Papers by Ndubuisi Christian Ani
Conflict Research Network West Africa (CORN), 2025
Reintegrating ‘repentant’ violent extremists is one of the most controversial transitional justic... more Reintegrating ‘repentant’ violent extremists is one of the most controversial transitional justice issues in the Lake Chad Basin today. In Nigeria, affected communities disapprove of the government’s defector programme, which provides amnesty, rehabilitation and reintegration for repentant Boko Haram fighters through Operation Safe Corridor. Using a restorative justice framework, this research interrogates the fundamental cause of resistance to the deradicalization and reintegration program. The research found that the state-led programme for repentant extremists fail to address the grievances and psychosocial needs of victims and communities affected by extremist activities. The current approach which seems to prioritize and favour perpetrators at the expense of victims risks antagonizing communities further and creating the impression that violence is beneficial, thereby undermining the overall aim of the program. A more comprehensive approach is needed, one that prioritizes the needs of victims and communities, while also providing a pathway for former extremists to reintegrate into society.
ENACT, 2025
Gangsterism in Liberia lies at the intersection of a society ravaged by civil war, a declining ec... more Gangsterism in Liberia lies at the intersection of a society ravaged by civil war, a declining economy, social exclusion of a bulging underclass, collusion between state officials and illicit markets, and inefficient law enforcement. For youths, gang involvement offers a sense of belonging, a surrogate family structure, and a means of protection and economic benefits. Gangs are also available for hire by politicians, criminal networks and business people seeking to intimidate their opponents or protect properties.
Key recommendations • A policy against gangsterism and criminal groupings is urgently needed in Liberia. A comprehensive policy would offer opportunities for a holistic response that involves the improved provision of public services, including enhanced law enforcement, in communities. • Youth-focused development is a critical priority for addressing the causes of gang violence and drug abuse in Liberia. Without discounting the importance of quick-impact youthempowerment initiatives, development programmes need to be long-term. • Schools should have drug prevention programmes. • International support could help Liberia establish treatment and rehabilitation centres to address substance abuse and criminality. • The Economic Community of West African States and African Union should establish a joint task force with Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea to disrupt kush production points and supply chains.
The political independence of African states in the 1960s provided opportunity for Africa to mate... more The political independence of African states in the 1960s provided opportunity for Africa to materialize the Pan-African desire for 'African solutions to African problems' as opposed to the dependence on, and impositions of, external powers. Over fifty years after independence however, the continent remains chronically dependent on external systems and interventions. Using Mills' Racial Contract theory and Frantz Fanon's Pitfalls of National Consciousness, the study engages with the causes of Africa's continued dependency. The paper contends that the constraints in materializing 'African solutions to African problems' resides in the fact that while outside forces have condescendingly treated Africa as 'a charity case' from which no real solution to its woes can emerge, Africa's lackluster and myopic leadership also share the blame for the miscarriage of a potentially sound ideal.
IPSS Policy Brief Series, 2024
One of the most overlooked aspects of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the m... more One of the most overlooked aspects of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the modalities of cooperation amongst Regional Economic communities (RECs). This oversight provides a reason as to why RECs rarely undertake joint assessments, mediation or peace support operations. Therefore, this policy brief shows that the lack of cooperation among RECs has led to siloed working approaches and turf politics amidst increasing security threats of cross-regional ramifications. Albeit APSA was established to provide opportunities for coordination and cooperation both at the African Union (AU) level and among RECs.
OCWAR-T Report, 2023
The densely populated southern regions of Kayes and Koulikoro in Mali are at a watershed moment, ... more The densely populated southern regions of Kayes and Koulikoro in Mali are at a watershed moment, with the rapid expansion into the regions by Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) from the north and central regions. The two regions provide JNIM with new and profitable frontiers for resource exploitation, such as access to a vast tax base and control of the lucrative timber logging sector. The regions also provide JNIM with opportunities for cattle rustling, kidnapping, banditry and access to artisanal gold mining sites.
OCWAR-T Research Report, 2023
Despite robust anti-money laundering and anti-migrant smuggling policies, this study finds that t... more Despite robust anti-money laundering and anti-migrant smuggling policies, this study finds that there are few money laundering investigations and charges against smugglers in Senegal and Sierra Leone. Those countries’
financial investigative agencies lack adequate resources and expertise to uncover the illicit proceeds of smugglers, which are often processed through cash and informal channels. This is compounded by a lack of reporting of suspicious transactions by entities vulnerable to money laundering, such as informal money remitters and real estate companies.
AFRICA REPORT, 2023
The United Nations Secretary-General’s proposal for a New Agenda for Peace (NAP) is a timely call... more The United Nations Secretary-General’s proposal for a New Agenda for Peace (NAP) is a timely call to address the critical gaps in global multilateralism. This report provides African perspectives on selected aspects of the NAP. It argues that existing prevention and peacebuilding frameworks must be revitalised. Global, regional and sub-regional decision-making processes should be aligned and existing partnerships must be revisited, enhanced and deepened as required. Adequate resourcing is also needed for African peace support operations and peacebuilding endeavours.
