Papers by Fernando Mendonca
Educação e Filosofia, 2024
Resumo: Em um artigo influente publicado em meados dos anos 80, Jacques Brunschwig defendeu a ide... more Resumo: Em um artigo influente publicado em meados dos anos 80, Jacques Brunschwig defendeu a ideia de que o debate dialético, para Aristóteles, não resultaria em vencedores e derrotados. Sua defesa é baseada no debate dialético como sendo um trabalho comum entre questionador e respondedor (cláusula koinon ergon [cf. Tópicos VIII.11 161a20-21]) e como um tipo de teste de consistência de uma dada proposição (cláusula dia tēn thesis [cf. Tópicos VIII.4 159a20]). Apesar dos muitos méritos do artigo, penso que o argumento de Brunschwig não considera adequadamente aspectos importantes do debate dialético no que concerne à performance dos debatedores, especialmente acerca dos recursos que o questionador deve usar. Ao não considerarmos esses aspectos, temos dificuldades para interpretar passagens em que Aristóteles recomenda o uso de táticas para enganar o respondedor. Meu objetivo nesse artigo será oferecer uma explicação diferente das cláusulas dia tēn thesis e koinon ergon, de modo que isso implicará uma conclusão segundo a qual o debate dialético honesto pode envolver vencedores e derrotados e manter a observância das duas cláusulas.
Dissertatio Revista de Filosofia, 2023
In a puzzling sentence, Aristotle claims in Nicomachean Ethics I.8 that proponents of unsuccessfu... more In a puzzling sentence, Aristotle claims in Nicomachean Ethics I.8 that proponents of unsuccessful accounts of eudaimonia have grasped if not many, at least some aspects of it correctly. This paper tries to explain in detail what this sentence means in the context by identifying what exactly was said correctly by the proponents of unsuccessful accounts. As a result, I submit, Aristotle has a rhetorical procedure, since Aristotle would be making some effort directed to convince people recalcitrant to his account of eudaimonia.
Archai , 2023
The purpose of this paper is an attempt to delimitate what the dialectical syllogism looks like i... more The purpose of this paper is an attempt to delimitate what the dialectical syllogism looks like in Aristotle's Topics. Aristotle never gave an example of a dialectical syllogism, but we have some clues spread over books I and VIII of the Topics which make it possible to understand at least what within a dialectical debate is a dialectical syllogism. The interpretation advanced here distinguishes the logical order of the dialectical argumentation from the order of the debate. This distinction enables us to have a better understanding of what is and how the dialectical syllogism is identified in the debate. In addition, we can solve some interpretative difficulties other interpretations could not solve, and have a more solid grasp of how endoxa are used in a dialectical debate.
Archai - Revista de Estudos sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental, 2017
In this paper, I analyse EE I 6, where Aristotle presented a famous methodological digression. Ma... more In this paper, I analyse EE I 6, where Aristotle presented a famous methodological digression. Many interpreters have taken this chapter as advocating a dialectical procedure of enquiry. My claim is that Aristotle does not keep a dialectical attitude towards endoxa or phainomena in this chapter. In order to accomplish my goal, I shall show that EE I 6 does not provide enough evidence for the dialectical construal of it, and that this construal, in turn, hangs on some assumptions brought out from other Aristotelian works (EN and Top.), which do not provide good evidence either. By the examination of these assumptions, I intend to show that Aristotle is not carrying out any sort of dialectic, especially dialectic conceived as conceptual analysis seeking to save phainomena or endoxa.
Dissertatio Revista de Filosofia, 2019
Resumo: O objetivo desse artigo é duplo: tentar esclarecer quais são as condições apresentadas em... more Resumo: O objetivo desse artigo é duplo: tentar esclarecer quais são as condições apresentadas em EN I que uma disciplina ou argumento deve cumprir para ser considerado preciso, e tentar mostrar que o exame da acrasia em EN VII 3 cumpre tais condições. Na primeira parte do texto, selecionarei passagens que apresentam tais condições e farei uma distinção entre precisão prática e precisão teórica. Na segunda parte, em que me dedicarei à análise dos sentidos em que se pode possuir conhecimento e não o utilizar em EN VII 3, mostrarei que Aristóteles tem como objetivo obter a formulação apropriada do explanandum que será objeto da investigação causal da acrasia. Minha conclusão será que os critérios de precisão apresentados na primeira parte do trabalho são cumpridos pelo procedimento aristotélico em EN VII 3.
