Videos by alessio gava
Philosophy by alessio gava
Universitas Philosophica, Dec 26, 2024
In his recent “Expanding the Empirical Realm: Constructive Empiricism and Augmented Observation” ... more In his recent “Expanding the Empirical Realm: Constructive Empiricism and Augmented Observation” (2024), Finnur Dellsén recalls a quite famous case that Gideon Rosen put forward against manifestationalism thirty years ago, and maintains that an analogous argument might be presented against Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. This study is meant as a response to Dellsén: while the idea behind his paper is sound, I do not think it actually works. In brief, the reason is that we do not have God’s point of view and thus are in no condition to know whether a certain scientific theory is empirically adequate, let alone true. Once again, perhaps constructive empiricism still represents the best compromise so far presented between strict empiricism and the acknowledgment of the rationality of science.
Problemata - International Journal of Philosophy, Jul 1, 2024
This paper represents a counterreply to “A rejoinder to Alessio Gava’s ‘Van Fraassen, a inferênci... more This paper represents a counterreply to “A rejoinder to Alessio Gava’s ‘Van Fraassen, a inferência da melhor explicação e a Matrix realista’”, by Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva, released in Problemata (v. 12, n. 2, 2021). The authors originally published an essay in the same journal, “Van Fraassen and inference to the best explanation” (2016), the object of critic - ‘friendly and gentle’ - in a work of mine that also appeared in Problemata, in 2019. In this paper I will show that, even when the subject matter is the inference to the best explanation, realists and antirealists end up debating about the same old topics, that represent the essence of the controversy between the two philosophical stances
Trans/Form/Ação, Oct 22, 2021
Tradução de "Bas van Fraassen’s Philosophy of Science and His Epistemic Voluntarism", de Kathleen... more Tradução de "Bas van Fraassen’s Philosophy of Science and His Epistemic Voluntarism", de Kathleen Okruhlik (2014).
Bas van Fraassen’s anti-realist account of science has played a major role in shaping recent philosophy of science. His constructive empiricism, in particular, has been widely discussed and criticized in the journal literature and is a standard topic in philosophy of science course curricula. Other aspects of his empiricism are less well known, including his empiricist account of scientific laws, his relatively recent re-evaluation of what it is to be an empiricist, and his empiricist structuralism. This essay attempts to provide an overview of these diverse aspects of van Fraassen’s empiricism and to show how they relate to one another. It also focuses on the nature of van Fraassens’s epistemic voluntarism and its relationship to his empiricist philosophy of science.
Universitas Philosophica, May 10, 2021
2020 is the year of the fortieth anniversary of Bas van Fraassen’s seminal book The Scientific Im... more 2020 is the year of the fortieth anniversary of Bas van Fraassen’s seminal book The Scientific Image. It is quite surprising, after such a long time, and considering how much the author’s proposal was debated during the last four decades, to find a new review of it on the March issue of Metascience. In “Concluding Unscientific Image”, Hans Halvorson claims that, in the work of the founder of constructive empiricism, not only is there a defense of an anti-realist perspective on science—and, at the same time, a critique of scientific realism—, but also a revolt against the way of doing philosophy that, since Quine, seemed to be hegemonic in analytical philosophy. The present study focuses on Halvorson’s allegations about what maintaining the empirical adequacy of a theory would encompass—and that, according to him, van Fraassen has in mind—and aims at showing that, perhaps, they do not correspond to what van Fraassen actually defends in his book.
Dissertatio - Revista de Filosofia, Feb 16, 2021
Bas van Fraassen maintains that the actual function of optical instruments is producing images. S... more Bas van Fraassen maintains that the actual function of optical instruments is producing images. Still, the output of a telescope is different from that of a microscope, for in the latter case it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between the observer, the image and the detected entity, while in the former it is - at least in principle. In this paper I argue that this is a weak argument to support the belief in the existence of exoplanets that, according to van Fraassen, comes with accepting a theory that posits these entities. If a constructive empiricist asserts the empirical adequacy of such a theory, she might be relying on typical realist arguments, instead - of the very same ilk as the ones used to defend the veridicality of microscopic images. Perhaps the time has come for van Fraassen to explain his view on telescopes.
