
Stéphanie Roy
Administrative Law and Environmental Governance
Supervisors: Pierre Lemieux
Supervisors: Pierre Lemieux
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Papers by Stéphanie Roy
of Minganie and the Innu Council of Ekuanitshit adopted
resolutions to provide rights and legal personhood to the Magpie
River in Quebec. This event is part of a globally developing
movement: the granting of rights to rivers, streams, and other
natural entities to better protect them. Granting rights—and
even legal personhood—to nature is imagined to be a solution
to reestablish a human-nature relationship which reflects
their interconnection and thus escape the current legal system’s
anthropocentric ethic. These rights’ true efficacy rests, however,
on the mechanisms that implement them. The guardianship
framing the protection of New Zealand’s Whanganui River
appears promising, as it imposes responsibilities on guardians
tasked with protecting natural entities, creating an ecocentric
model. But is granting rights to nature, who alone cannot
challenge the liberal foundations of the legal system in
which they operate, truly a better path to protect them? This
article reflects on this question after assessing the legal stakes
surrounding the grant of rights to the Magpie River in Quebec
and the characteristics of New Zealand’s regime implementing
the rights of the Whanganui River.
Books by Stéphanie Roy
of Minganie and the Innu Council of Ekuanitshit adopted
resolutions to provide rights and legal personhood to the Magpie
River in Quebec. This event is part of a globally developing
movement: the granting of rights to rivers, streams, and other
natural entities to better protect them. Granting rights—and
even legal personhood—to nature is imagined to be a solution
to reestablish a human-nature relationship which reflects
their interconnection and thus escape the current legal system’s
anthropocentric ethic. These rights’ true efficacy rests, however,
on the mechanisms that implement them. The guardianship
framing the protection of New Zealand’s Whanganui River
appears promising, as it imposes responsibilities on guardians
tasked with protecting natural entities, creating an ecocentric
model. But is granting rights to nature, who alone cannot
challenge the liberal foundations of the legal system in
which they operate, truly a better path to protect them? This
article reflects on this question after assessing the legal stakes
surrounding the grant of rights to the Magpie River in Quebec
and the characteristics of New Zealand’s regime implementing
the rights of the Whanganui River.