Abstract. My aim in this paper is twofold: I will try to clarify what the conditions developed in EN I a discipline or an argument must meet to be assumed as precise are, and, then, try to present evidence that the exam of akrasia in EN VII 3 meets these conditions. In the first part of this paper, I will select passages in which such conditions are displayed, and also distinguish between practical precision and theoretical precision. In the second part, where the analysis of the senses of having but not using knowledge in EN VII 3 is carried on, I will claim that Aristotle's objective is reaching the adequate statement of the explanandum that will be the subject of causal enquiry of akrasia. My concluding remarks will claim that the conditions displayed in this paper's first part are met by Aristotelian procedure in EN VII 3.
In this paper, I analyse EE I 6, where Aristotle presented a famous methodological digression. Ma... more In this paper, I analyse EE I 6, where Aristotle presented a famous methodological digression. Many interpreters have taken this chapter as advocating a dialectical procedure of enquiry. My claim is that Aristotle does not keep a dialectical attitude towards endoxa or phainomena in this chapter. In order to accomplish my goal, I shall show that EE I 6 does not provide enough evidence for the dialectical construal of it, and that this construal, in turn, hangs on some assumptions brought out from other Aristotelian works (EN and Top.), which do not provide good evidence either. By the examination of these assumptions, I intend to show that Aristotle is not carrying out any sort of dialectic, especially dialectic conceived as conceptual analysis seeking to save phainomena or endoxa.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249X_20_7
I claim that Aristotle does not make any concession to Socratic
Intellectualism in EN VII 1-3. In... more I claim that Aristotle does not make any concession to Socratic
Intellectualism in EN VII 1-3. In these chapters, Aristotle intends exactly the opposite, which is to refute the Socratic thesis that attributes to ignorance the cause of akrasia. I understand that Aristotle’s procedure has two parts whose boundaries are demarcated by the introduction of phusikōs argument. In the first part Aristotle shows some ways of having knowledge that do not produces action in order to contradict the Socratic thesis. In the second part is shown how akratic failure takes place and how it is explained by Aristotelian conception of practical knowledge. Thus, by saying in the conclusion to this second part that Socrates somehow was right, Aristotle does not mean to make any concession to Socratic Intellectualism. Rather, he means that the sentence that conveys the Socratic position by itself could be interpreted as correct, but, despite this, it is an important piece of a complete incorrect theory.
Meu objetivo nesse texto é oferecer uma interpretação do modo como a dialética aristotélica pode ... more Meu objetivo nesse texto é oferecer uma interpretação do modo como a dialética aristotélica pode ser útil para a filosofia em geral, e o conhecimento dos princípios em particular, sem incorrer em problemas epistemológicos geralmente presentes ao se tentar explicar como, a partir de proposições das quais não temos comprovação do valor de verdade que possuem, as endoxa, se pode conhecer proposições primeiras e verdadeiras. Meu argumento central é que não é a dialética que, afinal, é útil para o conhecimento filosófico, mas o próprio tratado, os Tópicos, na medida em que esse tratado oferece um conjunto amplo de ferramentas argumentativas que permitem ao seu estudante um domínio de técnicas lógico-linguísticas que podem ser aplicadas em qualquer âmbito discursivo, favorecendo o escrutínio mais profundo de proposições a serem examinadas.
English:
My aim is to develop an interpretation about how Aristotelian dialectic can be useful to philosophy and, in more specific terms, to knowledge of the first principles, avoiding epistemological problems regarding the away one can explain the knowledge of propositions which are primaries and trues, by departing from proposition whose truth-evaluation is not assured, the endoxa. My main argument is that what is in fact useful to get to know the first principles is not dialectic itself, but the treatise at stake, the Topics. Accordingly, this treatise offers an wide set of logical and linguistic tools that can be applied to any discursive universe, favouring a deep scrutiny of proposition to be examined.
Master's thesis by Fernando Mendonca
This is my Master's thesis in which I try to offer an anti-intellectualist account of akrasia in ... more This is my Master's thesis in which I try to offer an anti-intellectualist account of akrasia in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics VII. The most important point I claim is that akrasia is not due to some sort of intellectual failure or a simple conflict of desires, rather it is due to a specific kind of condition of character in which the acratic agent is not properly motivated to act accordingly to its reason's prescription.
Regarding the dialectic method, which plays a major role in this thesis, I have completely changed my mind, and a different interpretation of it can be found in my recent works. In a nutshell, now I think there is no dialectic method in EN VII at all.
Phd Thesis by Fernando Mendonca
Português:
Nosso objetivo é argumentar em favor de uma interpretação deflacionada da dialética a... more Português:
Nosso objetivo é argumentar em favor de uma interpretação deflacionada da dialética aristotélica nos Tópicos, visando mostrar que, para Aristóteles, a dialética é essencialmente um tipo específico de debate regulado, contrariamente a um tipo de interpretação bastante difundido que concebe a dialética como um método de investigação filosófica. Defendemos que a análise cuidadosa de certos textos fundamentais nos oferece evidências suficientes para sustentar que os Tópicos são um manual que codifica uma arte existente. Essa codificação do debate dialético tem caráter primordialmente descritivo e mostra as regras do debate, o tipo específico de argumento utilizado nele, o modo como as premissas são obtidas e a relação predicativa das proposições utilizadas pelos debatedores. O domínio das técnicas envolvidas no debate não se funda em nenhum tipo de conhecimento particular, mas, antes, na competência linguística. É por fazer um uso técnico dessa competência que os Tópicos podem ser úteis para a filosofia.
