The proof paradox results from conflicting intuitions concerning different types of fallible evid... more The proof paradox results from conflicting intuitions concerning different types of fallible evidence in a court of law. We accept fallible individual evidence but reject fallible statistical evidence even when the conditional probability that the defendant is guilty given the evidence is the same, a seeming inconsistency. This paper defends a solution to the proof paradox, building on a sensitivity account of checking and settling a question. The proposed sensitivity account of legal proof not only requires sensitivity simpliciter but sensitivity of each relevant step of the proof procedure and/or sensitivity concerning all relevant alternatives. This account avoids problems that have been identified for other sensitivity views of legal proof. Moreover, it is argued that sensitivity, rather than safety, is the crucial modal condition for legal proof. It is, finally, shown that the provided account can fruitfully support very different existing views on the relationship between knowledge and legal proof.
This paper provides a thorough analysis of two often informally stated claims. First, successful... more This paper provides a thorough analysis of two often informally stated claims. First, successful argumentation in the sense of persuasive argumentation requires agreement between the interlocutors about the rationality of arguments. Second, a general agreement about rationality of arguments cannot itself be established via argumentation, since such an attempt leads to an infinite meta-regress. Hence, agreement about the rationality of arguments is a precondition for successful argumentation. As the paper argues, these plausible claims hold under the assumption that interlocutors are subjectively rational and follow their own standards of rationality when engaging in argumentation.
Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of... more Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of the central debates is metaphysical, focusing on the features that make a disagreement deep. Proposals for what makes disagreements deep include theories about hinge propositions and first epistemic principles. In this paper, I criticize this metaphysical discussion by arguing that it is methodologically flawed. Deep disagreement is a technical or semi-technical term, but the metaphysical discussion mistakenly treats it as a common-sense concept to be analyzed and captured by our pre-theoretical intuitions. Since the literature on deep disagreement is subject to this fundamental confusion and deep disagreement is not a helpful umbrella term either, I propose eliminating the notion of deep disagreement from the philosophical discourse. Instead of analyzing the nature of deep disagreement, we should develop theories about different forms of disagreement, including disagreement about hinge propositions and disagreement about epistemic principles, and, in particular, a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement.
That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often... more That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S doubts that a source O is reliable and believes that information i is delivered by O, then S rationally suspends judgment about the truth of i. This paper aims to accomplish two tasks. First, it provides a thorough analysis of why bootstrapping argumentation is not an instance of rational persuasion. Second, it contains a more general theory about preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation.
In epistemology, the concept of knowledge is of distinctive interest. This fact is also reflected... more In epistemology, the concept of knowledge is of distinctive interest. This fact is also reflected in the discussion of epistemic value, which focuses to a large extend on the value problem of knowledge. This discussion suggests that knowledge has an outstanding value among epistemic standings because its value exceeds the value of its constitutive parts. I will argue that the value of knowledge is not outstanding by presenting epistemic standings of checking, transferring knowledge, and proving in court, whose values exceed the value of knowledge in certain contexts. Moreover, the values of these other epistemic standings do not always rely on the value of knowledge. In terms of value, knowledge is not an outstanding epistemic concept. Hence, in terms of value we cannot find support for the privileged position that knowledge enjoys in epistemology.
The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years.... more The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years. This discussion often relies on the intuition that deep disagreement is, in some sense, rationally irresolvable. In this paper, I will provide a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Such a theory is interesting in its own right, since it conflicts with the view that rational attitudes and procedures are paradigmatic tools for resolving disagreement. Moreover, I will suggest replacing discussions about deep disagreement with an analysis of rationally irresolvable disagreement, since this notion can be more clearly defined than deep disagreement and captures the basic intuitions underlying deep disagreement. I will first motivate this project by critically assessing the current debate about deep disagreement. I then detail the notions of rationality and resolvable disagreement which are crucial for a suitable theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement before sketching various instances of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Finally, I argue for replacing theories of deep disagreement with theories of rationally irresolvable disagreement, an approach that has significant advantages over existing theories of deep disagreement which focus on hinge propositions or fundamental epistemic principles.
