Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional-attitude conte... more Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional-attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanations that characteristically appeal to it, and ii) that we can understand those explanations by analogy with other 'higher-level' explanations. Using the framework, we argue for an under-appreciated form of Russellianism. Along the way we demonstrate that being more explicit about the framework in which debates about attitude content take place allows us to more precisely characterize the space of possible positions and the dialectic between them.
Among the virtues of Relationist approaches to Frege's puzzle is that they put us in a position t... more Among the virtues of Relationist approaches to Frege's puzzle is that they put us in a position to outline structural features of the puzzle that were only implicit in earlier work. In particular, they allow us to frame questions about the relation between the explanatory roles of sense and sameness-of-sense. In this paper, I distinguish a number of positions about that relation which have not been clearly distinguished. This has a few payoffs. It allows us to shed light on recent controversies about the 'essential indexical'. And it also allows us to see what's at stake between Relationists and their opponents. When we see what's at stake, we can see that we have reason to adopt an account of cognitive significance that incorporates elements of both Relationist and Fregean approaches.
The mental files framework has been a persistent presence in philosophy of mind and language for ... more The mental files framework has been a persistent presence in philosophy of mind and language for the last half-century and has enjoyed increased popularity in recent years. It has not gone unnoticed, however, that apparent metaphors-of files, of information being contained in files, etc.-play a central role in explications of the view. But it has been unclear how seriously we ought to take these metaphors. We aim to characterize the basic explanatory commitments of the approach in non-metaphorical terms. The guiding question for the paper is whether, once we move beyond the metaphors, there is any theoretical role for files. Our suggestion is that there is not. To put our view in a slogan: so called 'mental file' theory is committed to mental filing but not to mental files. In particular, we show how to replace the file-metaphor with two theses: one semantic and one metasemantic. We argue that the metaphor of mental files can be cashed out in terms of relational representational facts (viz. facts about the coordination of mental representations) and a metasemantic thesis about the role that information-relations to objects play in grounding coordination.
We draw attention to a series of implicit assumptions that have structured the debate about Frege... more We draw attention to a series of implicit assumptions that have structured the debate about Frege's Puzzle. Once these assumptions are made explicit, we rely on them to show that if one focuses exclusively on the issues raised by Frege cases, then one obtains a powerful consideration against a fine-grained conception of propositional attitude content. In light of this consideration, a form of Russellianism about content becomes viable.
[This paper was published in Ergo. A link to the open-access version is below] Metalinguistic app... more [This paper was published in Ergo. A link to the open-access version is below] Metalinguistic approaches to names hold that proper names are semantically associated with name-bearing properties. I argue that metalinguistic theorists owe us an account of the metaphysics of those properties. The unique structure of the debate about names gives an issue which might look to be narrowly linguistic an important metaphysical dimension. The only plausible account of name-bearing treats name-bearing properties as a species of response-dependent property. I outline how such an account should look, drawing on forms of response-dependence identified in the literature on colour, moral properties, etc. Having done that, I show how the account can illuminate a feature of the communicative function of names which would otherwise be puzzling from the perspective of metalinguistic accounts.
[This is the penultimate version of a paper that is forthcoming in Noûs] Fregeanism and Relationi... more [This is the penultimate version of a paper that is forthcoming in Noûs] Fregeanism and Relationism are competing families of solutions to Frege's Puzzle, and by extension, competing theories of propositional representation. My aim is to clarify what is at stake between them by characterizing and evaluating a Relationist argument. Relationists claim that it is cognitively possible for distinct token propositional attitudes to be, in a sense, qualitatively indistinguishable-to differ in no intrinsic representational features. The idea of an 'intrinsic representational feature' is not, however, made especially clear in the argument. I clarify it here and, having done so, offer reason to doubt the argument. This will put us in a position to draw some lessons about the relation between object-directed and representation-internal aspects of cognitive significance.
[This is the penultimate version of a paper which appears in Philosophy Compass] Frege's Puzzle i... more [This is the penultimate version of a paper which appears in Philosophy Compass] Frege's Puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posits representational relations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches, and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of Relationism -Semantic Relationism and Formal Relationism - corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I briefly discuss the consequences of relational approaches for foundational questions about propositional attitudes, intentional explanation, and compositionality.
Predicativists hold that proper names have predicate-type semantic values. They face an obvious c... more Predicativists hold that proper names have predicate-type semantic values. They face an obvious challenge: in many languages (English among them) names normally occur as, what appear to be, grammatical arguments (call these bare occurrences).The standard version of predicativism answers this challenge by positing an unpronounced determiner in bare occurrences. I argue that this is a mistake. Predicativists should draw a distinction between two kinds of semantic type: underived semantic type and derived semantic type. The predicativist thesis concerns the underived semantic type of proper names and underdetermines a view about the semantic type of bare occurrences. I'll argue that predicativists should hold that bare names are derived individual-denoting expressions. I end by considering what this result means for the relationship between predicativism and other metalinguistic theories of names.