English:
Our aim is to argue for a deflationary interpretation of Aristotelian dialectic in the Topics, showing that dialectic is, for Aristotle, a specific sort of regulated debate, in contrast to a widely spread kind of interpretation which conceives dialectic as a method of philosophical investigation. Our claim is that an analysis carefully conducted of certain key texts does provide us with sufficient evidences for defending that the Topics is a handbook which codifies an existent art. This codification has a descriptive character and reveals the rules of the debate, what is the specific kind of argument used in it, how premises are obtained and the predicative relation of the propositions used by the debaters. The mastery of the techniques required by the debate is not grounded in any sort of particular knowledge, rather in linguistic competence. It is by doing a technical usage of this competence that the Topics can be useful for philosophy
Conferences by Fernando Mendonca
Teaching Documents by Fernando Mendonca
Uploads
Papers by Fernando Mendonca
Abstract. My aim in this paper is twofold: I will try to clarify what the conditions developed in EN I a discipline or an argument must meet to be assumed as precise are, and, then, try to present evidence that the exam of akrasia in EN VII 3 meets these conditions. In the first part of this paper, I will select passages in which such conditions are displayed, and also distinguish between practical precision and theoretical precision. In the second part, where the analysis of the senses of having but not using knowledge in EN VII 3 is carried on, I will claim that Aristotle's objective is reaching the adequate statement of the explanandum that will be the subject of causal enquiry of akrasia. My concluding remarks will claim that the conditions displayed in this paper's first part are met by Aristotelian procedure in EN VII 3.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249X_20_7
Intellectualism in EN VII 1-3. In these chapters, Aristotle intends exactly the opposite, which is to refute the Socratic thesis that attributes to ignorance the cause of akrasia. I understand that Aristotle’s procedure has two parts whose boundaries are demarcated by the introduction of phusikōs argument. In the first part Aristotle shows some ways of having knowledge that do not produces action in order to contradict the Socratic thesis. In the second part is shown how akratic failure takes place and how it is explained by Aristotelian conception of practical knowledge. Thus, by saying in the conclusion to this second part that Socrates somehow was right, Aristotle does not mean to make any concession to Socratic Intellectualism. Rather, he means that the sentence that conveys the Socratic position by itself could be interpreted as correct, but, despite this, it is an important piece of a complete incorrect theory.
English:
My aim is to develop an interpretation about how Aristotelian dialectic can be useful to philosophy and, in more specific terms, to knowledge of the first principles, avoiding epistemological problems regarding the away one can explain the knowledge of propositions which are primaries and trues, by departing from proposition whose truth-evaluation is not assured, the endoxa. My main argument is that what is in fact useful to get to know the first principles is not dialectic itself, but the treatise at stake, the Topics. Accordingly, this treatise offers an wide set of logical and linguistic tools that can be applied to any discursive universe, favouring a deep scrutiny of proposition to be examined.
Master's thesis by Fernando Mendonca
Regarding the dialectic method, which plays a major role in this thesis, I have completely changed my mind, and a different interpretation of it can be found in my recent works. In a nutshell, now I think there is no dialectic method in EN VII at all.
Phd Thesis by Fernando Mendonca
Nosso objetivo é argumentar em favor de uma interpretação deflacionada da dialética aristotélica nos Tópicos, visando mostrar que, para Aristóteles, a dialética é essencialmente um tipo específico de debate regulado, contrariamente a um tipo de interpretação bastante difundido que concebe a dialética como um método de investigação filosófica. Defendemos que a análise cuidadosa de certos textos fundamentais nos oferece evidências suficientes para sustentar que os Tópicos são um manual que codifica uma arte existente. Essa codificação do debate dialético tem caráter primordialmente descritivo e mostra as regras do debate, o tipo específico de argumento utilizado nele, o modo como as premissas são obtidas e a relação predicativa das proposições utilizadas pelos debatedores. O domínio das técnicas envolvidas no debate não se funda em nenhum tipo de conhecimento particular, mas, antes, na competência linguística. É por fazer um uso técnico dessa competência que os Tópicos podem ser úteis para a filosofia.
