To appear in Mind & Language
Pre-published version
The aim of this paper is to establish a speci... more To appear in Mind & Language Pre-published version
The aim of this paper is to establish a specific view of linguistic understanding based on the framework of normative inferentialism. Normative inferentialism is presented as an overspecification (rich) account of meaning – the meaning of a sentence is understood as a cluster of context-dependent contents. The standard psychological mechanism responsible for reaching understanding of an utterance depends on the ability to eliminate contextually irrelevant aspects/parts of meaning. The advantages of the view are that the mechanism can a) explain a wide range of linguistic phenomena including polysemy, homonymy, and conversational implicatures and b) explain partial understanding of an utterance.
In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena rel... more In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena related to natural languages. First, I show how the distinction between the inferential potential and the inferential significance fits the standard distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the content of an utterance. Second, I show how the distinction could be used to explain ambiguity and free pragmatic enrichment from the perspective of normative inferentialism. The aim of this paper is to establish theoretical foundations that enable normative inferentialism to enter the discussions within the literalism-contextualism debate. As I argue, the biggest advantage of inferentialism is that it provides one general framework for the representation of meaning/content that naturally incorporates contextual information and so it can be used to represent meanings of various types of context-dependent sentences.
The idea that natural languages are shared by speakers within linguistic communities is often tak... more The idea that natural languages are shared by speakers within linguistic communities is often taken for granted. Several philosophers even take the notion of shared language as fundamental and that allows them to use it in further explanations. However, to justify the claim that speakers share a language, it should be possible to demarcate the shared language somehow. In this paper, I discuss: A) the explanatory role which the notion of shared language can play, and B) a strategy for demarcating shared languages from within the linguistic production of speakers. The aim of this paper is to show that the indeterminate nature of meaning in natural languages problematizes the intuitive idea of natural languages as shared.
In this paper, I discuss Quine's views on language sharing and linguistic communities. It is some... more In this paper, I discuss Quine's views on language sharing and linguistic communities. It is sometimes explicitly and often implicitly taken for granted that Quine believes that speakers can form communities in which they share a language. The aim of the paper is to show that this is a misinterpretation and, on the contrary, Quine is closer to linguistic individualism – the view according to which there is no guarantee that speakers within a community share a language and the notion of idiolect is more fundamental than the notion of shared language.
A traditional objection against inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning cons... more A traditional objection against inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning constitutive and therefore inferentialism has to comprise an analytic-synthetic distinction. As a response, Peregrin (2014) argues that meaning is a matter of inferential rules and only the subset of all the valid inferences for which there is a widely shared corrective behaviour corresponds to rules and so determines meaning. Unfortunately, Peregrin does not discuss what counts as " widely shared ". In the paper, I argue for an empirical plausibility of Peregrin's proposal. The aim of the paper is to show that we can find examples of meaning constitutive linguistic action in specific communication situations. The idea is supported by examples of meaning modulation from Ludlow (2014). If Peregrin is right, then we should be able to find specific meaning modulations in which a new meaning is publicly available and modulated in such a way that it has a potential to be widely shared. I believe that binding modulations – specific type of meaning modulations – satisfy this condition.
KEYWORDS: Inferentialism – meaning – meaning constitutive inferences – meaning modulation – normative inferentialism.
In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena rel... more In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena related to natural languages. First, I show how the distinction between the inferential potential and the inferential significance fits the standard distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the content of an utterance. Second, I show how the distinction could be used to explain ambiguity and free pragmatic enrichment from the perspective of normative inferentialism. The aim of this paper is to establish theoretical foundations that enable normative inferentialism to enter the discussions within the literalism-contextualism debate. As I argue, the biggest advantage of inferentialism is that it provides one general framework for the representation of meaning/content that naturally incorporates contextual information and so it can be used to represent meanings of various types of context-dependent sentences.
