Institute of Philosofy and Humanities

In the history of aesthetic thought, beauty has been construed as aesthetic value par excellence. According to aesthetic theories, beautiful is that which gives rise to the feeling of pleasure within us. Hence, aesthetic value of both nature and art works is measured in terms of the feeling of pleasure they occasion in us. Ugliness, correlated to the feeling of displeasure, on the other hand, has been traditionally theorized as an aesthetic category that stands in opposition to beauty, and therefore associated with aesthetic disvalue and worthlessness. In recent years, and particularly with the development of modern art, this traditional aesthetic picture has been widely criticized. It has been pointed out, based on the proliferation of art works that evoke intense feelings of displeasure, that ugliness can be greatly appreciated. A general objective of this paper is to propose an account of ugliness that entails, as its necessary part, the explanation of its possible appeal. In particular, I propose a solution to the problem, known in philosophical aesthetics as 'the paradox of ugliness', namely how we can value something that we prima facie do not like and find positively displeasing. I develop my explanation of ugliness in light of Kant's theory of taste. *

One of the main debates in current aesthetics and philosophy of art concerns the question whether we can learn anything from art. On one hand, cognitivists argue that art works are an important source of knowledge, either of propositional, conceptual, moral or experiential knowledge (i.e. knowledge what-it-is-like).  On the other hand, non-cognitivists deny that art can give us any knowledge, at least knowledge that is non-trivial (not known before the work appears) and unique (cannot be obtained by other means).  The purpose of art, anti-cognitivists argue, lies in the development and imaginative realization of the theme, rather than in the theme itself and what it communicates.  That is, what matters in art is the organization and structure of elements (of characters, events and situations) and how these elements cohere into a unified pattern or aesthetic form, producing thereby an aesthetic experience of pleasure or displeasure.
Both positions have their own merits. Cognitivists are right in claiming that there is much to an art work than just being pleasing to the eye (i.e. producing aesthetic pleasure). We often praise works of art for their insightfulness, while we criticize other works for being shallow and superficial. Thus, it appears that our vocabulary of artistic appraisal is charged with cognitive value terms. On the other hand, also anti-cognitivists make a good point. The kind of knowledge that art is supposed to give is something that can be gained by other means. But if knowledge can be gained by non-artistic means then what is so special about cognitive value of art?
It appears that the only way to defend the position that art has a unique cognitive value depends first on arguing that aesthetic experience, essential to artworks, is cognitive. This is a difficult task to begin with considering that aesthetic value has traditionally been distinguished from cognitive value based on the assumption that aesthetic experience is emotional (depending on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure) and that feelings are essentially non-cognitive. 
In what follows, I aim to express a critique of this view and to show that aesthetic feelings of pleasure (beauty) and displeasure (ugliness) have inherent cognitive aspirations. I reconcile cognitive and anti-cognitive positions by claiming that aesthetic value is a species of cognitive value and thus art works can have a distinctive cognitive value.  I intent to show that apprehension of a meaning in an art work is an aesthetic apprehension, that is, meaning is apprehended through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. I develop my proposal in light of Kant’s theory of aesthetic ideas put forward in the Critique of the Power of Judgment.

Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote: “In the tranquil landscape, and especially in the distant line of the horizon, man beholds somewhat as beautiful as his own nature” (2003. 39).  The poet captures nicely an idea, dominant in the contemporary environmental aesthetics, namely, that aesthetic appreciation of nature is intimately connected with the moral nature within us. Many of us have experienced when in contact with nature that its beauty moves us in a way that goes deeper than its initial appeal; it elicits in us a feeling of comfort, hope, a sense of well-being and belonging to the world. My aim in this paper is to propose an explanation of the connection between our aesthetic experience of natural beauty and our moral ideas. I approach this problem in light of Kant’s aesthetic theory put forward in the Critique of the Power of Judgment.