This paper replies to the comments made in Acta Analytica by Peter Baumann,
Kelly Becker, Maria... more This paper replies to the comments made in Acta Analytica by Peter Baumann,
Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Wes Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster on my
Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Routledge 2019), hereinafter abbreviated as KC. These papers resulted from a workshop organized by the
department of philosophy of the University of Maribor. I am very thankful to the
organizers of the workshop and to the authors for their comments.
In this Précis, I provide an overview of my Monograph Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological In... more In this Précis, I provide an overview of my Monograph Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Melchior 2019), which is subject to a book symposium organized by the University of Maribor. This volume in Acta Analytica contains contributions by Peter Baumann, Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Robert Weston Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster along with my replies.
The orthodox view about sensitivity and induction has it that beliefs formed via induction are in... more The orthodox view about sensitivity and induction has it that beliefs formed via induction are insensitive. Since inductive knowledge is highly plausible, this problem is usually regarded as a reductio argument against sensitivity accounts of knowledge. Some adherents of sensitivity defend sensitivity against this objection, for example by considering backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals. All these extant views about sensitivity and induction have to be revised, since the problem of sensitivity and induction is a different one. Regardless of whether we allow backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals, some instances of induction yield insensitive beliefs whereas others yield sensitive ones. These results are too heterogenous for providing a plausible sensitivity-account of inductive knowledge. Induction remains a serious problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge.
Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known pr... more Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially constitute knowledge according to these accounts. In this paper, I will first argue that existing solutions to this necessity problem, which accept standard possible-worlds semantics, are unsatisfactory. In order to solve the necessity problem, I will utilize an unorthodox account of counterfactuals, as proposed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:535–572, 1997), on which we also consider impossible worlds. Nolan’s account for counterpossibles delivers the intuitively correct result for sensitivity i.e. S’s belief is sensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge of necessities and insensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge failure. However, we acquire the same plausible result for safety only if we reject his strangeness of impossibility condition and accept...
This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrip... more This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa's trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation.
Discrimination is a central epistemic capacity but typically, theories of discrimination only use... more Discrimination is a central epistemic capacity but typically, theories of discrimination only use discrimination as a vehicle for analyzing knowledge. This paper aims at developing a self-contained theory of discrimination. Internalist theories of discrimination fail since there is no compelling correlation between discriminatory capacities and experiences. Moreover, statistical reliabilist theories are also flawed. Only a modal theory of discrimination is promising. Versions of sensitivity and adherence that take particular alternatives into account provide necessary and sufficient conditions on discrimination. Safety in contrast is not sufficient for discrimination as there are cases of safety that are clearly instances of discrimination failure. The developed account of discrimination between objects will be extended to discrimination between kinds and between types.
Sensitivity is a modal epistemic principle. Modal knowledge accounts are externalist in nature an... more Sensitivity is a modal epistemic principle. Modal knowledge accounts are externalist in nature and claim that the knowledge yielding connection between a true belief and the truthmaker must be spelled out in modal terms. The sensitivity condition was introduced by Robert Nozick. He suggests that if S knows that p, then S’s belief that p tracks truth. Nozick argues that this truth-tracking relation can be captured by subjunctive conditionals. As a first approximation, he provides the following modal analysis of knowledge: S knows that p iff (1) p is true; (2) S believes that p; (3) if p were false, S wouldn’t believe that p and (4) if p were true, S would believe that p. The dominant terminology in the literature, also adopted here, is to call condition (3) the sensitivity condition and condition (4) the adherence condition. The sensitivity condition is intuitively appealing since it states that a subject does not know that p if she would believe that p even if p were false. Nozick used the sensitivity condition to accomplish two major tasks. First, he provided a solution to the Gettier problem by arguing that in Gettier cases subjects do not know since the sensitivity condition is violated. Second, he presented a controversial solution to the skeptical problem according to which we have external world knowledge but do not know that the skeptical hypothesis is false. This solution is available because sensitivity is not closed under known entailment. Quickly, criticism of the sensitivity condition emerged. First, most epistemologists regarded the price of abandoning knowledge closure as a price too high to pay. Second, it was noted that sensitivity leads to the counterintuitive consequence of precluding us from inductive knowledge since induction typically yields insensitive beliefs. The most dominant reaction to these problems was to replace sensitivity by the modal principle of safety, nowadays the most popular modal principle. However, sensitivity is not only important as a starting point of modal epistemology. Because of its intuitive attractiveness, many authors aimed at refining the original sensitivity account in order to avoid well-known problems. This has led to a second wave of sensitivity accounts. As of today, various sensitivity-based theories are on the market, including accounts that avoid closure failure, probabilistic interpretations of sensitivity and adherence, and contextualist approaches. There is thus a vivid and ongoing debate about the sensitivity principle in epistemology.
Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known pr... more Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially constitute knowledge according to these accounts. In this paper, I will first argue that existing solutions to this necessity problem, which accept standard possible-worlds semantics, are unsatisfactory. In order to solve the necessity problem, I will utilize an unorthodox account of counterfactuals, as proposed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:535-572, 1997), on which we also consider impossible worlds. Nolan's account for counterpossibles delivers the intuitively correct result for sensitivity i.e. S's belief is sensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge of necessities and insensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge failure. However, we acquire the same plausible result for safety only if we reject his strangeness of impossibility condition and accept the modal closeness of impossible worlds. In this case, the necessity problem can be analogously solved for sensitivity and safety. For some, such non-moderate accounts might come at too high a cost. In this respect, sensitivity is better off than safety when it comes to knowing necessities.
This paper aims at resolving a puzzle about the persuasiveness
of bootstrapping. On the one hand,... more This paper aims at resolving a puzzle about the persuasiveness of bootstrapping. On the one hand, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method of settling questions about the reliability of a source. On the other hand, our beliefs that our sense apparatus is reliable is based on other empirically formed beliefs, that is, they are acquired via a presumably complex bootstrapping process. I will argue that when we doubt the reliability of a source, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method for coming to believe that the source is reliable. However, when being initially unaware of a source and its reliability, as in the case of forming beliefs about our sense apparatus, bootstrapping can be eventually persuasive.
EUR 89,95 alle Angaben ohne Gewähr Rezension Was ist Wissen? Welches sind die Quellen des Wissens... more EUR 89,95 alle Angaben ohne Gewähr Rezension Was ist Wissen? Welches sind die Quellen des Wissens? Gibt es eine Außenwelt? Liefert die naturalisierte Erkenntnistheorie eine tragfähige Theorie? Ist Experimentelle Philosophie noch Philosophie? Lässt sich das ‚Münchhausen-Trilemma' auflösen? Ist der epistemische Relativismus kohärent? Alle diese Fragen fallen in den Bereich der Erkenntnistheorie, neben der Metaphysik die ehemalige Königsdisziplin der Philosophie.
In diesem Artikel werden bestehende Lösungsansätze für das Problem des Außenweltskeptizismus präs... more In diesem Artikel werden bestehende Lösungsansätze für das Problem des Außenweltskeptizismus präsentiert und diskutiert. Ich werde erstens das skeptische Problem umreißen und systematisch mögliche Lösungsstrategien skizzieren. Zweitens werde ich Moores kontroversiellen Lösungsansatz darstellen. Ich werde drittens Theorien beschreiben, die das skeptische Problem lösen, indem sie das Geschlossenheitsprinzip für Wissen zurückweisen. Dabei werde ich vor allem auf Nozicks modale Sensitivitätstheorie eingehen. Viertens werde ich die alternative modale Theorie der Sicherheit und dessen Lösungsansatz für das skeptische Problem analysieren. Fünftens werde ich das mit dem skeptischen Problem verwandte Problem des einfachen Wissens diskutieren. Sechstens werde ich kontextualistische Lösungsansätze besprechen. In diesem Überblicksartikel sollen die anerkannten Vorteile und bekanntesten Probleme der jeweiligen Lösungsansätze besprochen werden, ohne dass eine Position für oder wider eine dieser Theorien vertreten wird.
