Christopher Erhard & Tobias Keiling (Hrsg.), Routledge Handbook on the Phenomenology of Agency, London, 2020
John Atwell observes that the eclectic and disparate nature of Sartre's thinking is nowhere more ... more John Atwell observes that the eclectic and disparate nature of Sartre's thinking is nowhere more extremely exposed than in Sartre's considerations on acting. As Atwell remarks: Very frequently, I find, Sartre begins a discussion with relatively familiar, i.e., "analytic," considerations only to turn abruptly to thoughts of a quite different sort, sometimes idealistic and sometimes phenomenological. Often, I think, he makes a rather sudden turn in order to carry out an analysis which his starting point will not accommodate. Nowhere is this more evident than in his treatment of the nature and explanation of action, for there he begins with (1) considerations much like those urged by many current analytic philosophers, goes on to (2) views normally called idealistic, and finally depends on (3) theories propounded by phenomenologists. (Atwell 1972: 143) I am not convinced that this exposition is helpful. Talking about a digression from a systematically oriented starting point to idealistic and phenomenological theories obfuscates Sartre's theoretical setup and thereby the place Sartre ascribes to his considerations on acting. Sartre does not start from a systematic reflection an acting in order to "digress" into "idealistic" and "phenomenological" theories. Sartre works on a unified theory of subjectivity-i.e. an ontology of subjectivity; and it is within that framework that actions find their place and that acting (in French: faire) is specified as the definiens of consciousness: "A first glance at human reality informs us that for it being is reduced to doing." (Sartre 1992: 612/521) i ; "human reality is act" (Sartre 1992: 615/523). Now, Atwell sees this; and he is eager to correct this merely first impression to stress that the three strands are interrelated. Still, he abstracts from Sartre's cumbersome ontology as if Sartre's notion of action could obviously be exposed without it. But this is far from obvious. What is obvious, however, is that this abstraction from Sartre's ontology is quite common when Sartre is brought into a dialogue with "analytically" oriented philosophers. This move is understandable since it tames Sartre; but it does not reflect that Sartre-in our case of action-reflects on the issue from within the standpoint of his ontology and that he even stresses that his reflection on action is the ultimate task of his ontology: "Ontology must be able to inform us about [the problem of Acting]; this is by the way one of ontology's essential tasks if the for-itself is the being which defines itself by action." (Sartre 1992: 558 modified/475) The following exposition refrains from this abstraction in order to expose the systematic place of acting in Sartre's overall theory and to reflect that Sartre's take on acting is shaped by the question why subjects are agents essentially (i.e. why they define themselves by action). Thus, I will not proceed from a glimpse at current issues in the theory of agency to ask how Sartre would relate to them. Rather, I will start with an extensive outline of Sartre's ontology to, then, sketch the resulting take on acting. The ontological framework: Sartre's dualism and his notion of consciousness as néant According to Sartre's dualism there are two irreducible regions of being: non-conscious being-initself (être en-soi) and the being of consciousness, i.e. being-for-itself (être pour-soi). Both appear in the title of his Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique as l'être and le néant. If one defines substance in terms of independence and as that which does not depend on anything else for its existence iii , then Sartre is no substance dualist. Only one of the two regions of being is independent: l'être en-soi. L'être pour-soi is sketched as a relational being presupposing an ontologically independent relatum in its being. Sartre hopes to ground this essential implication by outlining consciousness as a néant. Since this move is controversial and essential for Sartre's theoretical reflections on acting, and since it serves quite a number of systematic expectations, a brief reflection on this ontological determination may be useful.
Uploads
Papers by Simone Neuber
The article criticizes readings of Luther that present him as an opponent of the thesis "ought implies can". As the article argues, such a reading has two severe shortcomings: It misrepresents the structural place of Luther’s usus theologicus legis, and it fails to recognize the existential urgency that adherence to “ought implies can” had for Luther.
The article criticizes readings of Luther that present him as an opponent of the thesis "ought implies can". As the article argues, such a reading has two severe shortcomings: It misrepresents the structural place of Luther’s usus theologicus legis, and it fails to recognize the existential urgency that adherence to “ought implies can” had for Luther.