Perspectiva Filosófica, Feb 15, 2020
Bas van Fraassen's antirealist view of science and its aim, constructive empiricism, notoriously ... more Bas van Fraassen's antirealist view of science and its aim, constructive empiricism, notoriously rests upon a distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In order to back his empiricist stance, the Dutch philosopher put forward his own characterization of observability. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the point of constructive empiricism is not lost if the line is drawn in a somewhat different way from how he draws it. This means that other characterizations of observability can support this antirealist stance, provided they allow for a viable distinction between the observable and the unobservable. The aim of this work, however, is not to propose another characterization of observability that fits constructive empiricism, but to put forward a little amendment to van Fraassen's own antirealism, to the effect that it can actually be seen as a coherent position, albeit controversial, since its present consistency might be called into question.
Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, 2019
Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen's controversial view on microscopes, accordin... more Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen's controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not "windows on an invisible world", but rather "image generators". Both authors also claim that, since in a microscopic detection it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between all the elements involved, one is entitled to maintain an agnostic view about the reality of the entity allegedly represented by the produced image. In this paper I argue that, contrary to what Kusch maintains, this might not be a neutral way to render scientific evidence. Moreover, a constructive empiricist can support a realist interpretation of microscopic images. In fact, constructive empiricism and van Fraassen's own anti-realism do not necessarily amount to the same thing.
Problemata - International Journal of Philosophy, Jul 16, 2019
In a recent work published in this journal, "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação" (2... more In a recent work published in this journal, "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação" (2016), Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva identify four critical lines proposed by Bas van Fraassen against the form of abductive reasoning known as 'inference to the best explanation' (IBE). The first one, put forward by the Dutch philosopher in his seminal book The Scientific Image (1980), concerns the distinction between observable and unobservable entities. Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva consider that the distinction is of no relevance to the scientific practice. For this reason, they address van Fraassen's allegations against IBE qua justification of the existence of unobservable entities in a couple of pages and prefer focusing on the other lines they identified. The aim of this work is to pour over the analysis that the two authors perform about van Fraassen's mentioned argument and some realists' replies, particularly in the section that Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva devote to this topic. This will allow us to clarify van Fraassen's vision on scientific practice and on the 'immersion in the theoretical world-picture'. The importance and the relevance of the distinction between observables and unobservables will also be reaffirmed.
Universitas Philosophica , Jul 30, 2019
In their recent "A modest defense of manifestationalism" (2015), Asay and Bordner defend this pos... more In their recent "A modest defense of manifestationalism" (2015), Asay and Bordner defend this position from a quite famous criticism put forward by Rosen (1994), according to which while manifestationalism can be seen as more compatible with the letter of empiricism than other popular stances, such as constructive empiricism, it fails nonetheless to make sense of science. The two authors reckon that Rosen's argument is actually flawed. In their view, manifestationalism could in fact represent a legitimate thesis about the nature of scientific inquiry. In this paper, I will show that Asay and Bordner's criticisms to Rosen are actually off target. Moreover, they rest upon an understanding of what the aim of science is that might serve to their purposes, but that does not seem to be in line with the scientific enterprise. Perhaps constructive empiricism still represents the best compromise so far presented between strict empiricism and the acknowledgment of the rationality of science.
Science & Philosophy, Jun 30, 2019
Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing astronomy, astrophysics and particl... more Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing astronomy, astrophysics and particle physics. In a recent paper on this topic, Brigitte Falkenburg (2012) defended that only scientific realism can make sense of it and that realistic beliefs constitute an indispensable methodological principle of research in this discipline. The aim of this work is to show that there exists an anti-realist alternative to this account, along the lines of what Bas van Fraassen showed in his famous book The Scientific Image (1980). Problems and results of astroparticle physics can be understood from an empiricist point of view too, namely that of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, which is a more modest and metaphysics-free alternative to scientific realism. Although constructive empiricism can make sense of science no worse than scientific realism does, van Fraassen's goal is not to demonstrate that his stance is the only viable position, but just that it is not incoherent or proven false by his opponents (see Kusch 2015, 172). In this paper it will be shown that the constructive empiricist stance constitutes a legitimate alternative to scientific realism even when it gets to astroparticle physics and that it does indeed make sense of this new discipline, pace Falkenburg.
Trans/Form/Ação, Jan 7, 2019
In 1985, Alan Musgrave raised a serious objection against the possibility that a constructive emp... more In 1985, Alan Musgrave raised a serious objection against the possibility that a constructive empiricist could coherently draw the distinction – crucial to her – between observables and unobservables. In his brief response, in the same year, Bas van Fraassen claimed that Musgrave’s argument only works within the so-called “syntactic view” of theories, while it loses its force in the context of the “semantic view”. But that was not enough, or so claimed F. A. Muller, who published two articles (2004 and 2005) in order to extend the epistemic policy of constructive empiricism. In order to do so, Muller provided a rigorous characterization of observability, but this could only be accomplished by using modal logic. The outcome was a new (extended) epistemic policy for constructive empiricism, which van Fraassen apparently endorsed (cf. MULLER; VAN FRAASSEN, 2008). As it will be shown in this article, however, Muller’s extended epistemic policy is superfluous. Moreover, and more importantly, Musgrave’s argument seems to be a pseudo-problem.
