In this article I present an answer to the problem of deep disagreements posed by Robert Fogelin ... more In this article I present an answer to the problem of deep disagreements posed by Robert Fogelin (1985). According to this author, there are disagreements that cannot be resolved rationally because they refer to "framework propositions". I argue that, making certain distinctions, Fogelin's conclusion is less serious than initially thought. The first distinction is between resolving and overcoming disagreements. From the fact that disagreements cannot be resolved, it does not follow that they cannot be overcome in other ways. Thus, together with resolution, the parties can overcome disagreements through means such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration or suspension of judgment. The second distinction is between theoretical and practical disagreements. As I argue, while for theoretical disagreements the fact that they cannot be resolved implies that the only way to overcome them is by suspending judgment, for practical disagreements it is not possible to suspend judgment, but there are other ways to "manage disagreements". Having made these distinctions, I conclude by pointing out that the fact that certain disagreements are deep does not prevent them from being overcome, which reflects a pluralistic view of the argumentation that should be further explored.
When parties attempt to persuade their opponents of the tenability of a certain standpoint using ... more When parties attempt to persuade their opponents of the tenability of a certain standpoint using reasons, they will often find that the circumstances of the dialogue hinder their chances of resolution. Power imbalances, cognitive biases, lack of time or hidden interests are some of the circumstances they need to face. I will label these circumstances as suboptimal settings for argumentation. According to the pragma-dialectical tradition, higher-order conditions for critical discussion are unfulfilled in these cases (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jacobs, & Jackson, 1993). The main question of this paper is the following: what is the normative standard that parties in a discussion need to follow to arrive at a resolution within such circumstances? I will defend a middle-ground solution between two extreme ones. The first extreme position, the anything-goes policy, claims that, given that the conditions for a reasonable exchange of reasons are not satisfied, the dialogue stands outside the domain of reason, so anything goes for the parties. The second extreme position, the business as usual policy, claims that, since critical discussion is a normative model, the same rules should apply in suboptimal settings. Finally, the supernormal policy that I defend claims that we need a more general and comprehensive norm that I refer to as a supernorm to evaluate these cases. The supernormal policy divides argumentation into two stages: preparation and resolution. In the preparation stage, the parties attempt to restore or compensate for the suboptimality of the setting, while in the resolution stage, they attempt to resolve their disagreement. I contend that the moves of the preparation stage should be evaluated by using the supernorm instead of by the rules for critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004).
Some disagreements seem to be persistent: they are, pretty much, immune to persuasive argumentati... more Some disagreements seem to be persistent: they are, pretty much, immune to persuasive argumentation. If that is the case, how can they be overcome? Can argumentation help us? I propose that to overcome persistent disagreements through argumentation, we need a dynamic and pluralistic version of argumentation. Therefore, I propose that argumentation, more than a tool that uses persuasion to change the mind of the counterpart, is a toolbox that contains persuasion, deliberation, negotiation, and other dialogical strategies that can be used to reach an agreement. Résumé: Certains désaccords semblent persistants: ils sont, à peu près, à l'abri de l'argumentation persuasive. Si tel est le cas: comment les surmonter? L'argumentation peut-elle nous aider? Je proposerai que, pour surmonter les désaccords persistants par l'argumentation, nous avons besoin d'une version dynamique et pluraliste de l'argumentation. Par conséquent, je proposerai que l'argumentation, plus qu'un outil qui utilise la persuasion pour changer l'esprit de la contrepartie, est une boîte à outils qui utilise la persuasion, la délibération, la négociation et d'autres stratégies de dialogue pour parvenir à un accord.
In this article I present an answer to the problem of deep disagreements posed by Robert Fogelin ... more In this article I present an answer to the problem of deep disagreements posed by Robert Fogelin (1985). According to this author, there are disagreements that cannot be resolved rationally because they refer to "framework propositions". I argue that, making certain distinctions, Fogelin's conclusion is less serious than initially thought. The first distinction is between resolving and overcoming disagreements. From the fact that disagreements cannot be resolved, it does not follow that they cannot be overcome in other ways. Thus, together with resolution, the parties can overcome disagreements through means such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration or suspension of judgment. The second distinction is between theoretical and practical disagreements. As I argue, while for theoretical disagreements the fact that they cannot be resolved implies that the only way to overcome them is by suspending judgment, for practical disagreements it is not possible to suspend judgment, but there are other ways to "manage disagreements". Having made these distinctions, I conclude by pointing out that the fact that certain disagreements are deep does not prevent them from being overcome, which reflects a pluralistic view of the argumentation that should be further explored.
When parties attempt to persuade their opponents of the tenability of a certain standpoint using ... more When parties attempt to persuade their opponents of the tenability of a certain standpoint using reasons, they will often find that the circumstances of the dialogue hinder their chances of resolution. Power imbalances, cognitive biases, lack of time or hidden interests are some of the circumstances they need to face. I will label these circumstances as suboptimal settings for argumentation. According to the pragma-dialectical tradition, higher-order conditions for critical discussion are unfulfilled in these cases (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jacobs, & Jackson, 1993). The main question of this paper is the following: what is the normative standard that parties in a discussion need to follow to arrive at a resolution within such circumstances? I will defend a middle-ground solution between two extreme ones. The first extreme position, the anything-goes policy, claims that, given that the conditions for a reasonable exchange of reasons are not satisfied, the dialogue stands outside the domain of reason, so anything goes for the parties. The second extreme position, the business as usual policy, claims that, since critical discussion is a normative model, the same rules should apply in suboptimal settings. Finally, the supernormal policy that I defend claims that we need a more general and comprehensive norm that I refer to as a supernorm to evaluate these cases. The supernormal policy divides argumentation into two stages: preparation and resolution. In the preparation stage, the parties attempt to restore or compensate for the suboptimality of the setting, while in the resolution stage, they attempt to resolve their disagreement. I contend that the moves of the preparation stage should be evaluated by using the supernorm instead of by the rules for critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004).
Some disagreements seem to be persistent: they are, pretty much, immune to persuasive argumentati... more Some disagreements seem to be persistent: they are, pretty much, immune to persuasive argumentation. If that is the case, how can they be overcome? Can argumentation help us? I propose that to overcome persistent disagreements through argumentation, we need a dynamic and pluralistic version of argumentation. Therefore, I propose that argumentation, more than a tool that uses persuasion to change the mind of the counterpart, is a toolbox that contains persuasion, deliberation, negotiation, and other dialogical strategies that can be used to reach an agreement. Résumé: Certains désaccords semblent persistants: ils sont, à peu près, à l'abri de l'argumentation persuasive. Si tel est le cas: comment les surmonter? L'argumentation peut-elle nous aider? Je proposerai que, pour surmonter les désaccords persistants par l'argumentation, nous avons besoin d'une version dynamique et pluraliste de l'argumentation. Par conséquent, je proposerai que l'argumentation, plus qu'un outil qui utilise la persuasion pour changer l'esprit de la contrepartie, est une boîte à outils qui utilise la persuasion, la délibération, la négociation et d'autres stratégies de dialogue pour parvenir à un accord.
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