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant introduces the notion of the reflective judgment and the a priori principle of purposiveness or systematicity of nature. He claims that the ability to judge objects by means of this principle underlies empirical concept acquisition and it is therefore necessary for cognition in general. In addition, he suggests that there is a connection between this principle and judgments of taste. Kant's account of this connection has been criticized by several commentators for the reason that it leads to the 'everythingisbeautiful' problem. In this paper I argue, contrary to these objections, that both finding an object beautiful and acquiring the concept represent the satisfaction of the same principle of nature's purposiveness, which refers to the same cogni-tive need we have, that is, to systematize experience. I avoid the 'everything is beautiful' problem by arguing that aesthetic reflection refers to the synthesis of object's individual and distinctive properties, while logical reflection refers to the synthesis of object's general properties that it shares with other objects of its kind. Because aesthetic purposiveness is different from logical purposiveness, this allows for the possibility that we can have an object of cognition, without finding this object beautiful.

In § 49 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant puts forward a view that the feeling of pleasure in the experience of the beautiful can be stimulated not merely by perceptual properties, but by ideas and thoughts as well. The aim of this paper is to argue that aesthetic ideas fill in the emptiness that abstract and emotion concepts on their own would have without empirical intuitions. That is, aesthetic ideas make these concepts more accessible to us, by creating image schemas that allow us to think about these abstract concepts in a way linked to sensory experience, thereby imbuing them with a more substantive meaning and understanding.

The aim of my paper is to argue that Kant's aesthetic ideas can help us to overcome cognitive limitations that we often experience in our attempts to articulate the meaning of abstract concepts. I claim that aesthetic ideas, as expressed in works of art, have a cognitive dimension in that they reveal the introspective, emotional, and affective aspects that appear to be central to the content of abstract phenomena. I Most of us share the intuitive feeling that abstract concepts are harder to understand than concrete, empirical concepts. 1 This is evident, for example, from the feelings of insecurity and struggle that we experience each time we try to explain the meaning of concepts such as truth, love, hopelessness, or vulnerability. 2 Ralph Ellis nicely describes this experience: 'When we begin to say what we mean by "in love", most of us find ourselves struggling, questioning and revising what we think we mean by it […] There was an unsureness, a hesitance, a fear of saying what we did not mean, or not being able to say what we did mean.' 3 Yet we do not experience any difficulty in grasping the meaning of Cognitive Interpretation of Kant's theory of Aesthetic Ideas I thank the anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of the manuscript and their generous comments. Special gratitude is reserved for Sam Stoner, who provided valuable insight and suggestions. 1 One should bear in mind the distinction between abstractness and abstraction. Even though all concepts are abstracted from experience, not all of them are abstract concepts. Category members of abstract concepts are non-material, non-concrete, and non-sensory-perceivable objects in contrast to superordinate concepts (like the concepts of animal, furniture, artefact, and so forth), whose members are all concrete and sensory-perceivable objects.

The aim of this paper is to resolve some of the inconsistencies within Kant's theory of aesthetic ideas that have been left unaddressed by previous interpretations. Specifically, Kant's text appears to be imbued with the following two tensions. First, there appears to be a conflict between his commitment to the view that mere sensations cannot function as vehicles for the communication of aesthetic ideas and his claim that musical tones, on account of being mere sensations, can express aesthetic ideas. Second, his description of musical form as consisting of a play of aesthetic ideas that leave behind no thoughts appears to be incongruous with his formulation of aesthetic ideas as free imaginative representations that contain a wealth of thoughts and meanings. If what it means to express aesthetic ideas is precisely to stimulate much thinking, then how can an object exist that expresses aesthetic ideas, but without leaving any thoughts behind? I attempt to resolve these two perceived tensions by proposing a distinction between reflective and non-reflective aesthetic ideas communicated by form and mere sensations respectively.

n recent years, there have been debates in aesthetics and philosophy of art on the question of whether we can acquire knowledge about the world from works of art. However, little has been written on the effects that art has on cultivating self-knowledge and self-development. While, for most of us, it seems obvious that art has these effects, little is known about how and why these effects occur. Addressing this issue is the main aim of this paper. The gist of the argument is that narrative art provides a unique opportunity to adopt a dual (first- and third-personal) perspective on the self, which is argued recently by psychologists and philosophers of mind to be necessary for obtaining the kind of self-knowledge that leads to self-development and self-change, that is, therapeutic self-knowledge.