Training for Peace, 2022
Lessons from the African Standby Force (ASF), EU Battlegroup (EUBG) and NATO Response Force (NRF)... more Lessons from the African Standby Force (ASF), EU Battlegroup (EUBG) and NATO Response Force (NRF) show that rigid standby security arrangements are hard to deploy. Recent ASF deployments in Gambia, Lesotho, Mozambique and DRC may not follow strict ASF structures, but they reflect the required flexibility towards utilizing ready-elements and cross-regional capacities. Despite growing preference for interventions by adhoc coalitions, the African Standby Force remains key to harmonizing continental policy & standards for Pan-African agency. The ASF should now focus more on boosting its rotational readiness, rapid deployment capacities & inter-RECs/RMs cooperation to foster flexible & cross-regional missions.
Uncertainties about the specific responsibilities of the AU and sub-regions within the APSA frame... more Uncertainties about the specific responsibilities of the AU and sub-regions within the APSA framework have led to unnecessary duplicity, competition, half-hearted measures and rise of ad hoc arrangements. Indeed, clear-cut roles may not be feasible at this stage. But the AU and sub-regions needs a sequential framework for their working modalities and needs to enhance their coordination mechanisms.
Since 2011, Africa witnessed 7 different forms of popular uprisings leading to the overthrow of r... more Since 2011, Africa witnessed 7 different forms of popular uprisings leading to the overthrow of ruling heads of state. This includes the situations in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia in 2011, Burkina Faso in 2014, Zimbabwe in 2017 as well as the recent cases in Algeria and Sudan in 2019. During these uprisings, the African Union (AU) is criticized for its lack of responsiveness to government crackdown, but quick action to condemn the military-supported revolution. Using the case of Sudan, this article examines the complexities of popular uprisings in Africa and AU’s challenge in managing the situation. The paper argues that the AU faces the dilemma of protecting the rights of peaceful protesters in a sovereign state and ensuring long-term stability, including preventing the history of military adventurism on the continent. Yet, its role has often leaned disproportionately toward maintaining stability, which raises criticisms that it favors state regimes as opposed to its human-centric and democratic commitments. To enhance its credibility, the AU must adopt proactive roles to protect protesters against government crackdowns. Additionally, the AU needs to augment its existing African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) with actionable policy guidance for protesters, governments, and security agencies during popular uprisings.
Journal of African Union Studies (JoAUS), 2018
A growing trend in Africa's security landscape is the central role of sub-regional organizations ... more A growing trend in Africa's security landscape is the central role of sub-regional organizations and coalitions in addressing security threats in their respective regions. At the same time, the primary responsibility of the African Union (AU) in crises situations is increasingly vague and often focused on endorsing sub-regional decisions and supporting resource mobilization. Using the case of the South Sudan peace process led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), this article highlights issues with the current status quo. The article argues that the overlapping mandates and unclear division of labor between the AU and sub-regions in security situations has impact on Africa's integration agenda as well as the AU's primacy for peace and security on the continent. Indeed, clarifying the roles of the AU and sub-regional organizations is among the pivotal issues on the AU reform process that was initiated in January 2017. To enhance African integration and maximize the capacities on the continent for sustainable peace, the reform has to strengthen the capacity of the AU to influence peace processes led by sub-regional organizations, including playing a robust role when sub-regional mechanisms are unable and/or unwilling to pursue sustainable peace.
The idea of “African solutions to African problems” has enthralled policy makers in Africa and ac... more The idea of “African solutions to African problems” has enthralled policy makers in Africa and across the globe since the establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2001. The AU was equipped with robust mandates for coordinated solutions to the challenges in the continent unlike its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). While the maxim is employed in various policy discourses, there is limited consensus on what African solutions entail, especially in peace and security where the discourse dominates. Using the theoretical framework of constructivism, this article advances the debate by delineating three schools of thought—agency, indigenous, and innovative perspectives—on what constitute “African solutions.” The variances in these outlooks highlight the extensive view of “African solutions” and the multipronged ideas about Africa’s mechanisms and substantive values that could solve regional issues, and by extension, global challenges.