Griot - Revista de Filosofia, Dec 16, 2018
In his last book (2008), Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, put forward... more In his last book (2008), Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, put forward a table containing a categorization of images. His aim, however, was to discuss the reality of what they represent and not addressing the issue of images per se. One of the consequences is that it remained an open question what 'public hallucinations'-reflections in the water, rainbows and the like-are. In this paper it will be defended that only images in the relevant (representational) sense should be considered as such. For this and other reasons, van Fraassen's diagram should be amended. Moreover, as Physics teaches us, the class of the so-called 'images' that are actually objects is wider than van Fraassen reckons. The set of the observable objects do not contain only concrete things, but goes beyond what 'common sense realism' suggests. In addition to rocks, oceans and bicycles, we can also see rainbows, reflections in the water and the like.
Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, 2018
In his famous book "Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows" (2008), Roy Sorensen put forwa... more In his famous book "Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows" (2008), Roy Sorensen put forward a 'blocking theory of shadows', a causal view on these entities according to which a shadow is an absence of light caused by blockage. This approach allows him to solve a quite famous riddle on shadows, 'the Yale puzzle', that was devised by Robert Fogelin in the late 1960s and that Sorensen presents in the form mentioned by Bas van Fraassen (1989). István Aranyosi has recently criticized Sorensen's solution to the Yale puzzle, on the grounds that it does not resist another version of the riddle, that Aranyosi calls 'the Bilkent puzzle'. A new perspective on shadows, the 'Material Exstitution View', that allegedly permits to solve both puzzles, could be adopted as an alternative. In this paper I will show that Sorensen's blockage theory can actually handle both the Yale and the Bilkent puzzle, plus another one that I put forward ('the donut puzzle'), which instead is fatal to Aranyosi's position. As Sorensen puts it, nothing aside from the original blockage of light is needed.
Guairacá - Revista de Filosofia, 2018
Reliabilism is an epistemological theory about justification, which
defends the possibility that... more Reliabilism is an epistemological theory about justification, which
defends the possibility that a belief be justified merely because of the reliability of its mechanism of production. The claim that, in some cases, true beliefs can be classified as knowledge, despite (apparently) not satisfying the condition of justification in the classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief, constitutes, according to Robert Brandom, the Founding Insight of reliabilist epistemologies. Still, as it will be shown in this article, this does not lead to a change in the object of epistemology, from reasons to reliability. Moreover, the fact that true beliefs can, in some cases, be classified as knowledge, despite not satisfying the (classical interpretation of the) condition of justification, is in no conflict with the capacity of providing reasons for having them. As a matter of fact, according to Brandom, it is possible to identify reasons for having a certain belief even when the subject is in no condition to
provide them, as in the case of the reliability of the process that led to it. Changing the focus of justification from the subject to the belief – as the externalists seem to suggest – seems also to confirm Kent Bach’s claim that the apparent conflict between internalism and externalism perhaps has no reason to exist. Still, at first sight, the two competing positions are actually getting closer over the years. In this work, the possibility of an even closer convergence will be discussed.
Tabulae - Revista de Philosophia, 2018
Microscopes - not only the optic ones - are commonly considered, particularly by scientists and l... more Microscopes - not only the optic ones - are commonly considered, particularly by scientists and laboratory technicians, as devices that allow to widen the scope of our limited sensory system and see entities that would otherwise be unobservable. A notorious exception is Bas van Fraassen’s interpretation. This important and well-known philosopher of science sees these instruments as ‘engines of creation’ (of images), thus rejecting the ‘window onto the unobservable world’ metaphor. In this paper I will present, under the perspective of the realism/anti-realism debate in philosophy of science, the Dutch author’s position and show that, despite being a peculiar and isolated stand, it does not exhibit flaws or contradictions - from a strictly logical point of view, at least. The case of the mesosome, a folded invagination in the plasma membrane of bacteria that is produced by chemical fixation (for electron microscopy), is particularly instructive in this respect.
