Papers by Katharina Momsen
We investigate whether the presence of a default interacts with the willingness of decision-maker... more We investigate whether the presence of a default interacts with the willingness of decision-makers to gather, process and consider information. In an online experiment, where about 2,300 participants choose between two compiled charity donation options worth $100, we vary the availability of information and the presence of a default. Information avoidance, when possible, increases default effects considerably, manifesting a hitherto undocumented channel of the default bias. Moreover, we show that defaults trigger motivated reasoning: In the presence of a default – even if self-selected–, participants consider new information to a lower degree than without a preselected option. JEL Classifications: C90, D64, D83, D91
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022
In sequential interactions, both the first mover's intention and the outcome of his choice may in... more In sequential interactions, both the first mover's intention and the outcome of his choice may influence the second mover's action. While outcomes are typically observable, intentions are more likely to be hidden, leaving potential wiggle room for the second mover when deciding on a reciprocating action. We employ a controlled experiment to investigate how intentions and outcome affect second mover actions and whether second movers use hidden information as an excuse to behave more selfishly. We find that second movers react both to the intention of the first mover and to the achieved outcome when they are fully informed about both, but the effect is stronger for intentions than outcomes. When intentions are not revealed by default, second movers select into information based on their inclination to behave more prosocially. While information avoidance is frequent and selfishness is higher with hidden information, we do not find evidence of a strategic exploitation of moral wiggle room.
Research Papers in Economics, 2020
We experimentally examine the effect of self-serving information avoidance on democratic and indi... more We experimentally examine the effect of self-serving information avoidance on democratic and individual decisions in the context of climate change mitigation. Subjects need to choose between two allocations which differ in own payoffs and contributions to carbon offsets. In a between-subjects design, we vary the observability of the offset contribution, as well as the institutional decision context: individual consumption, dictatorship, and majority voting in small and large groups. If information is directly observable, we find robust evidence for expressive voting. However, in cases where information is initially unobservable but revealable without cost, there is no significant difference in selfish decisions between institutional decision contexts. We also find robust evidence for the exploitation of moral wiggle room via self-serving information avoidance in our consumption context, as well as with voting in large groups. Our results indicate that information avoidance effective...
We investigate if decision makers exploit moral wiggle room in green market settings. We therefor... more We investigate if decision makers exploit moral wiggle room in green market settings. We therefore implement a laboratory experiment in which subjects purchase products associated with externalities. In six between-subjects treatments, we alter the availability of information on the externalities, the price of revealing information as well as the nature of the externality, which could either affect another subject or change the amount spent by the experimenters on carbon offsets. We find that subjects do not exploit moral wiggle room when revealing information is costless. When a very small cost of revealing information is introduced, their behavior depends on the relation between prices and externalities. In situations in which it is relatively cheap to have a large impact on the recipient's payoff, subjects exploit moral wiggle room in order to choose selfishly. For other parametrizations, subjects behave either honestly egoistically or altruistically.
Journal of Economic Psychology
Limited price information and miscoordination reduce buyer surplus in markets with capacity-const... more Limited price information and miscoordination reduce buyer surplus in markets with capacity-constrained sellers. In an experiment, I study the effects of facilitating buyer coordination through communication and increasing the availability of price information. Improved coordination leads to an increase in trade and, under full price information, in prices. Whereas sellers benefit, buyers suffer more from the increase in prices than they benefit from the increase in trade. The impact of better price information depends on the presence of communication: with communication, an additional informed buyer induces sellers to raise their prices, yet without communication, one additional informed buyer provokes a price decrease.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2021
I experimentally analyze whether the introduction of watchdogs and the revelation of sellers' inv... more I experimentally analyze whether the introduction of watchdogs and the revelation of sellers' investment decisions can improve the market outcome in credence goods markets with horizontal product differentiation. Sellers can always give advice, yet they only observe consumers' valuations if they invest. I find that in the absence of watchdogs and with concealed investment decisions, both prices and investment rates are low and sellers give selfish advice. Each measure alone is not sufficient to improve recommendations; only the joint introduction has a significant positive impact on both quality and frequency of recommendations, but leaves welfare unaffected.