Alle Menschen streben von Natur aus nach Wissen" bemerkt Aristoteles zu Beginn seiner Metaphysik ... more Alle Menschen streben von Natur aus nach Wissen" bemerkt Aristoteles zu Beginn seiner Metaphysik (A 980a21). Philosophisch unvoreingenommen gehen wir auch davon aus, dass wir zahlreiche Dinge wissen. Ich weiß beispielsweise, dass Angela Merkel gerade Bundeskanzlerin der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist, dass Angela Merkel Physik studiert hat und dass Wien mehr Einwohner/innen als Zürich hat. Doch was ist Wissen und wann verfügt eine Person über Wissen? Wenn Aristoteles Recht hat und wir Menschen nach Wissen streben, dann muss die Frage, was Wissen überhaupt ist, von großer Bedeutung für uns sein. In der zeitgenössischen Erkenntnistheorie steht sie, obwohl sie schon in der Antike aufgeworfen wurde, nach wie vor im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit. Neben der Frage, was Wissen ist, sind in der gegenwärtigen Erkenntnistheorie die folgenden Fragen zentral: Wieso ist Wissen wertvoller als eine bloß wahre Meinung? Was ist die sog. epistemische Rechtfertigung? Haben wir überhaupt Wissen? Wie sehen die Quellen des Wissens aus? Diese Liste von Fragen macht deutlich, dass die wichtigsten Begriffe oder Phänomene, die man in der Erkenntnistheorie untersucht, Wissen und Rechtfertigung sind. Die meisten Erkenntnistheoretiker/innen beschäftigen sich dabei mit dem Wissen, das Menschen besitzen, oder den gerechtfertigten Überzeugungen von Menschen -was nicht bedeuten soll, dass nicht auch andere Wesen, wie Tiere oder Maschinen, prinzipiell über Wissen oder Rechtfertigung verfügen können. Es gibt noch zahlreiche weitere Themen, die in der Erkenntnistheorie eine Rolle spielen. Beispielweise welchen Beitrag die formale Erkenntnistheorie zum Verständnis erkenntnistheoretischer Phänomene liefern kann, welche Rolle Normen in der Erkenntnistheorie spielen und ob Kunst und Religion Erkenntnisse vermitteln können.
Epistemic contextualism is the view that knowledge attributions can have different truth-values i... more Epistemic contextualism is the view that knowledge attributions can have different truth-values in different contexts of usage and that epistemic puzzles such as the skeptical puzzle can be solved by referring to this mechanism. Contextualism is still one of the most debated epistemological positions. Thus, a thorough defense of contextualism is presumably the most systematic one so far. Furthermore, it incorporates persuasive new approaches, for example, incorporating the compatibility of knowledge and luck into the contextualist account.
The proof paradox results from conflicting intuitions concerning different types of fallible evid... more The proof paradox results from conflicting intuitions concerning different types of fallible evidence in a court of law. We accept fallible individual evidence but reject fallible statistical evidence even when the conditional probability that the defendant is guilty given the evidence is the same, a seeming inconsistency. This paper defends a solution to the proof paradox, building on a sensitivity account of checking and settling a question. The proposed sensitivity account of legal proof not only requires sensitivity simpliciter but sensitivity of each relevant step of the proof procedure and/or sensitivity concerning all relevant alternatives. This account avoids problems that have been identified for other sensitivity views of legal proof. Moreover, it is argued that sensitivity, rather than safety, is the crucial modal condition for legal proof. It is, finally, shown that the provided account can fruitfully support very different existing views on the relationship between knowledge and legal proof.
This paper provides a thorough analysis of two often informally stated claims. First, successful... more This paper provides a thorough analysis of two often informally stated claims. First, successful argumentation in the sense of persuasive argumentation requires agreement between the interlocutors about the rationality of arguments. Second, a general agreement about rationality of arguments cannot itself be established via argumentation, since such an attempt leads to an infinite meta-regress. Hence, agreement about the rationality of arguments is a precondition for successful argumentation. As the paper argues, these plausible claims hold under the assumption that interlocutors are subjectively rational and follow their own standards of rationality when engaging in argumentation.
Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of... more Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of the central debates is metaphysical, focusing on the features that make a disagreement deep. Proposals for what makes disagreements deep include theories about hinge propositions and first epistemic principles. In this paper, I criticize this metaphysical discussion by arguing that it is methodologically flawed. Deep disagreement is a technical or semi-technical term, but the metaphysical discussion mistakenly treats it as a common-sense concept to be analyzed and captured by our pre-theoretical intuitions. Since the literature on deep disagreement is subject to this fundamental confusion and deep disagreement is not a helpful umbrella term either, I propose eliminating the notion of deep disagreement from the philosophical discourse. Instead of analyzing the nature of deep disagreement, we should develop theories about different forms of disagreement, including disagreement about hinge propositions and disagreement about epistemic principles, and, in particular, a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement.
That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often... more That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S doubts that a source O is reliable and believes that information i is delivered by O, then S rationally suspends judgment about the truth of i. This paper aims to accomplish two tasks. First, it provides a thorough analysis of why bootstrapping argumentation is not an instance of rational persuasion. Second, it contains a more general theory about preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation.
In epistemology, the concept of knowledge is of distinctive interest. This fact is also reflected... more In epistemology, the concept of knowledge is of distinctive interest. This fact is also reflected in the discussion of epistemic value, which focuses to a large extend on the value problem of knowledge. This discussion suggests that knowledge has an outstanding value among epistemic standings because its value exceeds the value of its constitutive parts. I will argue that the value of knowledge is not outstanding by presenting epistemic standings of checking, transferring knowledge, and proving in court, whose values exceed the value of knowledge in certain contexts. Moreover, the values of these other epistemic standings do not always rely on the value of knowledge. In terms of value, knowledge is not an outstanding epistemic concept. Hence, in terms of value we cannot find support for the privileged position that knowledge enjoys in epistemology.
The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years.... more The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years. This discussion often relies on the intuition that deep disagreement is, in some sense, rationally irresolvable. In this paper, I will provide a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Such a theory is interesting in its own right, since it conflicts with the view that rational attitudes and procedures are paradigmatic tools for resolving disagreement. Moreover, I will suggest replacing discussions about deep disagreement with an analysis of rationally irresolvable disagreement, since this notion can be more clearly defined than deep disagreement and captures the basic intuitions underlying deep disagreement. I will first motivate this project by critically assessing the current debate about deep disagreement. I then detail the notions of rationality and resolvable disagreement which are crucial for a suitable theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement before sketching various instances of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Finally, I argue for replacing theories of deep disagreement with theories of rationally irresolvable disagreement, an approach that has significant advantages over existing theories of deep disagreement which focus on hinge propositions or fundamental epistemic principles.
This paper replies to the comments made in Acta Analytica by Peter Baumann,
Kelly Becker, Maria... more This paper replies to the comments made in Acta Analytica by Peter Baumann,
Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Wes Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster on my
Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Routledge 2019), hereinafter abbreviated as KC. These papers resulted from a workshop organized by the
department of philosophy of the University of Maribor. I am very thankful to the
organizers of the workshop and to the authors for their comments.
In this Précis, I provide an overview of my Monograph Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological In... more In this Précis, I provide an overview of my Monograph Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Melchior 2019), which is subject to a book symposium organized by the University of Maribor. This volume in Acta Analytica contains contributions by Peter Baumann, Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Robert Weston Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster along with my replies.
The orthodox view about sensitivity and induction has it that beliefs formed via induction are in... more The orthodox view about sensitivity and induction has it that beliefs formed via induction are insensitive. Since inductive knowledge is highly plausible, this problem is usually regarded as a reductio argument against sensitivity accounts of knowledge. Some adherents of sensitivity defend sensitivity against this objection, for example by considering backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals. All these extant views about sensitivity and induction have to be revised, since the problem of sensitivity and induction is a different one. Regardless of whether we allow backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals, some instances of induction yield insensitive beliefs whereas others yield sensitive ones. These results are too heterogenous for providing a plausible sensitivity-account of inductive knowledge. Induction remains a serious problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge.
Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known pr... more Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially constitute knowledge according to these accounts. In this paper, I will first argue that existing solutions to this necessity problem, which accept standard possible-worlds semantics, are unsatisfactory. In order to solve the necessity problem, I will utilize an unorthodox account of counterfactuals, as proposed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:535–572, 1997), on which we also consider impossible worlds. Nolan’s account for counterpossibles delivers the intuitively correct result for sensitivity i.e. S’s belief is sensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge of necessities and insensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge failure. However, we acquire the same plausible result for safety only if we reject his strangeness of impossibility condition and accept...
This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrip... more This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa's trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation.
Discrimination is a central epistemic capacity but typically, theories of discrimination only use... more Discrimination is a central epistemic capacity but typically, theories of discrimination only use discrimination as a vehicle for analyzing knowledge. This paper aims at developing a self-contained theory of discrimination. Internalist theories of discrimination fail since there is no compelling correlation between discriminatory capacities and experiences. Moreover, statistical reliabilist theories are also flawed. Only a modal theory of discrimination is promising. Versions of sensitivity and adherence that take particular alternatives into account provide necessary and sufficient conditions on discrimination. Safety in contrast is not sufficient for discrimination as there are cases of safety that are clearly instances of discrimination failure. The developed account of discrimination between objects will be extended to discrimination between kinds and between types.
Sensitivity is a modal epistemic principle. Modal knowledge accounts are externalist in nature an... more Sensitivity is a modal epistemic principle. Modal knowledge accounts are externalist in nature and claim that the knowledge yielding connection between a true belief and the truthmaker must be spelled out in modal terms. The sensitivity condition was introduced by Robert Nozick. He suggests that if S knows that p, then S’s belief that p tracks truth. Nozick argues that this truth-tracking relation can be captured by subjunctive conditionals. As a first approximation, he provides the following modal analysis of knowledge: S knows that p iff (1) p is true; (2) S believes that p; (3) if p were false, S wouldn’t believe that p and (4) if p were true, S would believe that p. The dominant terminology in the literature, also adopted here, is to call condition (3) the sensitivity condition and condition (4) the adherence condition. The sensitivity condition is intuitively appealing since it states that a subject does not know that p if she would believe that p even if p were false. Nozick used the sensitivity condition to accomplish two major tasks. First, he provided a solution to the Gettier problem by arguing that in Gettier cases subjects do not know since the sensitivity condition is violated. Second, he presented a controversial solution to the skeptical problem according to which we have external world knowledge but do not know that the skeptical hypothesis is false. This solution is available because sensitivity is not closed under known entailment. Quickly, criticism of the sensitivity condition emerged. First, most epistemologists regarded the price of abandoning knowledge closure as a price too high to pay. Second, it was noted that sensitivity leads to the counterintuitive consequence of precluding us from inductive knowledge since induction typically yields insensitive beliefs. The most dominant reaction to these problems was to replace sensitivity by the modal principle of safety, nowadays the most popular modal principle. However, sensitivity is not only important as a starting point of modal epistemology. Because of its intuitive attractiveness, many authors aimed at refining the original sensitivity account in order to avoid well-known problems. This has led to a second wave of sensitivity accounts. As of today, various sensitivity-based theories are on the market, including accounts that avoid closure failure, probabilistic interpretations of sensitivity and adherence, and contextualist approaches. There is thus a vivid and ongoing debate about the sensitivity principle in epistemology.
Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known pr... more Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially constitute knowledge according to these accounts. In this paper, I will first argue that existing solutions to this necessity problem, which accept standard possible-worlds semantics, are unsatisfactory. In order to solve the necessity problem, I will utilize an unorthodox account of counterfactuals, as proposed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:535-572, 1997), on which we also consider impossible worlds. Nolan's account for counterpossibles delivers the intuitively correct result for sensitivity i.e. S's belief is sensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge of necessities and insensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge failure. However, we acquire the same plausible result for safety only if we reject his strangeness of impossibility condition and accept the modal closeness of impossible worlds. In this case, the necessity problem can be analogously solved for sensitivity and safety. For some, such non-moderate accounts might come at too high a cost. In this respect, sensitivity is better off than safety when it comes to knowing necessities.
