In 1899 Emil Kraepelin published the sixth and final edition of his hand-book Psychiatrie, in whi... more In 1899 Emil Kraepelin published the sixth and final edition of his hand-book Psychiatrie, in which he proposed a classification of mental disorders which would form the basis for the later editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association (from the 3rdedition onwards). This manual is often called “the bible of psychiatry”. In this paper we discuss the ongoing struggle of psychiatry to understand the causes of mental disorders and to come up with a scientifically grounded classification. We will show the parallel between Emil Kraepelin’s personal struggle with the matter – and his provisional solution – and the current tensions and opposing opinions in the debates surrounding the latest edition of the manual (DSM-5) and its possible future. It brings us to the question whether mental disorders are natural kinds, and whether or not a more theoretical (instead of descriptive) approach of psychiatric classification is po...
November the 26th 1914, early in the morning. In the river mouth of the Medway, a fleet of impres... more November the 26th 1914, early in the morning. In the river mouth of the Medway, a fleet of impressive battle ships is ready to oppose maritime attacks on Great Britain. But everything is still quiet, at that moment. However, at a couple of minutes to eight, one of the ships is suddenly surrounded by flames, without the slightest previous warning. Next, a big explosion was heard for ten miles around. [1]
In 1899 Emil Kraepelin published the sixth and final edition of his handbook Psychiatrie, in whic... more In 1899 Emil Kraepelin published the sixth and final edition of his handbook Psychiatrie, in which he proposed a classification of mental disorders which would form the basis for the later editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association (from the 3 rd edition onwards). This manual is often called "the bible of psychiatry". In this paper we discuss the ongoing struggle of psychiatry to understand the causes of mental disorders and to come up with a scientifically grounded classification. We will show the parallel between Emil Kraepelin's personal struggle with the matter -and his provisional solution -and the current tensions and opposing opinions in the debates surrounding the latest edition of the manual (DSM-5) and its possible future. It brings us to the question whether mental disorders are natural kinds, and whether or not a more theoretical (instead of descriptive) approach of psychiatric classification is possible after all. We will analyze the current philosophical debate on these topics and will come to the conclusion that the matter is still unresolvable, and that the situation has in that sense not much changed since the time in which Emil Kraepelin proposed his classification.
Philosophers discuss Jerome Wakefield's influential view of mental disorder as “harmful dysfu... more Philosophers discuss Jerome Wakefield's influential view of mental disorder as “harmful dysfunction,” with detailed responses from Wakefield himself. One of the most pressing theoretical problems of psychiatry is the definition of mental disorder. Jerome Wakefield's proposal that mental disorder is “harmful dysfunction” has been both influential and widely debated; philosophers have been notably skeptical about it. This volume provides the first book-length collection of responses by philosophers to Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA), offering a survey of philosophical critiques as well as extensive and detailed replies by Wakefield himself. HDA is offered as a definition of mental disorder, but it is also the outcome of a method—conceptual analysis—and contributors first take up HDA's methodology, considering such topics as HDA's influences on the DSM, empirical support for HDA, and clinical practice. They go on to discuss HDA's ultimate goal, th...
The Scottish physician James Lind is famous for the experiments on potential cures of scurvy whic... more The Scottish physician James Lind is famous for the experiments on potential cures of scurvy which he performed in 1747 on board of the British navy vessel HMS Salisbury. In this paper we use Lind's experiments and their shortcomings to explain important contemporary methodological standards for biomedical research and the rationale behind these standards. We also describe the genesis of these methodological standards.
In the literature, the appeal to apply evidence-based medicine (EBM) to psychiatry is valued in t... more In the literature, the appeal to apply evidence-based medicine (EBM) to psychiatry is valued in two ways. Either it is claimed that psychiatry is not yet a fully scientific domain, and that evidence-based psychiatry (EBP) should be seen as a means to make it such. Or it is on the contrary claimed that an evidence-based approach cannot conform to the peculiarities of psychiatry and that it is hence impossible to model EBP on EBM. Both of these claims start from the conviction that (a) psychiatric diseases are categorically different from physical diseases and (b) the aims and methodology of the EBM movement are at least unproblematic enough to consider it as a possible model for EBP. I will argue against the latter two convictions to evaluate the persuasiveness of the former two claims. I will conclude that the discussion on the usefulness of EBP is misguided, and hence nor the claim that an evidence-based approach to psychiatry will make it fully scientific, neither the claim that t...