[This is the penultimate version of a paper that will appear in Linguistics and Philosophy.] This... more [This is the penultimate version of a paper that will appear in Linguistics and Philosophy.] This paper is about how to interpret and evaluate purported evidence for predicativism about proper names. I aim to point out some underappreciated thorny issues and to offer both predicativists and non-predicativists some advice about how best to pursue their respective projects. I hope to establish three related claims: (1) That non-predicativists have to posit relatively exotic, though not entirely implausible, polysemic mechanisms to capture the range of data that predicativists have introduced; (2) that neither referentialism nor extant versions of predicativism can offer a very plausible account of the interpretive possibilities for singular unmodified definite descriptions containing names; and (3) that the most plausible version of predicativism would treat bare names as non-anaphoric definite descriptions.
[This is the penultimate version of a paper that is forthcoming in Thought] Predicativism about n... more [This is the penultimate version of a paper that is forthcoming in Thought] Predicativism about names - the view that names are metalinguistic predicates - has yet to confront a foundational issue: how are names represented in the lexicon? I provide a positive characterization of the structure of the lexicon from the point of view Predicativism. I proceed to raise a problem for Predicativism on the basis of that characterization, focusing on cases in which individuals have names which are spelled the same way but pronounced differently. Finally, I introduce two potential strategies for solving the problem, and offer reasons not to be optimistic about either.
[This is the penultimate draft of a paper that is coming out in a special issue on mental files o... more [This is the penultimate draft of a paper that is coming out in a special issue on mental files of The Review of Philosophy and Psychology] Call an account of names satisfactionalist if it holds that object o is the referent of name a in virtue of o’s satisfaction of a descriptive condition associated with a. Call an account of names minimally descriptivist if it holds that if a competent speaker finds ‘a=b’ to be informative, then she must associate some information with ‘a’ which she does not associate with ‘b’. The rejection of both positions is part of the Kripkean orthodoxy, and is also built into extant versions of the file-picture of reference. In this paper, I argue that the rejection of minimal descriptivism only follows from the rejection of satisfactionalism given certain implausible assumptions about the nature of competence with a proper name. I do this by showing that considerations internal to the file-picture - in particular the idea that competence with a proper name constitutes an ‘epistemically rewarding’ relation to its bearer - motivate an acceptance of minimal descriptivism.
[This is the penultimate draft of a paper that is forthcoming in Philosophical Studies]
Proponen... more [This is the penultimate draft of a paper that is forthcoming in Philosophical Studies] Proponents of the predicate view of names explain the reference of an occurrence of a name N by invoking the property of bearing N. They avoid the charge that this view involves a vicious circularity by claiming that bearing N is not itself to be understood in terms of the reference of actual or possible occurrences of N. I argue that this approach is fundamentally mistaken. The phenomenon of ‘reference transfer’ shows that an individual can come to bear a name in virtue of the referential practices of a group of speakers. I develop a picture of name-bearing which captures this fact by treating the extension of name as a function of the way that extension is represented in the presuppositions of groups of speakers. I show that though there is a form of circularity inherent in this approach, it is not vicious circularity.
Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional-attitude conte... more Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional-attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanations that characteristically appeal to it, and ii) that we can understand those explanations by analogy with other 'higher-level' explanations. Using the framework, we argue for an under-appreciated form of Russellianism. Along the way we demonstrate that being more explicit about the framework in which debates about attitude content take place allows us to more precisely characterize the space of possible positions and the dialectic between them.
Among the virtues of Relationist approaches to Frege's puzzle is that they put us in a position t... more Among the virtues of Relationist approaches to Frege's puzzle is that they put us in a position to outline structural features of the puzzle that were only implicit in earlier work. In particular, they allow us to frame questions about the relation between the explanatory roles of sense and sameness-of-sense. In this paper, I distinguish a number of positions about that relation which have not been clearly distinguished. This has a few payoffs. It allows us to shed light on recent controversies about the 'essential indexical'. And it also allows us to see what's at stake between Relationists and their opponents. When we see what's at stake, we can see that we have reason to adopt an account of cognitive significance that incorporates elements of both Relationist and Fregean approaches.
