Papers by Michael Yudanin
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2014
Kant's moral philosophy usually considers two types of duties: negative duties that prohibit cert... more Kant's moral philosophy usually considers two types of duties: negative duties that prohibit certain actions and positive duties commanding action. With that, Kant insists on deriving all morality from reason alone. Such is the Categorical Imperative that Kant lays at the basis of ethics. Yet while negative duties can be derived from the Categorical Imperative and thus from reason, the paper argues that this is not the case with positive duties. After answering a number of attempts to derive positive duties from the Categorical Imperative, most notably those of Barbara Herman, it sketches an alternative approach to understanding the relationship between the universal moral law and specific moral contents. Keywords Ethics. Kant. Deontology. Categorical imperative. Positive duties. Negative duties Traditionally, moral philosophy considers two types of duties: duties prohibiting certain actions and duties commanding certain actions. 1 Prohibitive duties alone might be seen as insufficient, as it is hard to imagine a morality that does not command to help the fellow human in need, for example, or in general to take action rather than just refraining from certain actions. The first category, that of negative duties, includes duties of omission, or narrowing duties 2-duties that limit the range of actions moral beings are allowed to undertake. Positive duties, or widening duties of commission, are the duties of 'though shalt' that compel us to do certain things. Kant's moral philosophy includes both types of duties. When laying out the preliminary concepts of the metaphysics of morals, Kant talks about commission and omission as duties. 3 Later, in discussing the duties to oneself, he addresses positive and negative duties as duties of virtue, 4 where positive duties are commanding, and negative-forbidding action. This Ethic Theory Moral Prac
Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion, 2013
To know is to do, the agency of theory
accepted for publication in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
Published version available on Sp... more accepted for publication in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
Published version available on SpringerLink: http://link.springer.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/article/10.1007/s10677-014-9546-4
Kant’s moral philosophy usually considers two types of duties: negative duties that prohibit certain actions and positive duties commanding action. With that, Kant insists on deriving all morality from reason alone. Such is the Categorical Imperative that Kant lays at the basis of ethics. Yet while negative duties can be derived from the Categorical Imperative and thus from reason, the paper argues that this is not the case with positive duties. After answering a number of attempts to derive positive duties from the Categorical Imperative, most notably those of Barbara Herman, it sketches an alternative approach to understanding the relationship between the universal moral law and specific moral contents.
Applied Ethics: Risk, Justice and Liberty, Jul 2013
Freedom can be seen as individual’s capacity to choose between alternatives. As such, it stands i... more Freedom can be seen as individual’s capacity to choose between alternatives. As such, it stands in a dialectical relationship to its environment that both imposes constraints on freedom and allows carrying it out. Yet if we see liberty as freedom’s social accommodation, how would freedom shape liberty, and how would liberty accommodate freedom? As a capacity for choice, freedom is formal. Negative liberty, or freedom from, protects this capacity yet does not give it content. To make freedom meaningful, its societal accommodation has ensure that the choice can be carried out – in terms of accessing alternatives, understand them, and making informed choices. The paper, using the tools provided by the Hegelian philosophy and by information theory, explores the concept of liberty as an enabler of freedom and the role of knowledge in its enablement. This exploration leads us to specific positive rights that are necessary to make freedom meaningful.
Страницы, 2012
Мораль как справедливость и милосердие Традиционное понимание морали подразумевает два дополняющи... more Мораль как справедливость и милосердие Традиционное понимание морали подразумевает два дополняющих друг друга аспекта: справедливость и милосердие (см., напр., [Гусейнов, Апресян 200]). Это наблюдение касается как философского анализа, так и нравственной практики. Трудно представить себе жизнеспособную систему нравственности, которая предписывала бы, например, отсутствие дискриминации по не имеющим отношения к делу признакам при рассмотрении конфликтов, но при этом не видила бы ничего предосудительного в равнодушии к страждущим. Противоположная ситуация, когда милосердие предписывается, а справедливость игнорируется, столь же труднопредставима. Психологические исследования в области этики поддерживают подобное видение морали на уровне практики нравственных представлений [Хайдт, Грэм 2007; Хайдт 2007] ii . Этические теории, видящие один из вышеприведенных аспектов основополагающим, также пытаются объяснить и второй. Классическим примером может послужить этика Канта. В ее основе лежит чистый разум, дающий начало этике справедливости. Высказанная в Критике чистого разума [Кант 1964 III, 658], эта идея обосновывается в Основах метафизики нравственности и в Критике практического разума [Кант 1964 IV]. Однако в последнем этическом сочинении, Метафизике нравов [Кант 1964 IV], Кант обосновывает положительную мораль, мораль милосердия -как мы попытаемся доказать, не столь успешно. В качестве более новых примеров этических теорий, подчеркивающих один из аспектов нравственности, можно привести теорию морального развития Кольберга (Цукерман 1997, 49), подчеркивающую компонент справедливости, и альтернативу, ее дополняющую, предлагаемую его ученицей Гиллиган (Гиллиган 1982), которая выделяет аспект милосердия. Компонент справедливости можно соотнести с универсальной составляющей нравственности. Универсальность, переведенная на язык моральний теории, есть справедливость. Справедливость можно рассматривать в контексте распределения благ (дистрибутивная справедливость), преступления и наказания (ретрибутивная) и пр. (напр., [Кант 1964 IV, 213] и [Гусейнов 2001б]). Однако общим знаменателем всех определений является универсальный подход к этике, присутствие общих, не зависящих от частных случаев правил. Справедливость как беспристрастие есть универсальность. Милосердие, воспринимаемое как доброта, традиционно противопоставляется жестокости и злонамеренности [Апресян 2001]. Однако рассмотренное с формальной точки зрения, милосердие выступает прямой противоположностью справедливости. В то время как справедливость есть универсальность, переведенная на язык морали, милосердие, понимаемое как прощение, любовь к недоброжелателю, помощь страждущему, требует партикулярного отношения к объекту, то есть означает предпочтительный
Conference Presentations by Michael Yudanin
APA Eastern Division Meeting, 2018
Freedom is an unsolved problem in philosophy. Those belonging to the determinist school deny the... more Freedom is an unsolved problem in philosophy. Those belonging to the determinist school deny the possibility of free choice due to the deterministic nature of the supposedly free agents. The libertarians allege that there is a grain of indeterminism in free agents. The compatibilists argue that freedom and determinism can coexist and try to dissolve the contradiction between them. However, common compatibilist accounts do not explain how free choice develops in biological agents. I argue that describing freedom conceptually is impossible without explaining how it can exist in the world. Therefore, I develop an account of freedom’s instantiation in living entities and suggest several prerequisites that are necessary for its exercise. I argue that freedom is linked to the form of life and distinguish between choice in non-verbal animals and human freedom, where the latter is enabled by the development of language and thus a distinct character.
