This is the penultimate draft of an entry forthcoming in the International Encyclopedia of Ethics... more This is the penultimate draft of an entry forthcoming in the International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Please cite the published version. Rationality and Normativity John Brunero Suppose I point out to some person some way in which he's irrational (see Rationality). Perhaps I show him how his beliefs about the outcome of the recent election are the product of wishful thinking and fly in the face of the available evidence. Or perhaps I show him how his resistance to getting vaccinated is based on a poor calculation of the expected costs and benefits of doing so. Or perhaps I point out how his theological beliefs are full of inconsistencies. Or perhaps I show him how he's instrumentally irrational in intending (see Intention) to pass his final exams, believing that studying is necessary for passing, and yet not intending to study. Or perhaps I point out how he's akratic (see Weakness of Will) in believing that he ought to get some exercise, but not intending to do so. Most likely, he'll take offense. (Criticizing people for being irrational isn't a good way to make friends.) And he'll likely try to show that the criticism is misplaced-that the inconsistencies are only apparent, that there's really a rational basis for refusing the shot, and so forth. If I'm lucky enough to convince him at the end of the day that there is indeed some way in which he's irrational, that's likely to bring about some change of mind-perhaps leading him to resolve the inconsistencies in his theological beliefs, or make more prudent decisions about his health, and so forth. What he's not likely to do is to concede that the criticism is on target, but then shrug it off by saying something like, "I'm irrational. So what? What reason do I have to be rational?" That would certainly strike us, at least at a first glance, as an odd reply. But it's not clear exactly what's wrong with that dismissive reply. It won't help for us to say in response that rationality issues requirements-in particular, that it requires that our beliefs be responsive to the available evidence, and requires that our beliefs be consistent, and so forth. That's because the person making the dismissive reply would then simply ask why he should care about those requirements. After all, there are all sorts of requirements. Fashion requires that you not wear socks with sandals. The precepts of Roman Catholicism require that you attend Mass on Sundays. But you might reasonably wonder, as you are out for your Sunday walk in your socks and sandals, whether there's any reason to care about those requirements. Our "rationality skeptic" might just insist that the requirements of rationality are on a par with the requirements of fashion and Catholicism. He might demand that we provide some reason to take the requirements of rationality seriously (Kolodny 2005). The challenge posed by the skeptic who asks "Why be rational?" might have a familiar ring to it. The well-known debate over moral rationalism (see Rationalism in Ethics) is traditionally set up as an attempt to respond to a skeptic about moral requirements who asks, "Why be Moral?" (see Why be Moral?). This skeptic fully understands what the requirements of morality are, but he's looking for some reason to comply with those requirements. Likewise, our imagined skeptic fully understands what the requirements of rationality are, but he's looking for some reason to comply with those requirements. Those philosophers who think that this skeptical challenge can be met-that is, those who believe in what's come to be known as the "normativity of rationality" (see Normativity)-will aim to provide the skeptic with those reasons. In defending the normativity of any set of requirements-be they requirements of morality, rationality, or fashion-one could adopt one of two views. First, one could hold that the requirements are weakly normative-that is, one could hold that there is always a reason (see Reasons; Reasons, Motivating and Normative) for compliance with the relevant requirements, but that reason could be outweighed by competing reasons. When that reason is outweighed, it wouldn't be the case that one ought (see Ought) to do what is required. Second, one could hold that the requirements are strongly normative-that is, one could hold that there is always a reason for compliance with the relevant
Philosophers have often noted a contrast between practical and theoretical reasons when it comes ... more Philosophers have often noted a contrast between practical and theoretical reasons when it comes to cases involving equally balanced reasons. When there are strong practical reasons for A-ing, and equally strong practical reasons for some incompatible option, B-ing, the agent is permitted to make an arbitrary choice between them, having sufficient reason to A and sufficient reason to B. But when there is strong evidence for P and equally strong evidence for ~P, one isn't permitted to simply believe one or the other. Instead, one must withhold belief, neither believing that P nor believing that ~P. This paper examines what explains this contrast, focusing in particular on a proposal recently developed by Mark Schroeder across several papers. Schroeder aims to explain the contrast by an appeal to non-evidential, epistemic reasons against belief. But, I argue, it's not clear exactly what those reasons are, nor how those reasons are to be weighed against evidential reasons. Despite these challenges, I argue that there are grounds for optimism that the contrast can be explained within the broad framework Schroeder provides, and I aim to provide resources to meet the aforementioned challenges. There's a common contrast drawn between practical and theoretical reasons. 1 In cases in which the relevant practical reasons are equally balanced 2 , with strong reasons in support of two incompatible options-say, A-ing and B-ing-it's permissible for an agent to decide between them. In such cases, there would be sufficient reason for the agent to A and sufficient reason for the agent to B. When Buridan's ass is between two equidistant, equally good, bales of hay, it's permissible for it to head toward the one on the left, and permissible for it to head toward the one on the right. In contrast, in cases in which the relevant theoretical reasons are equally balanced, with strong evidence in support of two incompatible propositions-say, P and ~P-it's not permissible for someone to believe one or the other; instead, the proper response is to withhold belief, neither believing that P nor believing that ~P. In this case, the agent would lack sufficient reason to believe that P and lack sufficient reason to believe that ~P. To borrow terminology introduced by Selim Berker, practical reasons display