This paper offers an alternative interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s theory of laughter that can meet the challenges left behind by the interpretations that have so far been given. I argue that laughter is a reaction to the dissolution of nonsense, which takes the form of realizing our own misconceptions about the object. Laughter reveals something about our cognitive and rational system: namely, that it is insufficient to explain all of our experiences and perceptions of the world and that we often need to revise our expectations in order to make sense of the world. In this respect, laughter stands in a direct opposition to Kant’s notion of the sublime.

In the history of aesthetic thought, beauty has been construed as aesthetic value par excellence. According to aesthetic theories, beautiful is that which gives rise to the feeling of pleasure within us. Hence, aesthetic value of both nature and art works is measured in terms of the feeling of pleasure they occasion in us. Ugliness, correlated to the feeling of displeasure, on the other hand, has been traditionally theorized as an aesthetic category that stands in opposition to beauty, and therefore associated with aesthetic disvalue and worthlessness. In recent years, and particularly with the development of modern art, this traditional aesthetic picture has been widely criticized. It has been pointed out, based on the proliferation of art works that evoke intense feelings of displeasure, that ugliness can be greatly appreciated. A general objective of this paper is to propose an account of ugliness that entails, as its necessary part, the explanation of its possible appeal. In particular, I propose a solution to the problem, known in philosophical aesthetics as 'the paradox of ugliness', namely how we can value something that we prima facie do not like and find positively displeasing. I develop my explanation of ugliness in light of Kant's theory of taste.

The aim of my paper is to argue that Kant's aesthetic ideas can help us to overcome cognitive limitations that we often experience in our attempts to articulate the meaning of abstract concepts. I claim that aesthetic ideas, as expressed in works of art, have a cognitive dimension in that they reveal the introspective, emotional, and affective aspects that appear to be central to the content of abstract phenomena.

Contemporary discussions of the problem of ugliness in Kant’s aesthetic theory have, to my knowledge, left unexplored the relation of disgust to ugliness. At most, they have explained away disgust as merely an extreme form of ugliness or displeasure, as Guyer did in his interpretation of ugliness in Kant’s aesthetic theory,[1] and by that strayed from the phenomenological and conceptual uniqueness of disgust in comparison to ugliness, while Kant, as I argue, did not. As a matter of fact, careful investigation of the concept of disgust in Kant’s writing will reveal the distinctive and multifaceted character that he ascribed to this phenomenon. By examining Kant’s treatment of disgust in comparison with more comprehensive contemporary studies given by phenomenologist Aurel Kolnai, psychologist Paul Rozin, and the social study of William Ian Miller, I will address the ways in which disgust can penetrate artistic representation without subverting it and, more closely, interrogate the ro...

In § 49 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant puts forward a view that the feeling of pleasure in the experience of the beautiful can be stimulated not merely by perceptual properties, but by ideas and thoughts as well. The aim of this paper is to argue that aesthetic ideas fill in the emptiness that abstract and emotion concepts on their own would have without empirical intuitions. That is, aesthetic ideas make these concepts more accessible to us, by creating image schemas that allow us to think about these abstract concepts in a way linked to sensory experience, thereby imbuing them with a more substantive meaning and understanding.

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment , Kant introduces the notion of the reflective judgment and the a priori principle of purposiveness or systematicity of nature. He claims that the ability to judge objects by means of this principle underlies empirical concept acquisition and it is therefore necessary for cognition in general. In addition, he suggests that there is a connection between this principle and judgments of taste. Kant’s account of this connection has been criticized by several commentators for the reason that it leads to the ‘everythingisbeautiful’ problem. In this paper I argue, contrary to these objections, that both finding an object beautiful and acquiring the concept represent the satisfaction of the same principle of nature’s purposiveness, which refers to the same cognitive need we have, that is, to systematize experience. I avoid the ‘everything is beautiful’ problem by arguing that aesthetic reflection refers to the synthesis of object’s individual and dis...