The mental files framework has been a persistent presence in philosophy of mind and language for ... more The mental files framework has been a persistent presence in philosophy of mind and language for the last half-century and has enjoyed increased popularity in recent years. It has not gone unnoticed, however, that apparent metaphors-of files, of information being contained in files, etc.-play a central role in explications of the view. But it has been unclear how seriously we ought to take these metaphors. We aim to characterize the basic explanatory commitments of the approach in non-metaphorical terms. The guiding question for the paper is whether, once we move beyond the metaphors, there is any theoretical role for files. Our suggestion is that there is not. To put our view in a slogan: so called 'mental file' theory is committed to mental filing but not to mental files. In particular, we show how to replace the file-metaphor with two theses: one semantic and one metasemantic. We argue that the metaphor of mental files can be cashed out in terms of relational representational facts (viz. facts about the coordination of mental representations) and a metasemantic thesis about the role that information-relations to objects play in grounding coordination.
We draw attention to a series of implicit assumptions that have structured the debate about Frege... more We draw attention to a series of implicit assumptions that have structured the debate about Frege's Puzzle. Once these assumptions are made explicit, we rely on them to show that if one focuses exclusively on the issues raised by Frege cases, then one obtains a powerful consideration against a fine-grained conception of propositional attitude content. In light of this consideration, a form of Russellianism about content becomes viable.
[This paper was published in Ergo. A link to the open-access version is below] Metalinguistic app... more [This paper was published in Ergo. A link to the open-access version is below] Metalinguistic approaches to names hold that proper names are semantically associated with name-bearing properties. I argue that metalinguistic theorists owe us an account of the metaphysics of those properties. The unique structure of the debate about names gives an issue which might look to be narrowly linguistic an important metaphysical dimension. The only plausible account of name-bearing treats name-bearing properties as a species of response-dependent property. I outline how such an account should look, drawing on forms of response-dependence identified in the literature on colour, moral properties, etc. Having done that, I show how the account can illuminate a feature of the communicative function of names which would otherwise be puzzling from the perspective of metalinguistic accounts.
[This is the penultimate version of a paper that is forthcoming in Noûs] Fregeanism and Relationi... more [This is the penultimate version of a paper that is forthcoming in Noûs] Fregeanism and Relationism are competing families of solutions to Frege's Puzzle, and by extension, competing theories of propositional representation. My aim is to clarify what is at stake between them by characterizing and evaluating a Relationist argument. Relationists claim that it is cognitively possible for distinct token propositional attitudes to be, in a sense, qualitatively indistinguishable-to differ in no intrinsic representational features. The idea of an 'intrinsic representational feature' is not, however, made especially clear in the argument. I clarify it here and, having done so, offer reason to doubt the argument. This will put us in a position to draw some lessons about the relation between object-directed and representation-internal aspects of cognitive significance.
[This is the penultimate version of a paper which appears in Philosophy Compass] Frege's Puzzle i... more [This is the penultimate version of a paper which appears in Philosophy Compass] Frege's Puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posits representational relations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches, and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of Relationism -Semantic Relationism and Formal Relationism - corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I briefly discuss the consequences of relational approaches for foundational questions about propositional attitudes, intentional explanation, and compositionality.
Predicativists hold that proper names have predicate-type semantic values. They face an obvious c... more Predicativists hold that proper names have predicate-type semantic values. They face an obvious challenge: in many languages (English among them) names normally occur as, what appear to be, grammatical arguments (call these bare occurrences).The standard version of predicativism answers this challenge by positing an unpronounced determiner in bare occurrences. I argue that this is a mistake. Predicativists should draw a distinction between two kinds of semantic type: underived semantic type and derived semantic type. The predicativist thesis concerns the underived semantic type of proper names and underdetermines a view about the semantic type of bare occurrences. I'll argue that predicativists should hold that bare names are derived individual-denoting expressions. I end by considering what this result means for the relationship between predicativism and other metalinguistic theories of names.
[This is the penultimate version of a paper that will appear in Linguistics and Philosophy.] This... more [This is the penultimate version of a paper that will appear in Linguistics and Philosophy.] This paper is about how to interpret and evaluate purported evidence for predicativism about proper names. I aim to point out some underappreciated thorny issues and to offer both predicativists and non-predicativists some advice about how best to pursue their respective projects. I hope to establish three related claims: (1) That non-predicativists have to posit relatively exotic, though not entirely implausible, polysemic mechanisms to capture the range of data that predicativists have introduced; (2) that neither referentialism nor extant versions of predicativism can offer a very plausible account of the interpretive possibilities for singular unmodified definite descriptions containing names; and (3) that the most plausible version of predicativism would treat bare names as non-anaphoric definite descriptions.
[This is the penultimate version of a paper that is forthcoming in Thought] Predicativism about n... more [This is the penultimate version of a paper that is forthcoming in Thought] Predicativism about names - the view that names are metalinguistic predicates - has yet to confront a foundational issue: how are names represented in the lexicon? I provide a positive characterization of the structure of the lexicon from the point of view Predicativism. I proceed to raise a problem for Predicativism on the basis of that characterization, focusing on cases in which individuals have names which are spelled the same way but pronounced differently. Finally, I introduce two potential strategies for solving the problem, and offer reasons not to be optimistic about either.