The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence, 2020
The paper develops two objections to Michael Bratman’s self-governance approach to the normativit... more The paper develops two objections to Michael Bratman’s self-governance approach to the normativity of rational requirements. Bratman, drawing upon work by Harry Frankfurt, argues that having a place where one stands is a necessary, constitutive element of self-governance, and that violations of the consistency and coherence requirements on intentions make one lack a place where one stands. This allows for reasons of self-governance to ground reasons to comply with these rational requirements, thereby vindicating the normativity of rationality. The first objection is that the account under-generates reasons, since not all cases of incoherence will involve a failure to have a place where one stands. The second objection is that the account over-generates reasons: we would have strong reasons to avoid both incoherence and ambivalence. However, if we follow Frankfurt in thinking that ambivalence is a “disease of the will” that is as irrational as having contradictory beliefs, this second objection doesn’t get off the ground. Thus, the first part of the paper is devoted to explaining why Frankfurt’s argument for the irrationality of ambivalence fails
This volume is a collection of eleven essays by Mark Schroeder, including one previously unpublis... more This volume is a collection of eleven essays by Mark Schroeder, including one previously unpublished paper, divided into four parts. Schroeder's substantive introduction to the volume explains the unifying argumentative thread running through these essays and will be useful even to those who have read the essays
According to the Reasoning View, a normative reason to φ is a premise in a pattern of sound reaso... more According to the Reasoning View, a normative reason to φ is a premise in a pattern of sound reasoning leading to the conclusion to φ. But how should the Reasoning View account for reasons that are outweighed? One very promising proposal is to appeal to defeasible reasoning. On this proposal, when a reason is outweighed, the associated pattern of sound reasoning is defeated. Both Jonathan Way and Sam Asarnow have recently developed this idea in different ways. I argue that this appeal to defeasible reasoning faces a challenge, since reasons can be both outweighed and disabled. Way's view generates good predictions about outweighed reasons, but not about disabled reasons. Asarnow's view generates good predictions about disabled reasons, but not about outweighed reasons. We want a version of the Reasoning View that can generate good predictions about both. I present a version of the Reasoning View that can meet the challenge.
This chapter assesses analyses of normative reasons that appeal to the concepts of evidence or ex... more This chapter assesses analyses of normative reasons that appeal to the concepts of evidence or explanation along with some other normative concept. One influential analysis holds that some fact is a reason for an agent to ϕ if and only if that fact is evidence she ought to ϕ. I argue that, despite the many advantages of this proposal, there are cases of facts which are reasons to ϕ but aren’t evidence one ought to ϕ, and cases of facts which are evidence one ought to ϕ but aren’t reasons to ϕ. Others have analyzed reasons in terms of explanations: perhaps a reason for an agent to ϕ is a fact which explains why she ought to ϕ, or a fact which figures in a “weighing explanation,” or a fact which explains why her ϕ-ing would be good in some respect. There are difficulties facing all three of these proposals.
According to the Aristotelian Thesis, the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. Critics... more According to the Aristotelian Thesis, the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. Critics argue against it by pointing to cases in which some interference or inability prevents the production of action, yet in which that interference or inability doesn't impugn the success of an agent's reasoning. Some of those critics suggest instead that practical reasoning concludes in an intention, while others suggest it concludes in a belief with normative content, such as a belief about what one has conclusive, or sufficient, reason to do. In this paper, I argue that we should allow that practical reasoning could conclude in either an intention or a belief with normative content. I begin by developing an objection to the Aristotelian Thesis, showing how the objection will not also undermine the possibility of practical reasoning concluding in an intention or a belief. I then respond to an argument from Joseph Raz designed to exclude the possibility of intentions as conclusions of practical reasoning. Lastly, I show how the worry that belief isn't sufficiently "practical" to qualify as a conclusion of practical reasoning is misplaced. According to the Aristotelian Thesis, the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. Defenders of this thesis hold that it provides a way of distinguishing theoretical from practical reasoning: whereas theoretical reasoning concludes in a belief, practical reasoning concludes in an action. They will concede the possibility of theoretical reasoning about a practical subject matter-for instance, my reasoning to some belief about how I, or someone else, ought to act in a particular set of circumstances, perhaps even the very circumstances in which I now find myself. However, Aristotelians insist that such reasoning isn't, strictly speaking, practical reasoning if it doesn't issue in an action. Rather, it's merely theoretical reasoning about a practical subject matter. Several philosophers, including Elizabeth Anscombe, have attributed the thesis to Aristotle, and there are passages in Aristotle's work which suggest that he would endorse it. 1 But I'm going to leave aside the question of how to interpret Aristotle. There are enough contemporary defenders of the Aristotelian Thesis-including
Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have defended a view of good reasoning according to which good reas... more Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have defended a view of good reasoning according to which good reasoning is explained in terms of the preservation of fittingness. I argue that their Fittingness View is incorrect. Not all fittingness-preserving transitions in thought are instances of good reasoning.
