RESUMO Embora concordando com a afirmação de Fischborn (2018) de que, segundo uma definição tradi... more RESUMO Embora concordando com a afirmação de Fischborn (2018) de que, segundo uma definição tradicional do compatibilismo, minha posição deveria ser classificada como a de um incom-patibilista libertista, defendo aqui uma concepção diferente do compatibilismo, envolvendo, por um lado, a determinação causal local e probabilística das decisões (em lugar de um determinismo estrito universal) e, por outro, a vontade livre concebida como instanciada em decisões geradas por um processo decisório efetuado pelo cérebro, que considera conscientemente diferentes alternativas e poderia, em princípio, ter sido diferente do que foi, implicando que o agente poderia, em condições normais, ter agido diferentemente, nas mesmas circunstâncias. Após discutir diferentes perspectivas sobre a determinação causal (incluindo o determinismo) e sobre a vontade livre, faço uma revisão de algumas passa-gens de meus trabalhos anteriores, citadas por Fischborn. Concluo que o que é crucial na questão do (in)compatibilismo é a (in)compatibilidade entre a liberdade das decisões e a determinação causal natural das ações humanas. De acordo com essa visão mais flexível e, sustento, mais pertinente do compatibilismo, mantenho minha classificação anterior de minha posição sobre o assunto como compatibilista. Palavras-chave: livre-arbítrio, vontade livre, compatibilismo, determinismo, responsabili-dade moral. ABSTRACT While agreeing with Fischborn's (2018) contention that, according to one traditional definition of compatibilism, my position should be classified as that of a libertarian incompati-bilist, I argue here for a different view of compatibilism. This view involves, on the one hand, local probabilistic causation of decisions (rather than universal strict determinism) and, on the other, free will conceived as involving decisions generated by a decision-making process carried out by the brain, which consciously contemplates different alternatives and could in principle have been different from what it was, implying that the agent could in normal conditions have done otherwise in the same circumstances. After discussing different views of causation (including determinism) and of free will, I make a revision of some passages from my earlier work, quoted by Fischborn. I conclude that what is crucial in the question of (in)compatibilism is the (in)compatibility between freedom of decisions and natural causation of human actions. According to this looser and, I argue, more pertinent view of compatibilism, I maintain my previous classification of my position on the matter as compatibilist.
This paper investigates whether even if A, B is pragmatically polysemic, so that a nonconcessive ... more This paper investigates whether even if A, B is pragmatically polysemic, so that a nonconcessive conditional may have even if, and whether concessive conditionals, pragmatically defined, can fail to have even if or a non-temporal still. Different paraphrases are used to help elucidate pragmatic meanings. A theory of the pragmatic meanings of concessive and implicative conditionals is presented. The semantic meaning of even if and the question of whether concessive conditionals imply the truth of their consequents are also discussed.
It is argued that contraposition is valid for a class of natural language conditionals, if some m... more It is argued that contraposition is valid for a class of natural language conditionals, if some modifications are allowed to preserve the meaning of the original conditional. In many cases, implicit temporal indices must be considered, making a change in verb tense necessary. A suitable contrapositive for implicative counterfactual conditionals can also usually be found. In some cases, the addition of certain words is necessary to preserve meaning that is present in the original sentence and would be lost or changed in the contrapositive without them. A distinction is made between adding new meaning and adding new words to preserve existing meaning. For concessive conditionals and relevance conditionals, however, no valid contrapositive can be found. They do not belong to the class of contraposable conditionals, which can be independently defined. Difficult cases are also discussed in which the contradictory of the consequent semantically entails the truth of the antecedent. In such cases the content of the antecedent is implicit in the meaning of the consequent. Contraposition becomes possible if what is implicit in the original consequent is made explicit in the contrapositive antecedent.
A atribuição de postura epistêmica às frases condicionais, em função do gênero, da faixa etária e... more A atribuição de postura epistêmica às frases condicionais, em função do gênero, da faixa etária e do nível de escolaridade, foi estudada através da parafraseabilidade diferencial de se por caso ou por já que. Foram usadas frases condicionais com verbo no indicativo, apresentadas em contexto indefinido, ou precedidas de contextos indutores de atribuição de postura epistêmica positiva ou neutra. Os resultados mostraram uma maior tendência dos homens a atribuírem postura epistêmica positiva ao enunciador de tais condicionais e maior tendência dos mais jovens e dos menos letrados a desconsiderarem o contexto fornecido.