If we are to derive self-consciousness from self-reference, as Sebastian Rödl does in his book "S... more If we are to derive self-consciousness from self-reference, as Sebastian Rödl does in his book "Self-consciousness," the only basis for arguing for the materiality of the self would be establishing the material nature of self-reference. This can be done by demonstrating that the ways of knowing on which self-reference relies necessarily have material components. If, however, we can find a way of knowing that can underlie self-reference yet is not material, the materiality of the self on this account will become problematic. Mathematical knowledge seems to be such a case: it enables self-reference perfectly well without being essentially material. The paper evaluates the arguments for the materiality of mathematical knowledge and concludes that it can be seen as non-material in the sense that Rödl’s materialism requires, despite being a way of knowledge that enables self-reference.
Morality is traditionally understood as comprised of two components: justice and mercy. The firs... more Morality is traditionally understood as comprised of two components: justice and mercy. The first component, justice, the universal component of the form, is frequently seen as foundational for any moral system – which poses a challenge of explaining the second component, mercy, the particular component of content. Kantian ethics provides an example of this approach. After formulating his universalist theory of ethics in the Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals and further developing it in the Critique of practical reason, he attempts to use it in order to establish the morality of mercy in the Metaphysics of morals. Yet can universal morality of justice necessitate particular ethics of mercy? Using the example of competitive games, the relations between the ethics of justice and that of mercy are demonstrated, and it is shown that the former does not lead to the latter. Moreover, the universality of the rules of moral behavior can serve as a form for blatant brutality. Analyzing the characteristics of particular morality, we can conclude that physical humanity of the moral object, perceived as such by the subject, is a required condition for mercy. Removal of object's humanity is a necessary step toward an ethical system that allows cruelty – a system that can still be based on universal moral rules. Bhagavad Gītā, on the other hand, can be seen as an example of combining nīṣkāmakarma, the formal, universal ethics of desireless action, with a variety of particular motivations originating in the nature and social context of the moral agent.
Books by Michael Yudanin
Lexington, 2020
In Animal Choice and Human Freedom: On the Genealogy of Self-Determined Action, Michael Yudanin a... more In Animal Choice and Human Freedom: On the Genealogy of Self-Determined Action, Michael Yudanin argues that describing freedom conceptually is impossible without explaining how it can exist in the world. Yudanin develops an account of freedom’s instantiation in biological agents and provides several prerequisites that are necessary for its exercise. He demonstrates that freedom is linked to the form of life and distinguishes between choice in non-verbal animals and human freedom, where the latter is enabled by the development of language and thus possesses a distinct character. Following this descriptive account, Yudanin explores freedom’s evolutionary history, explaining how it developed in the course of the evolution of species.
ISBN-13 : 978-1793620187
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Papers by Michael Yudanin
Published version available on SpringerLink: http://link.springer.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/article/10.1007/s10677-014-9546-4
Kant’s moral philosophy usually considers two types of duties: negative duties that prohibit certain actions and positive duties commanding action. With that, Kant insists on deriving all morality from reason alone. Such is the Categorical Imperative that Kant lays at the basis of ethics. Yet while negative duties can be derived from the Categorical Imperative and thus from reason, the paper argues that this is not the case with positive duties. After answering a number of attempts to derive positive duties from the Categorical Imperative, most notably those of Barbara Herman, it sketches an alternative approach to understanding the relationship between the universal moral law and specific moral contents.
Conference Presentations by Michael Yudanin
Books by Michael Yudanin
ISBN-13 : 978-1793620187
Published version available on SpringerLink: http://link.springer.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/article/10.1007/s10677-014-9546-4
Kant’s moral philosophy usually considers two types of duties: negative duties that prohibit certain actions and positive duties commanding action. With that, Kant insists on deriving all morality from reason alone. Such is the Categorical Imperative that Kant lays at the basis of ethics. Yet while negative duties can be derived from the Categorical Imperative and thus from reason, the paper argues that this is not the case with positive duties. After answering a number of attempts to derive positive duties from the Categorical Imperative, most notably those of Barbara Herman, it sketches an alternative approach to understanding the relationship between the universal moral law and specific moral contents.
ISBN-13 : 978-1793620187