English:
Our aim is to argue for a deflationary interpretation of Aristotelian dialectic in the Topics, showing that dialectic is, for Aristotle, a specific sort of regulated debate, in contrast to a widely spread kind of interpretation which conceives dialectic as a method of philosophical investigation. Our claim is that an analysis carefully conducted of certain key texts does provide us with sufficient evidences for defending that the Topics is a handbook which codifies an existent art. This codification has a descriptive character and reveals the rules of the debate, what is the specific kind of argument used in it, how premises are obtained and the predicative relation of the propositions used by the debaters. The mastery of the techniques required by the debate is not grounded in any sort of particular knowledge, rather in linguistic competence. It is by doing a technical usage of this competence that the Topics can be useful for philosophy
Conferences by Fernando Mendonca
Teaching Documents by Fernando Mendonca
Agradeço a David Ebrey por ter permitido a tradução e divulgação do handout em português.
Abstract. My aim in this paper is twofold: I will try to clarify what the conditions developed in EN I a discipline or an argument must meet to be assumed as precise are, and, then, try to present evidence that the exam of akrasia in EN VII 3 meets these conditions. In the first part of this paper, I will select passages in which such conditions are displayed, and also distinguish between practical precision and theoretical precision. In the second part, where the analysis of the senses of having but not using knowledge in EN VII 3 is carried on, I will claim that Aristotle's objective is reaching the adequate statement of the explanandum that will be the subject of causal enquiry of akrasia. My concluding remarks will claim that the conditions displayed in this paper's first part are met by Aristotelian procedure in EN VII 3.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249X_20_7
Intellectualism in EN VII 1-3. In these chapters, Aristotle intends exactly the opposite, which is to refute the Socratic thesis that attributes to ignorance the cause of akrasia. I understand that Aristotle’s procedure has two parts whose boundaries are demarcated by the introduction of phusikōs argument. In the first part Aristotle shows some ways of having knowledge that do not produces action in order to contradict the Socratic thesis. In the second part is shown how akratic failure takes place and how it is explained by Aristotelian conception of practical knowledge. Thus, by saying in the conclusion to this second part that Socrates somehow was right, Aristotle does not mean to make any concession to Socratic Intellectualism. Rather, he means that the sentence that conveys the Socratic position by itself could be interpreted as correct, but, despite this, it is an important piece of a complete incorrect theory.
English:
My aim is to develop an interpretation about how Aristotelian dialectic can be useful to philosophy and, in more specific terms, to knowledge of the first principles, avoiding epistemological problems regarding the away one can explain the knowledge of propositions which are primaries and trues, by departing from proposition whose truth-evaluation is not assured, the endoxa. My main argument is that what is in fact useful to get to know the first principles is not dialectic itself, but the treatise at stake, the Topics. Accordingly, this treatise offers an wide set of logical and linguistic tools that can be applied to any discursive universe, favouring a deep scrutiny of proposition to be examined.
Regarding the dialectic method, which plays a major role in this thesis, I have completely changed my mind, and a different interpretation of it can be found in my recent works. In a nutshell, now I think there is no dialectic method in EN VII at all.
Nosso objetivo é argumentar em favor de uma interpretação deflacionada da dialética aristotélica nos Tópicos, visando mostrar que, para Aristóteles, a dialética é essencialmente um tipo específico de debate regulado, contrariamente a um tipo de interpretação bastante difundido que concebe a dialética como um método de investigação filosófica. Defendemos que a análise cuidadosa de certos textos fundamentais nos oferece evidências suficientes para sustentar que os Tópicos são um manual que codifica uma arte existente. Essa codificação do debate dialético tem caráter primordialmente descritivo e mostra as regras do debate, o tipo específico de argumento utilizado nele, o modo como as premissas são obtidas e a relação predicativa das proposições utilizadas pelos debatedores. O domínio das técnicas envolvidas no debate não se funda em nenhum tipo de conhecimento particular, mas, antes, na competência linguística. É por fazer um uso técnico dessa competência que os Tópicos podem ser úteis para a filosofia.
English:
Our aim is to argue for a deflationary interpretation of Aristotelian dialectic in the Topics, showing that dialectic is, for Aristotle, a specific sort of regulated debate, in contrast to a widely spread kind of interpretation which conceives dialectic as a method of philosophical investigation. Our claim is that an analysis carefully conducted of certain key texts does provide us with sufficient evidences for defending that the Topics is a handbook which codifies an existent art. This codification has a descriptive character and reveals the rules of the debate, what is the specific kind of argument used in it, how premises are obtained and the predicative relation of the propositions used by the debaters. The mastery of the techniques required by the debate is not grounded in any sort of particular knowledge, rather in linguistic competence. It is by doing a technical usage of this competence that the Topics can be useful for philosophy
Agradeço a David Ebrey por ter permitido a tradução e divulgação do handout em português.