I’ve been told that there are two principal approaches to drawing figures from life. One begins b... more I’ve been told that there are two principal approaches to drawing figures from life. One begins by tracing an outline of the figure to be drawn, locating its edges and key features on an imagined grid, and then using perspective to fill in depth. The other approach proceeds from the ‘center of mass’ of the subject, seeking to build up the image by supplying contour lines, the intersections of which convey depth— as if the representation were being created in relief. The second approach need not adopt a unified perspective, and is more concerned with evoking the volume and ‘presence’ of the subject than with accurate placement of edges and features. Call this second approach drawing ‘from the inside out’, meant to capture the living force of the subject rather than freeze it in a coordinate frame. I sometimes feel that those of us who hanker after system in ethics tend to opt unconsciously for the first approach, tracing the outlines of moral practice from the outside and setting it ...
Ralph Wedgwood has, almost single-handedly, attempted to shoulder the burden that critics of Plat... more Ralph Wedgwood has, almost single-handedly, attempted to shoulder the burden that critics of Platonic non-naturalism have laid at its feet for years. If there are irreducible, non-natural normative facts, properties, and relations, critics have pressed, just where are they in the order of things? And if they are outside the natural, causal order, how can we come to know them, or refer to them, or be necessarily moved by them? The standard answer, "These facts are known a priori, by rational intuition", has only deepened the mystery. For, as Kant pointed out, normative truths would have substantive implications for thought and action, and so must be synthetic rather than analytic. But how could purely rational a priori intuition deliver knowledge of such truths? Wedgwood finds the Intuitionists' self-assurance about their contact with normative reality not much better than magical thinking, and therefore seeks to offer a fundamental philosophical explanation of "the nature of normative facts, properties, and relations" that provides an illuminating, recognizably Platonic response to these worries. Aware of the constraints imposed upon metaphysical accounts of the normative by supervenience, Wedgwood also aims to work within the assumptions of what he calls "moderate naturalism", according to which all the contingent facts in the world contingent normative facts included are "realized in facts of the sort that are studied by the natural sciences and physics". No brief commentary can do justice to the full sweep and ingenuity of The Nature of Normativity. Here I will confine myself to some of the issues that are the central focus of Part II, which is presented as the metaphysical portion of the story. However, the intricate, interlocking nature of this story will require me to venture a bit into the semantic and epistemological concerns that take up Parts I and III.
Our notion of normativity appears to combine, in a way difficult to understand but seemingly fami... more Our notion of normativity appears to combine, in a way difficult to understand but seemingly familiar from experience, elements of force and freedom. On the one hand, a normative claim is thought to have a kind of compelling authority; on the other hand, if our respecting it is to be an appropriate species of respect, it must not be coerced, automatic, or trivially guaranteed by definition. Both Hume and Kant, I argue, looked to aesthetic experience as a convincing example exhibiting this marriage of force and freedom, as well as showing how our judgment can come to be properly attuned to the features that constitute value. This image of attunement carries over into their respective accounts of moral judgment. The seemingly radical difference between their moral theories may be traceable not to a different conception of normativity, but to a difference in their empirical psychological theories -a difference we can readily spot in their accounts of aesthetics.
please do not circulate without permission are"-would surely help. And fortunately, we have a lot... more please do not circulate without permission are"-would surely help. And fortunately, we have a lot to say about this-though no consensus exists, a number of systematic, well-developed accounts of rationality in belief are on offer. What about the agent's desires-"whatever they are"? 1 As co-equal participants in shaping dispositions to act, must they, too, show a modicum of rationality? That sounds reasonable enough. After all, in everyday life we often attribute the irrationality of an act-our own or that of another-less to irrational beliefs than to irrationality in the desires that shaped or motivated it. In clinical practice, likewise. Such desires might be arbitrary, groundless, obsessive, phobic, infantile, compulsive, delusive, incorrigible, uncontrollable, disproportionate, self-defeating, distorted by mood or emotion, …-it is a very long list. 2 1 At the outset, I will follow conventional usage among philosophers and treat the term desire as a generic term for motivating states of all sorts-from bare urges and appetites to considered preferences and goals. Aversions, too. Later I will identify something more specific for desires to be. Calling these forms of irrationality in desire seems about as natural as saying that arbitrariness, groundlessness, obsession, phobia, immaturity, compulsion, etc. are forms of irrationality in belief. Moreover, even though those of us who have (what would normally be called) irrational desires typically also have associated irrational beliefs, it does not seem that we can reduce all forms of irrationality in desire to irrationalities in belief. In many cases, it seems the other way 'round-irrationality in desire is driving irrationality in belief. Neither do all apparently irrational desires derive from false beliefs. Individuals in the grip of addictive or compulsive desire can have a frighteningly clear view of their situation.