In this essay, we'll consider the relationship between metaethics (see Metaethics) and ethics... more In this essay, we'll consider the relationship between metaethics (see Metaethics) and ethics. Specifically, we'll consider the question of whether philosophers can answer questions within metaethics while remaining neutral on substantive questions within ethics. We'll outline and evaluate some recent challenges to the idea that metaethics can remain neutral with respect to ethical issues. Keywords: cognitivism; emotivism; ethics; metaethics; methodology; normative ethics; objectivity; realism
Cognitivism about practical rationality is the view that some rational requirements governing int... more Cognitivism about practical rationality is the view that some rational requirements governing intentions can be explained by the rational requirements governing beliefs. Cognitivists tend to focus on two requirements of practical rationality in particular: a consistency requirement on intentions, and a requirement of means-ends coherence. Cognitivism about these practical requirements might seem promising. After all, we're very comfortable speaking of consistency and coherence requirements governing beliefs. And many have thought that intentions involve beliefs in some way. And so it's natural to think that the rational requirements governing those involved beliefs might explain the rational requirements governing those intentions. To get a sense of how such an explanation might go, consider how a cognitivist might explain a simplified version of a consistency requirement governing intentions, Intention Consistency: Rationality requires that [if one intends to X, then one does not intend not to X]. 1 The cognitivist could first point to a similar consistency requirement governing beliefs: Belief Consistency: Rationality requires that [if one believes that P, then one does not believe that ~P]. And she could then defend a thesis about the way intentions involve beliefs: Strong Belief Thesis: Intending to X involves believing that one will X. If the Strong Belief Thesis is true, whenever one intends to X and intends not to X, one has inconsistent beliefs about what one will do: a belief that one will X and a belief that one will not X. This suggests that Intention Consistency can be explained by Belief Consistency and the Strong Belief Thesis: it's irrational to have inconsistent intentions because, in doing so, you'll have inconsistent beliefs about what you will do, which is irrational. This is a simplified version of a consistency requirement on intentions since rationality requires not just that our intentions be consistent with one another, but also that they be consistent with our beliefs. For example, I would be irrational if I intended to travel to New York this afternoon and intended to travel to San Francisco this afternoon, while believing that if I travel to New York this afternoon, I won't travel to San Francisco this afternoon. But the cognitivist employing the Strong Belief Thesis will have no trouble here since the associated beliefs-that I'll travel to New York this afternoon, that I'll travel to San Francisco this afternoon, and that if I travel to New York this afternoon, I won't travel to San Francisco this afternoon-are jointly inconsistent. Cognitivist approaches to practical rationality have both their defenders (including Gilbert Harman, David Velleman, Jay Wallace, and Kieran Setiya) and their critics (most notably, Michael Bratman). 2 In this paper, I'm going to follow the trend in the literature and focus in particular on the prospects for cognitivism about means-ends coherence (also often referred to as "instrumental rationality"). Means-ends coherence, roughly speaking, requires that we intend the means we think are necessary for achieving our ends. For instance, a requirement of means-ends coherence prohibits me from intending to travel to New York this afternoon, believing I'll travel to New York this afternoon only if I intend to buy an airplane ticket, but not intending to buy an airplane ticket. 3 Someone who finds herself with this prohibited combination of attitudes could escape in three ways: coming to intend the means of buying the ticket, giving up her end of travelling to New York this afternoon, or revising her instrumental belief. So far as the requirement of means-ends coherence is concerned, there is no specific way one must proceed. For this reason, the requirement is often formulated as a wide-scope requirement, in that "requires" ranges over a conditional: Means-Ends Coherence: Rationality requires that [if one intends to E, and believes that one will E only if one intends to M, then one intends to M]. 4 This formulation is no doubt in need of further refinement. 5 But since the details won't matter here-except for a brief point I'll make in §2.3-we can work with this rough formulation. I'll start (§1) by considering the prospects for a cognitivist account of Means-Ends Coherence that appeals to the Strong Belief Thesis. I'll argue we should reject such accounts since the Strong Belief Thesis is either false or it's restricted in such a way that it can't do the explanatory work the cognitivist needs it to do. I then (§2) consider the prospects for a cognitivist account that doesn't appeal to the Strong Belief Thesis, but instead to some weaker thesis about the connection between intention and belief. I start with Wallace's cognitivist account, present two objections to it, and then present an account that's similar but avoids these objections. I defend the key assumptions of this account, and argue it's the best available cognitivist account of Means-Ends Coherence. However, the best isn't good enough. I argue (§3) that while cognitivists might be able to show that every instance of means-ends incoherence involves incoherence in belief, they haven't established that the theoretical requirements explain the practical ones. I argue that there are two reasons to doubt cognitivism's explanatory thesis. First, we should expect a theory that explains Means-Ends Coherence to also be able to explain