The aim of this article is to study positive or neutral epistemic stance in conditionals through ... more The aim of this article is to study positive or neutral epistemic stance in conditionals through the differential acceptability of paraphrases of 'se' ('if' ) with 'já que' ('since') or 'caso' ('in case'), respectively. After a brief discussion of the possibility of positive epistemic stance in conditionals, an empirical research project is related, in which conditional sentences were presented in three contexts: (1) indefinite context (isolated sentence); (2) certainty-inducing context; and (3) uncertainty-inducing context. Choice of paraphrases was correlated to the induced attribution of certainty or uncertainty and, in the indefinite context, both paraphrases were showed to be equally possible, in accordance with the context imagined by the subject. Differential paraphrasability was showed to be a useful methodological tool. The possibility of positive epistemic stance in conditionals was confirmed. O objetivo deste trabalho é estudar a postura epistêmica positiva ou neutra em condicionais, a partir do julgamento da aceitabilidade diferencial de paráfrases de se com já que ou caso, respectivamente. Após breve discussão da possibilidade da postura epistêmica positiva em condicionais, é relatada pesquisa empírica, em que frases condicionais foram apresentadas em três contextos: 1. contexto indefinido (frase isolada); 2. contexto indutor de certeza; 3. contexto indutor de incerteza. A escolha das paráfrases correlacionou-se com a atribuição induzida de certeza ou incerteza e, no contexto indefinido, ambas as paráfrases mostraram-se igualmente possíveis, de acordo com o contexto imaginado pelo sujeito. A parafraseabilidade diferencial mostrou-se um recurso metodológico útil. Confirmou-se a possibilidade de postura epistêmica positiva em condicionais.
Conditional assertions are a peculiar language structure that manifests a specific cognitive oper... more Conditional assertions are a peculiar language structure that manifests a specific cognitive operation. In order to express it, different languages have found different ways of using verb forms. Primary conditionals are here defined as those that presuppose the possibility of the falsity of both the antecedent and the consequent. In them, the truth of the antecedent appears as a sufficient condition for the truth of the consequent. The truth condition of primary conditionals is defined as the impossibility of the conjunction of the
truth of the antecedent with the falsity of the consequent. The demand for a connection between antecedent and consequent, expressed by Chrysippus as the incompatibility between the affirmation of the antecedent and the denial of the consequent, is thus satisfied. Counterfactuals are conditionals that speak of some aspect of reality through the imagination of an unreal situation.
Claims that necessary and sufficient conditions are not converse relations are discussed, as well... more Claims that necessary and sufficient conditions are not converse relations are discussed, as well as the related claim that If A, then B is not equivalent to A only if B. The analysis of alleged counterexamples has shown, among other things, how necessary and sufficient conditions should be understood, especially in the case of causal conditions, and the importance of distinguishing sufficient-cause conditionals from necessary-cause conditionals. It is concluded that necessary and sufficient conditions, adequately interpreted, are converse relations in all cases.
A commentary is given on Trevena and Miller (2010). The comparability of their experimental task ... more A commentary is given on Trevena and Miller (2010). The comparability of their experimental task and of the potential they recorded with those used and recorded by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983a) is questioned. An interpretation is given for the similarity of event-related potentials recorded when subjects decided to move and when they decided not to move.
Reinterpretations of Libet's results have received support from most commentaries. Libet's argume... more Reinterpretations of Libet's results have received support from most commentaries. Libet's arguments against alternative hypotheses are contested. Latency depends on intensity. Integration of intensity and duration explains the Minimum Train Duration. Analogies of Libet's timing of intentions with control (flash-lag-like) experiments indicate biases of opposite signs, according to intramodal or intermodal results. Rosenthal's view of nonconscious intentions (or sensations) becoming conscious after a delay is favored. Compatibilist free will is discussed.