Morality is differentbut how? Moral judgement certainly differs in various ways from ordinary jud... more Morality is differentbut how? Moral judgement certainly differs in various ways from ordinary judgement about the garden-variety objects in the world around us. A distinguished line of philosophers have argued that these differences are crystallised in a difference in the ver). nature and function of moral language. And yet grammar textbooks make no mention of a systematic distinction between moral and non-moral language, evcn at the level of deep structure. Indeed, moral language docs not in its grammatical or logical bchaviour betray the least sign of being anything other than ordinary. Increasingly, philosophers are inclined to take this at face value. Moral judgements, for example, are held to make assertions that can be true or false in our ordinary sense of these terms. Increasingly, too, philosophers are inclined to accept all the platitudes that follow from this. Thus, since 'truth is correspondence to the facts', moral truth is correspondence to the facts, too. Ordinary discourse supports us here: 'The fact is that I've promised to go and so I'm obliged to be there' is not a quirky way of expressing oneself. It even is deemed harmless to countenance talk of 'moral properties' (in ordinary speech one would more likely hear 'moral qualities') and 'moral facts' ('moral circumstances'). This sort of talk seems to assume nothing about whether such properties or facts are sui generis, for example. Perhaps, then, morality is different but moral discourse as such is not. And perhaps our willingness to talk in terms of moral properties and facts simply registers our readiness to apply the terms 'true' and 'false' to moral judgements. As such, it might be considered innocent of any significant metaphysical implications. Its real basis would be seen as lying in our discursive practices in morality, our tendencies to deliberate and disagree in distinctive ways -to make arguments, to insist upon consistency, to adduce evidence, and so on, Beyond this, no purported insight into the real composition of the world is claimed. If moral judgement is therefore factual in a thorough-going but ' I a m indebted hcrr to Gidron Roscn. Src P. Kailton and C. Rosen, 'Realism'. in J. Kim iilld E. Sosil ( t d s . ) . T/w Hlrukwuli C m / m h lo .\/?/o/i/!prif\ (0sfi)rtl: Hlarktvcll. 1991). The bcst-known cxamplc o f a n rrror throry in the moral caw is that ofJ. I.. Mackir, ELhic.c: lnvenlznl Rzghf and W'ron'q (1.ondon: Prnguin, 197i). '' It is not important hcrc whcthcr wc undcrstand thcsc judgcmcnts as absolutc or prima Jarie. Evcn a moral rcalist can, for cxamplr, cspousc a thcory ofprimafucie moral reasons, or a @ Rlackwell Puhlishers I.td. 19% ' Obviously, i t would not hclp at this point to cmbracc a global anti-realism about factual discourse, sincc prcciscly thc idca is to work out whcn a realist attitudc toward a factual domain ofdiscoursc is srnsiblc and whcn not. ' None, according to somc commrntators. Scc for cxamplc G. Say-McCord's introduction to his E.r.iuyr on Moral Realism (Ithaca: Cornell Univrrsity Press, 1989).
Moral thought and feeling are integral to how we see ourselves, how we live, and how we understan... more Moral thought and feeling are integral to how we see ourselves, how we live, and how we understand one another. Yet morality itself remains in many ways hard to understand. We speak of it as if it were a domain of knowledge, but what sort of knowledge could this be, and how would we acquire or test it? We appeal to it as if it afforded an objective standard for criticism and justification, rising above the level of personal aims or local custom, but what ground can we point to if asked to back this up? And we see it as having significant action-guiding force or normative authority, yet find it no easy matter to explain what this means, much less what would account for it. Small wonder Kant took seriously the worry that moral notions might covertly be based in ''mere high-flown fantasy.'' The essays collected in Facts, Values, and Norms attempt to make morality a bit more understandable, and thereby a bit less vulnerable to skepticism. They do so within what strives to be a coherent framework for meta-ethics and normative ethics, a form of naturalistic realism that treats moral inquiry as continuous in method with empirical science. Many philosophers believe, I know, that such a view is wrong-headed from the outset. Whatever morality is, they argue, it is not an empirical theory of anything -morality's character and methods belong to practical rather than theoretical reason. I believe that such criticisms run together things we do with moral language -express commitment, claim authority, guide action, exert sanctions -with what moral claims literally say such that moral discourse could sustain such uses.
