Papers by Sverke R . Saxegaard
Master's Thesis, 2019
Since the end of the Second World War, civil war has been the most frequent and deadly form of ar... more Since the end of the Second World War, civil war has been the most frequent and deadly form of armed conflict. This has resulted in an abundance of explanations of the occurrence of civil war. Nevertheless, a complete explanation of any phenomenon must be able to explain the absence as well as the occurrence of said phenomenon. The time has come to turn to the non-events, the dogs that do not bark; the countries where we should expect to see civil war, but where no civil war occurred. One such country is Tanzania. Within Tanzania’s postindependence history, the semi-autonomous region of Zanzibar, and the 1990-2010 period stand out as particularly conflict-prone. Therefore, the research question is: Why was there no civil war in Zanzibar in the period 1990 – 2010? To answer this question, I combine various theories of the causes of civil war into a comprehensive and systematic theoretical framework, which incorporates both structural and process-based theories of civil war onset. The resulting theoretical framework holds that governments and their domestic opposition produce their own civil wars, but not at their own accord; they produce them under certain structural conditions, given and transmitted from the past. This theoretical framework is developed in the theory chapter and operationalized in the methods chapter. I apply this theoretical framework to Zanzibar in the 1990-2010 period, and argue that Zanzibar avoided civil war in this period for three reasons. First, in years preceding elections, escalation to civil war was prevented because of a belief held by the opposition that the next election would lead to substantial political change. Second, regardless of the level of objective opportunity, lack of perceived opportunity has prevented the opposition from initiating a civil war. And third, the leadership of the opposition has acted in a risk-averse manner at key moments. In total, the empirical case study explains the puzzle of Zanzibar’s relative peacefulness and illustrates the advantages of theory synthesis and methodological pluralism in the analysis of civil war risk in specific cases.
Bachelor Thesis, 2016
Hva som motiverer innbyggere i rike vestlige demokratier til å ønske selvstendighet for sin regio... more Hva som motiverer innbyggere i rike vestlige demokratier til å ønske selvstendighet for sin region, har på nytt blitt et aktuelt spørsmål i Europa. Litteraturen på området har identifisert to beveggrunner som virker å være viktigere enn andre. For det første kan en forvente at et individ støtter selvstendighet dersom han eller hun vurderer selvstendighet som økonomisk gunstig. For det andre kan en forvente at et individ støtter selvstendighet dersom han eller hun har en sterk nasjonal identitet. Denne oppgaven undersøker hvilken av disse to faktorene som var viktigst forskotter og katalanere iforkant av folkeavstemningene om selvstendighet som ble avholdt i 2014. Undersøkelsen er basert påkvantitativ analyse av surveydata, og finnerat økonomisk vurdering var en viktigere faktor i både Skottland og Katalonia.Samtidig må det påpekes at selv om økonomisk vurdering er viktigere, har også nasjonal identitet en tydelig effekt på selvstendighetsønsket. Videre finner oppgaven atbritisk identitet har betydeligstørre effekt på selvstendighetsønsket enn skotsk identitet, en forskjell som ikke finnes mellom spansk og katalansk identitet.
Drafts by Sverke R . Saxegaard
Term Paper, 2017
December 3rd, 1956, Fidel Castro was presumed dead after a failed invasion. Two years later, on J... more December 3rd, 1956, Fidel Castro was presumed dead after a failed invasion. Two years later, on January 8th, 1957, Castro entered Havana as a triumphant liberator. What explains Castro’s rise from a failed revolutionary to the undisputed leader of the revolution?
In order to answer this question, three processes need to be explained. The fall of President Fulgencio Batista, the rise of the 26th of July Movement (M26) to become the dominant actor in the anti-Batista struggle, and the emergence of Fidel Castro as the undisputed leader of the M26.
In this essay I will compare different interpretations of the events that led to Castro’s entry into Havana as a victor. This comparison will include an interpretation of the civil conflict through the lens of New York Times journalism, in order to understand how the conflict was presented to the contemporary international audience. In the end, I will argue that Castro’s rise to supremacy was caused by a combination of thoughtful public relations and a number of lucky coincidences.