An examination of conditionals in di¤erent languages leads to a distinction of three types of con... more An examination of conditionals in di¤erent languages leads to a distinction of three types of conditionals instead of the usual two (indicative and subjunctive). The three types can be explained by the degree of acceptance or as-if acceptance of the truth of the antecedent. The labels subjunctive and indicative are shown to be inadequate. So-called indicative conditionals comprise two classes, the very frequent uncertain-fact conditionals and the quite rare accepted-fact conditionals. Uncertain-fact conditionals may have a time shift in contemporary English and the future subjunctive in Portuguese (though not all of them do). Moreover, paraphrases of if with in case or supposing are usually possible with approximately the same meaning. Accepted-fact conditionals never have these features.
An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. ... more An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. According to this reinterpretation, the Minimum Train Duration of electrical brain stimulation should be considered as the time needed to create a brain stimulus efficient for producing conscious sensation and not as a basis for inferring the latency for conscious sensation of peripheral origin. Latency for conscious sensation with brain stimulation may occur after the Minimum Train Duration. Backward masking with cortical stimuli suggests a 125-300 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of threshold skin stimuli. Backward enhancement is not suitable for inferring this latency. For determining temporal relations between stimuli that correspond to subjects' reports, the end of cerebral Minimum Train Duration should be used as reference, rather than its onset. Results of coupling peripheral and cortical stimuli are explained by a latency after the cortical Minimum Train Duration, having roughly the same duration as the latency for supraliminal skin stimuli. Results of coupling peripheral stimuli and stimuli to medial lemniscus (LM) are explained by a shorter LM latency and/or a longer peripheral latency. This interpretation suggests a 230 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of somatosensory near-threshold stimuli. The backward referral hypothesis, as formulated by Libet, should not be retained. Long readiness potentials preceding spontaneous conscious or nonconscious movements suggest that both kinds of movement are nonconsciously initiated. The validity of Libet's measures of W and M moments is questionable due to problems involving latencies, training, and introspective distinction of W and M. Veto of intended actions may be initially nonconscious but dependent on conscious awareness.
RESUMO Embora concordando com a afirmação de Fischborn (2018) de que, segundo uma definição tradi... more RESUMO Embora concordando com a afirmação de Fischborn (2018) de que, segundo uma definição tradicional do compatibilismo, minha posição deveria ser classificada como a de um incom-patibilista libertista, defendo aqui uma concepção diferente do compatibilismo, envolvendo, por um lado, a determinação causal local e probabilística das decisões (em lugar de um determinismo estrito universal) e, por outro, a vontade livre concebida como instanciada em decisões geradas por um processo decisório efetuado pelo cérebro, que considera conscientemente diferentes alternativas e poderia, em princípio, ter sido diferente do que foi, implicando que o agente poderia, em condições normais, ter agido diferentemente, nas mesmas circunstâncias. Após discutir diferentes perspectivas sobre a determinação causal (incluindo o determinismo) e sobre a vontade livre, faço uma revisão de algumas passa-gens de meus trabalhos anteriores, citadas por Fischborn. Concluo que o que é crucial na questão do (in)compatibilismo é a (in)compatibilidade entre a liberdade das decisões e a determinação causal natural das ações humanas. De acordo com essa visão mais flexível e, sustento, mais pertinente do compatibilismo, mantenho minha classificação anterior de minha posição sobre o assunto como compatibilista. Palavras-chave: livre-arbítrio, vontade livre, compatibilismo, determinismo, responsabili-dade moral. ABSTRACT While agreeing with Fischborn's (2018) contention that, according to one traditional definition of compatibilism, my position should be classified as that of a libertarian incompati-bilist, I argue here for a different view of compatibilism. This view involves, on the one hand, local probabilistic causation of decisions (rather than universal strict determinism) and, on the other, free will conceived as involving decisions generated by a decision-making process carried out by the brain, which consciously contemplates different alternatives and could in principle have been different from what it was, implying that the agent could in normal conditions have done otherwise in the same circumstances. After discussing different views of causation (including determinism) and of free will, I make a revision of some passages from my earlier work, quoted by Fischborn. I conclude that what is crucial in the question of (in)compatibilism is the (in)compatibility between freedom of decisions and natural causation of human actions. According to this looser and, I argue, more pertinent view of compatibilism, I maintain my previous classification of my position on the matter as compatibilist.
