Papers by Ralph Stefan Weir
Philosophy, 2024
Transhumanists claim that futuristic technologies will permit you to live indefinitely as a nonbi... more Transhumanists claim that futuristic technologies will permit you to live indefinitely as a nonbiological ‘posthuman’ with a radically improved quality of life. Philosophers have pointed out that whether some radically enhanced posthuman is really you depends on perplexing issues about the nature of personal identity. I present an especially pressing version of the personal-identity challenge to transhumanism, based on the ideas of Derek Parfit. Parfit distinguishes two main views of personal identity, an intuitive, nonreductive view and a revisionary, reductive view. I argue that the standard rationale for wanting to become a posthuman makes sense only if the intuitive view is correct, but that the standard rationale for thinking that it is possible to become a posthuman makes sense only if the revisionary view is correct. Following this, I explain why the obvious responses are unsatisfactory or imply the need to rethink transhumanism in ways that make it much less radical and less appealing.
The Philosophical Quarterly
Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences, 2023
Transhumanists such as Nick Bostrom and Ray Kurzweil argue that radical human enhancements will a... more Transhumanists such as Nick Bostrom and Ray Kurzweil argue that radical human enhancements will allow persons alive today to achieve a kind of technological immortality. The transhumanist movement has gained numerous followers who hope to live indefinitely as bio-enhanced 'posthumans' in a state of perpetual bliss. Transhumanism also has its opponents, however. Objections have been raised both to the possibility and to the desirability of the 'posthuman' future that transhumanists envision. This article argues that existing objections to transhumanism are vulnerable to one of two characteristic weaknesses. They depend either on debatable evaluative judgements or on doubtful speculation about the long-term future. Following this, I outline a new objection which, I claim, is not vulnerable to either weakness. According to this new objection, transhumanism presupposes two incompatible views of human nature.
Divine Revelation and the Sciences: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Revelation, 2024
A longstanding preoccupation of scholars of religion is the degree to which the body of revelatio... more A longstanding preoccupation of scholars of religion is the degree to which the body of revelation attested by a given religion is compatible with science. There are cases in which thinkers belonging to a religion go out of their way to deny that a claim has the status of revelation, despite evidence to the contrary, in order to guard their faith against scientific criticism. This is part of what I think is going on in the controversy upon which this paper focusses: the controversy over the place of mind-body (or soul-body) dualism in Christianity.
In the preface to the second edition of his German Metaphysics (1751) Christian Wolff distinguish... more In the preface to the second edition of his German Metaphysics (1751) Christian Wolff distinguishes three responses to the mind-body problem. Materialism says that everything is ultimately material. Idealism says that everything is ultimately mental. Substance dualism says that there are both material and mental things and that these are different substances. Through Baumgarten and Kant, Wolff's trichotomy shaped the way later theorists approach the mind-body problem and the Wolffian positions retain a kind of classical status. When Wolff was writing, Descartes' substance dualism and Leibniz's idealism were the leading positions. Materialism was relatively unpopular. This situation has changed remarkably. The present-day incarnation of materialism, physicalism, overtook substance dualism and idealism in the middle of the twentieth century to become the leading response to the mind-body problem. At the same time, substance dualism and idealism have become decidedly unpopular. Even present-day opponents of physicalism tend to reject the classical anti-physicalist positions in favour of standard or Russellian monist forms of property dualism. For this reason, an important question for present-day philosophy is whether it is really feasible to respond to the mind-body problem by positing nonphysical properties without nonphysical substances. This thesis argues that when the surrounding issues are clarified, both standard and Russellian monist forms of property dualism turn out to be much less plausible than we usually suppose. I conclude that if you posit nonphysical properties in response to the mind-body problem then you should be prepared to posit nonphysical substances as well. If it is true that the viable anti-physicalist positions require nonphysical substances, the effect on the philosophy of mind ought to be considerable. This would mean a return to the view that something resembling Wolff's trichotomy exhausts the main responses to the mind-body problem and hence to the status quo of the eighteenth century. [...]
The Review of Metaphysics, 2021
This essay champions the idea of substances, understood as things that can exist by themselves. I... more This essay champions the idea of substances, understood as things that can exist by themselves. I argue that this idea has a valuable role to play in present-day philosophy, in explaining what makes object-like things object-like, and an important place in the history of philosophy, from its roots in Aristotle to its full expression in Descartes. Both claims are unusual. For philosophers tend to regard the idea of something that could exist by itself as incoherent, and this has encouraged the view that it will be useless to present-day philosophers and that it cannot charitably be attributed to Descartes. I argue that the charge of incoherence rests on a misunderstanding. I also address various other objections to the idea of substances as things that can exist by themselves.