Philosophers have often noted a contrast between practical and theoretical reasons when it comes ... more Philosophers have often noted a contrast between practical and theoretical reasons when it comes to cases involving equally balanced reasons. When there are strong practical reasons for A-ing, and equally strong practical reasons for some incompatible option, B-ing, the agent is permitted to make an arbitrary choice between them, having sufficient reason to A and sufficient reason to B. But when there is strong evidence for P and equally strong evidence for ~P, one isn’t permitted to simply believe one or the other. Instead, one must withhold belief, neither believing that P nor believing that ~P. This paper examines what explains this contrast, focusing in particular on a proposal recently developed by Mark Schroeder across several papers. Schroeder aims to explain the contrast by an appeal to non-evidential, epistemic reasons against belief. But, I argue, it’s not clear exactly what those reasons are, nor how those reasons are to be weighed against evidential reasons. Despite these challenges, I argue that there are grounds for optimism that the contrast can be explained within the broad framework Schroeder provides, and I aim to provide resources to meet the aforementioned challenges.
This entry considers the question of whether rationality is normative; that is, the question of w... more This entry considers the question of whether rationality is normative; that is, the question of whether one always ought (or, more weakly, has a reason) to be rational. It first distinguishes substantive from structural rationality, noting how structural rationality presents a more serious challenge to the thesis that rationality is normative. It then considers the plausibility of skepticism about structural rationality, and notes some problems facing such skepticism. However, if we are not skeptics about structural requirements, we face the task of formulating those requirements. But both narrow-scope and wide-scope formulations seem incompatible with the idea that we always ought to be rational. This suggests that we have good reason to think that rationality is not strongly normative.
According to the Reasoning View, a normative reason to f is a premise in a pattern of sound reaso... more According to the Reasoning View, a normative reason to f is a premise in a pattern of sound reasoning leading to the conclusion to f. But how should the Reasoning View account for reasons that are outweighed? One very promising proposal is to appeal to defeasible reasoning. On this proposal, when a reason is outweighed, the associated pattern of sound reasoning is defeated. Both Jonathan Way and Sam Asarnow have recently developed this idea in different ways. I argue that this appeal to defeasible reasoning faces a challenge, since reasons can be both outweighed and disabled. Way's view generates good predictions about outweighed reasons, but not about disabled reasons. Asarnow's view generates good predictions about disabled reasons, but not about outweighed reasons. We want a version of the Reasoning View that can generate good predictions about both. I present a version of the Reasoning View that can meet the challenge.
There are two well-known formulations of the diachronic rational requirement of intention persist... more There are two well-known formulations of the diachronic rational requirement of intention persistence, due to Michael Bratman and John Broome. I argue in this paper that both formulations face serious difficulties. Bratman's formulation is unable to accommodate two different kinds of examples in which it is permissible to drop an intention even though one's assessment of the adequacy of its reasons remains constant. Broome's formulation is both too weak and too strong, unable to rule out the unlicensed reconsideration of intentions, while at the same time disallowing valuable spontaneous shifts in intentions. I propose a new formulation, Intention Persistence, that avoids these difficulties and has other advantages.
According to the Aristotelian Thesis, the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. Critics... more According to the Aristotelian Thesis, the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. Critics argue against it by pointing to cases in which some interference or inability prevents the production of action, yet in which that interference or inability doesn't impugn the success of an agent's reasoning. Some of those critics suggest instead that practical reasoning concludes in an intention, while others suggest it concludes in a belief with normative content, such as a belief about what one has conclusive, or sufficient, reason to do. In this paper, I argue that we should allow that practical reasoning could conclude in either an intention or a belief with normative content. I begin by developing an objection to the Aristotelian Thesis, showing how the objection will not also undermine the possibility of practical reasoning concluding in an intention or a belief. I then respond to an argument from Joseph Raz designed to exclude the possibility of intentions as conclusions of practical reasoning. Lastly, I show how the worry that belief isn't sufficiently "practical" to qualify as a conclusion of practical reasoning is misplaced.
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16(2), 2019
Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have defended a view of good reasoning according to which good reas... more Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have defended a view of good reasoning according to which good reasoning is explained in terms of the preservation of fittingness. I argue that their Fittingness View is incorrect. Not all fittingness-preserving transitions in thought are instances of good reasoning.
