Qualitative researchers sometimes talk about objectivity in relation to qualitative data sets. In... more Qualitative researchers sometimes talk about objectivity in relation to qualitative data sets. In this paper, I defend a reconstructed notion of objective qualitative data sets that may serve as a useful and reachable guiding ideal in qualitative data generation. In the first part of the paper, I develop the ideal. According to it, a qualitative data set is objective to the extent that it, in conjunction with true assumptions, possesses a combination of good-making features (epistemic values, epistemic virtues) in virtue of which the data set is suited to serve as evidence base for a satisfying answer to the research question under study. In the second part of the paper, I examine and reject two possible lines of objection to this ideal: One is that it picks out the wrong good-making features. The other is that the very focus on good-making features is misguided: the objectivity of a qualitative data set should instead be seen as a matter of how it was generated or evaluated.
It is currently common to conceive of the classic methodological individualism-holism debate in l... more It is currently common to conceive of the classic methodological individualism-holism debate in level terms. Accordingly, the dispute is taken to concern the proper level of explanations in the social sciences. In this paper, I argue that the debate is not apt to be characterized in level terms. The reason is that widely adopted notions of individualist explanations do not qualify as individual-level explanations because they span multiple levels. I defend this claim relative to supervenience, emergence, and other accounts of the social world as levelled. Moreover, I discuss the consequences of this finding for the ongoing methodological individualism-holism debate.
In the recent methodological individualism-holism debate on explanation, there has been considera... more In the recent methodological individualism-holism debate on explanation, there has been considerable focus on what reasons methodological holists may advance in support of their position. We believe it is useful to approach the other direction and ask what considerations methodological individualists may in fact offer in favor of their view about explanation. This is the background for the question we pursue in this paper: Why be a methodological individualist? We start out by introducing the methodological individualism-holism debate while distinguishing two forms of methodological individualism: a form that says that individualist explanations are always better than holist accounts and a form that says that providing intervening individualist mechanisms always makes for better explanations than purely holist ones. Next, we consider four lines of reasoning in support of methodological individualism: arguments from causation, from explanatory depth, from agency, and from normativity. We argue that none of them offer convincing reasons in support of the two explanatory versions of individualism we consider. While there may well be occasions in which individualists' favorite explanations are superior, we find no reason to think this always must be the case.
In this paper, I offer a partial analysis of the role of values in qualitative data collection in... more In this paper, I offer a partial analysis of the role of values in qualitative data collection in social research. The partial analysis shows that nonepistemic values have both required and permissible roles to play during this phase of research. By appeal to the analysis, I reject the ideal of value free science as applied to qualitative data collection, and I demonstrate why two alternative ideals should likewise be dismissed as standards for values in qualitative data collection. Also, I briefly discuss the extent to which the partial analysis carries over to quantitative data collection in social research.
Methodological holism is the view that social(level), macro(level), or holist explanations, as th... more Methodological holism is the view that social(level), macro(level), or holist explanations, as they are variously called, should be offered within the social sciences. This entry discusses different ways in which this position has been elaborated and some of the arguments offered in its support.
In this paper, I begin by detailing how social researchers may use informed consent to protect th... more In this paper, I begin by detailing how social researchers may use informed consent to protect the situational and informational privacy of those they study while gathering data by way of the method of participant observation. Next, I argue that the principle of informed consent should not be regarded as an absolute demand: under specified conditions, it is acceptable to make an exception to the principle. Finally, I demonstrate that the employment of informed consent does not suffice to protect individuals' privacy: social researchers must take a number of additional measures to prevent privacy invasions from occurring.
The aim of this paper is to provide a characterization of ability theories of practice and, in th... more The aim of this paper is to provide a characterization of ability theories of practice and, in this process, to defend Pierre Bourdieu's ability theory against Stephen Turner's objections. In part I, I outline ability theorists' conception of practices together with their objections to claims about rule following and rule explanations. In part II, I turn to the question of what ability theorists take to be the alternative to rule following and rule explanations. Ability theorists have offered, and been ascribed, somewhat different answers to this question, just as their replies, or positive accounts, have been heavily criticized by Turner. Due to this state of the debate, I focus on the positive account advanced by a single – and highly famous – ability theorist of practice, Pierre Bourdieu. Moreover, I show that, despite Turner's claims to the contrary, his arguments do not refute Bourdieu's positive account.