The Routledge Handbook on Idealism and Immaterialism, 2021
The problem of consciousness, as I present it here, is the problem of reconciling our understandi... more The problem of consciousness, as I present it here, is the problem of reconciling our understanding of consciousness with (i) the evidence for phenomenal transparency and (ii) the evidence that the physical world is causally closed. We might hope that idealism will do this. For idealism is just as hospitable to phenomenal transparency as dualism. And there is a sense in which idealism posits no physical world to be causally closed in the first place. But I argue that idealism has no advantage over dualism and physicalism in the face of this problem. In approaching this issue I also make some taxonomical suggestions that help clarify the options left open by the causal closure argument against dualism. I would urge these on theorists dealing with that argument generally, not just those interested in idealism.
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2021
In Galileo's Error, Philip Goff sets out a manifesto for a post-Galilean science of consciousness... more In Galileo's Error, Philip Goff sets out a manifesto for a post-Galilean science of consciousness. Article four of the manifesto reads: 'Anti-Dualism: Consciousness is not separate from the physical world; rather consciousness is located in the intrinsic nature of the physical world.' I argue that there is an important sense of ‘dualism’ in which Goff’s arguments are not only compatible with but entail dualism, and not only dualism but substance dualism. Substance dualism, in the sense I have in mind, is the view that (i) there are two sides to reality, a fundamentally mental side and a fundamentally nonmental side; and (ii) the fundamentally mental side consists of mental substances resembling Cartesian souls. I do not suggest that this is bad news for post-Galilean science of consciousness. My aim is rather to push for a certain view about what a theory of consciousness motivated by Goff’s arguments must look like.
From Existentialism to Metaphysics: The Philosophy of Stephen Priest, 2021
For several decades, Stephen Priest has championed a picture of the mind or soul as a private, ph... more For several decades, Stephen Priest has championed a picture of the mind or soul as a private, phenomenological space, knowable by introspection and logically independent of behaviour. Something resembling this picture once dominated Western philosophy, but it suffered a severe setback in the mid-twentieth century as a result of Wittgenstein’s ‘private language argument’. While Priest has written about the threat posed by Wittgenstein’s argument to the picture of the mind that he favours, he has not explained how advocates of that picture should respond to Wittgenstein. The present essay takes up this challenge, defending the picture of the mind as a private phenomenological space against four lines of argument drawn from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations § 243–315.
The International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2021
This paper examines whether biblical descriptions of the intermediate state imply dualism of the ... more This paper examines whether biblical descriptions of the intermediate state imply dualism of the sort that rules out physicalism. Certain passages in the Bible seem to describe persons or souls existing without their bodies in an intermediate state between death and resurrection. For this reason, these passages appear to imply a form of dualism. Some Christian physicalists have countered that the passages in question are in fact compatible with physicalism. For it is compatible with physicalism that, although we are necessarily constituted by physical bodies, we can continue to exist without our current bodies in the intermediate state by being constituted by replacement bodies. I argue that broadly Gricean considerations significantly weaken this response. In its place, I propose a new, linguistic objection to the biblical argument for dualism. The linguistic objection says that biblical descriptions of an intermediate state cannot imply dualism in the sense that contradicts physicalism because physicalism is defined by a concept of the physical derived from modern physics, and no term in the biblical languages expresses that concept. I argue that the linguistic objection is less vulnerable to Gricean considerations than the constitution objection. On the other hand the linguistic objection also makes concessions to dualism that some Christian physicalists will find unacceptable. And it may be possible to reinforce the biblical argument for dualism by appeal to recent research on 'common-sense dualism'. The upshot for Christian physicalists who wish to remain open to the biblical case for an intermediate state is therefore partly good, partly bad. The prospects for a Biblical argument for dualism in the sense that contradicts physicalism are limited but remain open.