This is the penultimate draft of an entry forthcoming in the International Encyclopedia of Ethics... more This is the penultimate draft of an entry forthcoming in the International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Please cite the published version. Rationality and Normativity John Brunero Suppose I point out to some person some way in which he's irrational (see Rationality). Perhaps I show him how his beliefs about the outcome of the recent election are the product of wishful thinking and fly in the face of the available evidence. Or perhaps I show him how his resistance to getting vaccinated is based on a poor calculation of the expected costs and benefits of doing so. Or perhaps I point out how his theological beliefs are full of inconsistencies. Or perhaps I show him how he's instrumentally irrational in intending (see Intention) to pass his final exams, believing that studying is necessary for passing, and yet not intending to study. Or perhaps I point out how he's akratic (see Weakness of Will) in believing that he ought to get some exercise, but not intending to do so. Most likely, he'll take offense. (Criticizing people for being irrational isn't a good way to make friends.) And he'll likely try to show that the criticism is misplaced-that the inconsistencies are only apparent, that there's really a rational basis for refusing the shot, and so forth. If I'm lucky enough to convince him at the end of the day that there is indeed some way in which he's irrational, that's likely to bring about some change of mind-perhaps leading him to resolve the inconsistencies in his theological beliefs, or make more prudent decisions about his health, and so forth. What he's not likely to do is to concede that the criticism is on target, but then shrug it off by saying something like, "I'm irrational. So what? What reason do I have to be rational?" That would certainly strike us, at least at a first glance, as an odd reply. But it's not clear exactly what's wrong with that dismissive reply. It won't help for us to say in response that rationality issues requirements-in particular, that it requires that our beliefs be responsive to the available evidence, and requires that our beliefs be consistent, and so forth. That's because the person making the dismissive reply would then simply ask why he should care about those requirements. After all, there are all sorts of requirements. Fashion requires that you not wear socks with sandals. The precepts of Roman Catholicism require that you attend Mass on Sundays. But you might reasonably wonder, as you are out for your Sunday walk in your socks and sandals, whether there's any reason to care about those requirements. Our "rationality skeptic" might just insist that the requirements of rationality are on a par with the requirements of fashion and Catholicism. He might demand that we provide some reason to take the requirements of rationality seriously (Kolodny 2005). The challenge posed by the skeptic who asks "Why be rational?" might have a familiar ring to it. The well-known debate over moral rationalism (see Rationalism in Ethics) is traditionally set up as an attempt to respond to a skeptic about moral requirements who asks, "Why be Moral?" (see Why be Moral?). This skeptic fully understands what the requirements of morality are, but he's looking for some reason to comply with those requirements. Likewise, our imagined skeptic fully understands what the requirements of rationality are, but he's looking for some reason to comply with those requirements. Those philosophers who think that this skeptical challenge can be met-that is, those who believe in what's come to be known as the "normativity of rationality" (see Normativity)-will aim to provide the skeptic with those reasons. In defending the normativity of any set of requirements-be they requirements of morality, rationality, or fashion-one could adopt one of two views. First, one could hold that the requirements are weakly normative-that is, one could hold that there is always a reason (see Reasons; Reasons, Motivating and Normative) for compliance with the relevant requirements, but that reason could be outweighed by competing reasons. When that reason is outweighed, it wouldn't be the case that one ought (see Ought) to do what is required. Second, one could hold that the requirements are strongly normative-that is, one could hold that there is always a reason for compliance with the relevant
Philosophers have often noted a contrast between practical and theoretical reasons when it comes ... more Philosophers have often noted a contrast between practical and theoretical reasons when it comes to cases involving equally balanced reasons. When there are strong practical reasons for A-ing, and equally strong practical reasons for some incompatible option, B-ing, the agent is permitted to make an arbitrary choice between them, having sufficient reason to A and sufficient reason to B. But when there is strong evidence for P and equally strong evidence for ~P, one isn't permitted to simply believe one or the other. Instead, one must withhold belief, neither believing that P nor believing that ~P. This paper examines what explains this contrast, focusing in particular on a proposal recently developed by Mark Schroeder across several papers. Schroeder aims to explain the contrast by an appeal to non-evidential, epistemic reasons against belief. But, I argue, it's not clear exactly what those reasons are, nor how those reasons are to be weighed against evidential reasons. Despite these challenges, I argue that there are grounds for optimism that the contrast can be explained within the broad framework Schroeder provides, and I aim to provide resources to meet the aforementioned challenges. There's a common contrast drawn between practical and theoretical reasons. 1 In cases in which the relevant practical reasons are equally balanced 2 , with strong reasons in support of two incompatible options-say, A-ing and B-ing-it's permissible for an agent to decide between them. In such cases, there would be sufficient reason for the agent to A and sufficient reason for the agent to B. When Buridan's ass is between two equidistant, equally good, bales of hay, it's permissible for it to head toward the one on the left, and permissible for it to head toward the one on the right. In contrast, in cases in which the relevant theoretical reasons are equally balanced, with strong evidence in support of two incompatible propositions-say, P and ~P-it's not permissible for someone to believe one or the other; instead, the proper response is to withhold belief, neither believing that P nor believing that ~P. In this case, the agent would lack sufficient reason to believe that P and lack sufficient reason to believe that ~P. To borrow terminology introduced by Selim Berker, practical reasons display