Term Paper, 2016
By October 2016, the ongoing civil war in Yemen has caused about 3.1 million internally displaced... more By October 2016, the ongoing civil war in Yemen has caused about 3.1 million internally displaced people and claimed over 10.000 lives (Security Council Report 2016). The conflict is in many ways the typical conflict of our time, as it involves Islamic extremism, a weak state formerly headed by an autocrat, a poor population divided by sectarian and tribal lines, oil reserves and intervention by foreign actors. Yemen is “the usual suspect” when it comes to contemporary violent conflict.
Because of these characteristics, the civil war in Yemen is suitable to illustrate the different theories about civil war onset. The process of illustrating the theories of civil war onset will also shed light on the specific origin of the civil war in Yemen. This is the dual purpose of this paper.
In order to do this I will first present a brief overview of who is fighting and what they are fighting to achieve. Thereafter I will present theories on civil war onset, grouped into three pathways, and apply them on The Yemeni civil war. In the end, I will reflect on the applicability of the theories and consider some alternative approaches.
Term Paper, 2017
On the 23rd of February 2012 Kofi Annan was appointed the first Joint Special Envoy to Syria from... more On the 23rd of February 2012 Kofi Annan was appointed the first Joint Special Envoy to Syria from the United Nations and the Arab League. The appointment marked the beginning of an ambitious peace process, formally supported by most of the major players in the international and regional community. The process had some initial success, including a temporary agreement to cease hostilities and the establishment of an unarmed UN military observation force. This process has been called the Annan Peace Plan. However, early summer the same year the conflict re-escalated and Annan eventually resigned on august 2nd. This paper seeks to answer the question of why this specific peace process failed to produce a stable peace, and simultaneously comment on the applicability of Underdal’s (1983) theory of negotiation failure on this kind of case.
In order to do this, I will first discuss the analytical framework of Underdal (1983) and its applicability on this sort of case. Thereafter I will briefly describe the turn of events constituting Annan’s Peace Plan, and explain why it failed to provide peace, using Underdal’s (1983) four obstacles to negotiation success. Finally, I will conclude on the main reasons for why the Annan Peace Plan failed, and whether Underdal’s (1983) theory is applicable to such a case.
Term Paper, 2017
Democratisation in the “global south” have at times ended in – or been characterized by – violent... more Democratisation in the “global south” have at times ended in – or been characterized by – violent political instability. At other times, democratisation have transpired in a peaceful manner. The various experiences of the recent Arab Spring, from Tunisia to Syria, underline the observation that: what starts of as calls for democracy might end in violent chaos as well as democratic progress. The observed variance generates a clear question: how and when might democratisation be vulnerable to violent political instability?
In order to answer this question, I will review the literature on democratisation generated in the wake of the stagnation of the third wave of democracy. This literature is not primarily focused on the relationship between democratisation and violent political instability, but on the challenges and opportunities of democratisation. Nevertheless, various theories of democratisation emphasize different processes, dynamics, and actors. Inherent vulnerability might, or might not, be present within these processes, dynamics, and actors. My goal is not to test theory, but to generate hypothesis regarding the possible inherent vulnerability of these elements.
In an article published in the Journal of Peace Research in March 2017 Hegre, Nygård and Ræder ev... more In an article published in the Journal of Peace Research in March 2017 Hegre, Nygård and Ræder evaluate the scope and intensity of the conflict trap. This paper will replicate the statistical analysis of Hegre et al. (2017) in order to critically assess their findings.
In this paper, I am going to summarize Howard and Roessler’s (2006) argument on liberalizing elec... more In this paper, I am going to summarize Howard and Roessler’s (2006) argument on liberalizing electoral outcomes in competitive authoritarian regimes. Thereafter, I will consider the concept of competitive authoritarianism, using the terminology developed in Adcock and Collier (2001). Thirdly, I will critically assess the choice of Kenya as a case study, using Gerring’s (2007) typology of strategic case selection. In the end, I will discuss how an alternative case study could be used in order to refine the causal mechanisms leading to liberalizing electoral outcomes.
