Constitutions and the Classics: Patterns of Constitutional Thought from Fortescue to Bentham, ed. by Denis Galligan, Oxford University Press, 2014
In this chapter I look at the constitutional features of Rousseau’s "association of the general w... more In this chapter I look at the constitutional features of Rousseau’s "association of the general will" and address the question whether and how is the tension between popular sovereignty and limited government resolved there. First I provide an account of Rousseau’s arguments for popular sovereignty and outline the main features of his "Association of the General will". Then, I look at the issue of constitutional beginning: (1) how is the sovereign constituted: how a mere aggregate of individuals becomes an association of the general will with the above properties; and (2) how is its general will shaped. The godly Legislator as Rousseau’s controversial solution to the problem of constitutional beginning is the focus of the second part. The last part is organized around the more strictly “constitutional” features of Rousseau’s project. What role does Rousseau envisage for constitutional safeguards of individual freedom within the association of the general will?
I discuss in detail here his doctrine of limited government as involving supremacy and separation of the sovereign from its government. Rousseau’s account of the rule of law, as well as the related controversy over the purported limits on the general will are next addressed. Rousseau’s understanding of individual rights protection and his likely response to the charge of tyrannical majorities within the association of the General will are the foci of the concluding section of this text.
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This book features a collection of writings that emerged from a programme of workshops that took place at Oxford University between 2008 and 2012. The aim of the programme was to examine from a constitutional perspective the writings of a selection of authors who may justly be considered to have provided the classics of legal and political theory in the British, French, and American contexts. The emphasis is on the British, beginning with John Fortescue in the fifteenth century and ending with Jeremy Bentham in the nineteenth. In light of the constitutional ferment in the United States and France in the later eighteenth century, the interconnections with the British system, and the enduring influence of the ideas that emerged, a selection of French and American writers from that time have been included. Some of the authors were deliberately constitutional theorists, while for others whose aims were different it is a matter of drawing out the constitutional aspects.
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Papers by Ruzha Smilova
The chapter first surveys the multiple theoretical sources of illiberalism – from the ideological extremes of radical left and conservative right critiques of liberalism. It then outlines how illiberal regimes turn these theoretical critiques into practices of gradual erosion of liberal democratic institutions and values. After a critical take on the debates around the “illiberal democracy” concept, in the main body of the chapter the ideational core of “democratic illiberalism” is spelt out.
The chapter first surveys the multiple theoretical sources of illiberalism – from the ideological extremes of radical left and conservative right critiques of liberalism. It then outlines how illiberal regimes turn these theoretical critiques into practices of gradual erosion of liberal democratic institutions and values. After a critical take on the debates around the “illiberal democracy” concept, in the main body of the chapter the ideational core of “democratic illiberalism” is spelt out.
it was pretty much at the centre of politics during the transition period, without ever becoming a dominant or an exclusive focus. Throughout the 1990s media regulation was a part of the struggle for domination of political actors: the ex-communists and the pro-reform democrats. At the start of the new millennium the political parties in Bulgaria went through a
process of crisis, which led to a marked relaxation of the political pressure on the media. Open partisanship disappeared and was replaced by more subtle ways of political influence;
the private media market was already quite developed, which took to the fore other concerns: the conflict between corporate interest and the quality of journalism. As a result of these
processes, at present the Bulgarian media regulation is at a loss in terms of guiding principles. All agree on the importance of issues as freedom of speech and media independence, but
there are strikingly different visions of what these abstract concepts mean. On the one hand, there is the pressure group of the commercial media, which press essentially either for less
regulation, or for regulation which maximises their profits, especially in the advertising market. One top priority of this group is the reduction of the public support for the public
media, be it in the form of a reduction of the subsidy that funds the public media, or in the elimination for the public broadcasters to attract commercial ads. On the other hand, still
there is a public interest oriented group of journalists, professors and NGO actors, who defend the role of the state in the media market both through regulation, and through direct
forms of support for the public media. Politicians and political parties still maintain close links with the media, yet the direction of the influence is changing: there is a growing trend of mediatisation of Bulgarian politics, with PR and media presentation having to a large extent replaced the need for extensive party membership or local structures for the parties.