This paper aims at resolving a puzzle about the persuasiveness
of bootstrapping. On the one hand,... more This paper aims at resolving a puzzle about the persuasiveness of bootstrapping. On the one hand, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method of settling questions about the reliability of a source. On the other hand, our beliefs that our sense apparatus is reliable is based on other empirically formed beliefs, that is, they are acquired via a presumably complex bootstrapping process. I will argue that when we doubt the reliability of a source, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method for coming to believe that the source is reliable. However, when being initially unaware of a source and its reliability, as in the case of forming beliefs about our sense apparatus, bootstrapping can be eventually persuasive.
EUR 89,95 alle Angaben ohne Gewähr Rezension Was ist Wissen? Welches sind die Quellen des Wissens... more EUR 89,95 alle Angaben ohne Gewähr Rezension Was ist Wissen? Welches sind die Quellen des Wissens? Gibt es eine Außenwelt? Liefert die naturalisierte Erkenntnistheorie eine tragfähige Theorie? Ist Experimentelle Philosophie noch Philosophie? Lässt sich das ‚Münchhausen-Trilemma' auflösen? Ist der epistemische Relativismus kohärent? Alle diese Fragen fallen in den Bereich der Erkenntnistheorie, neben der Metaphysik die ehemalige Königsdisziplin der Philosophie.
In diesem Artikel werden bestehende Lösungsansätze für das Problem des Außenweltskeptizismus präs... more In diesem Artikel werden bestehende Lösungsansätze für das Problem des Außenweltskeptizismus präsentiert und diskutiert. Ich werde erstens das skeptische Problem umreißen und systematisch mögliche Lösungsstrategien skizzieren. Zweitens werde ich Moores kontroversiellen Lösungsansatz darstellen. Ich werde drittens Theorien beschreiben, die das skeptische Problem lösen, indem sie das Geschlossenheitsprinzip für Wissen zurückweisen. Dabei werde ich vor allem auf Nozicks modale Sensitivitätstheorie eingehen. Viertens werde ich die alternative modale Theorie der Sicherheit und dessen Lösungsansatz für das skeptische Problem analysieren. Fünftens werde ich das mit dem skeptischen Problem verwandte Problem des einfachen Wissens diskutieren. Sechstens werde ich kontextualistische Lösungsansätze besprechen. In diesem Überblicksartikel sollen die anerkannten Vorteile und bekanntesten Probleme der jeweiligen Lösungsansätze besprochen werden, ohne dass eine Position für oder wider eine dieser Theorien vertreten wird.
Alle Menschen streben von Natur aus nach Wissen" bemerkt Aristoteles zu Beginn seiner Metaphysik ... more Alle Menschen streben von Natur aus nach Wissen" bemerkt Aristoteles zu Beginn seiner Metaphysik (A 980a21). Philosophisch unvoreingenommen gehen wir auch davon aus, dass wir zahlreiche Dinge wissen. Ich weiß beispielsweise, dass Angela Merkel gerade Bundeskanzlerin der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist, dass Angela Merkel Physik studiert hat und dass Wien mehr Einwohner/innen als Zürich hat. Doch was ist Wissen und wann verfügt eine Person über Wissen? Wenn Aristoteles Recht hat und wir Menschen nach Wissen streben, dann muss die Frage, was Wissen überhaupt ist, von großer Bedeutung für uns sein. In der zeitgenössischen Erkenntnistheorie steht sie, obwohl sie schon in der Antike aufgeworfen wurde, nach wie vor im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit. Neben der Frage, was Wissen ist, sind in der gegenwärtigen Erkenntnistheorie die folgenden Fragen zentral: Wieso ist Wissen wertvoller als eine bloß wahre Meinung? Was ist die sog. epistemische Rechtfertigung? Haben wir überhaupt Wissen? Wie sehen die Quellen des Wissens aus? Diese Liste von Fragen macht deutlich, dass die wichtigsten Begriffe oder Phänomene, die man in der Erkenntnistheorie untersucht, Wissen und Rechtfertigung sind. Die meisten Erkenntnistheoretiker/innen beschäftigen sich dabei mit dem Wissen, das Menschen besitzen, oder den gerechtfertigten Überzeugungen von Menschen -was nicht bedeuten soll, dass nicht auch andere Wesen, wie Tiere oder Maschinen, prinzipiell über Wissen oder Rechtfertigung verfügen können. Es gibt noch zahlreiche weitere Themen, die in der Erkenntnistheorie eine Rolle spielen. Beispielweise welchen Beitrag die formale Erkenntnistheorie zum Verständnis erkenntnistheoretischer Phänomene liefern kann, welche Rolle Normen in der Erkenntnistheorie spielen und ob Kunst und Religion Erkenntnisse vermitteln können.
