Faculté de philosophie

Sous la direction d'Yvan Comeau, professeur titulaire, Université Laval Avec la collaboration de Claire Boily, professionnelle de recherche, Chaire Marcelle-Mallet ISBN 978-2-924117-28-6 (version imprimée) ISBN 978-2-924117-29-3 (version numérique) Dépôt légal -Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec, 2013 Dépôt légal -Bibliothèque et Archives Canada, 2013

En me basant sur les travaux d’Axel Honneth sur la reconnaissance, je veux proposer des améliorations à apporter à notre relation avec les Premières Nations en comprenant tout d’abord le vice qui est au coeur de celle-ci, c’est-à-dire le mépris. En analysant certaines manifestations historiques du mépris envers les Premières Nations, j’examine si malgré les changements de vocabulaire légitimant la relation coloniale, il demeure une même dimension de mépris dans l’attitude des gouvernants face aux Premières Nations, niant leur droit ou leur capacité à s’autodéterminer. Pour y arriver, j’utilise la typologie de Honneth sur la reconnaissance et le mépris afin d’établir une dynamique de pénétration du mépris, tirée de l’analyse de deux cas historiques : le programme de conversion des Jésuites en Huronie au 17e siècle et le programme de civilisation britanno-canadien du 19e siècle. À partir de cette dynamique, je montrerai un modèle à ne pas suivre dans les relations aux peuples autochtones et donnerai quelques pistes de réflexion à propos de la nécessité de la reconstruction de la reconnaissance.

I have tried to show how criticism of aboriginal orthodoxy in discourse and measures taken by the current Conservative government and private commentators have set in motion a process of contempt, risking the harm associated with colonialism. Another critique of aboriginal orthodoxy, as presented by Jean-Jacques Simard, claims that First Nations are entitled to a certain level of self-government in defence of the rights of the abstract person: “it is first and foremost simply as human beings that all Amerindians possess the same rights as anyone else….” Yet this option ignores the history of First Nations’ relationships with French Canadians, English Canadians and the British. While appeal to the abstract person can protect people from a threat, it cannot eliminate that threat. It seems clear that contempt towards aboriginals is still present and that their emancipation without an honourable historical justification would also lead to the exacerbation of racism against aboriginals. ...

One of the main characteristics of today’s democratic societies is their pluralism. As a result, liberal political philosophers often claim that the state should remain neutral with respect to different conceptions of the good. Legal and social policies should be acceptable to everyone regardless of their culture, their religion or their comprehensive moral views. One might think that this commitment to neutrality should be especially pronounced in urban centres, with their culturally diverse populations. However, there are a large number of laws and policies adopted at the municipal level that contradict the liberal principle of neutrality. In this paper, I want to suggest that these perfectionistlaws and policies are legitimate at the urban level. Specifically, I will argue that the principle of neutrality applies only indirectly to social institutions within the broader framework of the nation-state. This is clear in the case of voluntary associations, but to a certain extent this rationale applies also to cities. In a liberal regime, private associations are allowed to hold and defend perfectionist views, focused on a particular conception of the good life. One problem is to determine the limits of this perfectionism at the urban level, since cities, unlike private associations, are publicinstitutions. My aim here is therefore to give a liberal justification to a limited form of perfectionism of municipal laws and policies.

One of the main characteristics of today’s democratic societies is their pluralism. As a result, liberal political philosophers often claim that the state should remain neutral with respect to different conceptions of the good. Legal and social policies should be acceptable to everyone regardless of their culture, their religion or their comprehensive moral views. One might think that this commitment to neutrality should be especially pronounced in urban centres, with their culturally diverse populations. However, there are a large number of laws and policies adopted at the municipal level that contradict the liberal principle of neutrality. In this paper, I want to suggest that these perfectionist laws and policies are legitimate at the urban level. Specifically, I will argue that the principle of neutrality applies only indirectly to social institutions within the broader framework of the nation-state. This is clear in the case of voluntary associations, but to a certain extent th...