According to the standard interpretation of Lewis's theory of predicate meaning (the U&N theory),... more According to the standard interpretation of Lewis's theory of predicate meaning (the U&N theory), the naturalness of meaning candidates should be stated metaphysically as a length of definition in terms of fundamental properties. Recently, Weatherson has criticized the U&N theory and argued that the criterion of naturalness should be stated epistemologically as the amount of evidence needed to form a belief. Despite the criticism, his attitude towards the U&N theory is quite relaxed. According to Weatherson, the U&N theory can be used as a good heuristic for delivering the correct verdicts when doing applied semantics, i.e., when we try to determine the best meaning candidate for a particular predicate. In this paper, I try to show that the "good heuristic strategy" is of no use because A) there is no guarantee that the epistemological and the metaphysical criteria of naturalness deliver the same verdicts and B) even if they deliver the same verdicts, the difference in their theoretical backgrounds may affect arguments which rely on the verdicts. The difference will be shown by drawing on the example of Theodore Sider and his use of the U&N theory.
The aim of this paper is to establish a specific view of linguistic understanding based on the fr... more The aim of this paper is to establish a specific view of linguistic understanding based on the framework of normative inferentialism. Normative inferentialism is presented as an overspecification (rich) account of meaning—the meaning of a sentence is understood as a cluster of context‐dependent contents. The standard psychological mechanism responsible for reaching understanding of an utterance depends on the ability to eliminate contextually irrelevant aspects/parts of meaning. The advantages of the view are that the mechanism can (a) explain a wide range of linguistic phenomena including polysemy, homonymy, and conversational implicatures, and (b) explain partial understanding of an utterance.
In this paper, I discuss a specifi c approach to measuring and comparing the simplicity of theori... more In this paper, I discuss a specifi c approach to measuring and comparing the simplicity of theories that is based on Lewis's notion of fundamental properties. In particular, I discuss the criterion of simplicity as stated by Williams. According to Williams, the best candidate for a theory is the one which has the shortest defi nition in terms of fundamental properties. Th e aim of this paper is to show that the criterion thus specifi ed has two constraints. First, the criterion is not applicable to cases in which candidates for theories that specify fundamental properties are compared. Secondly, the applicability of the criterion in social sciences seems to be unwarranted.
A traditional objection to inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning-constitut... more A traditional objection to inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning-constitutive and therefore inferentialism has to comprise an analytic-synthetic distinction. As a response, Peregrin argues that meaning is a matter of inferential rules and only the subset of all the valid inferences for which there is a widely shared corrective behaviour corresponds to rules and so determines meaning. Unfortunately, Peregrin does not discuss what counts as "widely shared". In the paper, I argue for an empirical plausibility of Peregrin's proposal. The aim of the paper is to show that we can find examples of meaning-constitutive linguistic action, which sustain Peregrin's response. The idea is supported by examples of meaning modulation. If Peregrin is right, then we should be able to find specific meaning modulations in which a new meaning is publicly available and modulated in such a way that it has a potential to be widely shared. I believe that binding modulations-a specific type of meaning modulations-satisfy this condition.
In this paper, I discuss Quine's views on language sharing and linguistic communities. It is some... more In this paper, I discuss Quine's views on language sharing and linguistic communities. It is sometimes explicitly and often implicitly taken for granted that Quine believes that speakers can form communities in which they share a language. The aim of the paper is to show that this is a misinterpretation and, on the contrary, Quine is closer to linguistic individualismthe view according to which there is no guarantee that speakers within a community share a language and the notion of idiolect is more fundamental than the notion of shared language.
In this paper, I discuss a specific approach to measuring and comparing the simplicity of theorie... more In this paper, I discuss a specific approach to measuring and comparing the simplicity of theories that is based on Lewis’s notion of fundamental properties. In particular, I discuss the criterion of simplicity as stated by Williams. According to Williams, the best candidate for a theory is the one which has the shortest definition in terms of fundamental properties. The aim of this paper is to show that the criterion thus specified has two constraints. First, the criterion is not applicable to cases in which candidates for theories that specify fundamental properties are compared. Secondly, the applicability of the criterion in social sciences seems to be unwarranted.
A traditional objection to inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning-constitut... more A traditional objection to inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning-constitutive and therefore inferentialism has to comprise an analytic-synthetic distinction. As a response, Peregrin argues that meaning is a matter of inferential rules and only the subset of all the valid inferences for which there is a widely shared corrective behaviour corresponds to rules and so determines meaning. Unfortunately, Peregrin does not discuss what counts as "widely shared". In the paper, I argue for an empirical plausibility of Peregrin's proposal. The aim of the paper is to show that we can find examples of meaning-constitutive linguistic action, which sustain Peregrin's response. The idea is supported by examples of meaning modulation. If Peregrin is right, then we should be able to find specific meaning modulations in which a new meaning is publicly available and modulated in such a way that it has a potential to be widely shared. I believe that binding modulations-a specific type of meaning modulations-satisfy this condition.