In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall's theoretical utility perspective for causation in every... more In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall's theoretical utility perspective for causation in everyday contexts. We do this by presenting some instances of it, thereby adding some flesh to the skeleton that Hall has provided. Our elaboration of the theoretical utility perspective ...
... als theoretisch kader voor de explicatie van causaal redeneren. Leen De Vreese Promotor: Prof... more ... als theoretisch kader voor de explicatie van causaal redeneren. Leen De Vreese Promotor: Prof. dr. Erik Weber ... Aan het eind van die rit was ik immers in staat om mijn werk op het terrein van causaal redeneren met twee voeten op de juiste grond te zetten. ...
There are basically three different ways of philosophically defining, describing or characterizin... more There are basically three different ways of philosophically defining, describing or characterizing causation. One can be either a causal monist, a causal pluralist, or a causal abolitionist. Causal monism is the traditional way of dealing with causation. The causal monist tries to reduce ...
How Modern was James Lind's Methodology? * * The research for this paper benefited from a bilater... more How Modern was James Lind's Methodology? * * The research for this paper benefited from a bilateral scientific exchange project funded by the Ministry of the Flemish Community (project BIL01/80) and the Polish State Committee for Scientific Research. We thank Steffen Ducheyne and Robrecht Vanderbeeken for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Causal pluralism is currently a hot topic in philosophy. However, the consequences of this view o... more Causal pluralism is currently a hot topic in philosophy. However, the consequences of this view on causation for scientific knowledge and scientific methodology are heavily underexposed in the present debate. My aim in this paper is to argue that an epistemological-methodological point of view should be valued as a line of approach on its own and to demonstrate how epistemological-methodological causal pluralism differs in its scope from conceptual and metaphysical causal pluralism. Further, I defend epistemological-methodological causal pluralism and try to illustrate that scientific practice needs diverse causal concepts in diverse domains, and even diverse causal concepts within singular domains.
This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl H... more This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the "pragmatic approach to scientific explanation." We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.
Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the on... more Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction – traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism – can be defended in...
The Scottish physician James Lind is the most celebrated name in the history of research into the... more The Scottish physician James Lind is the most celebrated name in the history of research into the causes and cures of scurvy. This is due to the famous experiment he conducted in 1747 on H.M.S. Salisbury in order to compare the efficiency of six popular treatments for scurvy. This experiment is generally regarded as the first controlled trial in clinical science (see e.g. Carpenter 1986, p. 52). The experiment relates to the possible cures of scurvy, not to its causes. The traditional view is that Lind was much less innovative in his research on the causes of scurvy. In 1867 the French naval surgeon H. Rey, in his analysis and critique of Lind’s Treatise of the Scurvy, complained that, while Lind relied only on experiments in matters of therapeutics, his theory on the causes of scurvy was based on “ideas that are far removed from any kind of scientific precision”. According to Rey, Lind accepted some ideas on the
Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science+Bu... more Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science+Business Media B.V.. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be selfarchived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com".
The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
In the traditional philosophical debate over different conceptual analyses of "disease,&... more In the traditional philosophical debate over different conceptual analyses of "disease," it is often presupposed that "disease" is univocally definable and that there are clear boundaries which distinguish this univocal category "disease" from the category of "nondisease." In this paper, I will argue for a shift in the discussion on the concept of "disease" and propose an alternative, pragmatic approach that is based on the conviction that "disease" is not a theoretical concept but a practical term. I develop a view on which our use of the term "disease" is determined by two interacting factors, namely, value-laden considerations about the (un)desirabilty of certain states and discoveries of cause(s) which is/are explanatorily relevant. I show how these factors interact with regard to a taxonomy of kinds of diseases. This pragmatic approach will not lead me to a final definition of "disease," but will result in a more realistic description of the way we build, use, apply, and change our concept of "disease." Meanwhile, it is useful as a basis for critical reflection on disease-labeling in medicine.