I will argue that we humans are built for inequality. Inequality across individuals, to be sure. ... more I will argue that we humans are built for inequality. Inequality across individuals, to be sure. We are descended from social apes for whom group membership, group exclusion, and social hierarchy are fundamental facts of life. But in an especially deep sense, I want to suggest, we are built for inequality across time. Some puzzles about well-being-at least, the sort of well-being that appears to matter to people when asked about their current feelings or overall satisfaction with their lives-can be resolved in light of this profound fact about us. The upshot is, I believe, that some rethinking is needed in ethics about both equality and well-being. Better understanding the sources of our motives and of our sense of well-being, and the ways in which our aspirations, motives and wellbeing are tied to inequality will, I think, lessen in some ways the moral importance of equality as such. It will likewise shift the way we should think about the relation of morality to well-beingwhether one is a consequentialist, like myself, or simply someone who recognizes a prima facie duty of beneficence or self-concern. Consequentialism has always, I believe, been a good candidate for "a morality of respect for persons". One interesting result of the reflections below, if sound, is that this case can be made even stronger. All this sounds impossibly ambitious. It is. To begin, I'd like to express a few reservations about the notion that equality has intrinsic moral or non-moral value. Equality of material well-being. Imagine two worlds, Favored World Alpha and Favored World Beta, far distant from one another but not entirely outside the bounds of possible causal contact. They have no knowledge of one another. Alpha and Beta are favored worlds because fortune has smiled upon them. The inhabitants have more than enough to meet their needs, plenty enough to satisfy their wants, and yet more besides. Life on both Alpha and Beta has its usual ups and downs, of course, and there are illness, injury, death, and broken hearts in both worlds. But the level of misfortune and misery in each is about as low as one could imagine attaining with a population of intelligent beings with tender feelings. Turns out, people in Beta have a 1% higher material standard of living than those in Alpha. Perhaps a slightly higher proportion of Beta-dwellers has a strong interest in material production and accumulation. They have a slightly different work-leisure trade off as a result, and thoroughly enjoy this rhythm of life. They would be in fact be very slightly stressed by working less. Beta has an average work week of 35.35 hours vs. 35.00 hours for Alpha; as a result, Alpha dwellers have 2.2 televisions per capita, for example, while Beta dwellers have 2.222 per capita. Suppose you were told you had a choice. You could push a button and make the next generation of Alpha-dwellers a tiny bit more motivated toward material production and consumption, which would result within two generations in equalizing material well-being with Beta, or you could refrain from pushing this button. Would there be anything to be said in favor of pushing it? Of course, if this would make those on Alpha 1% happier, that would be an argument for it. But people on Alpha are already about as happy as could be. So we are simply supposing a change in material well-being, the result of a slight shift in preferences, but a constant level of preference satisfaction. Or, leaving preferences unchanged, imagine that you face a different choice: you could push or not push a button that would make production processes on Beta 1% less efficient. This, too, would equalize the worlds in material standard. The desires of Beta-dwellers would be somewhat less satisfied, but only very marginally. Their overall happiness might be essentially unchanged, or it might fall a tiny amount. Would there be any moral or non-moral good realized by the equalization? Could it offset even this tiny loss in happiness? Of course, if Beta-dwellers were more materially prosperous at the expense of Alpha-dwellers in some way, then leveling Beta's standard downward might have a moral rationale. But the rationale could be a matter of the injustice of exploitation rather than equality as such. Equality of happiness. Once again, imagine Alpha and Beta to be Favored Planets, as before. Now imagine that Alpha and Beta have equal material well-being, and that Alpha-and Betadwellers are all about happy as we can imagine intelligent beings ever being, except: Betadwellers differ from Alpha-dwellers in a tiny genetic detail, the result of which is that they are naturally are capable of a slightly more intense sense of well-being when fully pleased-in much the same way that, for certain people, the taste of certain foods or enjoyment of chocolate is more intense. As a result, life on Beta is just a bit happier than life on Alpha. This difference, we suppose, is entirely unearned and "arbitrary" in that sense from a moral point of view. Suppose you could push a button and change this gene on Beta, so that dwellers on the two planets would instead experience essentially the same intensity of enjoyment level of happiness. Would there be anything to be said for this? Of course, you might