Journal Articles by Tal Meir Giladi
Hegel Bulletin , 2025
Hegel contends that judgements are contradictory, finite and untrue. Prominent schol- ars argue t... more Hegel contends that judgements are contradictory, finite and untrue. Prominent schol- ars argue that Hegel’s issue with judgements is resolved in the later stages of his Logic. Specifically, Ng suggests that this solution is found in Hegel’s discussion of life. In this article, I argue that not only does life fail to resolve Hegel’s problem with judgement— death highlights its insolubility. To support this claim, I examine Hegel’s discussion of judgements in the Logic, showing that judgements are inherently contradictory because they both unite and separate individuals and universals. Instead of being resolved ret- rospectively, I demonstrate that contradiction, finitude and untruth are intrinsic to judgements. Moreover, since judgements play a constitutive and determinative role in Hegel’s metaphysics, they pass their contradictions, finitude and untruth onto the objects they constitute. Specifically, I argue that for living beings, judgement is literally a matter of life and death, because the contradiction of judgements implies the finitude of the objects they constitute—namely, the perishability of things and the mortality of organisms.
Hegel-Jahrbuch, 2020
In his classic article, “Hegel's Phenomenological Method” (1970), Kenley R. Dove suggests that in... more In his classic article, “Hegel's Phenomenological Method” (1970), Kenley R. Dove suggests that in chapters 1-3 of the Phenomenology of Spirit, “we” (understood roughly as the readers) actively participate in the dialectic of consciousness. In this paper I show – drawing on Joseph Gauvin's work on the “for us” written the same year as Dove's – that the latter's account regarding the “we” is inexact. I argue that this misunderstanding stems from a quid pro quo between merely stylistic occurrences of the word “we” and interventions of texts “for us”, i.e. texts that express the particular viewpoint on experience attributed in the Phenomenology to its readers.
Beyond the historical interest of reassessing Dove's commentary, this paper is intended to help readers avoid similar confusions themselves. This, by providing a rule of thumb enabling a more accurate identification of texts expressing “our” point of view. This is important since in the Phenomenology texts that are “for us” contain – in contrast to mere appearance “for consciousness” – the philosophical position Hegel considers to be true.
Naharaim, 2024
Engels explained his admiration for Balzac by pointing to an apparent discrepancy between Balzac’... more Engels explained his admiration for Balzac by pointing to an apparent discrepancy between Balzac’s literature and his politics. Despite his sympathies for the French nobility, Balzac’s realism “compelled” him to portray this class in unflattering terms. In this article, I challenge Engels’s reading, arguing that Marx’s scattered remarks on Balzac take us in a different direction. Specifically, I argue that in his remark on Balzac’s The Peasants Marx pinpointed the author’s preoccupation with the spread of bourgeois ideology into the nobility. Building on this remark, I analyze several of Balzac’s works showing that insofar as Balzac lambasted the nobles, his critique was primarily directed towards nobles who had adopted bour- geois ways. In this light, and against Engels’s observation, Balzac’s critique of the nobles appears to stem from his sympathy to aristocratic values rather than con- flicting with them. In showing that affinities between Balzac, Marx and Engels did not depend on Balzac expressing anti-noble sentiment, I argue that the admiration the fathers of communism had for the monarchist’s prose exemplifies a partial, yet typical convergence between socialists and conservatives in their critique of modern bourgeois society.
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2024
In Marx's posthumously published manuscripts from 1857-1863, we find a systematic exposition of h... more In Marx's posthumously published manuscripts from 1857-1863, we find a systematic exposition of his concept of subsumption. Though much has been written about it, significant interpretative gaps persist. In this article, I begin filling these gaps by examining the emergence of Marx's concept of subsumption. I will argue that in the Grundrisse Marx brings together distinct but complementary elements from Hegel's theories of judgment and teleology to coin two new and well delineated concepts of subsumption that prefigure his later concepts of formal and real subsumption. These two concepts may be defined as: (a) the process of acquiring the social relational property of being a means to an end; (b) the process by which changes in non-relational properties occur in something due to this acquisition-and occur to better suit said end.
Philosophia, 2023
The years following Israel's founding were formative ones for the development of philosophy as an... more The years following Israel's founding were formative ones for the development of philosophy as an academic discipline in this country. During this period, the distinction between philosophy seen as contiguous with the humanities and social sciences, and philosophy seen as adjacent to the natural and exact sciences began to make its presence felt in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This distinction, which was manifest in the curriculum, was by no means unique to the Hebrew University, but reflected the broader bifurcation between two schools of Western philosophy in the twentieth century. In English-speaking countries, it is generally referred to as the divide between analytic and continental philosophy. What was special about the situation at the Hebrew University, however, was that the split manifested itself in a rather small department, being embodied, basically, in one prominent representative of each school-Nathan Rotenstreich and Yehoshua Bar-Hillel. This article will focus on some key aspects of the lives and thought of Rotenstreich and Bar-Hillel. It will address their philosophical maturation as S.H. Bergmann's students, their views on the goals of twentieth-century philosophy, on the philosopher's role in public life, and the circumstances under which they started teaching in Jerusalem right after the founding of the State of Israel.
Idealistic Studies, 2022
Scholars have recently argued that Hegel posited international
recognition as a necessary featur... more Scholars have recently argued that Hegel posited international
recognition as a necessary feature of international relations. My main
effort in this article is to disprove this point. Specifically, I show that since
Hegel rejected the notion of an international legal system, he must hold
that international recognition depends on the arbitrary will of individual
states. To pinpoint Hegel’s position, I offer a close reading of Hegel’s
intricate formulations from the final paragraphs of the Philosophy of
Right—formulations that are easy to quote out of context just as they
are transparent when considered in due context.