Journal of evaluation in clinical practice, Jan 28, 2016
The reliability and validity of psychiatric diagnoses have always been a major concern. The Diagn... more The reliability and validity of psychiatric diagnoses have always been a major concern. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) reliability field trials yielded ambiguous results, with some diagnostic categories scoring well below par. We argue that the emphasis on the reliability of psychiatric diagnoses, which has dominated psychiatric nosology and guided the endeavor of improving the DSM in its consecutive editions, is misguided and lacks in structural validity. In this article, we defend a pragmatic view on psychiatric disease as the most fruitful approach to an understanding of what the categorical distinctions in the DSM (can) represent. Disorders in the DSM are descriptions of clinical pictures and do not necessarily correspond to an identified pathological substrate. Although this is a logical result of the nature of psychiatric disease, it bears important consequences. The various DSM disease categories are not uniform but should be ...
In 1899 Emil Kraepelin published the sixth and final edition of his hand-book Psychiatrie, in whi... more In 1899 Emil Kraepelin published the sixth and final edition of his hand-book Psychiatrie, in which he proposed a classification of mental disorders which would form the basis for the later editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association (from the 3rdedition onwards). This manual is often called “the bible of psychiatry”. In this paper we discuss the ongoing struggle of psychiatry to understand the causes of mental disorders and to come up with a scientifically grounded classification. We will show the parallel between Emil Kraepelin’s personal struggle with the matter – and his provisional solution – and the current tensions and opposing opinions in the debates surrounding the latest edition of the manual (DSM-5) and its possible future. It brings us to the question whether mental disorders are natural kinds, and whether or not a more theoretical (instead of descriptive) approach of psychiatric classification is po...
November the 26th 1914, early in the morning. In the river mouth of the Medway, a fleet of impres... more November the 26th 1914, early in the morning. In the river mouth of the Medway, a fleet of impressive battle ships is ready to oppose maritime attacks on Great Britain. But everything is still quiet, at that moment. However, at a couple of minutes to eight, one of the ships is suddenly surrounded by flames, without the slightest previous warning. Next, a big explosion was heard for ten miles around. [1]
In 1899 Emil Kraepelin published the sixth and final edition of his handbook Psychiatrie, in whic... more In 1899 Emil Kraepelin published the sixth and final edition of his handbook Psychiatrie, in which he proposed a classification of mental disorders which would form the basis for the later editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association (from the 3 rd edition onwards). This manual is often called "the bible of psychiatry". In this paper we discuss the ongoing struggle of psychiatry to understand the causes of mental disorders and to come up with a scientifically grounded classification. We will show the parallel between Emil Kraepelin's personal struggle with the matter -and his provisional solution -and the current tensions and opposing opinions in the debates surrounding the latest edition of the manual (DSM-5) and its possible future. It brings us to the question whether mental disorders are natural kinds, and whether or not a more theoretical (instead of descriptive) approach of psychiatric classification is possible after all. We will analyze the current philosophical debate on these topics and will come to the conclusion that the matter is still unresolvable, and that the situation has in that sense not much changed since the time in which Emil Kraepelin proposed his classification.
Philosophers discuss Jerome Wakefield's influential view of mental disorder as “harmful dysfu... more Philosophers discuss Jerome Wakefield's influential view of mental disorder as “harmful dysfunction,” with detailed responses from Wakefield himself. One of the most pressing theoretical problems of psychiatry is the definition of mental disorder. Jerome Wakefield's proposal that mental disorder is “harmful dysfunction” has been both influential and widely debated; philosophers have been notably skeptical about it. This volume provides the first book-length collection of responses by philosophers to Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA), offering a survey of philosophical critiques as well as extensive and detailed replies by Wakefield himself. HDA is offered as a definition of mental disorder, but it is also the outcome of a method—conceptual analysis—and contributors first take up HDA's methodology, considering such topics as HDA's influences on the DSM, empirical support for HDA, and clinical practice. They go on to discuss HDA's ultimate goal, th...
