
Heine A Holmen
I am Head of Department at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at NTNU in Trondheim (Norway). I also have a position as associate professor in philosophy at the University of Tromsø - the Arctic University of Norway. In addition I am editor of Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift.
My work focuses on human agency and -will, the epistemology of action, death and the meaning and life, immortality, love, and other issues.
My research interests are therefore dwelling in many different philosophical terrains, like metaphysics, philosophy of action, -mind, -life and death, ethics, moral psychology and meta-ethics. In addition, I enjoy reading the history of philosophy and the classics og literature.
My Ph.D. thesis - "Ethics and the Nature of Action" - was defended at the University of Oslo (UiO) in 2012 at the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN). I have been a visiting scholar at Birkbeck College, London, in 2008 and at Rutgers University, New Jersey, in 2009.
Supervisors: Jennifer Hornsby and Carsten M. Hansen
My work focuses on human agency and -will, the epistemology of action, death and the meaning and life, immortality, love, and other issues.
My research interests are therefore dwelling in many different philosophical terrains, like metaphysics, philosophy of action, -mind, -life and death, ethics, moral psychology and meta-ethics. In addition, I enjoy reading the history of philosophy and the classics og literature.
My Ph.D. thesis - "Ethics and the Nature of Action" - was defended at the University of Oslo (UiO) in 2012 at the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN). I have been a visiting scholar at Birkbeck College, London, in 2008 and at Rutgers University, New Jersey, in 2009.
Supervisors: Jennifer Hornsby and Carsten M. Hansen
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Papers by Heine A Holmen
ENGLISH ABSTRACT Anscombe's philosophy of action has made a decisive comeback. In particular, philosophers like David Velleman and Kieran Setiya have done much to show that her framework promises to explain the tight connection between acting intentionally and agent's knowledge (knowledge of what one does and why) by making the latter integral to the nature of the former. Sarah K. Paul challenges this assumption by defending an alternative, inferen-tial epistemology of agent's knowledge. According to her, agents infer a belief about what they are doing from knowing one's intention and background conditions. Bellow, I defend the Anscombean approach negatively by showing why Paul's model fails. Firstly, by showing that it fails to provide a sufficiently strong inferential basis to provide the agent with
knowledge of what she is doing. Secondly, by arguing that the theory fails to explain why the phenomenology of agent’s knowledge appears as it does.
profound boredom and dread and makes us face the death of all value. It hurls us towards the hostile, boring and nihilistic stages of the universe, and allows fates worse than death. I therefore conclude, with a nod towards Voltaire, that if death did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it.
Papers - Scandinavian by Heine A Holmen
Books by Heine A Holmen
ENGLISH ABSTRACT Anscombe's philosophy of action has made a decisive comeback. In particular, philosophers like David Velleman and Kieran Setiya have done much to show that her framework promises to explain the tight connection between acting intentionally and agent's knowledge (knowledge of what one does and why) by making the latter integral to the nature of the former. Sarah K. Paul challenges this assumption by defending an alternative, inferen-tial epistemology of agent's knowledge. According to her, agents infer a belief about what they are doing from knowing one's intention and background conditions. Bellow, I defend the Anscombean approach negatively by showing why Paul's model fails. Firstly, by showing that it fails to provide a sufficiently strong inferential basis to provide the agent with
knowledge of what she is doing. Secondly, by arguing that the theory fails to explain why the phenomenology of agent’s knowledge appears as it does.
profound boredom and dread and makes us face the death of all value. It hurls us towards the hostile, boring and nihilistic stages of the universe, and allows fates worse than death. I therefore conclude, with a nod towards Voltaire, that if death did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it.