think that the loss in intensity of good feeling on Beta would swamp this equality gain and argue against pushing the button. But the question is not the magnitude of this equality gain, but whether there would be any such gain that could even slightly offset the Beta-dwellers loss in happiness. Of course, if one could push a button and change the gene on Alpha, there would be a good rationale for doing that. But the rationale could be that Alpha-dwellers would be happier, not that they would be the hedonic equals of Beta-Dwellers. Equality of respect. It might seem obvious that equality of respect is intrinsically morally valuable, but this may be because we are thinking of inequalities only in a range of cases, where other dimensions of value also vary. Try to suppress all such variation. Back to Alpha and Beta. Alpha-dwellers and Beta-dwellers again show a genetic difference. Those on Alpha respect each other, just as those on Beta do, but the amount and resilience of respect is greater on Beta, again owing to a minor genetic difference. People on both planets are only mortal after all. Like us they can be pushed by stress, disappointment, or fear to fail to respect others fully. Ideal conditions exist, however, for the rapid disappearance of such disrespectful thoughts once they appear. Individuals on both planets have the wherewithal for restoring their equilibrium and going on to live secure, prosperous, healthy, satisfying lives, so that the undertow exerted on respect for others fades. But there is, I said, a slight genetic difference. Beta-dwellers are slightly more resilient psychically, and so it takes a little bit more stress, disappointment, or fear to lead them to adopt an attitude of disrespect. Moreover, they bounce back from such episodes slightly more quickly. Suppose you could push a button and change this gene on Beta, thereby equalizing the respect shown for others on the two planets. Would there be anything to be said for this? Of course, if you could push a button and change the gene on Alpha, there would be something to be said for that, since then people on Alpha would show more respect for one another. But then rationale could be increasing respect, not equalizing it. You're probably fed up with Alpha/Beta examples. So think of Earth. Suppose there is a genetic difference among actual humans that is normally expressed in differences in the resilience or intensity of the respect they have for others. People with the R allele, say, are harder to push
Moral discourse and practice some philosophical approaches DARWALL Stephen, GIBBARD Allan, RAILTO... more Moral discourse and practice some philosophical approaches DARWALL Stephen, GIBBARD Allan, RAILTON Peter.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Nov 1, 2020
In this comment I will be focusing on Chapter 5 of Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception ... more In this comment I will be focusing on Chapter 5 of Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception (Siegel 2017), as well as a more recent essay of hers that expands upon Chapter 5. Since I expect that one of the key challenges Siegel will face in making her case for the rationality of perception concerns the nature of inference and its relation to rationality, I hope that this focus will prove helpful.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, Feb 27, 2013
Evidence of prospective processes is increasingly common in psychological research, which suggest... more Evidence of prospective processes is increasingly common in psychological research, which suggests the fruitfulness of a theoretical framework for mind and brain built around future orientation. No metaphysics of determinism or indeterminism is presupposed by this framework, nor do considerations of scientific method require determinism-successful scientific theories in the natural sciences all involve probabilistic elements. We speculate that expressive behavior and moral decision making use prospective processes parallel to those used in nonmoral decisions.
According to a simple form of consequentialism, we should base decisions on our judgments about t... more According to a simple form of consequentialism, we should base decisions on our judgments about their consequences for achieving our goals. Our goals give us reason to endorse consequentialism as a standard of decision making. Alternative standards invariably lead to consequences that are less good in this sense. Yet some people knowingly follow decision rules that violate consequentialism. For example, they prefer harmful omissions to less harmful acts, they favor the status quo over alternatives they would otherwise judge to be belter, they provide third-party compensation on the basis of the cause of an injury rather than the benefit from the compensation, they ignore deterrent effects in decisions about punishment, and they resist coercive reforms they judge to be beneficial. I suggest that nonconsequentialist principles arise from overgeneralizing rules that are consistent with consequentialism in a limited set of cases. Commitment to such rules is detached from their original purposes. The existence of such nonconsequentialist decision biases has implications for philosophical and experimental methodology, the relation between psychology and public policy, and education.