African Human Rights Law Journal, 2018
After 2009 when the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against President Omar ... more After 2009 when the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan, the African Union began to promote an immunity principle for sitting leaders and senior government officials. The immunity principle was formalised in article 46Abis of the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. While the immunity principle raised an uproar among civil society groups, there has been limited scholarly engagement with its implications for conflict resolution and the need to deter would-be perpetrators of international crimes. Thus, the article examines the impact of the AU’s immunity principle on conflict resolution efforts in Africa using South Sudan as a case study and drawing lessons from the case involving the former President of Chad, Hissène Habré. The article contends that even though an AU-led hybrid court without any immunity provisions is to be established in South Sudan, the AU’s historical immunity stance will impede the hybrid court from trying the warring leaders who are the main actors responsible for the crimes in South Sudan. As such, the immunity principle provides opportunities for the warring leaders, who eventually will be leaders and senior government officials in line with the peace deal, to enjoy impunity for international crimes. If it is established the court most likely will focus on trying scapegoats of the warring factions in a tokenist effort at justice. The Habré case reveals that the trial of incumbent leaders is possible when incumbent leaders lose political power, but prosecution depends on additional variables such as a lack of international support. In the context of the proclivity of some leaders on the continent to remain in power beyond their constitutional mandates, the AU’s immunity stance further provides an incentive for the ‘sit-tight-in office syndrome’ to avoid future probes into international crimes. The article argues that the AU’s strategic shift away from the immunity stance could prevent impunity and provide leaders with greater legitimacy.
This report, produced by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), is the second in a two-part st... more This report, produced by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), is the second in a two-part study examining current dynamics with regards to violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the Lake Chad region (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger). The first report examined factionalism within the Boko Haram movement, while the second report profiles current responses and challenges.
The Lake Chad region is characterised by a number of factors which make it conducive to the presence of non-state actors. No single factor explains the emergence and rise of Boko Haram in the region, but understanding the overall context is important to understanding the movement itself. Chief among the factors enabling the rise of Boko Haram include a limited state presence and poor governance, underdevelopment and unemployment, environmental pressures enhanced by the receding waters of Lake Chad and desertification, and a deep history of Islamic conservatism.
While those factors describe the shared overall context in which Boko Haram has operated and thrived, responses have differed across the region. The development of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has played an instrumental role in terms of coordinating military action, but cooperation has generally been restricted to this sphere, and largely amounts to joint military operations around border locations.
Yet, positive signs of increased military cooperation have begun to appear. In addition, Nigerian security forces have undertaken a number of internal offensives, though it is unclear to what degree the security apparatus has considered the split within Boko Haram and adjusted its operating methods accordingly. Rather, it appears that the focus initially centered on Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and its leader Abubakar Shekau, instead of Islamic State West Africa (ISIS-WA), although a more equitable balance in terms of operational targeting has emerged lately. In Cameroon, the country second most affected by militant activity, the response has involved the mobilisation of security actors at all levels, which has also provided a chance for the government to reorganise and deepen its presence in border communities that were previously neglected.
Non-military responses have largely been ad-hoc and suffer from limited coordination across the region, although the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) is attempting to change that. Nonetheless, some key challenges have emerged in regards to this aspect. This report highlights a few areas of concern beginning with the need to balance security considerations with restrictions on local livelihoods. Given the precarious nature of livelihoods in the Lake Chad region, especially for those displaced, civilians can be threatened by the unintended effects of government or military policies. Restrictions on aspects like movement, transport, or the engagement in certain trades, while taken with security in mind, ultimately increase dependency and forestall the ability of the region to get back on its feet.
Vigilante organisations were present throughout the Lake Chad region prior to the Boko Haram crisis, but they have taken on an increased importance in response to it. Yet many questions remain as to their future, especially given the expectations of vigilante members themselves, considering their contribution and the sacrifices endured. The gap in state presence made the reliance on vigilantes necessary, but that same gap in terms of state services will still have to be overcome to ensure the vigilantes remain productive members of society.
Over the past few years, a significant number of former combatants have defected from both factions of Boko Haram. However, reintegration is a challenging aspect, which countries in the region have handled differently. The needs of local communities must be taken into account for any re-integration project to succeed, and this aspect will be a key test for the region's ability to move on from a violent chapter in its history.
Finally, many parts of the Lake Chad region, especially Nigeria's Borno state, have been devastated by the conflict. Reconstruction efforts are underway but are increasingly intersecting with politics ahead of Nigeria's general and state elections in early 2019. National, state, and local leaders must not allow this to disrupt plans for sustainable solutions in favour of more expedient but ultimately cosmetic adjustments, which may have political benefits but do little with regards to long-term recovery.
The response to the Boko Haram crisis is a key test for countries in the region to ensure that they can collectively recover from the destruction of the past few years, but also more pertinently provide for their citizens. As schisms within Boko Haram have led to a development of a faction that prioritises a new relationship with civilians (ISIS-WA), regional governments must do everything they can to ensure their response outpaces that of the militants and succeeds in re-invigorating the social compact between citizen and government in the Lake Chad region, thereby diminishing the long-term appeal of Islamist militancy as an alternative.
ISS Research Report, 2018
This report, produced by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), is the first in a two-part stu... more This report, produced by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), is the first in a two-part study examining current dynamics with regards to violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the Lake Chad region (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger). The report examines factionalism within Boko Haram, while the accompanying report profiles current responses and challenges.