This paper investigates whether even if A, B is pragmatically polysemic, so that a nonconcessive ... more This paper investigates whether even if A, B is pragmatically polysemic, so that a nonconcessive conditional may have even if, and whether concessive conditionals, pragmatically defined, can fail to have even if or a non-temporal still. Different paraphrases are used to help elucidate pragmatic meanings. A theory of the pragmatic meanings of concessive and implicative conditionals is presented. The semantic meaning of even if and the question of whether concessive conditionals imply the truth of their consequents are also discussed.
It is argued that contraposition is valid for a class of natural language conditionals, if some m... more It is argued that contraposition is valid for a class of natural language conditionals, if some modifications are allowed to preserve the meaning of the original conditional. In many cases, implicit temporal indices must be considered, making a change in verb tense necessary. A suitable contrapositive for implicative counterfactual conditionals can also usually be found. In some cases, the addition of certain words is necessary to preserve meaning that is present in the original sentence and would be lost or changed in the contrapositive without them. A distinction is made between adding new meaning and adding new words to preserve existing meaning. For concessive conditionals and relevance conditionals, however, no valid contrapositive can be found. They do not belong to the class of contraposable conditionals, which can be independently defined. Difficult cases are also discussed in which the contradictory of the consequent semantically entails the truth of the antecedent. In such cases the content of the antecedent is implicit in the meaning of the consequent. Contraposition becomes possible if what is implicit in the original consequent is made explicit in the contrapositive antecedent.
A atribuição de postura epistêmica às frases condicionais, em função do gênero, da faixa etária e... more A atribuição de postura epistêmica às frases condicionais, em função do gênero, da faixa etária e do nível de escolaridade, foi estudada através da parafraseabilidade diferencial de se por caso ou por já que. Foram usadas frases condicionais com verbo no indicativo, apresentadas em contexto indefinido, ou precedidas de contextos indutores de atribuição de postura epistêmica positiva ou neutra. Os resultados mostraram uma maior tendência dos homens a atribuírem postura epistêmica positiva ao enunciador de tais condicionais e maior tendência dos mais jovens e dos menos letrados a desconsiderarem o contexto fornecido.
The aim of this article is to study positive or neutral epistemic stance in conditionals through ... more The aim of this article is to study positive or neutral epistemic stance in conditionals through the differential acceptability of paraphrases of 'se' ('if' ) with 'já que' ('since') or 'caso' ('in case'), respectively. After a brief discussion of the possibility of positive epistemic stance in conditionals, an empirical research project is related, in which conditional sentences were presented in three contexts: (1) indefinite context (isolated sentence); (2) certainty-inducing context; and (3) uncertainty-inducing context. Choice of paraphrases was correlated to the induced attribution of certainty or uncertainty and, in the indefinite context, both paraphrases were showed to be equally possible, in accordance with the context imagined by the subject. Differential paraphrasability was showed to be a useful methodological tool. The possibility of positive epistemic stance in conditionals was confirmed. O objetivo deste trabalho é estudar a postura epistêmica positiva ou neutra em condicionais, a partir do julgamento da aceitabilidade diferencial de paráfrases de se com já que ou caso, respectivamente. Após breve discussão da possibilidade da postura epistêmica positiva em condicionais, é relatada pesquisa empírica, em que frases condicionais foram apresentadas em três contextos: 1. contexto indefinido (frase isolada); 2. contexto indutor de certeza; 3. contexto indutor de incerteza. A escolha das paráfrases correlacionou-se com a atribuição induzida de certeza ou incerteza e, no contexto indefinido, ambas as paráfrases mostraram-se igualmente possíveis, de acordo com o contexto imaginado pelo sujeito. A parafraseabilidade diferencial mostrou-se um recurso metodológico útil. Confirmou-se a possibilidade de postura epistêmica positiva em condicionais.
Conditional assertions are a peculiar language structure that manifests a specific cognitive oper... more Conditional assertions are a peculiar language structure that manifests a specific cognitive operation. In order to express it, different languages have found different ways of using verb forms. Primary conditionals are here defined as those that presuppose the possibility of the falsity of both the antecedent and the consequent. In them, the truth of the antecedent appears as a sufficient condition for the truth of the consequent. The truth condition of primary conditionals is defined as the impossibility of the conjunction of the
truth of the antecedent with the falsity of the consequent. The demand for a connection between antecedent and consequent, expressed by Chrysippus as the incompatibility between the affirmation of the antecedent and the denial of the consequent, is thus satisfied. Counterfactuals are conditionals that speak of some aspect of reality through the imagination of an unreal situation.
