Gregor Hochstetter

Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Philosophisches Seminar, Post-Doc

Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, PhD-Student, Department Member

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My name is Gregor Hochstetter, I recently completed my PhD in Philosophy at the Philosophy of Neuroscience Group, at the Centre for Integrative Neuroscience (CIN) and the University of Tuebingen. I work mainly at the intersection of philosophy of mind & action, psychology, and neuroscience. In my doctoral dissertation I developed a new framework for agency and self-control, which centres on the idea that inhibitory control is essential to understanding these two phenomena. Before I started my doctoral research, I studied philosophy and ethics in Tübingen and London and fine arts and animation at the Academy of Fine Arts in Stuttgart.
Supervisors: Hong Yu Wong, Wayne Wu, Rüdiger Bittner, and Steven Butterfill

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Papers by Gregor Hochstetter

Inhibition. Eine Studie über Handlungs- und Selbstkontrolle

Inhibition. Eine Studie über Handlungs- und Selbstkontrolle, 2021

Worin besteht der Unterschied zwischen dem, was ein Akteur tut, und dem, was ihm lediglich widerf... more Worin besteht der Unterschied zwischen dem, was ein Akteur tut, und dem, was ihm lediglich widerfährt? Den Kontrast zwischen Handlungen und bloßen Ereignissen zu erklären, ist das, was Harry Frankfurt das „Problem des Handelns“ genannt hat. Bisher gingen Philosophinnen und Philosophen stets davon aus, dass der Unterschied zwischen aktivem und passivem Verhalten allein durch Verweis auf die besonderen Produktionsbedingungen von Handlungen erklärt werden könne. Aber dies ist nicht der Fall. Die Kernthese dieses Buches ist, dass Handlungen nur verstanden und erklärt werden können, wenn man sowohl die produktiven als auch die inhibitorischen Aspekte von Handlungskontrolle berücksichtigt. Trotz der Bedeutung inhibitorischer Kontrolle im Alltag gibt es derzeit weder eine philosophische Auseinandersetzung damit noch einen philosophischen Ansatz, der inhibitorische Kontrolle erklären würde. Das Ziel des Buches ist es, diese Lücke in der philosophischen Forschungsliteratur zu schließen.

Affective Control of Action

This commentary challenges Railton’s claim that the affective system is the key source of control... more This commentary challenges Railton’s claim that the affective system is the key source of control of action. Whilst the affective system is important for understanding how acting for a reason is possible, we argue that there are many levels of control of action and adaptive behaviour and that the affective system is only one source of control. Such a model seems to be more in line with the emerging picture from affective and movement neuroscience.

Attention in Bodily Awareness

Synthese. Special Issue on Neuroscience and Its Philosophy, 2016

The aim of this paper is to develop and defend an Attentional View of bodily awareness, on which ... more The aim of this paper is to develop and defend an Attentional View of bodily awareness, on which attention is necessary for bodily awareness. The original formulation of the Attentional View is due to Marcel Kinsbourne (1995 and 2002). First, I will show that the Attentional View of bodily awareness as formulated by Kinsbourne is superior to other accounts in the literature for characterizing the relationship between attention and bodily awareness. Kinsbourne’s account is the only account in the literature so far which can accommodate key neurological diseases such as personal neglect. Second, when I consider Kinsbourne’s view in more detail, I will argue that Kinsbourne’s Attentional View faces problems because it is too reductive. Kinsbourne deviates from the standard taxonomy on which there is a body schema and a body image. Instead he reduces the body image to the neural representation of the body in the somatosensory cortex, the body schema and attentional shifts. I will present two challenges to Kinsbourne’s view which demonstrate that Kinsbourne’s reduction of the body image is unsuccessful. Finally, I will present a revised version of the Attentional View that is both empirically adequate and philosophically satisfactory.