This paper examines the methodological anti-naturalist claim that social scientists make indispen... more This paper examines the methodological anti-naturalist claim that social scientists make indispensably use of a method that is distinct to the social sciences, when studying norms by way of participant observation. Based on a detailed examination of how social scientists use participant observation to study norms, I argue that, on diverse specifications of " method " , the methodological anti-naturalist contention should be rejected.
In "Redescription, Reduction, and Emergence: A response to Tobias Hansson Wahlberg," Elder-Vass t... more In "Redescription, Reduction, and Emergence: A response to Tobias Hansson Wahlberg," Elder-Vass takes the opportunity to reply to my criticism of his theory in "Holism, Emergence, and the Crucial Distinction." In this response, I show how methodological individualists may respond to his argument against their position and I argue that Elder-Vass fails to provide reasons as to why his particular distinction between individualist and holist explanations should be adopted.
One issue of dispute between methodological individualists and methodological holists is whether ... more One issue of dispute between methodological individualists and methodological holists is whether holist explanations are dispensable in the sense that individualist explanations are able to do their explanatory job. Methodological individualists say they are, whereas methodological holists deny this. In the first part of the paper, I discuss Elder-Vass' version of an influential argument in support of methodological holism, the argument from emergence. I argue that methodological individualists should reject it: The argument relies on a distinction between individualist and holist explanations that they find unacceptable and Elder-Vass' reasons in support of his way of drawing this distinction are not good ones. In the second part, I examine what, if anything, would be good reasons in support of a particular way of differentiating between individualist and holist explanations. I propose that a good reason is one which shows, in an acceptable manner, that the distinction, drawn in the same way in all contexts, is useful from the perspective of offering explanations of the social world. I show that if this criterion is adopted, it will result in a fruitful reorientation of the whole debate between methodological individualists and methodological holists.
Qualitative researchers sometimes talk about objectivity in relation to qualitative data sets. In... more Qualitative researchers sometimes talk about objectivity in relation to qualitative data sets. In this paper, I defend a reconstructed notion of objective qualitative data sets that may serve as a useful and reachable guiding ideal in qualitative data generation. In the first part of the paper, I develop the ideal. According to it, a qualitative data set is objective to the extent that it, in conjunction with true assumptions, possesses a combination of good-making features (epistemic values, epistemic virtues) in virtue of which the data set is suited to serve as evidence base for a satisfying answer to the research question under study. In the second part of the paper, I examine and reject two possible lines of objection to this ideal: One is that it picks out the wrong good-making features. The other is that the very focus on good-making features is misguided: the objectivity of a qualitative data set should instead be seen as a matter of how it was generated or evaluated.
It is currently common to conceive of the classic methodological individualism-holism debate in l... more It is currently common to conceive of the classic methodological individualism-holism debate in level terms. Accordingly, the dispute is taken to concern the proper level of explanations in the social sciences. In this paper, I argue that the debate is not apt to be characterized in level terms. The reason is that widely adopted notions of individualist explanations do not qualify as individual-level explanations because they span multiple levels. I defend this claim relative to supervenience, emergence, and other accounts of the social world as levelled. Moreover, I discuss the consequences of this finding for the ongoing methodological individualism-holism debate.
In the recent methodological individualism-holism debate on explanation, there has been considera... more In the recent methodological individualism-holism debate on explanation, there has been considerable focus on what reasons methodological holists may advance in support of their position. We believe it is useful to approach the other direction and ask what considerations methodological individualists may in fact offer in favor of their view about explanation. This is the background for the question we pursue in this paper: Why be a methodological individualist? We start out by introducing the methodological individualism-holism debate while distinguishing two forms of methodological individualism: a form that says that individualist explanations are always better than holist accounts and a form that says that providing intervening individualist mechanisms always makes for better explanations than purely holist ones. Next, we consider four lines of reasoning in support of methodological individualism: arguments from causation, from explanatory depth, from agency, and from normativity. We argue that none of them offer convincing reasons in support of the two explanatory versions of individualism we consider. While there may well be occasions in which individualists' favorite explanations are superior, we find no reason to think this always must be the case.
In this paper, I offer a partial analysis of the role of values in qualitative data collection in... more In this paper, I offer a partial analysis of the role of values in qualitative data collection in social research. The partial analysis shows that nonepistemic values have both required and permissible roles to play during this phase of research. By appeal to the analysis, I reject the ideal of value free science as applied to qualitative data collection, and I demonstrate why two alternative ideals should likewise be dismissed as standards for values in qualitative data collection. Also, I briefly discuss the extent to which the partial analysis carries over to quantitative data collection in social research.
