Papers by Nikolay Marinov
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
... Where we depart from existing studies is that we study voters' attitudes directly, and w... more ... Where we depart from existing studies is that we study voters' attitudes directly, and we focus on the problem of foreigners' taking a side in the election. 3See, for example, Falcoff, Valenzuela and Purcell (1988), Thompson and Kuntz (2004), Ferguson (2008). 1 Page 4. ...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
How do approaching elections affect the security policy states conduct? We build on classic polit... more How do approaching elections affect the security policy states conduct? We build on classic political economy arguments and theorize that one problem likely faced by democratic policy-makers near elections is that of time-inconsistency. The time inconsistency problem arises when the costs and benefits of policy are not realized at the same time. We develop an application of the argument to the case of allied troop contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom (“OEF”) and the International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”) mission in Afghanistan. In that case, we argue the expectation should be one of fewer troops committed close to elections. The exogenous timing of elections allows us to identify the effects of approaching elections on troop levels. Our finding of significantly lower troop contributions near elections is the first arguably identified effect of electoral proximity on security policy
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Centre for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford, Nov 12, 2003
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2002
International Studies Association annual convention, March, Mar 22, 2006
Abstract The current pessimism on whether economic sanctions 'work'for changing the behavior of o... more Abstract The current pessimism on whether economic sanctions 'work'for changing the behavior of other countries rests on evidence derived entirely from counter-factual thought experiments on a relatively small number of cases. Because judgement calls play a controversial role in such studies, and because we do not know whether the cases selected reflect trends in the relevant universe, the conventional wisdom that sanctions fail is suspect.
Abstract: Before democracy becomes the only game in town, when are leaders motivated to hold demo... more Abstract: Before democracy becomes the only game in town, when are leaders motivated to hold democratic elections? We argue that in the absence of institutionalized democracy, information about election quality plays an important role. When a government's true actions are not communicated credibly to the electorate, leaders have no incentive to hold democratic elections. In many countries in the developing world, such credible sources of information are scarce.
Abstract What does policy fluctuation around elections tell us about how parties set security pol... more Abstract What does policy fluctuation around elections tell us about how parties set security policy in democracies? On the one hand, parties may be ideologues, clinging to the same policy—in which case only changes in government composition after elections should be associated with policy change. On the other hand, parties may be opportunists, decreasing or increasing troops as elections near, or as elections recede.
⇤ We thank the Center for Middle East Studies at Yale University and the Institution for Social a... more ⇤ We thank the Center for Middle East Studies at Yale University and the Institution for Social and Policy Studies at Yale University for generous funding for this project. We thank Erdem Aytaç for going well above the call of duty with the quality of the research assistance rendered. Our gratitude goes to Ali Ç arkoglu at Koç University for making this survey possible, along with his team of European Union collaborators. , and website.
Does foreign aid promote good governance in recipient countries? We help arbitrate the debate ove... more Does foreign aid promote good governance in recipient countries? We help arbitrate the debate over this question by leveraging a novel source of exogeneity: the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. We find that when a country's former colonizer is the president of the Council of the European Union during the budget-making process, the country is allocated considerably more foreign aid than are countries whose former colonizer does not hold the presidency. Using instrumental variables estimation, we demonstrate that this aid has positive effects on multiple measures of human rights and governance, although the effects are short-lived after the shock to aid dissipates. We then disaggregate aid flows, present evidence for the causal mechanism at work, and offer directions for future advances.
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Papers by Nikolay Marinov