The criterion of naturalness represents David Lewis’s attempt to answer some of the sceptical arg... more The criterion of naturalness represents David Lewis’s attempt to answer some of the sceptical arguments in (meta-) semantics by comparing the naturalness of meaning candidates. Recently, the criterion has been challenged by a new sceptical argument. Williams argues that the criterion cannot rule out the candidates which are not permuted versions of an intended interpretation. He presents such a candidate the arithmetical interpretation (a specific instantiation of Henkin’s model), and he argues that it opens up the possibility of Pythagorean worlds, i.e. the worlds similar to ours in which the arithmetical interpretation is the best candidate for a semantic theory. The aim of this paper is a) to reconsider the general conditions for the applicability of Lewis’s criterion of naturalness and b) to show that Williams’s new sceptical challenge is based on a problematic assumption that the arithmetical interpretation is independent of fundamental properties and relations. As I show, if...
This book brings arguments for metaphysical realism, and its aspiration appears to be to make the... more This book brings arguments for metaphysical realism, and its aspiration appears to be to make them knock-down. Sider tries to convince the reader that we can identify the structure of the world; he believes that we can reach the access to brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
The idea that natural languages are shared by speakers within linguistic communities is often tak... more The idea that natural languages are shared by speakers within linguistic communities is often taken for granted. Several philosophers even take the notion of shared language as fundamental and that allows them to use it in further explanations. However, to justify the claim that speakers share a language, it should be possible to demarcate the shared language somehow. In this paper, I discuss: A) the explanatory role which the notion of shared language can play, and B) a strategy for demarcating shared languages from within the linguistic production of speakers. The aim of this paper is to show that the indeterminate nature of meaning in natural languages problematizes the intuitive idea of natural languages as shared.
Analytická filozofia na vzostupe ov, 4 konferencie, viac ako 750 aktívnych účastníkov. Taký je su... more Analytická filozofia na vzostupe ov, 4 konferencie, viac ako 750 aktívnych účastníkov. Taký je sumár akcií orientovaných na analytickú filozofiu v rozmedzí od augusta do septembra 2017. Bez čenia si dovolím vyhlásiť, že analytická filozofia kra akademického roka. Nás môže určite tešiť, že všetky akcie sa uskuto Českej republiky: Mníchov (ECAP9), Stará Lesná (XXI. CSSAF), Salzburg (SOPhiA), Bochum (PLM4).
To appear in Mind & Language
Pre-published version
The aim of this paper is to establish a speci... more To appear in Mind & Language Pre-published version
The aim of this paper is to establish a specific view of linguistic understanding based on the framework of normative inferentialism. Normative inferentialism is presented as an overspecification (rich) account of meaning – the meaning of a sentence is understood as a cluster of context-dependent contents. The standard psychological mechanism responsible for reaching understanding of an utterance depends on the ability to eliminate contextually irrelevant aspects/parts of meaning. The advantages of the view are that the mechanism can a) explain a wide range of linguistic phenomena including polysemy, homonymy, and conversational implicatures and b) explain partial understanding of an utterance.
In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena rel... more In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena related to natural languages. First, I show how the distinction between the inferential potential and the inferential significance fits the standard distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the content of an utterance. Second, I show how the distinction could be used to explain ambiguity and free pragmatic enrichment from the perspective of normative inferentialism. The aim of this paper is to establish theoretical foundations that enable normative inferentialism to enter the discussions within the literalism-contextualism debate. As I argue, the biggest advantage of inferentialism is that it provides one general framework for the representation of meaning/content that naturally incorporates contextual information and so it can be used to represent meanings of various types of context-dependent sentences.
The idea that natural languages are shared by speakers within linguistic communities is often tak... more The idea that natural languages are shared by speakers within linguistic communities is often taken for granted. Several philosophers even take the notion of shared language as fundamental and that allows them to use it in further explanations. However, to justify the claim that speakers share a language, it should be possible to demarcate the shared language somehow. In this paper, I discuss: A) the explanatory role which the notion of shared language can play, and B) a strategy for demarcating shared languages from within the linguistic production of speakers. The aim of this paper is to show that the indeterminate nature of meaning in natural languages problematizes the intuitive idea of natural languages as shared.