In August 2016, Boko Haram officially split into two groups - Islamic State-West Africa (ISIS-WA), led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), led by long-time militant Abubakar Shekau. The rupture occurred after some militants opposed to the continuation of Shekau's rule secured the support of Islamic State, replacing him with al-Barnawi. Shekau rejected the demotion, and instead began commanding a faction comprised of fighters loyal to him.
The roots of the rupture have been present for some time, and revolve around a few key concerns: Shekau's dictatorial leadership style, a need to revive the movement during a period of territorial loss, and most pertinently, a debate over who is an acceptable target of the group's violence. In particular, ISISWA and JAS differ ideologically in terms of whether Muslim civilians can and should be targeted. JAS has argued that anyone who does not actively support the group is essentially a government collaborator, and thus is worthy of attack. ISIS-WA holds a stricter view with regards to Muslim civilian targeting and has advocated shifting the locus of violence back towards government forces and installations instead.
The divergent paths each group has taken in the nearly two years since their split can be traced back to this ideological divide. JAS has been responsible for a wave of suicide attacks, frequently deploying female and child bombers, against civilian soft targets in the region. ISIS-WA has on the other hand preferred to engage in less frequent but more large-scale assaults primarily targeting military structures. Both conduct violence outside this dichotomy, while it is also likely that some militants do not fully subscribe to either faction - but this overall trend explains a significant proportion of attack patterns in the Lake Chad region since 2016.
The factions themselves have largely ignored each other since the split, both in terms of messaging and violence, though sporadic clashes have occurred. Geographically JAS remains confined to south-central Borno around the Sambisa Forest, and along the Cameroonian border. ISIS-WA initially established a stronghold in Lake Chad and along the Niger border, but has subsequently expanded southwards, now with a presence in Yobe State and parts of south-central Borno as well. The enlarged areas of influence place the factions in a few areas of general overlap, but the situation remains fluid, as both adjust to continued military pressure.
Neither ISIS-WA nor JAS have demonstrated substantial external linkages, although ISIS-WA's messaging continues to be coordinated with Islamic State media outlets, while the faction itself is still allied to Islamic State's global network of terrorist affiliates. Nonetheless, little evidence of practical ties on the ground has emerged, including with other Islamic State-aligned groups operating in the Sahel and North Africa. Rather both groups rely predominately on local means to sustain themselves. Financing is emblematic of this dynamic, as both generate revenue by extorting those living in areas of their influence, taxing the trade of commodities such as cattle and fish, and conducting high-profile kidnapping operations.
A priority for ISIS-WA has been to resurrect relations with the civilian populace after militant excesses under Shekau's leadership. This shift can be seen in the reduced rate of civilian casualties during ISIS-WA attacks, and shifts in patterns of engagement. Nonetheless, a revival of popular support remains a difficult prospect, as many civilians have been scarred by the recent actions of extremist actors in the region. Additionally, those in areas of ISIS-WA influence often have little choice but to interact with the militants, as the faction remains capable of extreme violence, especially against those who violate its rules.
Yet ISIS-WA's attempts to redefine its relations with the civilian population could make it more of a longterm threat to regional stability than that posed by JAS. The concern remains that future discontent against regional governments - driven by conditions that led to the popularity of Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf in the first place and which largely persist today - may be channelled through groups like ISIS-WA, which appear to be sympathetic and offer an alternative path. In this sense, one key strategic element behind the division of Boko Haram into two groups has been the development of a more long-term vision by ISIS-WA, which threatens regional stability in the Lake Chad region, a situation that is likely to endure into the near future.
Since the establishment of the African Union in 2001, there has been a heightened activism for Af... more Since the establishment of the African Union in 2001, there has been a heightened activism for African Solutions (AfSol) in peace and security as opposed to the reality of external impositions and interventions. This article contends that while international factors play a role in Africa’s insecurities, the continent suffers largely from the ineptitude and myopic interests of Africa’s leadership at the state and regional levels. The clamour for AfSol by political leaders often serves to mask the complicity of local actors in Africa’s crises especially in peace and security. To ensure sustainable peace and stability on the continent, the AfSol concept should be underpinned with good governance and reliable attempts at context-specific solutions alongside mainstream development and security paradigms.
In January 2016, the European Union placed a cap on the amount it would provide for AMISOM peacek... more In January 2016, the European Union placed a cap on the amount it would provide for AMISOM peacekeeper stipends. This decision widened a rift between the mission and its partners over its record of achievement and future trajectory, eventually leading to a more concrete strategy for an AMISOM withdrawal. Nonetheless, in the absence of conditions that would allow a withdrawal, all involved in AMISOM may have to compromise to ensure that fragile security gains are not reversed.