Methodological holism is the view that social(level), macro(level), or holist explanations, as th... more Methodological holism is the view that social(level), macro(level), or holist explanations, as they are variously called, should be offered within the social sciences. This entry discusses different ways in which this position has been elaborated and some of the arguments offered in its support.
In this paper, I begin by detailing how social researchers may use informed consent to protect th... more In this paper, I begin by detailing how social researchers may use informed consent to protect the situational and informational privacy of those they study while gathering data by way of the method of participant observation. Next, I argue that the principle of informed consent should not be regarded as an absolute demand: under specified conditions, it is acceptable to make an exception to the principle. Finally, I demonstrate that the employment of informed consent does not suffice to protect individuals' privacy: social researchers must take a number of additional measures to prevent privacy invasions from occurring.
The aim of this paper is to provide a characterization of ability theories of practice and, in th... more The aim of this paper is to provide a characterization of ability theories of practice and, in this process, to defend Pierre Bourdieu's ability theory against Stephen Turner's objections. In part I, I outline ability theorists' conception of practices together with their objections to claims about rule following and rule explanations. In part II, I turn to the question of what ability theorists take to be the alternative to rule following and rule explanations. Ability theorists have offered, and been ascribed, somewhat different answers to this question, just as their replies, or positive accounts, have been heavily criticized by Turner. Due to this state of the debate, I focus on the positive account advanced by a single – and highly famous – ability theorist of practice, Pierre Bourdieu. Moreover, I show that, despite Turner's claims to the contrary, his arguments do not refute Bourdieu's positive account.
This paper examines the methodological anti-naturalist claim that social scientists make indispen... more This paper examines the methodological anti-naturalist claim that social scientists make indispensably use of a method that is distinct to the social sciences, when studying norms by way of participant observation. Based on a detailed examination of how social scientists use participant observation to study norms, I argue that, on diverse specifications of " method " , the methodological anti-naturalist contention should be rejected.
In "Redescription, Reduction, and Emergence: A response to Tobias Hansson Wahlberg," Elder-Vass t... more In "Redescription, Reduction, and Emergence: A response to Tobias Hansson Wahlberg," Elder-Vass takes the opportunity to reply to my criticism of his theory in "Holism, Emergence, and the Crucial Distinction." In this response, I show how methodological individualists may respond to his argument against their position and I argue that Elder-Vass fails to provide reasons as to why his particular distinction between individualist and holist explanations should be adopted.
One issue of dispute between methodological individualists and methodological holists is whether ... more One issue of dispute between methodological individualists and methodological holists is whether holist explanations are dispensable in the sense that individualist explanations are able to do their explanatory job. Methodological individualists say they are, whereas methodological holists deny this. In the first part of the paper, I discuss Elder-Vass' version of an influential argument in support of methodological holism, the argument from emergence. I argue that methodological individualists should reject it: The argument relies on a distinction between individualist and holist explanations that they find unacceptable and Elder-Vass' reasons in support of his way of drawing this distinction are not good ones. In the second part, I examine what, if anything, would be good reasons in support of a particular way of differentiating between individualist and holist explanations. I propose that a good reason is one which shows, in an acceptable manner, that the distinction, drawn in the same way in all contexts, is useful from the perspective of offering explanations of the social world. I show that if this criterion is adopted, it will result in a fruitful reorientation of the whole debate between methodological individualists and methodological holists.
Edited by: Bohman, J. Bouvier, A., Kaldis, B., Montuschi, E., Risjord, M., Roth, P., Turner, S., ... more Edited by: Bohman, J. Bouvier, A., Kaldis, B., Montuschi, E., Risjord, M., Roth, P., Turner, S., Wylie, A., Zahle, J., Zamora-Bonilla, J.
In this paper we examine the major motivations for methodological individualism understood as a c... more In this paper we examine the major motivations for methodological individualism understood as a claim about explanation. We start out by introducing the methodological individualism-holism debate while distinguishing two forms of methodological individualism: a form that says that individualist explanations are always better than holist accounts and a form that says that providing intervening individualist mechanisms always makes for better explanations than purely holist ones. Next, we consider five lines of reasoning in support of methodological individualism: arguments from causation, from explanatory depth, from agency, from intervention, and from normativity. We argue that none of them offer convincing reasons in support of the two explanatory versions of individualism we consider. While there may well be occasions in which individualists' favorite explanations are superior, we find no reason to think this always must be the case.
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Papers by Julie Zahle
- 2014; Vol. 44(5).