In this paper, I discuss Quine's views on language sharing and linguistic communities. It is some... more In this paper, I discuss Quine's views on language sharing and linguistic communities. It is sometimes explicitly and often implicitly taken for granted that Quine believes that speakers can form communities in which they share a language. The aim of the paper is to show that this is a misinterpretation and, on the contrary, Quine is closer to linguistic individualism – the view according to which there is no guarantee that speakers within a community share a language and the notion of idiolect is more fundamental than the notion of shared language.
A traditional objection against inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning cons... more A traditional objection against inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning constitutive and therefore inferentialism has to comprise an analytic-synthetic distinction. As a response, Peregrin (2014) argues that meaning is a matter of inferential rules and only the subset of all the valid inferences for which there is a widely shared corrective behaviour corresponds to rules and so determines meaning. Unfortunately, Peregrin does not discuss what counts as " widely shared ". In the paper, I argue for an empirical plausibility of Peregrin's proposal. The aim of the paper is to show that we can find examples of meaning constitutive linguistic action in specific communication situations. The idea is supported by examples of meaning modulation from Ludlow (2014). If Peregrin is right, then we should be able to find specific meaning modulations in which a new meaning is publicly available and modulated in such a way that it has a potential to be widely shared. I believe that binding modulations – specific type of meaning modulations – satisfy this condition.
KEYWORDS: Inferentialism – meaning – meaning constitutive inferences – meaning modulation – normative inferentialism.
In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena rel... more In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena related to natural languages. First, I show how the distinction between the inferential potential and the inferential significance fits the standard distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the content of an utterance. Second, I show how the distinction could be used to explain ambiguity and free pragmatic enrichment from the perspective of normative inferentialism. The aim of this paper is to establish theoretical foundations that enable normative inferentialism to enter the discussions within the literalism-contextualism debate. As I argue, the biggest advantage of inferentialism is that it provides one general framework for the representation of meaning/content that naturally incorporates contextual information and so it can be used to represent meanings of various types of context-dependent sentences.
According to the standard interpretation of Lewis's theory of predicate meaning (the U&N theory),... more According to the standard interpretation of Lewis's theory of predicate meaning (the U&N theory), the naturalness of meaning candidates should be stated metaphysically as a length of definition in terms of fundamental properties. Recently, Weatherson has criticized the U&N theory and argued that the criterion of naturalness should be stated epistemologically as the amount of evidence needed to form a belief. Despite the criticism, his attitude towards the U&N theory is quite relaxed. According to Weatherson, the U&N theory can be used as a good heuristic for delivering the correct verdicts when doing applied semantics, i.e., when we try to determine the best meaning candidate for a particular predicate. In this paper, I try to show that the "good heuristic strategy" is of no use because A) there is no guarantee that the epistemological and the metaphysical criteria of naturalness deliver the same verdicts and B) even if they deliver the same verdicts, the difference in their theoretical backgrounds may affect arguments which rely on the verdicts. The difference will be shown by drawing on the example of Theodore Sider and his use of the U&N theory.
The aim of this paper is to establish a specific view of linguistic understanding based on the fr... more The aim of this paper is to establish a specific view of linguistic understanding based on the framework of normative inferentialism. Normative inferentialism is presented as an overspecification (rich) account of meaning—the meaning of a sentence is understood as a cluster of context‐dependent contents. The standard psychological mechanism responsible for reaching understanding of an utterance depends on the ability to eliminate contextually irrelevant aspects/parts of meaning. The advantages of the view are that the mechanism can (a) explain a wide range of linguistic phenomena including polysemy, homonymy, and conversational implicatures, and (b) explain partial understanding of an utterance.
In this paper, I discuss a specifi c approach to measuring and comparing the simplicity of theori... more In this paper, I discuss a specifi c approach to measuring and comparing the simplicity of theories that is based on Lewis's notion of fundamental properties. In particular, I discuss the criterion of simplicity as stated by Williams. According to Williams, the best candidate for a theory is the one which has the shortest defi nition in terms of fundamental properties. Th e aim of this paper is to show that the criterion thus specifi ed has two constraints. First, the criterion is not applicable to cases in which candidates for theories that specify fundamental properties are compared. Secondly, the applicability of the criterion in social sciences seems to be unwarranted.