Africology, 2017
This paper advances knowledge on some of Africa's indigenous principles of conflict resolution th... more This paper advances knowledge on some of Africa's indigenous principles of conflict resolution that could enhance peace efforts within the continent and the globe. The paper particularly explores the relevance of Africa's community, restorative and holistic principles of conflict resolution and the role of the African Union in enhancing their relevance in contemporary continental and global discourses.
The systematic degradation of indigenous systems in Africa is one of the colonial legacies that p... more The systematic degradation of indigenous systems in Africa is one of the colonial legacies that prevent indigenous communities from achieving justice in the face of continued colonial exploitation and elite corruption.
The crisis in the Gambia has been averted, but many other peace and security issues need urgent d... more The crisis in the Gambia has been averted, but many other peace and security issues need urgent discussion at the summit.
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Papers by Ndubuisi Christian Ani
Key recommendations • A policy against gangsterism and criminal groupings is urgently needed in Liberia. A comprehensive policy would offer opportunities for a holistic response that involves the improved provision of public services, including enhanced law enforcement, in communities. • Youth-focused development is a critical priority for addressing the causes of gang violence and drug abuse in Liberia. Without discounting the importance of quick-impact youthempowerment initiatives, development programmes need to be long-term. • Schools should have drug prevention programmes. • International support could help Liberia establish treatment and rehabilitation centres to address substance abuse and criminality. • The Economic Community of West African States and African Union should establish a joint task force with Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea to disrupt kush production points and supply chains.
financial investigative agencies lack adequate resources and expertise to uncover the illicit proceeds of smugglers, which are often processed through cash and informal channels. This is compounded by a lack of reporting of suspicious transactions by entities vulnerable to money laundering, such as informal money remitters and real estate companies.
The Lake Chad region is characterised by a number of factors which make it conducive to the presence of non-state actors. No single factor explains the emergence and rise of Boko Haram in the region, but understanding the overall context is important to understanding the movement itself. Chief among the factors enabling the rise of Boko Haram include a limited state presence and poor governance, underdevelopment and unemployment, environmental pressures enhanced by the receding waters of Lake Chad and desertification, and a deep history of Islamic conservatism.
While those factors describe the shared overall context in which Boko Haram has operated and thrived, responses have differed across the region. The development of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has played an instrumental role in terms of coordinating military action, but cooperation has generally been restricted to this sphere, and largely amounts to joint military operations around border locations.
Yet, positive signs of increased military cooperation have begun to appear. In addition, Nigerian security forces have undertaken a number of internal offensives, though it is unclear to what degree the security apparatus has considered the split within Boko Haram and adjusted its operating methods accordingly. Rather, it appears that the focus initially centered on Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and its leader Abubakar Shekau, instead of Islamic State West Africa (ISIS-WA), although a more equitable balance in terms of operational targeting has emerged lately. In Cameroon, the country second most affected by militant activity, the response has involved the mobilisation of security actors at all levels, which has also provided a chance for the government to reorganise and deepen its presence in border communities that were previously neglected.
Non-military responses have largely been ad-hoc and suffer from limited coordination across the region, although the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) is attempting to change that. Nonetheless, some key challenges have emerged in regards to this aspect. This report highlights a few areas of concern beginning with the need to balance security considerations with restrictions on local livelihoods. Given the precarious nature of livelihoods in the Lake Chad region, especially for those displaced, civilians can be threatened by the unintended effects of government or military policies. Restrictions on aspects like movement, transport, or the engagement in certain trades, while taken with security in mind, ultimately increase dependency and forestall the ability of the region to get back on its feet.
Vigilante organisations were present throughout the Lake Chad region prior to the Boko Haram crisis, but they have taken on an increased importance in response to it. Yet many questions remain as to their future, especially given the expectations of vigilante members themselves, considering their contribution and the sacrifices endured. The gap in state presence made the reliance on vigilantes necessary, but that same gap in terms of state services will still have to be overcome to ensure the vigilantes remain productive members of society.
Over the past few years, a significant number of former combatants have defected from both factions of Boko Haram. However, reintegration is a challenging aspect, which countries in the region have handled differently. The needs of local communities must be taken into account for any re-integration project to succeed, and this aspect will be a key test for the region's ability to move on from a violent chapter in its history.
Finally, many parts of the Lake Chad region, especially Nigeria's Borno state, have been devastated by the conflict. Reconstruction efforts are underway but are increasingly intersecting with politics ahead of Nigeria's general and state elections in early 2019. National, state, and local leaders must not allow this to disrupt plans for sustainable solutions in favour of more expedient but ultimately cosmetic adjustments, which may have political benefits but do little with regards to long-term recovery.