Revista Hispeci & Lema (On-Line), 2017
Observation plays a key role in the empirical science; for this reason, but not only, it is also ... more Observation plays a key role in the empirical science; for this reason, but not only, it is also a crucial topic of discussion in the philosophy of science. As a matter of fact, observability, under different perspectives, spans through the XX and XXI century philosophy of science debate and represents one of the main issues in the realism vs anti-realism dispute. Important contemporary authors, such as Bas van Fraassen, endorse Paul Feyerabend’s thesis that observability is a mere pragmatic concept. According to the famous Austrian philosopher, when we observe, we are on a par with an instrument. It is just a matter of ‘stimulus-response’. In this paper it will be defended that, on the contrary, any attempt of dealing with this issue by the philosophers is legitimate. In this topic, it is philosophy – and not science – that should have the last word.
Aufklärung - revista de filosofia, 2017
Observation and observability represent a crucial topic in the philosophy of science, as the huge... more Observation and observability represent a crucial topic in the philosophy of science, as the huge production of papers and books on the subject attests. Philosophy of perception, on the other hand, is a field of study that took root effectively in the last decades. Even then, apparently, the main theories on observation have neglected the issue of determining which is the object of a successful perception. As a consequence, some theses that have recently been proposed are actually paradoxical, despite deriving from renowned and, prima facie, satisfactory and complete theories. This is the situation of van Fraassen’s assertions on the (putative?) observation of images and rainbows (see 2001 and 2008) and of Sorensen’s claims on what one actually sees during a solar eclipse (see 2008). After putting forward a possible characterization of the object of perception, with no need of discussing the issue of intentionality, in this paper it will be shown that devoting adequate attention to this topic, together with acknowledging that observation is an action, in which the subject plays an indeed active role, would make it possible to avoid drawing conclusions that do not seem to be correct, such as the ones just mentioned. Any theory about observation will only be complete and adequate provided the object of perception is taken into account.
Prolegomena - Journal of Philosophy, 2017
According to Roy Sorensen, when one looks at the Moon, during a solar eclipse, what she sees is i... more According to Roy Sorensen, when one looks at the Moon, during a solar eclipse, what she sees is its inner (concave) part of the farther, reflective one, and not the always-facing-Earth side of our natural satellite. To make his point clearer, he put forward the famous example of a double eclipse involving the fictional planets Far and Near. From the observer's vantage point, the two planets have the same apparent diameter and overlap. What the agent sees is a dark disk, but believes that what she is seeing is Near, because Far is behind it. Sorensen claims that what she actually sees is planet Far and that the causal theory of perception explains why this is the case. Of course, this position stands against common sense. Sorensen shows that it counters Alvin Goldman's renowned observation criteria too. Nonetheless, he maintains, since Near is causally idle and the agent does see something, the only possible conclusion is that she sees Far, pace Goldman – and common sense. In this paper, I try to demonstrate that Sorensen is wrong and that the correct solution to the eclipse riddle is that the observer sees Near. As a matter of fact, besides meeting common sense and Goldman's observability criteria (along with others), Near can be legitimately be considered the object of a successful perceptual discrimination even in the light of the causal theory of perception .
Guairacá - Revista de Filosofia, 2017
Constructive Empiricism, the anti-realist position about science proposed by the Dutch philosophe... more Constructive Empiricism, the anti-realist position about science proposed by the Dutch philosopher Bas van Fraassen in 1980, heavily relies upon the distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In 2004 and 2005, F. A. Muller provided a rigorous characterization of observability, later endorsed, apparently, by van Fraassen (cf. Muller & van Fraassen 2008). However, an analysis of what it means to observe is needed to secure Muller’s ‘definition’. Van Fraassen always maintained that observation is an empirical matter, but I argue that a philosophical analysis is also needed and that van Fraassen himself relied on philosophical principles to address the issue of observability.
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Philosophy by alessio gava
Bas van Fraassen’s anti-realist account of science has played a major role in shaping recent philosophy of science. His constructive empiricism, in particular, has been widely discussed and criticized in the journal literature and is a standard topic in philosophy of science course curricula. Other aspects of his empiricism are less well known, including his empiricist account of scientific laws, his relatively recent re-evaluation of what it is to be an empiricist, and his empiricist structuralism. This essay attempts to provide an overview of these diverse aspects of van Fraassen’s empiricism and to show how they relate to one another. It also focuses on the nature of van Fraassens’s epistemic voluntarism and its relationship to his empiricist philosophy of science.