Hegel Bulletin, 2020
In his Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel affirms that truth is ‘usually’ understood as the agreement of ... more In his Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel affirms that truth is ‘usually’ understood as the agreement of thought with the object, but that in the ‘deeper, i.e. philosophical sense’, truth is the agreement of a content with itself or of an object with its concept. Hegel then provides illustrations of this second sort of truth: a ‘true friend’, a ‘true state’, a ‘true work of art’. Robert Stern has argued that Hegel's ‘deeper’ or ‘philosophical’ truth is close to what Heidegger labelled ‘material’ truth, namely a property attributed to a thing on the basis of the accordance of that thing with its essence. It has since been common to think of Hegel's concept of ‘philosophical’ truth as ‘ontological’, ‘objective’ or ‘material’ in contrast to ‘epistemological’ or ‘propositional’ definitions. In this paper, I wish to add an important nuance to the existing literature on this subject: even though things have a truth-value for Hegel, the latter is always negative. I argue that Hegel's criterion of ‘philosophical’ truth, which is best formulated as ‘agreement with self’, is first and foremost intended to examine the truth-value of thought-determinations. I then argue that even though this criterion may also be applied to examine the truth-value of things (namely, even though things have a truth-value), things never fall under this definition. After reviewing several of Hegel's explicit remarks on the matter, I provide an alternative explanation to those features of Hegel's ‘philosophical’ truth which have led scholars to view it as a truth in things. Especially, I argue that what are generally seen as Hegel's examples (‘true friend’, ‘true state’, ‘true work of art’) are not intended as examples but only as imperfect illustrations of ‘philosophical’ truth.
Book Chapters by Tal Meir Giladi
Full Hebrew version of my preface to Karl Marx's Einleitung und Vorwort zur Kritik der politische... more Full Hebrew version of my preface to Karl Marx's Einleitung und Vorwort zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie / גרסה מלאה של פתח הדבר לספר "מבוא והקדמה לביקורת הכלכלה המדינית" מאת קרל מרקס
Full Hebrew version of my preface to Louis Althusser's Pour Marx / גרסה מלאה של פתח הדבר לספר "בש... more Full Hebrew version of my preface to Louis Althusser's Pour Marx / גרסה מלאה של פתח הדבר לספר "בשביל מרקס" מאת לואי אלתוסר
Talks by Tal Meir Giladi
2019 Talk at the Continental Seminar, Tel Aviv
Translations by Tal Meir Giladi
(First pages) Karl Marx, Mavo ve Hakdama le'vikoret hakalkala hamedinit [Einleitung und Vorwort z... more (First pages) Karl Marx, Mavo ve Hakdama le'vikoret hakalkala hamedinit [Einleitung und Vorwort zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie], tr. Tal Meir Giladi, Jerusalem: Magnes, 2022.
(First pages) Louis Althusser, Bishvil Marx [Pour Marx], tr. Tal Meir Giladi, Tel Aviv: Resling, ... more (First pages) Louis Althusser, Bishvil Marx [Pour Marx], tr. Tal Meir Giladi, Tel Aviv: Resling, 2018.
Published in Dehak (דחק), volume 8, 2017, pp. 549-57.
Published in Dehak (דחק), volume 7, 2016, pp. 529-47. (text looks funny in preview, download it a... more Published in Dehak (דחק), volume 7, 2016, pp. 529-47. (text looks funny in preview, download it and it will look fine)
Published in Dehak (דחק), volume 6, 2016, pp. 583-90.
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Journal Articles by Tal Meir Giladi
Beyond the historical interest of reassessing Dove's commentary, this paper is intended to help readers avoid similar confusions themselves. This, by providing a rule of thumb enabling a more accurate identification of texts expressing “our” point of view. This is important since in the Phenomenology texts that are “for us” contain – in contrast to mere appearance “for consciousness” – the philosophical position Hegel considers to be true.
recognition as a necessary feature of international relations. My main
effort in this article is to disprove this point. Specifically, I show that since
Hegel rejected the notion of an international legal system, he must hold
that international recognition depends on the arbitrary will of individual
states. To pinpoint Hegel’s position, I offer a close reading of Hegel’s
intricate formulations from the final paragraphs of the Philosophy of
Right—formulations that are easy to quote out of context just as they
are transparent when considered in due context.
Book Chapters by Tal Meir Giladi
Talks by Tal Meir Giladi
Translations by Tal Meir Giladi
Beyond the historical interest of reassessing Dove's commentary, this paper is intended to help readers avoid similar confusions themselves. This, by providing a rule of thumb enabling a more accurate identification of texts expressing “our” point of view. This is important since in the Phenomenology texts that are “for us” contain – in contrast to mere appearance “for consciousness” – the philosophical position Hegel considers to be true.
recognition as a necessary feature of international relations. My main
effort in this article is to disprove this point. Specifically, I show that since
Hegel rejected the notion of an international legal system, he must hold
that international recognition depends on the arbitrary will of individual
states. To pinpoint Hegel’s position, I offer a close reading of Hegel’s
intricate formulations from the final paragraphs of the Philosophy of
Right—formulations that are easy to quote out of context just as they
are transparent when considered in due context.