The response to the Boko Haram crisis is a key test for countries in the region to ensure that they can collectively recover from the destruction of the past few years, but also more pertinently provide for their citizens. As schisms within Boko Haram have led to a development of a faction that prioritises a new relationship with civilians (ISIS-WA), regional governments must do everything they can to ensure their response outpaces that of the militants and succeeds in re-invigorating the social compact between citizen and government in the Lake Chad region, thereby diminishing the long-term appeal of Islamist militancy as an alternative.
In August 2016, Boko Haram officially split into two groups - Islamic State-West Africa (ISIS-WA), led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), led by long-time militant Abubakar Shekau. The rupture occurred after some militants opposed to the continuation of Shekau's rule secured the support of Islamic State, replacing him with al-Barnawi. Shekau rejected the demotion, and instead began commanding a faction comprised of fighters loyal to him.
The roots of the rupture have been present for some time, and revolve around a few key concerns: Shekau's dictatorial leadership style, a need to revive the movement during a period of territorial loss, and most pertinently, a debate over who is an acceptable target of the group's violence. In particular, ISISWA and JAS differ ideologically in terms of whether Muslim civilians can and should be targeted. JAS has argued that anyone who does not actively support the group is essentially a government collaborator, and thus is worthy of attack. ISIS-WA holds a stricter view with regards to Muslim civilian targeting and has advocated shifting the locus of violence back towards government forces and installations instead.
The divergent paths each group has taken in the nearly two years since their split can be traced back to this ideological divide. JAS has been responsible for a wave of suicide attacks, frequently deploying female and child bombers, against civilian soft targets in the region. ISIS-WA has on the other hand preferred to engage in less frequent but more large-scale assaults primarily targeting military structures. Both conduct violence outside this dichotomy, while it is also likely that some militants do not fully subscribe to either faction - but this overall trend explains a significant proportion of attack patterns in the Lake Chad region since 2016.
The factions themselves have largely ignored each other since the split, both in terms of messaging and violence, though sporadic clashes have occurred. Geographically JAS remains confined to south-central Borno around the Sambisa Forest, and along the Cameroonian border. ISIS-WA initially established a stronghold in Lake Chad and along the Niger border, but has subsequently expanded southwards, now with a presence in Yobe State and parts of south-central Borno as well. The enlarged areas of influence place the factions in a few areas of general overlap, but the situation remains fluid, as both adjust to continued military pressure.
Neither ISIS-WA nor JAS have demonstrated substantial external linkages, although ISIS-WA's messaging continues to be coordinated with Islamic State media outlets, while the faction itself is still allied to Islamic State's global network of terrorist affiliates. Nonetheless, little evidence of practical ties on the ground has emerged, including with other Islamic State-aligned groups operating in the Sahel and North Africa. Rather both groups rely predominately on local means to sustain themselves. Financing is emblematic of this dynamic, as both generate revenue by extorting those living in areas of their influence, taxing the trade of commodities such as cattle and fish, and conducting high-profile kidnapping operations.
A priority for ISIS-WA has been to resurrect relations with the civilian populace after militant excesses under Shekau's leadership. This shift can be seen in the reduced rate of civilian casualties during ISIS-WA attacks, and shifts in patterns of engagement. Nonetheless, a revival of popular support remains a difficult prospect, as many civilians have been scarred by the recent actions of extremist actors in the region. Additionally, those in areas of ISIS-WA influence often have little choice but to interact with the militants, as the faction remains capable of extreme violence, especially against those who violate its rules.
Yet ISIS-WA's attempts to redefine its relations with the civilian population could make it more of a longterm threat to regional stability than that posed by JAS. The concern remains that future discontent against regional governments - driven by conditions that led to the popularity of Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf in the first place and which largely persist today - may be channelled through groups like ISIS-WA, which appear to be sympathetic and offer an alternative path. In this sense, one key strategic element behind the division of Boko Haram into two groups has been the development of a more long-term vision by ISIS-WA, which threatens regional stability in the Lake Chad region, a situation that is likely to endure into the near future.
Key recommendations • A policy against gangsterism and criminal groupings is urgently needed in Liberia. A comprehensive policy would offer opportunities for a holistic response that involves the improved provision of public services, including enhanced law enforcement, in communities. • Youth-focused development is a critical priority for addressing the causes of gang violence and drug abuse in Liberia. Without discounting the importance of quick-impact youthempowerment initiatives, development programmes need to be long-term. • Schools should have drug prevention programmes. • International support could help Liberia establish treatment and rehabilitation centres to address substance abuse and criminality. • The Economic Community of West African States and African Union should establish a joint task force with Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea to disrupt kush production points and supply chains.
financial investigative agencies lack adequate resources and expertise to uncover the illicit proceeds of smugglers, which are often processed through cash and informal channels. This is compounded by a lack of reporting of suspicious transactions by entities vulnerable to money laundering, such as informal money remitters and real estate companies.