The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence, 2020
The paper develops two objections to Michael Bratman’s self-governance approach to the normativit... more The paper develops two objections to Michael Bratman’s self-governance approach to the normativity of rational requirements. Bratman, drawing upon work by Harry Frankfurt, argues that having a place where one stands is a necessary, constitutive element of self-governance, and that violations of the consistency and coherence requirements on intentions make one lack a place where one stands. This allows for reasons of self-governance to ground reasons to comply with these rational requirements, thereby vindicating the normativity of rationality. The first objection is that the account under-generates reasons, since not all cases of incoherence will involve a failure to have a place where one stands. The second objection is that the account over-generates reasons: we would have strong reasons to avoid both incoherence and ambivalence. However, if we follow Frankfurt in thinking that ambivalence is a “disease of the will” that is as irrational as having contradictory beliefs, this second objection doesn’t get off the ground. Thus, the first part of the paper is devoted to explaining why Frankfurt’s argument for the irrationality of ambivalence fails
This volume is a collection of eleven essays by Mark Schroeder, including one previously unpublis... more This volume is a collection of eleven essays by Mark Schroeder, including one previously unpublished paper, divided into four parts. Schroeder's substantive introduction to the volume explains the unifying argumentative thread running through these essays and will be useful even to those who have read the essays
According to the Reasoning View, a normative reason to φ is a premise in a pattern of sound reaso... more According to the Reasoning View, a normative reason to φ is a premise in a pattern of sound reasoning leading to the conclusion to φ. But how should the Reasoning View account for reasons that are outweighed? One very promising proposal is to appeal to defeasible reasoning. On this proposal, when a reason is outweighed, the associated pattern of sound reasoning is defeated. Both Jonathan Way and Sam Asarnow have recently developed this idea in different ways. I argue that this appeal to defeasible reasoning faces a challenge, since reasons can be both outweighed and disabled. Way's view generates good predictions about outweighed reasons, but not about disabled reasons. Asarnow's view generates good predictions about disabled reasons, but not about outweighed reasons. We want a version of the Reasoning View that can generate good predictions about both. I present a version of the Reasoning View that can meet the challenge.
This chapter assesses analyses of normative reasons that appeal to the concepts of evidence or ex... more This chapter assesses analyses of normative reasons that appeal to the concepts of evidence or explanation along with some other normative concept. One influential analysis holds that some fact is a reason for an agent to ϕ if and only if that fact is evidence she ought to ϕ. I argue that, despite the many advantages of this proposal, there are cases of facts which are reasons to ϕ but aren’t evidence one ought to ϕ, and cases of facts which are evidence one ought to ϕ but aren’t reasons to ϕ. Others have analyzed reasons in terms of explanations: perhaps a reason for an agent to ϕ is a fact which explains why she ought to ϕ, or a fact which figures in a “weighing explanation,” or a fact which explains why her ϕ-ing would be good in some respect. There are difficulties facing all three of these proposals.
According to the Aristotelian Thesis, the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. Critics... more According to the Aristotelian Thesis, the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. Critics argue against it by pointing to cases in which some interference or inability prevents the production of action, yet in which that interference or inability doesn't impugn the success of an agent's reasoning. Some of those critics suggest instead that practical reasoning concludes in an intention, while others suggest it concludes in a belief with normative content, such as a belief about what one has conclusive, or sufficient, reason to do. In this paper, I argue that we should allow that practical reasoning could conclude in either an intention or a belief with normative content. I begin by developing an objection to the Aristotelian Thesis, showing how the objection will not also undermine the possibility of practical reasoning concluding in an intention or a belief. I then respond to an argument from Joseph Raz designed to exclude the possibility of intentions as conclusions of practical reasoning. Lastly, I show how the worry that belief isn't sufficiently "practical" to qualify as a conclusion of practical reasoning is misplaced. According to the Aristotelian Thesis, the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. Defenders of this thesis hold that it provides a way of distinguishing theoretical from practical reasoning: whereas theoretical reasoning concludes in a belief, practical reasoning concludes in an action. They will concede the possibility of theoretical reasoning about a practical subject matter-for instance, my reasoning to some belief about how I, or someone else, ought to act in a particular set of circumstances, perhaps even the very circumstances in which I now find myself. However, Aristotelians insist that such reasoning isn't, strictly speaking, practical reasoning if it doesn't issue in an action. Rather, it's merely theoretical reasoning about a practical subject matter. Several philosophers, including Elizabeth Anscombe, have attributed the thesis to Aristotle, and there are passages in Aristotle's work which suggest that he would endorse it. 1 But I'm going to leave aside the question of how to interpret Aristotle. There are enough contemporary defenders of the Aristotelian Thesis-including
Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have defended a view of good reasoning according to which good reas... more Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have defended a view of good reasoning according to which good reasoning is explained in terms of the preservation of fittingness. I argue that their Fittingness View is incorrect. Not all fittingness-preserving transitions in thought are instances of good reasoning.
