Papers by Sonja Schierbaum
Routledge eBooks, Nov 30, 2023
Routledge eBooks, Nov 30, 2023
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jun 20, 2024
Brill | mentis eBooks, Apr 17, 2009
In Ockham’s Assumption of Mental Speech: Thinking in a World of Particulars , Sonja Schierbaum of... more In Ockham’s Assumption of Mental Speech: Thinking in a World of Particulars , Sonja Schierbaum offers a detailed philosophical reconstruction of William Ockham’s (1287-1349) conception of mental speech.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Nov 10, 2022
History of Philosophy Quarterly
The aim of this paper is to show that, unlike proponents of Humean accounts of intentional action... more The aim of this paper is to show that, unlike proponents of Humean accounts of intentional action, Ockham can also answer the fundamental question of why we desire anything at all. For Ockham, desire cannot be the starting point of the explanation, since desire presupposes yet another kind of appetitive act that is objectual, or non-propositional, in its nature. Ockham calls this love (amor). It should become clear that Ockham's approach, even in his day, is not common. It is, however, worthy of detailed examination because it furthers a deeper and more complete understanding of intentional action by shedding light on this more fundamental question. In his terminology, love is the most basic kind of unconditional willing, not least because it is purely objectual: we appreciate persons as ends, not as means. The explanation of intentional action has to start somewhere. And, for Ockham, it starts with love for persons.
BRILL eBooks, Mar 3, 2023
History of Philosophy Quarterly, 2020
I present a historical solution to the so-called Arbitrariness Objection (AO). The AO has been le... more I present a historical solution to the so-called Arbitrariness Objection (AO). The AO has been leveled against contemporary libertarian conceptions of free will and says that freedom of the will, conceived as freedom of indifference, implies that choices can be made for no reason. If successful, the AO would undermine the rationality of libertarian views, which is why a rebuttal of it is of systematic interest. I discuss the attempt of Christian August Crusius (1715–75) in order to explain that Crusius rejects the AO by showing that there is no choice without a reason.
The Language of Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy
Freedom of will for Ockham consists in the possibility of opposite choices, as Panaccio puts it (... more Freedom of will for Ockham consists in the possibility of opposite choices, as Panaccio puts it (Panaccio 2012, 75–93 and 91). Voluntarists such as Ockham commonly argue for the need of positing the possibility of opposite choices as a prerequisite for moral responsibility. An agent can be held morally responsible for his action only if he could have done other than he actually did. This conception, however, gives rise to the worry that it implies the very possibility of acting irrationally, insofar as it implies the possibility of acting for no reason at all. My aim in this paper is to show that Ockham has the means to meet the objection of irrationality, at least if this is the objection that there can be free, yet ‘random’ choices of actions that are carried out for no reason, or for no end and thus, resist any attempt of explanation. As a result, it should become clear that this reading implies that Ockham basically splits up rational and moral action by allowing human agents to set up anything which exists as an end. The challenge for Ockham, then, is to show how rational and moral action can be reconciled on this basis.
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Papers by Sonja Schierbaum
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