The Lake Chad region is characterised by a number of factors which make it conducive to the presence of non-state actors. No single factor explains the emergence and rise of Boko Haram in the region, but understanding the overall context is important to understanding the movement itself. Chief among the factors enabling the rise of Boko Haram include a limited state presence and poor governance, underdevelopment and unemployment, environmental pressures enhanced by the receding waters of Lake Chad and desertification, and a deep history of Islamic conservatism.
While those factors describe the shared overall context in which Boko Haram has operated and thrived, responses have differed across the region. The development of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has played an instrumental role in terms of coordinating military action, but cooperation has generally been restricted to this sphere, and largely amounts to joint military operations around border locations.
Yet, positive signs of increased military cooperation have begun to appear. In addition, Nigerian security forces have undertaken a number of internal offensives, though it is unclear to what degree the security apparatus has considered the split within Boko Haram and adjusted its operating methods accordingly. Rather, it appears that the focus initially centered on Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and its leader Abubakar Shekau, instead of Islamic State West Africa (ISIS-WA), although a more equitable balance in terms of operational targeting has emerged lately. In Cameroon, the country second most affected by militant activity, the response has involved the mobilisation of security actors at all levels, which has also provided a chance for the government to reorganise and deepen its presence in border communities that were previously neglected.
Non-military responses have largely been ad-hoc and suffer from limited coordination across the region, although the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) is attempting to change that. Nonetheless, some key challenges have emerged in regards to this aspect. This report highlights a few areas of concern beginning with the need to balance security considerations with restrictions on local livelihoods. Given the precarious nature of livelihoods in the Lake Chad region, especially for those displaced, civilians can be threatened by the unintended effects of government or military policies. Restrictions on aspects like movement, transport, or the engagement in certain trades, while taken with security in mind, ultimately increase dependency and forestall the ability of the region to get back on its feet.
Vigilante organisations were present throughout the Lake Chad region prior to the Boko Haram crisis, but they have taken on an increased importance in response to it. Yet many questions remain as to their future, especially given the expectations of vigilante members themselves, considering their contribution and the sacrifices endured. The gap in state presence made the reliance on vigilantes necessary, but that same gap in terms of state services will still have to be overcome to ensure the vigilantes remain productive members of society.
Over the past few years, a significant number of former combatants have defected from both factions of Boko Haram. However, reintegration is a challenging aspect, which countries in the region have handled differently. The needs of local communities must be taken into account for any re-integration project to succeed, and this aspect will be a key test for the region's ability to move on from a violent chapter in its history.
Finally, many parts of the Lake Chad region, especially Nigeria's Borno state, have been devastated by the conflict. Reconstruction efforts are underway but are increasingly intersecting with politics ahead of Nigeria's general and state elections in early 2019. National, state, and local leaders must not allow this to disrupt plans for sustainable solutions in favour of more expedient but ultimately cosmetic adjustments, which may have political benefits but do little with regards to long-term recovery.
The response to the Boko Haram crisis is a key test for countries in the region to ensure that they can collectively recover from the destruction of the past few years, but also more pertinently provide for their citizens. As schisms within Boko Haram have led to a development of a faction that prioritises a new relationship with civilians (ISIS-WA), regional governments must do everything they can to ensure their response outpaces that of the militants and succeeds in re-invigorating the social compact between citizen and government in the Lake Chad region, thereby diminishing the long-term appeal of Islamist militancy as an alternative.
In August 2016, Boko Haram officially split into two groups - Islamic State-West Africa (ISIS-WA), led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), led by long-time militant Abubakar Shekau. The rupture occurred after some militants opposed to the continuation of Shekau's rule secured the support of Islamic State, replacing him with al-Barnawi. Shekau rejected the demotion, and instead began commanding a faction comprised of fighters loyal to him.
The roots of the rupture have been present for some time, and revolve around a few key concerns: Shekau's dictatorial leadership style, a need to revive the movement during a period of territorial loss, and most pertinently, a debate over who is an acceptable target of the group's violence. In particular, ISISWA and JAS differ ideologically in terms of whether Muslim civilians can and should be targeted. JAS has argued that anyone who does not actively support the group is essentially a government collaborator, and thus is worthy of attack. ISIS-WA holds a stricter view with regards to Muslim civilian targeting and has advocated shifting the locus of violence back towards government forces and installations instead.
The divergent paths each group has taken in the nearly two years since their split can be traced back to this ideological divide. JAS has been responsible for a wave of suicide attacks, frequently deploying female and child bombers, against civilian soft targets in the region. ISIS-WA has on the other hand preferred to engage in less frequent but more large-scale assaults primarily targeting military structures. Both conduct violence outside this dichotomy, while it is also likely that some militants do not fully subscribe to either faction - but this overall trend explains a significant proportion of attack patterns in the Lake Chad region since 2016.