I’ve been told that there are two principal approaches to drawing figures from life. One begins b... more I’ve been told that there are two principal approaches to drawing figures from life. One begins by tracing an outline of the figure to be drawn, locating its edges and key features on an imagined grid, and then using perspective to fill in depth. The other approach proceeds from the ‘center of mass’ of the subject, seeking to build up the image by supplying contour lines, the intersections of which convey depth— as if the representation were being created in relief. The second approach need not adopt a unified perspective, and is more concerned with evoking the volume and ‘presence’ of the subject than with accurate placement of edges and features. Call this second approach drawing ‘from the inside out’, meant to capture the living force of the subject rather than freeze it in a coordinate frame. I sometimes feel that those of us who hanker after system in ethics tend to opt unconsciously for the first approach, tracing the outlines of moral practice from the outside and setting it ...
Ralph Wedgwood has, almost single-handedly, attempted to shoulder the burden that critics of Plat... more Ralph Wedgwood has, almost single-handedly, attempted to shoulder the burden that critics of Platonic non-naturalism have laid at its feet for years. If there are irreducible, non-natural normative facts, properties, and relations, critics have pressed, just where are they in the order of things? And if they are outside the natural, causal order, how can we come to know them, or refer to them, or be necessarily moved by them? The standard answer, "These facts are known a priori, by rational intuition", has only deepened the mystery. For, as Kant pointed out, normative truths would have substantive implications for thought and action, and so must be synthetic rather than analytic. But how could purely rational a priori intuition deliver knowledge of such truths? Wedgwood finds the Intuitionists' self-assurance about their contact with normative reality not much better than magical thinking, and therefore seeks to offer a fundamental philosophical explanation of "the nature of normative facts, properties, and relations" that provides an illuminating, recognizably Platonic response to these worries. Aware of the constraints imposed upon metaphysical accounts of the normative by supervenience, Wedgwood also aims to work within the assumptions of what he calls "moderate naturalism", according to which all the contingent facts in the world contingent normative facts included are "realized in facts of the sort that are studied by the natural sciences and physics". No brief commentary can do justice to the full sweep and ingenuity of The Nature of Normativity. Here I will confine myself to some of the issues that are the central focus of Part II, which is presented as the metaphysical portion of the story. However, the intricate, interlocking nature of this story will require me to venture a bit into the semantic and epistemological concerns that take up Parts I and III.
Our notion of normativity appears to combine, in a way difficult to understand but seemingly fami... more Our notion of normativity appears to combine, in a way difficult to understand but seemingly familiar from experience, elements of force and freedom. On the one hand, a normative claim is thought to have a kind of compelling authority; on the other hand, if our respecting it is to be an appropriate species of respect, it must not be coerced, automatic, or trivially guaranteed by definition. Both Hume and Kant, I argue, looked to aesthetic experience as a convincing example exhibiting this marriage of force and freedom, as well as showing how our judgment can come to be properly attuned to the features that constitute value. This image of attunement carries over into their respective accounts of moral judgment. The seemingly radical difference between their moral theories may be traceable not to a different conception of normativity, but to a difference in their empirical psychological theories -a difference we can readily spot in their accounts of aesthetics.
please do not circulate without permission are"-would surely help. And fortunately, we have a lot... more please do not circulate without permission are"-would surely help. And fortunately, we have a lot to say about this-though no consensus exists, a number of systematic, well-developed accounts of rationality in belief are on offer. What about the agent's desires-"whatever they are"? 1 As co-equal participants in shaping dispositions to act, must they, too, show a modicum of rationality? That sounds reasonable enough. After all, in everyday life we often attribute the irrationality of an act-our own or that of another-less to irrational beliefs than to irrationality in the desires that shaped or motivated it. In clinical practice, likewise. Such desires might be arbitrary, groundless, obsessive, phobic, infantile, compulsive, delusive, incorrigible, uncontrollable, disproportionate, self-defeating, distorted by mood or emotion, …-it is a very long list. 2 1 At the outset, I will follow conventional usage among philosophers and treat the term desire as a generic term for motivating states of all sorts-from bare urges and appetites to considered preferences and goals. Aversions, too. Later I will identify something more specific for desires to be. Calling these forms of irrationality in desire seems about as natural as saying that arbitrariness, groundlessness, obsession, phobia, immaturity, compulsion, etc. are forms of irrationality in belief. Moreover, even though those of us who have (what would normally be called) irrational desires typically also have associated irrational beliefs, it does not seem that we can reduce all forms of irrationality in desire to irrationalities in belief. In many cases, it seems the other way 'round-irrationality in desire is driving irrationality in belief. Neither do all apparently irrational desires derive from false beliefs. Individuals in the grip of addictive or compulsive desire can have a frighteningly clear view of their situation.