The Scottish physician James Lind is famous for the experiments on potential cures of scurvy whic... more The Scottish physician James Lind is famous for the experiments on potential cures of scurvy which he performed in 1747 on board of the British navy vessel HMS Salisbury. In this paper we use Lind's experiments and their shortcomings to explain important contemporary methodological standards for biomedical research and the rationale behind these standards. We also describe the genesis of these methodological standards.
In the literature, the appeal to apply evidence-based medicine (EBM) to psychiatry is valued in t... more In the literature, the appeal to apply evidence-based medicine (EBM) to psychiatry is valued in two ways. Either it is claimed that psychiatry is not yet a fully scientific domain, and that evidence-based psychiatry (EBP) should be seen as a means to make it such. Or it is on the contrary claimed that an evidence-based approach cannot conform to the peculiarities of psychiatry and that it is hence impossible to model EBP on EBM. Both of these claims start from the conviction that (a) psychiatric diseases are categorically different from physical diseases and (b) the aims and methodology of the EBM movement are at least unproblematic enough to consider it as a possible model for EBP. I will argue against the latter two convictions to evaluate the persuasiveness of the former two claims. I will conclude that the discussion on the usefulness of EBP is misguided, and hence nor the claim that an evidence-based approach to psychiatry will make it fully scientific, neither the claim that t...
In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall's theoretical utility perspective for causation in every... more In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall's theoretical utility perspective for causation in everyday contexts. We do this by presenting some instances of it, thereby adding some flesh to the skeleton that Hall has provided. Our elaboration of the theoretical utility perspective ...
... als theoretisch kader voor de explicatie van causaal redeneren. Leen De Vreese Promotor: Prof... more ... als theoretisch kader voor de explicatie van causaal redeneren. Leen De Vreese Promotor: Prof. dr. Erik Weber ... Aan het eind van die rit was ik immers in staat om mijn werk op het terrein van causaal redeneren met twee voeten op de juiste grond te zetten. ...
There are basically three different ways of philosophically defining, describing or characterizin... more There are basically three different ways of philosophically defining, describing or characterizing causation. One can be either a causal monist, a causal pluralist, or a causal abolitionist. Causal monism is the traditional way of dealing with causation. The causal monist tries to reduce ...
How Modern was James Lind's Methodology? * * The research for this paper benefited from a bilater... more How Modern was James Lind's Methodology? * * The research for this paper benefited from a bilateral scientific exchange project funded by the Ministry of the Flemish Community (project BIL01/80) and the Polish State Committee for Scientific Research. We thank Steffen Ducheyne and Robrecht Vanderbeeken for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Causal pluralism is currently a hot topic in philosophy. However, the consequences of this view o... more Causal pluralism is currently a hot topic in philosophy. However, the consequences of this view on causation for scientific knowledge and scientific methodology are heavily underexposed in the present debate. My aim in this paper is to argue that an epistemological-methodological point of view should be valued as a line of approach on its own and to demonstrate how epistemological-methodological causal pluralism differs in its scope from conceptual and metaphysical causal pluralism. Further, I defend epistemological-methodological causal pluralism and try to illustrate that scientific practice needs diverse causal concepts in diverse domains, and even diverse causal concepts within singular domains.
This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl H... more This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the "pragmatic approach to scientific explanation." We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.
Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the on... more Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction – traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism – can be defended in...
