q: espacio de probabilidad neutro al riesgo x(p): portafolio de cobertura F: precio futuro de la energía Comercializadores Generadores Carr, Madan (2001) p: precio spot K: precio de ejercicio de las opciones put K': precio de ejercicio de las opciones call x(p): portafolio de cobertura F: precio futuro de la energía (*) + : función max (*,0) Estrategia de replica Bonos Futuros/Forwards Opciones put, j=1,.., m Opciones call, j=1,…,n Oum, Oren, Deng (2006)
Latin American countries devote insufficient efforts to prevent the impact of earthquakes, floods... more Latin American countries devote insufficient efforts to prevent the impact of earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and other natural hazards on infrastructure. The political cycle introduces the incentive for some politicians and civil works firms to profit from incoming aid and the reconstruction process. Incentives are at the heart of disaster management policy in infrastructure: every time they are misaligned, countries may end up building inadequate infrastructure that have to be totally developed or massively refurbished every few years ("reconstruction of the vulnerability"). Insurance and other risk transfer measures are necessary to handle the exposure of project debt or equity holders, but may fail to internalize the loss of value added to the society: the economy as a whole suffers because infrastructure takes time to rebuild. More fundamentally, scarce resources are endemically invested to just pull through the physical stock, when they could otherwise be invested in other sectors. This paper analyzes the institutional and political economy landscape of disaster management in Ecuador, focused on its road network. It also provides policy recommendations, following the IDB Action Plan in Natural Disasters mandate to identify measures increasing the capacities of national disaster management systems. The recommendations pertain to changes in governance of the national disaster management system in issues related to transportation, as well as strengthening the Ministry of Public Works' role and skills as sector leader in all the country. The proposals, if implemented, should diminish "risk-rent" extraction and provide the context in which risk transfer makes sense. Pietro Masci Division Chief Infrastructure and Financial Markets Division Contents Introduction 1 Evolution of the Ecuadorian disaster management system 3 The impact of disasters in Ecuador The consolidation of a discretionary approach Disaster declaration, national budgeting and incentives to deliver low quality reconstruction Implications and Problems in the Transport Sector Institutional constraints Structural weakness of the public transport sector National disaster programs and sector funding Recommendations Governance Strengthening of prevention and mitigation The role of multilateral agencies Some implementation issues References
... Fondo. ♦ De esta manera se evita el comportamiento oportunista de la firma participante al qu... more ... Fondo. ♦ De esta manera se evita el comportamiento oportunista de la firma participante al querer ganar ... London,. Engel, E., Fisher, R. y Galetovic, A. (1997), InfrastructureFranchising and Government Liabilities, Cartagena. Engel ...
Este artículo aborda diversos asuntos centrales al diseño de arquitecturas de mercados eléctricos... more Este artículo aborda diversos asuntos centrales al diseño de arquitecturas de mercados eléctricos. Primero, se enuncian las características económicas de la electricidad cuyos mercados son inherentemente incompletos e imperfectamente competitivos. Se discuten además el ...
En la presente investigación se analiza la intervención de un operador externo en la prestación d... more En la presente investigación se analiza la intervención de un operador externo en la prestación del servicio de agua potable en municipios menores (numero de suscriptores menos a 8000 ), teniendo en cuenta las variables financieras, técnicas, sociales y políticas. Además se ...
... móviles). Hasta este nivel, la cadena de valor permanece dentro de la red o de la industria d... more ... móviles). Hasta este nivel, la cadena de valor permanece dentro de la red o de la industria de dispositivos. El ... La competencia entre redes, la innovación en segmentos de la cadena de valor móvil y su apropiación por firmas separadas ...
El objetivo de este proyecto es diseñar un mecanismo regulatorio e institucional para el mercado ... more El objetivo de este proyecto es diseñar un mecanismo regulatorio e institucional para el mercado de Internet en presencia de recursos con capacidad limitada; un mecanismo que permita por medio de una asignación eficiente de recursos y una orientación del proceso de ...
Este informe se publica con el único objeto de contribuir al debate sobre un tema de importancia ... more Este informe se publica con el único objeto de contribuir al debate sobre un tema de importancia para los países de la región. Su publicación por este medio tiene como propósito generar comentarios y sugerencias de las personas interesadas en el tema. El informe no ha sido sometido a un proceso independiente de revisión ni ha sido estudiado por el Grupo gerencial del Departamento de Desarrollo Sostenible. Por lo tanto no representa la posición oficial del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.
4 The conclusions put forward in this report are those of the authors, and do not necessarily ref... more 4 The conclusions put forward in this report are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDB, the OECD, or Members of these organizations. ... 1. MOBILE TELEPHONY IN LATIN AMERICA: OVERVIEW ....................... 6 ... COLOMBIA................................................ ...
Redistribution and status quo resilience Reforms needing phases tend to be time Reforms needing p... more Redistribution and status quo resilience Reforms needing phases tend to be time Reforms needing phases tend to be time-inconsistent inconsistent Key stakeholders find it difficult to exchange certain costs Key stakeholders find it difficult to exchange certain costs for expected flows of uncertain gains. Add loss for expected flows of uncertain gains. Add loss-aversion! aversion! The problem does not disappear if reform gains were The problem does not disappear if reform gains were securitized and paid lump securitized and paid lump-sum to compensate "losers" sum to compensate "losers" (Dixit (Dixit-Londregan) Londregan) Problem exacerbated in the presence of cross Problem exacerbated in the presence of cross-subsidies, a subsidies, a recipe for political capture and manipulation (Guatemala, recipe for political capture and manipulation (Guatemala, Foster and Foster and Araújo Araújo). Entrenchment of vested interests). Entrenchment of vested interests
On August 14, 2003, in a matter of minutes, the lights went out, affecting around fifty million p... more On August 14, 2003, in a matter of minutes, the lights went out, affecting around fifty million people in the northeastern United States (allegedly most powerful nation on the planet), Ontario, and Quebec. This constituted the biggest blackout in North American history. Only a couple of weeks later, commuters in London (UK) were affected by a power outage in the underground. In September in Copenhagen and southern Sweden almost four million users were left in the dark. After alternative explanations were ruled out and the expected political game of passing the blaming around receded, many began attributing these all too common problems of brownouts and blackouts on systemic, underlying conditions. The processes of liberalization and privatization of the power sectors ended up under negative public scrutiny. This is the kind of time in which von-der-Fehr and Millan's book saw the light.
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