Morality is differentbut how? Moral judgement certainly differs in various ways from ordinary jud... more Morality is differentbut how? Moral judgement certainly differs in various ways from ordinary judgement about the garden-variety objects in the world around us. A distinguished line of philosophers have argued that these differences are crystallised in a difference in the ver). nature and function of moral language. And yet grammar textbooks make no mention of a systematic distinction between moral and non-moral language, evcn at the level of deep structure. Indeed, moral language docs not in its grammatical or logical bchaviour betray the least sign of being anything other than ordinary. Increasingly, philosophers are inclined to take this at face value. Moral judgements, for example, are held to make assertions that can be true or false in our ordinary sense of these terms. Increasingly, too, philosophers are inclined to accept all the platitudes that follow from this. Thus, since 'truth is correspondence to the facts', moral truth is correspondence to the facts, too. Ordinary discourse supports us here: 'The fact is that I've promised to go and so I'm obliged to be there' is not a quirky way of expressing oneself. It even is deemed harmless to countenance talk of 'moral properties' (in ordinary speech one would more likely hear 'moral qualities') and 'moral facts' ('moral circumstances'). This sort of talk seems to assume nothing about whether such properties or facts are sui generis, for example. Perhaps, then, morality is different but moral discourse as such is not. And perhaps our willingness to talk in terms of moral properties and facts simply registers our readiness to apply the terms 'true' and 'false' to moral judgements. As such, it might be considered innocent of any significant metaphysical implications. Its real basis would be seen as lying in our discursive practices in morality, our tendencies to deliberate and disagree in distinctive ways -to make arguments, to insist upon consistency, to adduce evidence, and so on, Beyond this, no purported insight into the real composition of the world is claimed. If moral judgement is therefore factual in a thorough-going but ' I a m indebted hcrr to Gidron Roscn. Src P. Kailton and C. Rosen, 'Realism'. in J. Kim iilld E. Sosil ( t d s . ) . T/w Hlrukwuli C m / m h lo .\/?/o/i/!prif\ (0sfi)rtl: Hlarktvcll. 1991). The bcst-known cxamplc o f a n rrror throry in the moral caw is that ofJ. I.. Mackir, ELhic.c: lnvenlznl Rzghf and W'ron'q (1.ondon: Prnguin, 197i). '' It is not important hcrc whcthcr wc undcrstand thcsc judgcmcnts as absolutc or prima Jarie. Evcn a moral rcalist can, for cxamplr, cspousc a thcory ofprimafucie moral reasons, or a @ Rlackwell Puhlishers I.td. 19% ' Obviously, i t would not hclp at this point to cmbracc a global anti-realism about factual discourse, sincc prcciscly thc idca is to work out whcn a realist attitudc toward a factual domain ofdiscoursc is srnsiblc and whcn not. ' None, according to somc commrntators. Scc for cxamplc G. Say-McCord's introduction to his E.r.iuyr on Moral Realism (Ithaca: Cornell Univrrsity Press, 1989).
Moral thought and feeling are integral to how we see ourselves, how we live, and how we understan... more Moral thought and feeling are integral to how we see ourselves, how we live, and how we understand one another. Yet morality itself remains in many ways hard to understand. We speak of it as if it were a domain of knowledge, but what sort of knowledge could this be, and how would we acquire or test it? We appeal to it as if it afforded an objective standard for criticism and justification, rising above the level of personal aims or local custom, but what ground can we point to if asked to back this up? And we see it as having significant action-guiding force or normative authority, yet find it no easy matter to explain what this means, much less what would account for it. Small wonder Kant took seriously the worry that moral notions might covertly be based in ''mere high-flown fantasy.'' The essays collected in Facts, Values, and Norms attempt to make morality a bit more understandable, and thereby a bit less vulnerable to skepticism. They do so within what strives to be a coherent framework for meta-ethics and normative ethics, a form of naturalistic realism that treats moral inquiry as continuous in method with empirical science. Many philosophers believe, I know, that such a view is wrong-headed from the outset. Whatever morality is, they argue, it is not an empirical theory of anything -morality's character and methods belong to practical rather than theoretical reason. I believe that such criticisms run together things we do with moral language -express commitment, claim authority, guide action, exert sanctions -with what moral claims literally say such that moral discourse could sustain such uses.
