JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, a... more JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
Sense-certainty and the ''this-such'' Willem A. deVries Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is knowle... more Sense-certainty and the ''this-such'' Willem A. deVries Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is knowledge's voyage of self-discovery. It begins with the mere appearance of knowledge-that is, what knowledge at first seems to be. But what knowledge at first seems to be is not congruent with its reality, even in its first appearance. 1 The incongruence creates an instability that pushes knowledge on to other ways to take itself, stopping only when a conception of knowledge has been developed on which knowledge seems to be exactly what it is. My concern here is an examination of one of the opening arguments in the ''sense-Certainty'' chapter of the Phenomenology, showing how the moves Hegel tracks in the ''sense-Certainty'' chapter provide an important supplement to the analysis of perceptual knowledge provided by Wilfrid Sellars (1967).
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Jan 26, 2007
In the following dialogue between TT-a foundationalist-and WdeV-a Sellarsian, we offer our differ... more In the following dialogue between TT-a foundationalist-and WdeV-a Sellarsian, we offer our differing assessments of the principle for observational knowledge proposed in Wilfrid Sellars's 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'. Sellars writes: 'For a Konstatierung "This is green" to "express observational knowledge", not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a green object in standard conditions, but the perceiver must know that tokens of "This is green" are symptoms of the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual perception.' In the ensuing dialogue, TT argues that it sets the bar too high when knowledge about perceptual conditions is required for ordinary observational knowledge-that young children, for example, are implausibly excluded as knowers given Sellars's principle. WdeV defends Sellars's metaknowledge requirement against these charges. Results from developmental psychology are surveyed for what they show about the actual capabilities of young children. The implications of these results for the success of Sellars's principle are debated.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, a... more JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
Sense-certainty and the ''this-such'' Willem A. deVries Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is knowle... more Sense-certainty and the ''this-such'' Willem A. deVries Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is knowledge's voyage of self-discovery. It begins with the mere appearance of knowledge-that is, what knowledge at first seems to be. But what knowledge at first seems to be is not congruent with its reality, even in its first appearance. 1 The incongruence creates an instability that pushes knowledge on to other ways to take itself, stopping only when a conception of knowledge has been developed on which knowledge seems to be exactly what it is. My concern here is an examination of one of the opening arguments in the ''sense-Certainty'' chapter of the Phenomenology, showing how the moves Hegel tracks in the ''sense-Certainty'' chapter provide an important supplement to the analysis of perceptual knowledge provided by Wilfrid Sellars (1967).
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Jan 26, 2007
In the following dialogue between TT-a foundationalist-and WdeV-a Sellarsian, we offer our differ... more In the following dialogue between TT-a foundationalist-and WdeV-a Sellarsian, we offer our differing assessments of the principle for observational knowledge proposed in Wilfrid Sellars's 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'. Sellars writes: 'For a Konstatierung "This is green" to "express observational knowledge", not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a green object in standard conditions, but the perceiver must know that tokens of "This is green" are symptoms of the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual perception.' In the ensuing dialogue, TT argues that it sets the bar too high when knowledge about perceptual conditions is required for ordinary observational knowledge-that young children, for example, are implausibly excluded as knowers given Sellars's principle. WdeV defends Sellars's metaknowledge requirement against these charges. Results from developmental psychology are surveyed for what they show about the actual capabilities of young children. The implications of these results for the success of Sellars's principle are debated.
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