In this essay, we'll consider the relationship between metaethics (see Metaethics) and ethics... more In this essay, we'll consider the relationship between metaethics (see Metaethics) and ethics. Specifically, we'll consider the question of whether philosophers can answer questions within metaethics while remaining neutral on substantive questions within ethics. We'll outline and evaluate some recent challenges to the idea that metaethics can remain neutral with respect to ethical issues. Keywords: cognitivism; emotivism; ethics; metaethics; methodology; normative ethics; objectivity; realism
Cognitivism about practical rationality is the view that some rational requirements governing int... more Cognitivism about practical rationality is the view that some rational requirements governing intentions can be explained by the rational requirements governing beliefs. Cognitivists tend to focus on two requirements of practical rationality in particular: a consistency requirement on intentions, and a requirement of means-ends coherence. Cognitivism about these practical requirements might seem promising. After all, we're very comfortable speaking of consistency and coherence requirements governing beliefs. And many have thought that intentions involve beliefs in some way. And so it's natural to think that the rational requirements governing those involved beliefs might explain the rational requirements governing those intentions. To get a sense of how such an explanation might go, consider how a cognitivist might explain a simplified version of a consistency requirement governing intentions, Intention Consistency: Rationality requires that [if one intends to X, then one does not intend not to X]. 1 The cognitivist could first point to a similar consistency requirement governing beliefs: Belief Consistency: Rationality requires that [if one believes that P, then one does not believe that ~P]. And she could then defend a thesis about the way intentions involve beliefs: Strong Belief Thesis: Intending to X involves believing that one will X. If the Strong Belief Thesis is true, whenever one intends to X and intends not to X, one has inconsistent beliefs about what one will do: a belief that one will X and a belief that one will not X. This suggests that Intention Consistency can be explained by Belief Consistency and the Strong Belief Thesis: it's irrational to have inconsistent intentions because, in doing so, you'll have inconsistent beliefs about what you will do, which is irrational. This is a simplified version of a consistency requirement on intentions since rationality requires not just that our intentions be consistent with one another, but also that they be consistent with our beliefs. For example, I would be irrational if I intended to travel to New York this afternoon and intended to travel to San Francisco this afternoon, while believing that if I travel to New York this afternoon, I won't travel to San Francisco this afternoon. But the cognitivist employing the Strong Belief Thesis will have no trouble here since the associated beliefs-that I'll travel to New York this afternoon, that I'll travel to San Francisco this afternoon, and that if I travel to New York this afternoon, I won't travel to San Francisco this afternoon-are jointly inconsistent. Cognitivist approaches to practical rationality have both their defenders (including Gilbert Harman, David Velleman, Jay Wallace, and Kieran Setiya) and their critics (most notably, Michael Bratman). 2 In this paper, I'm going to follow the trend in the literature and focus in particular on the prospects for cognitivism about means-ends coherence (also often referred to as "instrumental rationality"). Means-ends coherence, roughly speaking, requires that we intend the means we think are necessary for achieving our ends. For instance, a requirement of means-ends coherence prohibits me from intending to travel to New York this afternoon, believing I'll travel to New York this afternoon only if I intend to buy an airplane ticket, but not intending to buy an airplane ticket. 3 Someone who finds herself with this prohibited combination of attitudes could escape in three ways: coming to intend the means of buying the ticket, giving up her end of travelling to New York this afternoon, or revising her instrumental belief. So far as the requirement of means-ends coherence is concerned, there is no specific way one must proceed. For this reason, the requirement is often formulated as a wide-scope requirement, in that "requires" ranges over a conditional: Means-Ends Coherence: Rationality requires that [if one intends to E, and believes that one will E only if one intends to M, then one intends to M]. 4 This formulation is no doubt in need of further refinement. 5 But since the details won't matter here-except for a brief point I'll make in §2.3-we can work with this rough formulation. I'll start (§1) by considering the prospects for a cognitivist account of Means-Ends Coherence that appeals to the Strong Belief Thesis. I'll argue we should reject such accounts since the Strong Belief Thesis is either false or it's restricted in such a way that it can't do the explanatory work the cognitivist needs it to do. I then (§2) consider the prospects for a cognitivist account that doesn't appeal to the Strong Belief Thesis, but instead to some weaker thesis about the connection between intention and belief. I start with Wallace's cognitivist account, present two objections to it, and then present an account that's similar but avoids these objections. I defend the key assumptions of this account, and argue it's the best available cognitivist account of Means-Ends Coherence. However, the best isn't good enough. I argue (§3) that while cognitivists might be able to show that every instance of means-ends incoherence involves incoherence in belief, they haven't established that the theoretical requirements explain the practical ones. I argue that there are two reasons to doubt cognitivism's explanatory thesis. First, we should expect a theory that explains Means-Ends Coherence to also be able to explain