I will argue that we humans are built for inequality. Inequality across individuals, to be sure. ... more I will argue that we humans are built for inequality. Inequality across individuals, to be sure. We are descended from social apes for whom group membership, group exclusion, and social hierarchy are fundamental facts of life. But in an especially deep sense, I want to suggest, we are built for inequality across time. Some puzzles about well-being-at least, the sort of well-being that appears to matter to people when asked about their current feelings or overall satisfaction with their lives-can be resolved in light of this profound fact about us. The upshot is, I believe, that some rethinking is needed in ethics about both equality and well-being. Better understanding the sources of our motives and of our sense of well-being, and the ways in which our aspirations, motives and wellbeing are tied to inequality will, I think, lessen in some ways the moral importance of equality as such. It will likewise shift the way we should think about the relation of morality to well-beingwhether one is a consequentialist, like myself, or simply someone who recognizes a prima facie duty of beneficence or self-concern. Consequentialism has always, I believe, been a good candidate for "a morality of respect for persons". One interesting result of the reflections below, if sound, is that this case can be made even stronger. All this sounds impossibly ambitious. It is. To begin, I'd like to express a few reservations about the notion that equality has intrinsic moral or non-moral value. Equality of material well-being. Imagine two worlds, Favored World Alpha and Favored World Beta, far distant from one another but not entirely outside the bounds of possible causal contact. They have no knowledge of one another. Alpha and Beta are favored worlds because fortune has smiled upon them. The inhabitants have more than enough to meet their needs, plenty enough to satisfy their wants, and yet more besides. Life on both Alpha and Beta has its usual ups and downs, of course, and there are illness, injury, death, and broken hearts in both worlds. But the level of misfortune and misery in each is about as low as one could imagine attaining with a population of intelligent beings with tender feelings. Turns out, people in Beta have a 1% higher material standard of living than those in Alpha. Perhaps a slightly higher proportion of Beta-dwellers has a strong interest in material production and accumulation. They have a slightly different work-leisure trade off as a result, and thoroughly enjoy this rhythm of life. They would be in fact be very slightly stressed by working less. Beta has an average work week of 35.35 hours vs. 35.00 hours for Alpha; as a result, Alpha dwellers have 2.2 televisions per capita, for example, while Beta dwellers have 2.222 per capita. Suppose you were told you had a choice. You could push a button and make the next generation of Alpha-dwellers a tiny bit more motivated toward material production and consumption, which would result within two generations in equalizing material well-being with Beta, or you could refrain from pushing this button. Would there be anything to be said in favor of pushing it? Of course, if this would make those on Alpha 1% happier, that would be an argument for it. But people on Alpha are already about as happy as could be. So we are simply supposing a change in material well-being, the result of a slight shift in preferences, but a constant level of preference satisfaction. Or, leaving preferences unchanged, imagine that you face a different choice: you could push or not push a button that would make production processes on Beta 1% less efficient. This, too, would equalize the worlds in material standard. The desires of Beta-dwellers would be somewhat less satisfied, but only very marginally. Their overall happiness might be essentially unchanged, or it might fall a tiny amount. Would there be any moral or non-moral good realized by the equalization? Could it offset even this tiny loss in happiness? Of course, if Beta-dwellers were more materially prosperous at the expense of Alpha-dwellers in some way, then leveling Beta's standard downward might have a moral rationale. But the rationale could be a matter of the injustice of exploitation rather than equality as such. Equality of happiness. Once again, imagine Alpha and Beta to be Favored Planets, as before. Now imagine that Alpha and Beta have equal material well-being, and that Alpha-and Betadwellers are all about happy as we can imagine intelligent beings ever being, except: Betadwellers differ from Alpha-dwellers in a tiny genetic detail, the result of which is that they are naturally are capable of a slightly more intense sense of well-being when fully pleased-in much the same way that, for certain people, the taste of certain foods or enjoyment of chocolate is more intense. As a result, life on Beta is just a bit happier than life on Alpha. This difference, we suppose, is entirely unearned and "arbitrary" in that sense from a moral point of view. Suppose you could push a button and change this gene on Beta, so that dwellers on the two planets would instead experience essentially the same intensity of enjoyment level of happiness. Would there be anything to be said for this? Of course, you might think that the loss in