[This is the penultimate draft of a paper that is coming out in a special issue on mental files o... more [This is the penultimate draft of a paper that is coming out in a special issue on mental files of The Review of Philosophy and Psychology] Call an account of names satisfactionalist if it holds that object o is the referent of name a in virtue of o’s satisfaction of a descriptive condition associated with a. Call an account of names minimally descriptivist if it holds that if a competent speaker finds ‘a=b’ to be informative, then she must associate some information with ‘a’ which she does not associate with ‘b’. The rejection of both positions is part of the Kripkean orthodoxy, and is also built into extant versions of the file-picture of reference. In this paper, I argue that the rejection of minimal descriptivism only follows from the rejection of satisfactionalism given certain implausible assumptions about the nature of competence with a proper name. I do this by showing that considerations internal to the file-picture - in particular the idea that competence with a proper name constitutes an ‘epistemically rewarding’ relation to its bearer - motivate an acceptance of minimal descriptivism.
[This is the penultimate draft of a paper that is forthcoming in Philosophical Studies]
Proponen... more [This is the penultimate draft of a paper that is forthcoming in Philosophical Studies] Proponents of the predicate view of names explain the reference of an occurrence of a name N by invoking the property of bearing N. They avoid the charge that this view involves a vicious circularity by claiming that bearing N is not itself to be understood in terms of the reference of actual or possible occurrences of N. I argue that this approach is fundamentally mistaken. The phenomenon of ‘reference transfer’ shows that an individual can come to bear a name in virtue of the referential practices of a group of speakers. I develop a picture of name-bearing which captures this fact by treating the extension of name as a function of the way that extension is represented in the presuppositions of groups of speakers. I show that though there is a form of circularity inherent in this approach, it is not vicious circularity.
Uploads
Papers by Aidan Gray
what this result means for the relationship between predicativism and other metalinguistic theories of names.
Call an account of names satisfactionalist if it holds that object o is the referent of name a in virtue of o’s satisfaction of a descriptive condition associated with a. Call an account
of names minimally descriptivist if it holds that if a competent speaker finds ‘a=b’ to be informative, then she must associate some information with ‘a’ which she does not associate with ‘b’. The rejection of both positions is part of the Kripkean orthodoxy, and is also built into extant versions of the file-picture of reference. In this paper, I argue that the rejection
of minimal descriptivism only follows from the rejection of satisfactionalism given certain implausible assumptions about the nature of competence with a proper name. I do this by
showing that considerations internal to the file-picture - in particular the idea that competence with a proper name constitutes an ‘epistemically rewarding’ relation to its bearer - motivate an acceptance of minimal descriptivism.
Proponents of the predicate view of names explain the reference of an occurrence of a name N by invoking the property of bearing N. They avoid the charge that this view
involves a vicious circularity by claiming that bearing N is not itself to be understood in terms of the reference of actual or possible occurrences of N. I argue that this approach is fundamentally mistaken. The phenomenon of ‘reference transfer’ shows that an individual can come to bear a name in virtue of the referential practices of a group of speakers. I develop a picture of name-bearing which captures this fact by
treating the extension of name as a function of the way that extension is represented in the presuppositions of groups of speakers. I show that though there is a form of circularity inherent in this approach, it is not vicious circularity.
what this result means for the relationship between predicativism and other metalinguistic theories of names.
Call an account of names satisfactionalist if it holds that object o is the referent of name a in virtue of o’s satisfaction of a descriptive condition associated with a. Call an account
of names minimally descriptivist if it holds that if a competent speaker finds ‘a=b’ to be informative, then she must associate some information with ‘a’ which she does not associate with ‘b’. The rejection of both positions is part of the Kripkean orthodoxy, and is also built into extant versions of the file-picture of reference. In this paper, I argue that the rejection
of minimal descriptivism only follows from the rejection of satisfactionalism given certain implausible assumptions about the nature of competence with a proper name. I do this by
showing that considerations internal to the file-picture - in particular the idea that competence with a proper name constitutes an ‘epistemically rewarding’ relation to its bearer - motivate an acceptance of minimal descriptivism.
Proponents of the predicate view of names explain the reference of an occurrence of a name N by invoking the property of bearing N. They avoid the charge that this view
involves a vicious circularity by claiming that bearing N is not itself to be understood in terms of the reference of actual or possible occurrences of N. I argue that this approach is fundamentally mistaken. The phenomenon of ‘reference transfer’ shows that an individual can come to bear a name in virtue of the referential practices of a group of speakers. I develop a picture of name-bearing which captures this fact by
treating the extension of name as a function of the way that extension is represented in the presuppositions of groups of speakers. I show that though there is a form of circularity inherent in this approach, it is not vicious circularity.