A traditional objection to inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning-constitut... more A traditional objection to inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning-constitutive and therefore inferentialism has to comprise an analytic-synthetic distinction. As a response, Peregrin argues that meaning is a matter of inferential rules and only the subset of all the valid inferences for which there is a widely shared corrective behaviour corresponds to rules and so determines meaning. Unfortunately, Peregrin does not discuss what counts as "widely shared". In the paper, I argue for an empirical plausibility of Peregrin's proposal. The aim of the paper is to show that we can find examples of meaning-constitutive linguistic action, which sustain Peregrin's response. The idea is supported by examples of meaning modulation. If Peregrin is right, then we should be able to find specific meaning modulations in which a new meaning is publicly available and modulated in such a way that it has a potential to be widely shared. I believe that binding modulations-a specific type of meaning modulations-satisfy this condition.
In this paper, I discuss Quine's views on language sharing and linguistic communities. It is some... more In this paper, I discuss Quine's views on language sharing and linguistic communities. It is sometimes explicitly and often implicitly taken for granted that Quine believes that speakers can form communities in which they share a language. The aim of the paper is to show that this is a misinterpretation and, on the contrary, Quine is closer to linguistic individualismthe view according to which there is no guarantee that speakers within a community share a language and the notion of idiolect is more fundamental than the notion of shared language.
In this paper, I discuss a specific approach to measuring and comparing the simplicity of theorie... more In this paper, I discuss a specific approach to measuring and comparing the simplicity of theories that is based on Lewis’s notion of fundamental properties. In particular, I discuss the criterion of simplicity as stated by Williams. According to Williams, the best candidate for a theory is the one which has the shortest definition in terms of fundamental properties. The aim of this paper is to show that the criterion thus specified has two constraints. First, the criterion is not applicable to cases in which candidates for theories that specify fundamental properties are compared. Secondly, the applicability of the criterion in social sciences seems to be unwarranted.
A traditional objection to inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning-constitut... more A traditional objection to inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning-constitutive and therefore inferentialism has to comprise an analytic-synthetic distinction. As a response, Peregrin argues that meaning is a matter of inferential rules and only the subset of all the valid inferences for which there is a widely shared corrective behaviour corresponds to rules and so determines meaning. Unfortunately, Peregrin does not discuss what counts as "widely shared". In the paper, I argue for an empirical plausibility of Peregrin's proposal. The aim of the paper is to show that we can find examples of meaning-constitutive linguistic action, which sustain Peregrin's response. The idea is supported by examples of meaning modulation. If Peregrin is right, then we should be able to find specific meaning modulations in which a new meaning is publicly available and modulated in such a way that it has a potential to be widely shared. I believe that binding modulations-a specific type of meaning modulations-satisfy this condition.
The criterion of naturalness represents David Lewis’s attempt to answer some of the sceptical arg... more The criterion of naturalness represents David Lewis’s attempt to answer some of the sceptical arguments in (meta-) semantics by comparing the naturalness of meaning candidates. Recently, the criterion has been challenged by a new sceptical argument. Williams argues that the criterion cannot rule out the candidates which are not permuted versions of an intended interpretation. He presents such a candidate the arithmetical interpretation (a specific instantiation of Henkin’s model), and he argues that it opens up the possibility of Pythagorean worlds, i.e. the worlds similar to ours in which the arithmetical interpretation is the best candidate for a semantic theory. The aim of this paper is a) to reconsider the general conditions for the applicability of Lewis’s criterion of naturalness and b) to show that Williams’s new sceptical challenge is based on a problematic assumption that the arithmetical interpretation is independent of fundamental properties and relations. As I show, if...
This book brings arguments for metaphysical realism, and its aspiration appears to be to make the... more This book brings arguments for metaphysical realism, and its aspiration appears to be to make them knock-down. Sider tries to convince the reader that we can identify the structure of the world; he believes that we can reach the access to brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
The idea that natural languages are shared by speakers within linguistic communities is often tak... more The idea that natural languages are shared by speakers within linguistic communities is often taken for granted. Several philosophers even take the notion of shared language as fundamental and that allows them to use it in further explanations. However, to justify the claim that speakers share a language, it should be possible to demarcate the shared language somehow. In this paper, I discuss: A) the explanatory role which the notion of shared language can play, and B) a strategy for demarcating shared languages from within the linguistic production of speakers. The aim of this paper is to show that the indeterminate nature of meaning in natural languages problematizes the intuitive idea of natural languages as shared.