Epistemic contextualism is the view that knowledge attributions can have different truth-values i... more Epistemic contextualism is the view that knowledge attributions can have different truth-values in different contexts of usage and that epistemic puzzles such as the skeptical puzzle can be solved by referring to this mechanism. Contextualism is still one of the most debated epistemological positions. Thus, a thorough defense of contextualism is presumably the most systematic one so far. Furthermore, it incorporates persuasive new approaches, for example, incorporating the compatibility of knowledge and luck into the contextualist account.
Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation , 2019
Knowing and Checking accomplishes three major tasks:
(1) It breaks new ground by developing the ... more Knowing and Checking accomplishes three major tasks:
(1) It breaks new ground by developing the first thorough epistemic theory of checking. (2) It provides a novel explanation of enduring epistemological problems, such as the skeptical problem, via a theory of checking instead of, as is the usual strategy, by a theory of knowledge. (3) It settles a lively debate in epistemology by arguing that sensitivity is necessary for checking but not for knowing, thereby finding a new home for the much discussed modal sensitivity principle.
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Papers by Guido Melchior
court, whose values exceed the value of knowledge in certain contexts. Moreover, the values of these other epistemic standings do not always rely on the value of knowledge. In terms of value, knowledge is not an outstanding epistemic concept. Hence, in terms of value we cannot find support for the privileged position that knowledge enjoys in epistemology.
Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Wes Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster on my
Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Routledge 2019), hereinafter abbreviated as KC. These papers resulted from a workshop organized by the
department of philosophy of the University of Maribor. I am very thankful to the
organizers of the workshop and to the authors for their comments.
of bootstrapping. On the one hand, bootstrapping is
not a persuasive method of settling questions about the
reliability of a source. On the other hand, our beliefs that
our sense apparatus is reliable is based on other empirically
formed beliefs, that is, they are acquired via a presumably
complex bootstrapping process. I will argue that when we
doubt the reliability of a source, bootstrapping is not a persuasive
method for coming to believe that the source is reliable.
However, when being initially unaware of a source and
its reliability, as in the case of forming beliefs about our sense
apparatus, bootstrapping can be eventually persuasive.
court, whose values exceed the value of knowledge in certain contexts. Moreover, the values of these other epistemic standings do not always rely on the value of knowledge. In terms of value, knowledge is not an outstanding epistemic concept. Hence, in terms of value we cannot find support for the privileged position that knowledge enjoys in epistemology.
Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Wes Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster on my
Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Routledge 2019), hereinafter abbreviated as KC. These papers resulted from a workshop organized by the
department of philosophy of the University of Maribor. I am very thankful to the
organizers of the workshop and to the authors for their comments.
of bootstrapping. On the one hand, bootstrapping is
not a persuasive method of settling questions about the
reliability of a source. On the other hand, our beliefs that
our sense apparatus is reliable is based on other empirically
formed beliefs, that is, they are acquired via a presumably
complex bootstrapping process. I will argue that when we
doubt the reliability of a source, bootstrapping is not a persuasive
method for coming to believe that the source is reliable.
However, when being initially unaware of a source and
its reliability, as in the case of forming beliefs about our sense
apparatus, bootstrapping can be eventually persuasive.
(1) It breaks new ground by developing the first thorough epistemic theory of checking.
(2) It provides a novel explanation of enduring epistemological problems, such as the skeptical problem, via a theory of checking instead of, as is the usual strategy, by a theory of knowledge.
(3) It settles a lively debate in epistemology by arguing that sensitivity is necessary for checking but not for knowing, thereby finding a new home for the much discussed modal sensitivity principle.