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2021
Limited price information and miscoordination reduce buyer surplus in markets with capacity-const... more Limited price information and miscoordination reduce buyer surplus in markets with capacity-constrained sellers. In an experiment, I study the effects of facilitating buyer coordination through communication and increasing the availability of price information. Improved coordination leads to an increase in trade and, under full price information, in prices. Whereas sellers benefit, buyers suffer more from the increase in prices than they benefit from the increase in trade. The impact of better price information depends on the presence of communication: with communication, an additional informed buyer induces sellers to raise their prices, yet without communication, one additional informed buyer provokes a price decrease.
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials
In sequential interactions, both the agent’s intention and the outcome of his
choice may influenc... more In sequential interactions, both the agent’s intention and the outcome of his
choice may influence the principal’s action. While outcomes are typically observable,
intentions are more likely to be hidden, leaving potential wiggle room for the
principal when deciding on a reciprocating action. We employ a controlled experiment
to investigate how intentions and outcome affect the principal’s actions and
whether principals use hidden information as an excuse to behave more selfishly.
We find that principals react mainly to the intention of the agent. When intentions
are not revealed by default, principals tend to select into information based on
their inclination to behave more prosocially. While information avoidance is frequent
and selfishness is higher with hidden information, we do not find evidence
of a strategic exploitation of moral wiggle room.
Ecological Economics, 2020
therefore implement a laboratory experiment in which subjects purchase products associated with e... more therefore implement a laboratory experiment in which subjects purchase products associated with externalities.
In six between-subjects treatments, we alter the availability of information on the externalities, the price of
revealing information as well as the nature of the externality, which could either affect another subject or change
the amount spent by the experimenters on carbon offsets. We find that subjects do not strategically avoid information
when revealing information is costless. When a very small cost of revealing information is introduced,
their behavior depends on the relation between prices and externalities. In situations in which it is relatively
cheap to have a large impact on the recipient's payoff, subjects avoid information in order to choose selfishly. For
other parameterizations, subjects behave either honestly egoistically or altruistically.
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck, 2019
We investigate if decision makers exploit moral wiggle room in green market set- tings. We theref... more We investigate if decision makers exploit moral wiggle room in green market set- tings. We therefore implement a laboratory experiment in which subjects purchase products associated with externalities. In six between-subjects treatments, we alter the availability of information on the externalities, the price of revealing information as well as the nature of the externality, which could either affect another subject or change the amount spent by the experimenters on carbon offsets. We find that subjects do not exploit moral wiggle room when revealing information is costless. When a very small cost of revealing information is introduced, their behavior de- pends on the relation between prices and externalities. In situations in which it is relatively cheap to have a large impact on the recipient’s payoff, subjects exploit moral wiggle room in order to choose selfishly. For other parametrizations, subjects behave either honestly egoistically or altruistically.
Drafts by Katharina Momsen
University of Innsbruck, Working Papers in Economics and Statistics, 2020
We experimentally examine the effect of self-serving information avoidance
on democratic and indi... more We experimentally examine the effect of self-serving information avoidance
on democratic and individual decisions in the context of climate change mitigation.
Subjects need to choose between two allocations which differ in own
payoffs and contributions to carbon offsets. In a between-subjects design, we
vary the observability of the offset contribution, as well as the institutional
decision context: individual consumption, dictatorship, and majority voting
in small and large groups. If information is directly observable, we find robust
evidence for expressive voting. However, in cases where information is
initially unobservable but revealable without cost, there is no significant difference
in selfish decisions between institutional decision contexts. We also
find robust evidence for the exploitation of moral wiggle room via self-serving
information avoidance in our consumption context, as well as with voting in
large groups. Our results indicate that information avoidance effectively substitutes
expressive ethical voting as an instrument to manage self-image on
the part of the voter. This suggests that moral biases might be less likely in
elections than previously thought.
Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck 2019-18, 2019
We investigate if people exploit moral wiggle room in green markets when revelation is stochastic... more We investigate if people exploit moral wiggle room in green markets when revelation is stochastic and the revealed information is potentially erroneous. In our laboratory experiment, subjects purchase products associated with co-benefits represented as a contribution to carbon offsets purchased by the experimenters. Information on the size of this contribution is unobservable at first, but can be actively revealed by the consumer. In seven treatments, we alter the information structure as well as the perceived revelation costs. We find strong evidence of self-serving information avoidance in treatments with simple stochastic revelation and reduced reliability of the information, representing potentially 'fake' news. The propensity to avoid information increases with the introduction of nominal information costs, which are in fact not payo?-relevant. We conclude that, generally, self-serving information avoidance can arise in green market situations if specific situational excuses are present, which could explain the demand for products associated with 'greenwashing'.