Thus, after twenty years of transition from communism, the Bulgarian media environment is currently in a state of normative confusion. There are different competing visions and
interpretations of common ground concepts such as media independence and freedom of speech. Therefore, civil society is gradually losing orientation in the complex battles between
different special groups and purely commercial interests in this field. Unfortunately, European regulation does not provide the normative grounding necessary for this area – it is also torn apart among various priorities and normative goals. In the absence of clear normative standards, it is no surprise that the media is increasingly seen as an extension of either partisan or corporate strategies.
Статията разглежда изискванията на равното гражданство в съвременните плуралистични общества и дискутира въпроса дали равното гражданство изисква само толерантост или и някаква форма на признаване на различните – членове на културни малцинства. Основната теза на автора е, че равното гражданство изисква равно уважение към всички членове на политическата общност, което в съвременните плуралистични общества означава и признаване на правото на собствена култура на членовете на малцинствени културни групи. Критично разгледана и отхвърлена е и популярната теза, че политиките на признаване и мултикултурализма по-общо са вътрешнопротиворечиви форми на ценностен релативизъм.
The dilemma at the heart of contemporary debates on the authority of democracy is the following: to be the preferred form of government, democracy should be able to guarantee good government, yet the impartial procedures, which are for many the essence of democracy, do not by themselves guarantee such result, though may “accidentally” produce it. In the text I briefly summarize the main theses and the weaknesses of the two major camps within this debate – those of the proceduralists and the instrumentalists. Against their background I provide a brief reconstruction of the original contribution to this debate – the “epistemic proceduralism” of David Estlund. I outline a series of possible critiques against this “hybrid” conception that may come from the two opposite extremes in the debate. I also identify a major, in my view, challenge for such a theory: to provide a non-arbitrary, principled way of limiting the circle of citizens, whose consent is necessary for legitimacy of government, without entirely dispensing with consent as a condition for legitimacy yet also without turning all into hostages of the capricious few, refusing (with no reason) to grant their consent. The problems with Estlund's criterion - Qualified acceptability Requirement (QAR), and with determining the group of “the qualified” in particular, which are part of Estlund’s response to this challenge, indicate the limits of his “epistemic proceduralism”. It fails as a fully adequate analysis of the authority and legitimacy of democratic government, since it seems to violate a fundamental normative assumption of democratic government – citizen equality.
The interview is published here in English.
В този текст анализирам двете страни на тази дилема, представени в "процедуралисткия егалитаризъм" на Джеръми Уолдрън и "инструменталистката защита на демокрацията" на Ричард Арнесън. Статията завършва с кратко представяна на основните тези на "епистемичния процедурализъм" на Дейвид Естлънд, оригинален опит за разрешаване на "дилемата на демокрацията."
Статията разглежда изискванията на равното гражданство в съвременните плуралистични общества и дискутира въпроса дали равното гражданство изисква само толерантост или и някаква форма на признаване на различните – членове на културни малцинства. Основната теза на автора е, че равното гражданство изисква равно уважение към всички членове на политическата общност, което в съвременните плуралистични общества означава и признаване на правото на собствена култура на членовете на малцинствени културни групи. Критично разгледана и отхвърлена е и популярната теза, че политиките на признаване и мултикултурализма по-общо са вътрешнопротиворечиви форми на ценностен релативизъм.
The question I am addressing in my paper is whether Waldron’s novel way of thinking about dignity as the ground of rights and his concept of responsibility-rights provides a prospect for responding to the “tragedy of liberty” a major challenge to the contemporary constitutional legal systems. One of the causes of the tragedy of liberty is that due to its inherent lack of responsibilities, the consistent application of liberty may lead to self-destruction. The passion for liberty, accordingly, gives way to other concerns: dignity, equality, equal respect, leaving little space for liberty itself.
It is in view of these concerns for the place and value of liberty, that an analysis of Waldron’s account is provided. The “leveling up”, “universalized rank” understanding of human dignity as the ground and content of rights seems to invite ever expanding, inflated right-claims, leading to clashes with fundamental liberties and liberal rights. Ultimately, this expansionist picture of rights seems self-defeating. The concept of responsibility-rights, advanced by Waldron, looks like a welcome limit on this expansion.