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Papers by Sverke R . Saxegaard
Drafts by Sverke R . Saxegaard
In order to answer this question, three processes need to be explained. The fall of President Fulgencio Batista, the rise of the 26th of July Movement (M26) to become the dominant actor in the anti-Batista struggle, and the emergence of Fidel Castro as the undisputed leader of the M26.
In this essay I will compare different interpretations of the events that led to Castro’s entry into Havana as a victor. This comparison will include an interpretation of the civil conflict through the lens of New York Times journalism, in order to understand how the conflict was presented to the contemporary international audience. In the end, I will argue that Castro’s rise to supremacy was caused by a combination of thoughtful public relations and a number of lucky coincidences.
Because of these characteristics, the civil war in Yemen is suitable to illustrate the different theories about civil war onset. The process of illustrating the theories of civil war onset will also shed light on the specific origin of the civil war in Yemen. This is the dual purpose of this paper.
In order to do this I will first present a brief overview of who is fighting and what they are fighting to achieve. Thereafter I will present theories on civil war onset, grouped into three pathways, and apply them on The Yemeni civil war. In the end, I will reflect on the applicability of the theories and consider some alternative approaches.
In order to do this, I will first discuss the analytical framework of Underdal (1983) and its applicability on this sort of case. Thereafter I will briefly describe the turn of events constituting Annan’s Peace Plan, and explain why it failed to provide peace, using Underdal’s (1983) four obstacles to negotiation success. Finally, I will conclude on the main reasons for why the Annan Peace Plan failed, and whether Underdal’s (1983) theory is applicable to such a case.
In order to answer this question, I will review the literature on democratisation generated in the wake of the stagnation of the third wave of democracy. This literature is not primarily focused on the relationship between democratisation and violent political instability, but on the challenges and opportunities of democratisation. Nevertheless, various theories of democratisation emphasize different processes, dynamics, and actors. Inherent vulnerability might, or might not, be present within these processes, dynamics, and actors. My goal is not to test theory, but to generate hypothesis regarding the possible inherent vulnerability of these elements.
In order to answer this question, three processes need to be explained. The fall of President Fulgencio Batista, the rise of the 26th of July Movement (M26) to become the dominant actor in the anti-Batista struggle, and the emergence of Fidel Castro as the undisputed leader of the M26.
In this essay I will compare different interpretations of the events that led to Castro’s entry into Havana as a victor. This comparison will include an interpretation of the civil conflict through the lens of New York Times journalism, in order to understand how the conflict was presented to the contemporary international audience. In the end, I will argue that Castro’s rise to supremacy was caused by a combination of thoughtful public relations and a number of lucky coincidences.
Because of these characteristics, the civil war in Yemen is suitable to illustrate the different theories about civil war onset. The process of illustrating the theories of civil war onset will also shed light on the specific origin of the civil war in Yemen. This is the dual purpose of this paper.
In order to do this I will first present a brief overview of who is fighting and what they are fighting to achieve. Thereafter I will present theories on civil war onset, grouped into three pathways, and apply them on The Yemeni civil war. In the end, I will reflect on the applicability of the theories and consider some alternative approaches.
In order to do this, I will first discuss the analytical framework of Underdal (1983) and its applicability on this sort of case. Thereafter I will briefly describe the turn of events constituting Annan’s Peace Plan, and explain why it failed to provide peace, using Underdal’s (1983) four obstacles to negotiation success. Finally, I will conclude on the main reasons for why the Annan Peace Plan failed, and whether Underdal’s (1983) theory is applicable to such a case.
In order to answer this question, I will review the literature on democratisation generated in the wake of the stagnation of the third wave of democracy. This literature is not primarily focused on the relationship between democratisation and violent political instability, but on the challenges and opportunities of democratisation. Nevertheless, various theories of democratisation emphasize different processes, dynamics, and actors. Inherent vulnerability might, or might not, be present within these processes, dynamics, and actors. My goal is not to test theory, but to generate hypothesis regarding the possible inherent vulnerability of these elements.