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
It is widely held that for an action to be free it must be the case that
the agent can do otherwi... more It is widely held that for an action to be free it must be the case that
the agent can do otherwise. Compatibilists and incompatibilists
disagree over what this ability amounts to. Two recent articles
offer novel perspectives on the debate by employing Angelika
Kratzer’s semantics of ‘can’. Alex Grzankowski proposes that
Kratzer’s semantics favour incompatibilism because they make
valid a version of the Consequence Argument. Christian List
argues that Kratzer’s semantics favour a novel form of
compatibilism. I argue that List’s compatibilist application of
Kratzer’s semantics faces problems not faced by Grzankowski’s
incompatibilist employment of them. On the other hand I argue
that Kratzer’s semantics make Grzankowski’s version of the
Consequence Argument valid only at the cost of rendering it
dialectically useless. Contrary to both views Kratzer’s semantics
do not appear to add substantial weight to either side of the
compatibilism/incompatibilism dispute.
Synthesis philosophica, Aug 10, 2017
Traditional responses to the problem of evil may be classed as 'logical' responses, insofar as th... more Traditional responses to the problem of evil may be classed as 'logical' responses, insofar as they aim to show that God's existence is logically compatible with evil and suffering. In this paper I discuss what might be called a nonlogical or 'aporetic' response. According to the aporetic response, the problem of evil appears to us as intractable, but it does so only because of the limitedness of human minds. I argue on independent grounds that human minds are limited in a specific way: our experience of value is, in an important respect, aspectually shaped (aspectual shape is a term is used by Tim Crane, John Searle, and others in the philosophy of perception). This thesis is useful for understanding various syndromes in the way we relate to normative areas like ethics, aesthetics, politics or religion. It can also be used to provide the framework for a novel aporetic theodicy.
Books by Ralph Stefan Weir
The pieces collected here are written by fifteen philosophers and one poet who have been influenc... more The pieces collected here are written by fifteen philosophers and one poet who have been influenced by Stephen Priest, or develop themes in Priest’s philosophy, or both. They include contributions from the United Kingdom, the USA, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Taiwan and Japan by authors working in range of traditions. Topics covered include philosophical method, the analytical/continental divide, the nature of the mind (or self, or soul), metaphysics, and the meaning of life. The volume also includes responses by Priest and an intellectual biography, describing some of the life-experiences which caused Priest to become interested in philosophy, and to make the transition from existentialism to metaphysics
Videos of Talks by Ralph Stefan Weir
Recollection Series, Pusey House, Oxford, 2022
On Wednesday 23 November at 4pm, in the Chapel of Pusey House as part of their “Recollection Seri... more On Wednesday 23 November at 4pm, in the Chapel of Pusey House as part of their “Recollection Series,” Dr Ralph Weir of the University of Lincoln asked what a culturally and scientifically informed person should think about the idea of the soul. He discussed a number of common misconceptions, and reflected on why the idea of the soul evokes such intense hostility in today's intellectual climate. He concluded by explaining why he thinks the idea of the soul is here to stay.
RALPH WEIR is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Lincoln, and an Associate Member of the Faculty of Theology and Religion at the University of Oxford.
This talk was delivered at the conference Dualism in the Twenty-First Century, which took place a... more This talk was delivered at the conference Dualism in the Twenty-First Century, which took place at the Central European University, Budapest on 6-8 December 2018. This event was organised by the Humane Philosophy Project and supported by the Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion, University of Oxford, the John Templeton Foundation, the Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, the Central European University, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the Ruhr University Bochum, and the School of History and Heritage, University of Lincoln.
Dualism is the thesis that in addition to physical entities there exist nonphysical mental entiti... more Dualism is the thesis that in addition to physical entities there exist nonphysical mental entities. The mental entities are ‘fundamentally new features of the world’ to use David Chalmers’ description. (1996, 125) Philosophers distinguish two kinds of dualism: substance dualism and property dualism. According to the received view substance dualism is beyond the pale, whereas property dualism is a respectable position, deserving of our consideration. In this paper I argue that the standard grounds for accepting property dualism rationally oblige us to accept classical substance dualism like Descartes’.
Organised event recordings by Ralph Stefan Weir
Sir Roger Penrose - “Consciousness and the Foundations of Physics”, delivered at the Ian Ramsey C... more Sir Roger Penrose - “Consciousness and the Foundations of Physics”, delivered at the Ian Ramsey Centre - Humane Philosophy Project 2014-2015 Seminar. Chaired by Ralph Weir, Alister McGrath and Mikolaj Slawkowski-Rode.