defends the possibility that a belief be justified merely because of the reliability of its mechanism of production. The claim that, in some cases, true beliefs can be classified as knowledge, despite (apparently) not satisfying the condition of justification in the classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief, constitutes, according to Robert Brandom, the Founding Insight of reliabilist epistemologies. Still, as it will be shown in this article, this does not lead to a change in the object of epistemology, from reasons to reliability. Moreover, the fact that true beliefs can, in some cases, be classified as knowledge, despite not satisfying the (classical interpretation of the) condition of justification, is in no conflict with the capacity of providing reasons for having them. As a matter of fact, according to Brandom, it is possible to identify reasons for having a certain belief even when the subject is in no condition to
provide them, as in the case of the reliability of the process that led to it. Changing the focus of justification from the subject to the belief – as the externalists seem to suggest – seems also to confirm Kent Bach’s claim that the apparent conflict between internalism and externalism perhaps has no reason to exist. Still, at first sight, the two competing positions are actually getting closer over the years. In this work, the possibility of an even closer convergence will be discussed.
Manicômios nunca mais!!
Bas van Fraassen’s anti-realist account of science has played a major role in shaping recent philosophy of science. His constructive empiricism, in particular, has been widely discussed and criticized in the journal literature and is a standard topic in philosophy of science course curricula. Other aspects of his empiricism are less well known, including his empiricist account of scientific laws, his relatively recent re-evaluation of what it is to be an empiricist, and his empiricist structuralism. This essay attempts to provide an overview of these diverse aspects of van Fraassen’s empiricism and to show how they relate to one another. It also focuses on the nature of van Fraassens’s epistemic voluntarism and its relationship to his empiricist philosophy of science.
defends the possibility that a belief be justified merely because of the reliability of its mechanism of production. The claim that, in some cases, true beliefs can be classified as knowledge, despite (apparently) not satisfying the condition of justification in the classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief, constitutes, according to Robert Brandom, the Founding Insight of reliabilist epistemologies. Still, as it will be shown in this article, this does not lead to a change in the object of epistemology, from reasons to reliability. Moreover, the fact that true beliefs can, in some cases, be classified as knowledge, despite not satisfying the (classical interpretation of the) condition of justification, is in no conflict with the capacity of providing reasons for having them. As a matter of fact, according to Brandom, it is possible to identify reasons for having a certain belief even when the subject is in no condition to
provide them, as in the case of the reliability of the process that led to it. Changing the focus of justification from the subject to the belief – as the externalists seem to suggest – seems also to confirm Kent Bach’s claim that the apparent conflict between internalism and externalism perhaps has no reason to exist. Still, at first sight, the two competing positions are actually getting closer over the years. In this work, the possibility of an even closer convergence will be discussed.
Resumo: o breve artigo é uma réplica à resposta de Alessio Gava ao artigo "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação", publicado em Problemata (v. 7. n. 1, 2016), de autoria de Marcos Rodrigues da Silva e Debora Minikoski.
Palavras-chave: Alessio Gava; empirismo construtivo; realismo.
Il 52enne ci ha inviato un contributo riguardante i fatti accaduti a Brasilia, e noi abbiamo scelto di pubblicarlo integralmente
VITTORIO VENETO - "Il Covid? Qui alcuni sostengono che è un'invenzione occidentale". Alessio Gava, professore giramondo, attualmente si trova in Russia. Il 51enne vittoriese, infatti, insegna matematica e fisica presso il liceo linguistico italiano "Italo Calvino" di Mosca. Dopo le esperienze in Marocco e in Brasile, l'insegnante sta iniziando a conoscere anche la cultura e le usanze russe.
di Alessio Gava
26/05/2020
Resumo: O presente trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar o resultado de uma oficina envolvendo um aplicativo de celular, desenvolvida por três bolsistas do projeto de matemática do PIBID da Universidade Estadual do Paraná - campus Apucarana e realizada com quatro turmas do sexto ano do Colégio Estadual Antônio dos Três Reis de Oliveira, da cidade de Apucarana. O objetivo da atividade foi trazer a tecnologia para dentro da sala de aula e mostrar para os estudantes como podem utilizar seus smartphones para a compreensão de uma determinada matéria. A proposta principal foi a de que os alunos aprendessem a tabuada de multiplicação, estudando de uma forma mais divertida e dinâmica, em vista de uma prova que teriam na semana seguinte. Considerações sobre a importância tanto do lúdico quanto das novas tecnologias em sala de aula também serão tecidas. Por que, em nossas universidades, na formação de educadores/professores, não existem disciplinas centradas no lúdico?