Claims that necessary and sufficient conditions are not converse relations are discussed, as well... more Claims that necessary and sufficient conditions are not converse relations are discussed, as well as the related claim that If A, then B is not equivalent to A only if B. The analysis of alleged counterexamples has shown, among other things, how necessary and sufficient conditions should be understood, especially in the case of causal conditions, and the importance of distinguishing sufficient-cause conditionals from necessary-cause conditionals. It is concluded that necessary and sufficient conditions, adequately interpreted, are converse relations in all cases.
A commentary is given on Trevena and Miller (2010). The comparability of their experimental task ... more A commentary is given on Trevena and Miller (2010). The comparability of their experimental task and of the potential they recorded with those used and recorded by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983a) is questioned. An interpretation is given for the similarity of event-related potentials recorded when subjects decided to move and when they decided not to move.
Reinterpretations of Libet's results have received support from most commentaries. Libet's argume... more Reinterpretations of Libet's results have received support from most commentaries. Libet's arguments against alternative hypotheses are contested. Latency depends on intensity. Integration of intensity and duration explains the Minimum Train Duration. Analogies of Libet's timing of intentions with control (flash-lag-like) experiments indicate biases of opposite signs, according to intramodal or intermodal results. Rosenthal's view of nonconscious intentions (or sensations) becoming conscious after a delay is favored. Compatibilist free will is discussed.
An examination of conditionals in di¤erent languages leads to a distinction of three types of con... more An examination of conditionals in di¤erent languages leads to a distinction of three types of conditionals instead of the usual two (indicative and subjunctive). The three types can be explained by the degree of acceptance or as-if acceptance of the truth of the antecedent. The labels subjunctive and indicative are shown to be inadequate. So-called indicative conditionals comprise two classes, the very frequent uncertain-fact conditionals and the quite rare accepted-fact conditionals. Uncertain-fact conditionals may have a time shift in contemporary English and the future subjunctive in Portuguese (though not all of them do). Moreover, paraphrases of if with in case or supposing are usually possible with approximately the same meaning. Accepted-fact conditionals never have these features.
An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. ... more An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. According to this reinterpretation, the Minimum Train Duration of electrical brain stimulation should be considered as the time needed to create a brain stimulus efficient for producing conscious sensation and not as a basis for inferring the latency for conscious sensation of peripheral origin. Latency for conscious sensation with brain stimulation may occur after the Minimum Train Duration. Backward masking with cortical stimuli suggests a 125-300 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of threshold skin stimuli. Backward enhancement is not suitable for inferring this latency. For determining temporal relations between stimuli that correspond to subjects' reports, the end of cerebral Minimum Train Duration should be used as reference, rather than its onset. Results of coupling peripheral and cortical stimuli are explained by a latency after the cortical Minimum Train Duration, having roughly the same duration as the latency for supraliminal skin stimuli. Results of coupling peripheral stimuli and stimuli to medial lemniscus (LM) are explained by a shorter LM latency and/or a longer peripheral latency. This interpretation suggests a 230 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of somatosensory near-threshold stimuli. The backward referral hypothesis, as formulated by Libet, should not be retained. Long readiness potentials preceding spontaneous conscious or nonconscious movements suggest that both kinds of movement are nonconsciously initiated. The validity of Libet's measures of W and M moments is questionable due to problems involving latencies, training, and introspective distinction of W and M. Veto of intended actions may be initially nonconscious but dependent on conscious awareness.
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Papers by Gilberto Gomes
truth of the antecedent with the falsity of the consequent. The demand for a connection between antecedent and consequent, expressed by Chrysippus as the incompatibility between the affirmation of the antecedent and the denial of the consequent, is thus satisfied. Counterfactuals are conditionals that speak of some aspect of reality through the imagination of an unreal situation.
truth of the antecedent with the falsity of the consequent. The demand for a connection between antecedent and consequent, expressed by Chrysippus as the incompatibility between the affirmation of the antecedent and the denial of the consequent, is thus satisfied. Counterfactuals are conditionals that speak of some aspect of reality through the imagination of an unreal situation.