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Papers by Katharina Momsen
choice may influence the principal’s action. While outcomes are typically observable,
intentions are more likely to be hidden, leaving potential wiggle room for the
principal when deciding on a reciprocating action. We employ a controlled experiment
to investigate how intentions and outcome affect the principal’s actions and
whether principals use hidden information as an excuse to behave more selfishly.
We find that principals react mainly to the intention of the agent. When intentions
are not revealed by default, principals tend to select into information based on
their inclination to behave more prosocially. While information avoidance is frequent
and selfishness is higher with hidden information, we do not find evidence
of a strategic exploitation of moral wiggle room.
In six between-subjects treatments, we alter the availability of information on the externalities, the price of
revealing information as well as the nature of the externality, which could either affect another subject or change
the amount spent by the experimenters on carbon offsets. We find that subjects do not strategically avoid information
when revealing information is costless. When a very small cost of revealing information is introduced,
their behavior depends on the relation between prices and externalities. In situations in which it is relatively
cheap to have a large impact on the recipient's payoff, subjects avoid information in order to choose selfishly. For
other parameterizations, subjects behave either honestly egoistically or altruistically.
Drafts by Katharina Momsen
on democratic and individual decisions in the context of climate change mitigation.
Subjects need to choose between two allocations which differ in own
payoffs and contributions to carbon offsets. In a between-subjects design, we
vary the observability of the offset contribution, as well as the institutional
decision context: individual consumption, dictatorship, and majority voting
in small and large groups. If information is directly observable, we find robust
evidence for expressive voting. However, in cases where information is
initially unobservable but revealable without cost, there is no significant difference
in selfish decisions between institutional decision contexts. We also
find robust evidence for the exploitation of moral wiggle room via self-serving
information avoidance in our consumption context, as well as with voting in
large groups. Our results indicate that information avoidance effectively substitutes
expressive ethical voting as an instrument to manage self-image on
the part of the voter. This suggests that moral biases might be less likely in
elections than previously thought.
choice may influence the principal’s action. While outcomes are typically observable,
intentions are more likely to be hidden, leaving potential wiggle room for the
principal when deciding on a reciprocating action. We employ a controlled experiment
to investigate how intentions and outcome affect the principal’s actions and
whether principals use hidden information as an excuse to behave more selfishly.
We find that principals react mainly to the intention of the agent. When intentions
are not revealed by default, principals tend to select into information based on
their inclination to behave more prosocially. While information avoidance is frequent
and selfishness is higher with hidden information, we do not find evidence
of a strategic exploitation of moral wiggle room.
In six between-subjects treatments, we alter the availability of information on the externalities, the price of
revealing information as well as the nature of the externality, which could either affect another subject or change
the amount spent by the experimenters on carbon offsets. We find that subjects do not strategically avoid information
when revealing information is costless. When a very small cost of revealing information is introduced,
their behavior depends on the relation between prices and externalities. In situations in which it is relatively
cheap to have a large impact on the recipient's payoff, subjects avoid information in order to choose selfishly. For
other parameterizations, subjects behave either honestly egoistically or altruistically.
on democratic and individual decisions in the context of climate change mitigation.
Subjects need to choose between two allocations which differ in own
payoffs and contributions to carbon offsets. In a between-subjects design, we
vary the observability of the offset contribution, as well as the institutional
decision context: individual consumption, dictatorship, and majority voting
in small and large groups. If information is directly observable, we find robust
evidence for expressive voting. However, in cases where information is
initially unobservable but revealable without cost, there is no significant difference
in selfish decisions between institutional decision contexts. We also
find robust evidence for the exploitation of moral wiggle room via self-serving
information avoidance in our consumption context, as well as with voting in
large groups. Our results indicate that information avoidance effectively substitutes
expressive ethical voting as an instrument to manage self-image on
the part of the voter. This suggests that moral biases might be less likely in
elections than previously thought.