The introduction of quantum mechanics in the early 20th Century led many physicists to question the “Newtonian” type of picture of an objective deterministic physical reality that had been previously regarded as an essential background to a fully scientific picture of the world. Quantum measurement, as described in standard theory however, requires a fundamental indeterminism, and issues such as Bell non-locality cause basic difficulties with a picture of objective reality that is consistent with the principles of relativity. Accordingly, many philosophers of science have felt driven to viewpoints according to which “reality” itself takes on subjective qualities, seemingly dependent upon the experiences of conscious beings.
My own position is an essentially opposite one, and I argue that conscious experience itself arises from a particular objective feature of physical law. This, however, must go beyond our current understanding of the laws of quantum processes and their relation to macroscopic phenomena. I argue that this objective feature has to do with implications of Einstein’s general theory of relativity and, moreover, must lie beyond the scope of a fully computational universe.
SIR ROGER PENROSE OM FRS is a renowned mathematical physicist, mathematician and philosopher of science. He is the Emeritus Rouse Ball Professor of Mathematics at the Mathematical Institute of the University of Oxford, as well as an Emeritus Fellow of Wadham College. He is known for his work in mathematical physics, especially his contributions to general relativity and cosmology. He has received numerous prizes and awards, including the 1988 Wolf Prize for physics, which he shared with Stephen Hawking for their contribution to our understanding of the Universe. In 1972 he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of London in 1972. He was knighted for services to science in 1994 and appointed to the Order of Merit in 2000. He also holds honorary doctorate degrees from many distinguished universities including Warsaw, Leuven, York and Bath.
In a riveting scene from the film Wall Street, Gordon Gekko proclaims that “greed is good.” The g... more In a riveting scene from the film Wall Street, Gordon Gekko proclaims that “greed is good.” The great philosopher David Hume, on the other hand, describes greed as the most destructive of the vices. The recent banking debacle and continuing uproar about executive bonus pay has placed the controversial issue of greed at the very heart of how we view modern society. Is Gekko’s maxim simply in need of some moderation? Or is Hume’s view too extreme? In this talk I examine these conflicting notions and discuss how we might approach the problem of greed today. I look at the concept of incentives, which are essential for achieving results, and whether the desire for money is really as dangerous as it might seem.
STEWART SUTHERLAND, Baron Sutherland of Houndwood is a distinguished philosopher of religion and public servant. He is currently a fellow of Birkbeck College, University of London. He has served as Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Edinburgh, Vice-Chancellor of the University of London, President of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and Professor of History and Philosophy of Religion at King's College, London. Lord Sutherland is the author of many publications including Atheism and the Rejection of God: Contemporary Philosophy and 'The Brothers Karamazov' (1977), Faith and Ambiguity (1984), and God, Jesus and Belief: The Legacy of Theism (1984).
Anthropomorphism (applying to non-humans predicates appropriate only to human beings) may seem an... more Anthropomorphism (applying to non-humans predicates appropriate only to human beings) may seem an ally of humanism: in fact it is its enemy. Anthropomorphic error takes five forms: biological, zoological, technological, institutional, and theological.
Biological anthropomorphism applies to parts of human beings predicates that are applicable only to whole human beings: e.g. Neo-Darwinism. Again, the anthropomorphic fallacy is committed if we attribute to non-human animals the possession of concepts that can only be manifested by language-users. The attribution of human concepts and activities to computers is the currently most popular form of technological anthropomorphism.
Anthropomorphism can operate not only in the sub-human sphere, but also in the superhuman sphere. Predicates appropriate only to individual humans may be applied to social and political institutions. Again, religious believers apply to God many predicates applicable literally only to humans. The metaphorical nature of this attribution is widely accepted, but some mentalistic predicates are held to be literally true of God.
SIR ANTHONY KENNY is former Master of Balliol College, President of the British Academy, and Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Oxford. He has made significant contributions to the philosophy of mind, ancient and scholastic philosophy, the philosophy of Wittgenstein and the philosophy of religion.
On the 11th of February Timothy Williamson spoke on the topic 'What is Naturalism?' at the ongoin... more On the 11th of February Timothy Williamson spoke on the topic 'What is Naturalism?' at the ongoing seminar series on the theme of naturalism organised by the Humane Philosophy Project and the Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion.