Analytická filozofia na vzostupe ov, 4 konferencie, viac ako 750 aktívnych účastníkov. Taký je su... more Analytická filozofia na vzostupe ov, 4 konferencie, viac ako 750 aktívnych účastníkov. Taký je sumár akcií orientovaných na analytickú filozofiu v rozmedzí od augusta do septembra 2017. Bez čenia si dovolím vyhlásiť, že analytická filozofia kra akademického roka. Nás môže určite tešiť, že všetky akcie sa uskuto Českej republiky: Mníchov (ECAP9), Stará Lesná (XXI. CSSAF), Salzburg (SOPhiA), Bochum (PLM4).
In this paper, I discuss Quine's views on language sharing and linguistic communities. It is some... more In this paper, I discuss Quine's views on language sharing and linguistic communities. It is sometimes explicitly and often implicitly taken for granted that Quine believes that speakers can form communities in which they share a language. The aim of the paper is to show that this is a misinterpretation and, on the contrary, Quine is closer to linguistic individualismthe view according to which there is no guarantee that speakers within a community share a language and the notion of idiolect is more fundamental than the notion of shared language.
In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena rel... more In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena related to natural languages. First, I show how the distinction between the inferential potential and the inferential significance fits the standard distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the content of an utterance. Second, I show how the distinction could be used to explain ambiguity and free pragmatic enrichment from the perspective of normative inferentialism. The aim of this paper is to establish theoretical foundations that enable normative inferentialism to enter the discussions within the literalism-contextualism debate. As I argue, the biggest advantage of inferentialism is that it provides one general framework for the representation of meaning/content that naturally incorporates contextual information and so it can be used to represent meanings of various types of context-dependent sentences.
According to the standard interpretation of Lewis's theory of predicate meaning (the U&N theory),... more According to the standard interpretation of Lewis's theory of predicate meaning (the U&N theory), the naturalness of meaning candidates should be stated metaphysically as a length of definition in terms of fundamental properties. Recently, Weatherson has criticized the U&N theory and argued that the criterion of naturalness should be stated epistemologically as the amount of evidence needed to form a belief. Despite the criticism, his attitude towards the U&N theory is quite relaxed. According to Weatherson, the U&N theory can be used as a good heuristic for delivering the correct verdicts when doing applied semantics, i.e., when we try to determine the best meaning candidate for a particular predicate. In this paper, I try to show that the "good heuristic strategy" is of no use because A) there is no guarantee that the epistemological and the metaphysical criteria of naturalness deliver the same verdicts and B) even if they deliver the same verdicts, the difference in their theoretical backgrounds may affect arguments which rely on the verdicts. The difference will be shown by drawing on the example of Theodore Sider and his use of the U&N theory.
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Pre-published version
The aim of this paper is to establish a specific view of linguistic understanding based on the framework of normative inferentialism. Normative inferentialism is presented as an overspecification (rich) account of meaning – the meaning of a sentence is understood as a cluster of context-dependent contents. The standard psychological mechanism responsible for reaching understanding of an utterance depends on the ability to eliminate contextually irrelevant aspects/parts of meaning. The advantages of the view are that the mechanism can a) explain a wide range of linguistic phenomena including polysemy, homonymy, and conversational implicatures and b) explain partial understanding of an utterance.
KEYWORDS: Inferentialism – meaning – meaning constitutive inferences – meaning modulation – normative inferentialism.
Papers by Matej Drobňák
Pre-published version
The aim of this paper is to establish a specific view of linguistic understanding based on the framework of normative inferentialism. Normative inferentialism is presented as an overspecification (rich) account of meaning – the meaning of a sentence is understood as a cluster of context-dependent contents. The standard psychological mechanism responsible for reaching understanding of an utterance depends on the ability to eliminate contextually irrelevant aspects/parts of meaning. The advantages of the view are that the mechanism can a) explain a wide range of linguistic phenomena including polysemy, homonymy, and conversational implicatures and b) explain partial understanding of an utterance.
KEYWORDS: Inferentialism – meaning – meaning constitutive inferences – meaning modulation – normative inferentialism.