Philosophers have often noted a contrast between practical and theoretical reasons when it comes ... more Philosophers have often noted a contrast between practical and theoretical reasons when it comes to cases involving equally balanced reasons. When there are strong practical reasons for A-ing, and equally strong practical reasons for some incompatible option, B-ing, the agent is permitted to make an arbitrary choice between them, having sufficient reason to A and sufficient reason to B. But when there is strong evidence for P and equally strong evidence for ~P, one isn’t permitted to simply believe one or the other. Instead, one must withhold belief, neither believing that P nor believing that ~P. This paper examines what explains this contrast, focusing in particular on a proposal recently developed by Mark Schroeder across several papers. Schroeder aims to explain the contrast by an appeal to non-evidential, epistemic reasons against belief. But, I argue, it’s not clear exactly what those reasons are, nor how those reasons are to be weighed against evidential reasons. Despite these challenges, I argue that there are grounds for optimism that the contrast can be explained within the broad framework Schroeder provides, and I aim to provide resources to meet the aforementioned challenges.
This entry considers the question of whether rationality is normative; that is, the question of w... more This entry considers the question of whether rationality is normative; that is, the question of whether one always ought (or, more weakly, has a reason) to be rational. It first distinguishes substantive from structural rationality, noting how structural rationality presents a more serious challenge to the thesis that rationality is normative. It then considers the plausibility of skepticism about structural rationality, and notes some problems facing such skepticism. However, if we are not skeptics about structural requirements, we face the task of formulating those requirements. But both narrow-scope and wide-scope formulations seem incompatible with the idea that we always ought to be rational. This suggests that we have good reason to think that rationality is not strongly normative.
According to the Reasoning View, a normative reason to f is a premise in a pattern of sound reaso... more According to the Reasoning View, a normative reason to f is a premise in a pattern of sound reasoning leading to the conclusion to f. But how should the Reasoning View account for reasons that are outweighed? One very promising proposal is to appeal to defeasible reasoning. On this proposal, when a reason is outweighed, the associated pattern of sound reasoning is defeated. Both Jonathan Way and Sam Asarnow have recently developed this idea in different ways. I argue that this appeal to defeasible reasoning faces a challenge, since reasons can be both outweighed and disabled. Way's view generates good predictions about outweighed reasons, but not about disabled reasons. Asarnow's view generates good predictions about disabled reasons, but not about outweighed reasons. We want a version of the Reasoning View that can generate good predictions about both. I present a version of the Reasoning View that can meet the challenge.
There are two well-known formulations of the diachronic rational requirement of intention persist... more There are two well-known formulations of the diachronic rational requirement of intention persistence, due to Michael Bratman and John Broome. I argue in this paper that both formulations face serious difficulties. Bratman's formulation is unable to accommodate two different kinds of examples in which it is permissible to drop an intention even though one's assessment of the adequacy of its reasons remains constant. Broome's formulation is both too weak and too strong, unable to rule out the unlicensed reconsideration of intentions, while at the same time disallowing valuable spontaneous shifts in intentions. I propose a new formulation, Intention Persistence, that avoids these difficulties and has other advantages.
According to the Aristotelian Thesis, the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. Critics... more According to the Aristotelian Thesis, the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. Critics argue against it by pointing to cases in which some interference or inability prevents the production of action, yet in which that interference or inability doesn't impugn the success of an agent's reasoning. Some of those critics suggest instead that practical reasoning concludes in an intention, while others suggest it concludes in a belief with normative content, such as a belief about what one has conclusive, or sufficient, reason to do. In this paper, I argue that we should allow that practical reasoning could conclude in either an intention or a belief with normative content. I begin by developing an objection to the Aristotelian Thesis, showing how the objection will not also undermine the possibility of practical reasoning concluding in an intention or a belief. I then respond to an argument from Joseph Raz designed to exclude the possibility of intentions as conclusions of practical reasoning. Lastly, I show how the worry that belief isn't sufficiently "practical" to qualify as a conclusion of practical reasoning is misplaced.
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16(2), 2019
Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have defended a view of good reasoning according to which good reas... more Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have defended a view of good reasoning according to which good reasoning is explained in terms of the preservation of fittingness. I argue that their Fittingness View is incorrect. Not all fittingness-preserving transitions in thought are instances of good reasoning.
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