Uploads
Papers by Ralph Stefan Weir
the agent can do otherwise. Compatibilists and incompatibilists
disagree over what this ability amounts to. Two recent articles
offer novel perspectives on the debate by employing Angelika
Kratzer’s semantics of ‘can’. Alex Grzankowski proposes that
Kratzer’s semantics favour incompatibilism because they make
valid a version of the Consequence Argument. Christian List
argues that Kratzer’s semantics favour a novel form of
compatibilism. I argue that List’s compatibilist application of
Kratzer’s semantics faces problems not faced by Grzankowski’s
incompatibilist employment of them. On the other hand I argue
that Kratzer’s semantics make Grzankowski’s version of the
Consequence Argument valid only at the cost of rendering it
dialectically useless. Contrary to both views Kratzer’s semantics
do not appear to add substantial weight to either side of the
compatibilism/incompatibilism dispute.
Books by Ralph Stefan Weir
Videos of Talks by Ralph Stefan Weir
RALPH WEIR is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Lincoln, and an Associate Member of the Faculty of Theology and Religion at the University of Oxford.
Organised event recordings by Ralph Stefan Weir
The introduction of quantum mechanics in the early 20th Century led many physicists to question the “Newtonian” type of picture of an objective deterministic physical reality that had been previously regarded as an essential background to a fully scientific picture of the world. Quantum measurement, as described in standard theory however, requires a fundamental indeterminism, and issues such as Bell non-locality cause basic difficulties with a picture of objective reality that is consistent with the principles of relativity. Accordingly, many philosophers of science have felt driven to viewpoints according to which “reality” itself takes on subjective qualities, seemingly dependent upon the experiences of conscious beings.
My own position is an essentially opposite one, and I argue that conscious experience itself arises from a particular objective feature of physical law. This, however, must go beyond our current understanding of the laws of quantum processes and their relation to macroscopic phenomena. I argue that this objective feature has to do with implications of Einstein’s general theory of relativity and, moreover, must lie beyond the scope of a fully computational universe.
SIR ROGER PENROSE OM FRS is a renowned mathematical physicist, mathematician and philosopher of science. He is the Emeritus Rouse Ball Professor of Mathematics at the Mathematical Institute of the University of Oxford, as well as an Emeritus Fellow of Wadham College. He is known for his work in mathematical physics, especially his contributions to general relativity and cosmology. He has received numerous prizes and awards, including the 1988 Wolf Prize for physics, which he shared with Stephen Hawking for their contribution to our understanding of the Universe. In 1972 he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of London in 1972. He was knighted for services to science in 1994 and appointed to the Order of Merit in 2000. He also holds honorary doctorate degrees from many distinguished universities including Warsaw, Leuven, York and Bath.
STEWART SUTHERLAND, Baron Sutherland of Houndwood is a distinguished philosopher of religion and public servant. He is currently a fellow of Birkbeck College, University of London. He has served as Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Edinburgh, Vice-Chancellor of the University of London, President of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and Professor of History and Philosophy of Religion at King's College, London. Lord Sutherland is the author of many publications including Atheism and the Rejection of God: Contemporary Philosophy and 'The Brothers Karamazov' (1977), Faith and Ambiguity (1984), and God, Jesus and Belief: The Legacy of Theism (1984).
Biological anthropomorphism applies to parts of human beings predicates that are applicable only to whole human beings: e.g. Neo-Darwinism. Again, the anthropomorphic fallacy is committed if we attribute to non-human animals the possession of concepts that can only be manifested by language-users. The attribution of human concepts and activities to computers is the currently most popular form of technological anthropomorphism.
Anthropomorphism can operate not only in the sub-human sphere, but also in the superhuman sphere. Predicates appropriate only to individual humans may be applied to social and political institutions. Again, religious believers apply to God many predicates applicable literally only to humans. The metaphorical nature of this attribution is widely accepted, but some mentalistic predicates are held to be literally true of God.
SIR ANTHONY KENNY is former Master of Balliol College, President of the British Academy, and Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Oxford. He has made significant contributions to the philosophy of mind, ancient and scholastic philosophy, the philosophy of Wittgenstein and the philosophy of religion.
the agent can do otherwise. Compatibilists and incompatibilists
disagree over what this ability amounts to. Two recent articles
offer novel perspectives on the debate by employing Angelika
Kratzer’s semantics of ‘can’. Alex Grzankowski proposes that
Kratzer’s semantics favour incompatibilism because they make
valid a version of the Consequence Argument. Christian List
argues that Kratzer’s semantics favour a novel form of
compatibilism. I argue that List’s compatibilist application of
Kratzer’s semantics faces problems not faced by Grzankowski’s
incompatibilist employment of them. On the other hand I argue
that Kratzer’s semantics make Grzankowski’s version of the
Consequence Argument valid only at the cost of rendering it
dialectically useless. Contrary to both views Kratzer’s semantics
do not appear to add substantial weight to either side of the
compatibilism/incompatibilism dispute.