intensity of good feeling on Beta would swamp this equality gain and argue against pushing the button. But the question is not the magnitude of this equality gain, but whether there would be any such gain that could even slightly offset the Beta-dwellers loss in happiness. Of course, if one could push a button and change the gene on Alpha, there would be a good rationale for doing that. But the rationale could be that Alpha-dwellers would be happier, not that they would be the hedonic equals of Beta-Dwellers. Equality of respect. It might seem obvious that equality of respect is intrinsically morally valuable, but this may be because we are thinking of inequalities only in a range of cases, where other dimensions of value also vary. Try to suppress all such variation. Back to Alpha and Beta. Alpha-dwellers and Beta-dwellers again show a genetic difference. Those on Alpha respect each other, just as those on Beta do, but the amount and resilience of respect is greater on Beta, again owing to a minor genetic difference. People on both planets are only mortal after all. Like us they can be pushed by stress, disappointment, or fear to fail to respect others fully. Ideal conditions exist, however, for the rapid disappearance of such disrespectful thoughts once they appear. Individuals on both planets have the wherewithal for restoring their equilibrium and going on to live secure, prosperous, healthy, satisfying lives, so that the undertow exerted on respect for others fades. But there is, I said, a slight genetic difference. Beta-dwellers are slightly more resilient psychically, and so it takes a little bit more stress, disappointment, or fear to lead them to adopt an attitude of disrespect. Moreover, they bounce back from such episodes slightly more quickly. Suppose you could push a button and change this gene on Beta, thereby equalizing the respect shown for others on the two planets. Would there be anything to be said for this? Of course, if you could push a button and change the gene on Alpha, there would be something to be said for that, since then people on Alpha would show more respect for one another. But then rationale could be increasing respect, not equalizing it. You're probably fed up with Alpha/Beta examples. So think of Earth. Suppose there is a genetic difference among actual humans that is normally expressed in differences in the resilience or intensity of the respect they have for others. People with the R allele, say, are harder to push
Moral discourse and practice some philosophical approaches DARWALL Stephen, GIBBARD Allan, RAILTO... more Moral discourse and practice some philosophical approaches DARWALL Stephen, GIBBARD Allan, RAILTON Peter.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Nov 1, 2020
In this comment I will be focusing on Chapter 5 of Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception ... more In this comment I will be focusing on Chapter 5 of Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception (Siegel 2017), as well as a more recent essay of hers that expands upon Chapter 5. Since I expect that one of the key challenges Siegel will face in making her case for the rationality of perception concerns the nature of inference and its relation to rationality, I hope that this focus will prove helpful.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, Feb 27, 2013
Evidence of prospective processes is increasingly common in psychological research, which suggest... more Evidence of prospective processes is increasingly common in psychological research, which suggests the fruitfulness of a theoretical framework for mind and brain built around future orientation. No metaphysics of determinism or indeterminism is presupposed by this framework, nor do considerations of scientific method require determinism-successful scientific theories in the natural sciences all involve probabilistic elements. We speculate that expressive behavior and moral decision making use prospective processes parallel to those used in nonmoral decisions.
According to a simple form of consequentialism, we should base decisions on our judgments about t... more According to a simple form of consequentialism, we should base decisions on our judgments about their consequences for achieving our goals. Our goals give us reason to endorse consequentialism as a standard of decision making. Alternative standards invariably lead to consequences that are less good in this sense. Yet some people knowingly follow decision rules that violate consequentialism. For example, they prefer harmful omissions to less harmful acts, they favor the status quo over alternatives they would otherwise judge to be belter, they provide third-party compensation on the basis of the cause of an injury rather than the benefit from the compensation, they ignore deterrent effects in decisions about punishment, and they resist coercive reforms they judge to be beneficial. I suggest that nonconsequentialist principles arise from overgeneralizing rules that are consistent with consequentialism in a limited set of cases. Commitment to such rules is detached from their original purposes. The existence of such nonconsequentialist decision biases has implications for philosophical and experimental methodology, the relation between psychology and public policy, and education.
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