The factions themselves have largely ignored each other since the split, both in terms of messaging and violence, though sporadic clashes have occurred. Geographically JAS remains confined to south-central Borno around the Sambisa Forest, and along the Cameroonian border. ISIS-WA initially established a stronghold in Lake Chad and along the Niger border, but has subsequently expanded southwards, now with a presence in Yobe State and parts of south-central Borno as well. The enlarged areas of influence place the factions in a few areas of general overlap, but the situation remains fluid, as both adjust to continued military pressure.
Neither ISIS-WA nor JAS have demonstrated substantial external linkages, although ISIS-WA's messaging continues to be coordinated with Islamic State media outlets, while the faction itself is still allied to Islamic State's global network of terrorist affiliates. Nonetheless, little evidence of practical ties on the ground has emerged, including with other Islamic State-aligned groups operating in the Sahel and North Africa. Rather both groups rely predominately on local means to sustain themselves. Financing is emblematic of this dynamic, as both generate revenue by extorting those living in areas of their influence, taxing the trade of commodities such as cattle and fish, and conducting high-profile kidnapping operations.
A priority for ISIS-WA has been to resurrect relations with the civilian populace after militant excesses under Shekau's leadership. This shift can be seen in the reduced rate of civilian casualties during ISIS-WA attacks, and shifts in patterns of engagement. Nonetheless, a revival of popular support remains a difficult prospect, as many civilians have been scarred by the recent actions of extremist actors in the region. Additionally, those in areas of ISIS-WA influence often have little choice but to interact with the militants, as the faction remains capable of extreme violence, especially against those who violate its rules.
Yet ISIS-WA's attempts to redefine its relations with the civilian population could make it more of a longterm threat to regional stability than that posed by JAS. The concern remains that future discontent against regional governments - driven by conditions that led to the popularity of Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf in the first place and which largely persist today - may be channelled through groups like ISIS-WA, which appear to be sympathetic and offer an alternative path. In this sense, one key strategic element behind the division of Boko Haram into two groups has been the development of a more long-term vision by ISIS-WA, which threatens regional stability in the Lake Chad region, a situation that is likely to endure into the near future.
Using a constructivist framework and a qualitative methodology with reliance on interview data from African peace and security experts as well as literary discourses on African indigenous conflict resolution, this dissertation explores the substantive value of the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ and the implications for the interventionist outlook employed by the African Union. The research employs the case study of the African Union’s intervention in Somalia to assess the achievements, challenges and prospects in the application of African solutions.
The findings of the dissertation highlights that ‘African solutions’ in conflict resolution does not refer to unique elements. Rather they refer to Africa’s prioritized values in conflict resolution that may be in consonant or discordant with those of other geopolitical regions, but significant enough to advance self-determination, local ownership and the quest for sustainable solutions in Africa. Although it emerged from the misgivings about external impositions and interventions in Africa, the maxim ‘African Solutions to African problems’ indicts African actors for their failure to exhibit appropriate agency in terms of advancing context-sensitive solutions to the continent’s challenges. In line with the theoretical framework of constructivism which argues that the international system is influenced by prevailing ideas, the ideals of African solutions obliges Africa to critic and enhance its values and priorities, and negotiate them within the prevailing theory and practice of conflict resolution without being constrained by the dictates and approaches of dominant powers.
2. The AU’s role in peace and security goes beyond norm-setting
2. Discussions around the African Standby Force gain momentum
2. The African Union and the question of LGBTI-rights
3. The AU will have to do more to convince SADC
4. Helping those affected by Boko Haram to get back on their feet
5. Interview with Nicholas Haysom, UN Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan
The future of EU support for APSA: issues to look out for
UAE port deal with Somaliland stirs up trouble in the Horn
The AU and the constitutional review process in Burundi
South Sudan could fall on deaf ears if the region
and the UN Security Council remain divided.
summit.
Clarifying the relationship between the AU and RECs
is on the reform agenda.
■ Addis Insight
An analysis of the work of the PSC this year shows
fewer meetings were held on crisis situations.
Election observers need to up their game in 2018 if
they are to remain relevant.
In the past year the AU has taken some steps towards
silencing the guns.
to peacekeeping missions will affect US-Africa
relations.
Should the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic be
allowed to attend crucial AU partnership summits?
Questions remain over the implementation of the AU’s new Amnesty Month for the surrender of illegal weapons.
Situation Analysis
The Nigerian government should engage with the pro- Biafra agitators, not popularise their cause through crackdowns.
on the margins of the upcoming General Assembly in
New York to talk about South Sudan.
There is growing skepticism over the viability of the African Standby Force.
Looming funding cuts should urge the AU to fill crucial peacekeeping doctrinal gaps.
meeting on Western Sahara since the kingdom
rejoined the AU.
More funding is needed for relief efforts and the fight
against terrorism in Somalia.
The AU recently celebrated the 10th anniversary of
the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance – a useful tool that is not being used
often enough.
The new financing model of the AU is an opportunity for member states to pay their dues regularly and on time.