RALPH WEIR is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Lincoln, and an Associate Member of the Faculty of Theology and Religion at the University of Oxford.
The introduction of quantum mechanics in the early 20th Century led many physicists to question the “Newtonian” type of picture of an objective deterministic physical reality that had been previously regarded as an essential background to a fully scientific picture of the world. Quantum measurement, as described in standard theory however, requires a fundamental indeterminism, and issues such as Bell non-locality cause basic difficulties with a picture of objective reality that is consistent with the principles of relativity. Accordingly, many philosophers of science have felt driven to viewpoints according to which “reality” itself takes on subjective qualities, seemingly dependent upon the experiences of conscious beings.
My own position is an essentially opposite one, and I argue that conscious experience itself arises from a particular objective feature of physical law. This, however, must go beyond our current understanding of the laws of quantum processes and their relation to macroscopic phenomena. I argue that this objective feature has to do with implications of Einstein’s general theory of relativity and, moreover, must lie beyond the scope of a fully computational universe.
SIR ROGER PENROSE OM FRS is a renowned mathematical physicist, mathematician and philosopher of science. He is the Emeritus Rouse Ball Professor of Mathematics at the Mathematical Institute of the University of Oxford, as well as an Emeritus Fellow of Wadham College. He is known for his work in mathematical physics, especially his contributions to general relativity and cosmology. He has received numerous prizes and awards, including the 1988 Wolf Prize for physics, which he shared with Stephen Hawking for their contribution to our understanding of the Universe. In 1972 he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of London in 1972. He was knighted for services to science in 1994 and appointed to the Order of Merit in 2000. He also holds honorary doctorate degrees from many distinguished universities including Warsaw, Leuven, York and Bath.
STEWART SUTHERLAND, Baron Sutherland of Houndwood is a distinguished philosopher of religion and public servant. He is currently a fellow of Birkbeck College, University of London. He has served as Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Edinburgh, Vice-Chancellor of the University of London, President of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and Professor of History and Philosophy of Religion at King's College, London. Lord Sutherland is the author of many publications including Atheism and the Rejection of God: Contemporary Philosophy and 'The Brothers Karamazov' (1977), Faith and Ambiguity (1984), and God, Jesus and Belief: The Legacy of Theism (1984).
Biological anthropomorphism applies to parts of human beings predicates that are applicable only to whole human beings: e.g. Neo-Darwinism. Again, the anthropomorphic fallacy is committed if we attribute to non-human animals the possession of concepts that can only be manifested by language-users. The attribution of human concepts and activities to computers is the currently most popular form of technological anthropomorphism.
Anthropomorphism can operate not only in the sub-human sphere, but also in the superhuman sphere. Predicates appropriate only to individual humans may be applied to social and political institutions. Again, religious believers apply to God many predicates applicable literally only to humans. The metaphorical nature of this attribution is widely accepted, but some mentalistic predicates are held to be literally true of God.
SIR ANTHONY KENNY is former Master of Balliol College, President of the British Academy, and Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Oxford. He has made significant contributions to the philosophy of mind, ancient and scholastic philosophy, the philosophy of Wittgenstein and the philosophy of religion.
Keynote speakers:
Michael Inwood, Trinity College, University of Oxford
Ferenc Hörcher, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Tenzin Dechen Rochard, Dharma Friendship Foundation
Short papers will be delivered by Nikolas Prassas, Agata Filipowicz, Robbert-Jan Winters and Jacob Burda.
For more information please visit http://www.humanephilosophy.com
This event will take place at the central campus of the University of Warsaw.
A call for papers can be viewed here: http://philevents.org/event/show/17632
Keynote speakers:
Agata Bielik-Robson
Nottingham University
Andreas Kinneging
Leiden University
Jonathan Lear
University of Chicago
Andrew Pinsent
Oxford University
Stephen Priest
University of Oxford
Zofia Rosinska
University of Warsaw
Line Ryberg-Ingerslev
Aarhus University
Anthony Steinbock
Southern Illinois University
Kenneth Stikkers
Southern Illinois University
Jerry Valberg
University College London
The Humane Philosophy Project is an international initiative based at the Universities of Oxford and Warsaw. Its foremost concern is to bring academic philosophy to bear on human concerns, and to re-establish the connection between philosophy and broader human culture.