European Governance

2 The number of parties in office is function of the cleavages present in society, one of which led to the splitting of parties along linguistic lines, and due to the institutional arrangements arrived at to cope with this situation, such as the linguistic parity in the Council of ministers.

Page 1. Le référendum sur le Traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe Patrick Dumont, Fernand Fehlen, Raphaël Kies et Philippe Poirier Le référendum sur le Traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe Rapport élaboré pour la Chambre des Députés STADE - Études sociologiques et politiques sur le Luxembourg Université du Luxembourg Luxembourg, février 2007 Page 2.

Abstract Ministerial portfolios are the most obvious payoffs for parties entering a governing coalition in parliamentary democracies. This renders the bargaining over portfolios an important phase of the government formation process. The question of 'who gets what, and why?'in terms of ministerial remits has not yet received much attention by coalition or party scholars.

This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of rel-evant parties in an assembly. The most widespread indicator of frag-mentation used in comparative politics is the 'Effective Number of Par-ties'(ENP), designed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Taking both the number of parties and their relative weights into account, the ENP is arguably a good parsimonious operationalization of the number of 'relevant'parties.

DI-fusion, le Dépôt institutionnel numérique de l'ULB, est l'outil de référencementde la production scientifique de l'ULB.L'interface de recherche DI-fusion permet de consulter les publications des chercheurs de l'ULB et les thèses qui y ont été défendues.

Green parties have been represented in the parliaments of European Union countries since 1981, but it was not until recently that a few have entered national governments. Using a data set comprised of 51 government formation opportunities (where the Greens were represented in parliament), the authors of this article show that the parties involved in these bargaining situations are more office-oriented than earlier studies had found. As Green parties are seen to be less office-seeking than other parties, this general tendency for office-seeking behaviour in government formation may partly account for the scarcity of Greens in government. Furthermore, a number of hypotheses derived from theories that account for the specific nature of Green parties in terms of their office-, policyand vote-seeking orientations are tested. It is found that Greens participate in government when they have lost votes in at least one election, when the main party of the left identifies them as a clear electoral threat and when the policy distance between the Greens and either the formateur party or the main left party is small (the latter condition must be accompanied by a substantial proportion of seats for the Green party in parliament). As most of these simultaneous conditions only materialized recently, and in a few countries, it is argued that this analysis, which is the first comparative and multivariate test focused on this question, explains the scarcity and the delay of Green governmental participation.

In this article, we address recent claims that executive— legislative relations in parliamentary democracies are undergoing important changes owing to either a `presidentialization' or a `Europeanization' of domestic political systems. Therefore, we test empirically whether parliamentary democracies are indeed experiencing changes in executive—legislative relations and whether these developments can, in part, be explained by an increase in European integration. Using data on ministerial selection in Swedish cabinets during the years 1952—2006, we find that there appears to be a slight tendency towards `presidentialization', which is indicated by a decrease in ministers with a parliamentary background being appointed, and that there exists some support for the notion that Sweden's political and economic integration into the European Union is part of the explanation for this change.