The more concrete questions I address in this article are, firstly, whether Waldron’s ‘high equal status’ conception of dignity is open to the objection that it invites an expansionist, ultimately self-defeating picture of rights, and, secondly, whether the concept of responsibility-rights he advances is plausible and can furnish an apt response to this objection of expansionism and self-defeat of rights.
I discuss in detail here his doctrine of limited government as involving supremacy and separation of the sovereign from its government. Rousseau’s account of the rule of law, as well as the related controversy over the purported limits on the general will are next addressed. Rousseau’s understanding of individual rights protection and his likely response to the charge of tyrannical majorities within the association of the General will are the foci of the concluding section of this text.
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This book features a collection of writings that emerged from a programme of workshops that took place at Oxford University between 2008 and 2012. The aim of the programme was to examine from a constitutional perspective the writings of a selection of authors who may justly be considered to have provided the classics of legal and political theory in the British, French, and American contexts. The emphasis is on the British, beginning with John Fortescue in the fifteenth century and ending with Jeremy Bentham in the nineteenth. In light of the constitutional ferment in the United States and France in the later eighteenth century, the interconnections with the British system, and the enduring influence of the ideas that emerged, a selection of French and American writers from that time have been included. Some of the authors were deliberately constitutional theorists, while for others whose aims were different it is a matter of drawing out the constitutional aspects.
В настоящия текст ще разгледам само един от опитите да се отговори на предизвикателството на философските анархисти. Това е опитът да се изведе общо морално задължение за подчинение на закона от т.нар. задължение за честната игра, първоначално предложено от Хърбърт Харт и Джон Ролс и доразвито от редица съвременни политически философи, най-вече Джордж Клоско.
За да оценя успеха на такъв тип теория, първо ще анализирам аргументите на Робърт Нозик и Джон Симънс, които от волунтаристки позиции атакуват извеждането на общо задължение за подчинение от принципа за честна игра. Ще разгледам и дам оценка на опитите на Ричард Арнесън и Джордж Клоско да предложат базирано на честната игра задължение за подчинение, устойчиво на подобни волунтаристки атаки. Ще покажа, че теорията на Клоско за "презумптивните" публични блага като основа на задължението за подчинение на закона, макар и донякъде успешно да отговаря на тези предизвикателства, пренебрегва един не маловажен проблем. Това е проблемът, идентифициран от Ролс като "проблем с гаранциите" (assurance problem)", че достатъчно други хора също ще се подчиняват на закона, за да е жизнена схемата на съвместно сътрудничество и потенциалните участници действително да имат задължения да се включат в нея. Задълженията за честна игра са от класа "условни" задължения: те са валидни задължения, само ако условието "достатъчен брой други хора да ги спазват" е удовлетворено. Типичен пример за такива "условни" задължения са някои правни задължения, като задължението да се спазват ограниченията на скоростта на движение, задължението да не се замърсява околната среда и т.н. Имаме морално задължение да ги спазваме, само ако има достатъчно общо ниво на спазване от страна на другите на тези задължения. Ще твърдя, че това "условие за достатъчното спазване на правилата от другите" (или compliance condition, както го нарича Едмъндсън") поставя сериозно предизвикателство пред теориите за задължението за подчинение като задължение на честната игра, което все още не е адекватно адресирано от съвременните участници в този дебат.
Хипотезата е тествана с анализ на широкоразпространената в България практика на неплащане на сметки за топлоенергия (казусът Топлофикация).
organizations, politicized media, etc. compete with the political parties for the mandate to “represent the people”. At present, there is no coherent, fully-fledged alternative political model of governance different from representative liberal democracy. But still, experiments are taking place, and political actors who claim to be an alternative – like Syriza and
Podemos – do exceptionally well in elections.
How to make sense of these developments? Do they signal a greater potential for civic activism and public participation in politics? Or are these phenomena a negative reaction, a simple show of desperation and frustration with the inefficiency of the current state of democratic government?
The Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia has addressed these questions in some depth by carrying out comparative research on three forms of civic activism – setting up novel forms of political representation; involvement in NGOs; and self-organization and self-structuring through social networks, the blogosphere, etc. – in countries affected by massive protests.
The results of the research are collected in this publication. It comprises
six case studies (including a case study Bulgaria), their comparative analysis and a set of policy recommendations regarding the three spheres of interest.