The Scottish physician James Lind is the most celebrated name in the history of research into the... more The Scottish physician James Lind is the most celebrated name in the history of research into the causes and cures of scurvy. This is due to the famous experiment he conducted in 1747 on H.M.S. Salisbury in order to compare the efficiency of six popular treatments for scurvy. This experiment is generally regarded as the first controlled trial in clinical science (see e.g. Carpenter 1986, p. 52). The experiment relates to the possible cures of scurvy, not to its causes. The traditional view is that Lind was much less innovative in his research on the causes of scurvy. In 1867 the French naval surgeon H. Rey, in his analysis and critique of Lind’s Treatise of the Scurvy, complained that, while Lind relied only on experiments in matters of therapeutics, his theory on the causes of scurvy was based on “ideas that are far removed from any kind of scientific precision”. According to Rey, Lind accepted some ideas on the
Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science+Bu... more Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science+Business Media B.V.. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be selfarchived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com".
The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
In the traditional philosophical debate over different conceptual analyses of "disease,&... more In the traditional philosophical debate over different conceptual analyses of "disease," it is often presupposed that "disease" is univocally definable and that there are clear boundaries which distinguish this univocal category "disease" from the category of "nondisease." In this paper, I will argue for a shift in the discussion on the concept of "disease" and propose an alternative, pragmatic approach that is based on the conviction that "disease" is not a theoretical concept but a practical term. I develop a view on which our use of the term "disease" is determined by two interacting factors, namely, value-laden considerations about the (un)desirabilty of certain states and discoveries of cause(s) which is/are explanatorily relevant. I show how these factors interact with regard to a taxonomy of kinds of diseases. This pragmatic approach will not lead me to a final definition of "disease," but will result in a more realistic description of the way we build, use, apply, and change our concept of "disease." Meanwhile, it is useful as a basis for critical reflection on disease-labeling in medicine.
Journal of evaluation in clinical practice, Jan 28, 2016
The reliability and validity of psychiatric diagnoses have always been a major concern. The Diagn... more The reliability and validity of psychiatric diagnoses have always been a major concern. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) reliability field trials yielded ambiguous results, with some diagnostic categories scoring well below par. We argue that the emphasis on the reliability of psychiatric diagnoses, which has dominated psychiatric nosology and guided the endeavor of improving the DSM in its consecutive editions, is misguided and lacks in structural validity. In this article, we defend a pragmatic view on psychiatric disease as the most fruitful approach to an understanding of what the categorical distinctions in the DSM (can) represent. Disorders in the DSM are descriptions of clinical pictures and do not necessarily correspond to an identified pathological substrate. Although this is a logical result of the nature of psychiatric disease, it bears important consequences. The various DSM disease categories are not uniform but should be ...
In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall's theoretical utility perspective
for causation in everyday ... more In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall's theoretical utility perspective
for causation in everyday contexts. We do this by presenting some
instances of it, thereby adding some esh to the skeleton that Hall
has provided. Our elaboration of the theoretical utility perspective
also provides arguments for it: the instances we present show the
fruitfulness of the approach. A question raised by Hall's proposal
is: should we give up descriptive analysis of causation (and descriptive
analysis in general) completely? We argue that, at least for causation,
traditional descriptive conceptual analysis must be given up.
However, we also argue that a more modest variant of descriptive
conceptual analysis can be useful.
In a paper ‘Causation in Context’ (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth
value of causal... more In a paper ‘Causation in Context’ (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth
value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not
depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to
causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic,
counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly
present Menzies’ arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds
for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare
the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out
whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect
to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all
causal claims would be equally warranted.
This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl H... more This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the "pragmatic approach to scientific explanation." We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.
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Papers by Leen De Vreese
for causation in everyday contexts. We do this by presenting some
instances of it, thereby adding some esh to the skeleton that Hall
has provided. Our elaboration of the theoretical utility perspective
also provides arguments for it: the instances we present show the
fruitfulness of the approach. A question raised by Hall's proposal
is: should we give up descriptive analysis of causation (and descriptive
analysis in general) completely? We argue that, at least for causation,
traditional descriptive conceptual analysis must be given up.
However, we also argue that a more modest variant of descriptive
conceptual analysis can be useful.
value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not
depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to
causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic,
counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly
present Menzies’ arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds
for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare
the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out
whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect
to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all
causal claims would be equally warranted.