Department of Social Sciences

Yksimielisyys maksuttoman koulutuksen tärkeydestä jäi viime vuosituhannelle ja keskustelu lukukausimaksuista on runsasta, mutta ei kovin korkeatasoista. Yhtä mieltä ollaan siitä, että koulutuksen on oltava tasa-arvoista, mutta käsitykset tasa-arvon saavuttamisen tavoista vaihtelevat valtavasti. Erimielisiä ollaan myös siitä, onko maksuton koulutus Suomessa uhattuna.
Talouskriisissä päättäjien on helppo kannattaa maksuja, koska ne nähdään keinoksi keventää julkisen sektorin maksutaakkaa ja sopivat kritiikittömästi omaksuttuun puheeseen kilpailukyvystä. Etenkin kun maksujen käyttöön ottaminen ja korottaminen on globaali trendi.
Opetusinisteri Krista Kiuru (sd.) kannattaa innokkaasti lukukausimaksuja EU/ETA-alueen ulkopuolelta tuleville opiskelijoille, vaikka Suomessa vuosina 2010-2014 tehty maksukokeilu arvioitiin täysin epäonnistuneeksi, eikä lukukausimaksujen eduista ole luotettavaa tietoa.

Traditionally animal ethics has criticized the anthropocentric worldview according to which humans differ categorically from the rest of the nature in some morally relevant way. It has claimed that even though there are differences, there are also crucial similarities between humans and animals that make it impossible to draw a categorical distinction into humans that are morally valuable and animals that are not. This argument, according to which animals and humans share common characteristics that lead to moral value, is at the heart of animal ethics. Lately the emphasis on similarity has been under attack. It has been claimed that the search for similarity is itself part of anthropocentric morality, since only those like us are valuable. It also has been claimed that true respect for animals comes from recognizing their difference and "otherness", not from seeing similarities. This paper analyses the new "other animal ethics" by critically examining its basis and consequences. The conclusion is that despite the fact that other animal ethics is right in demanding respect for also difference, it remains both vague and contradictory in its theoretical basis, and leads to undesirable consequences from the perspective of animal welfare.

As it comes to animal ethics, broad versions of contractualism are often used as a reason for excluding animals from the category of those with moral value in the individualistic sense. Ideas of "reciprocity" and "moral agency" are invoked to show that only those capable of understanding and respecting the value of others may have value themselves. Because of this, possible duties toward animals are often made dependent upon altruism: to pay regard to animals is to act in an other-regarding manner instead of mutual benefit. There are three main versions of altruism in animal ethics. The first one of these is the most traditional, and emphasises benevolence as a source of moral regard. The second concentrates on the notion of value, and claims that animals have value in the individualistic sense despite being incapable of moral agency. The third resists overt theory-dependency, often included in the second version, and concentrates more on the elements of "context" and "identification". Out of these, a combination of the last two is identified as the most fruitful basis for altruistic animal ethics.

Recently, many pro-animal thinkers have expressed critical views on the animal rights movement. In particular, the movement has been criticized for being philosophically uninformed, politically regressive, and practically unpersuasive. This paper investigates these criticisms and seeks to map out the philosophy behind the grassroots animal rights movement, specifically. It concludes that the criticism presented by animal studies scholars is often misplaced due to a lack of understanding of the philosophical notions within the movement, but that the critics are right to argue that the movement needs to place more emphasis on persuasion.

Aulis Aarnio kirjoittaa eläinten oikeuksista (Tieteessä tapahtuu 2/2005) mielenkiintoisia ajatuksia. Ne toistavat varsin tarkasti perinteistä eläinten oikeuksien kritiikkiä. Aarnion näkemykset ovatkin toisinto mm. Carl Cohenin ja Roger Scrutonin oikeuksien moraalista merkitystä koskevista käsityksistä ja ovat olleet, varsinkin aikaisemmin, yleinen tapa kritisoida eläinoikeusajattelua.

Viimeiset kaksi tuhatta vuotta ovat nähneet monia moraalisia murroksia. Käsitykset yksilön arvosta, yhteiskunnan olemuksesta, näiden kahden suhteesta, eri ihmisryhmien arvosta, jne. ovat vaihdelleet suuresti. Taustalla ei ole vaikuttanut pelkästään moraalifi losofointi, mutta moraalisten argumenttien uudenlainen esittäminen on ollut osa jokaista murrosta. Eläinetiikka on yksi uudenlaisen murroksen esittäjä.

Las descripciones externas cuya aproximación a los animales se lleva a cabo por medio de mecanismos externos en lugar de estados mentales, han ganado una posición preeminente. Sin embargo, de acuerdo con el objetivismo fuerte, la atención necesita colocarse sobre las presunciones que subyacen a las creencias dadas. Cuando esto se aplica al tema de la mente animal se pone de manifiesto que las descripciones internas, más bien que las externas, son quizás las que ofrecerían una opción más fructífera. Esta afirmación viene apoyada por la crítica wittgensteiniana del escepticismo que busca evitar la "deflación" y plantea una "postura afectiva". Con todo, para evitar el relativismo y el conservadurismo, las descripciones internas y la postura afectiva necesitan hacer hincapié en las ramificaciones epistemológicas que están detrás de las creencias concernientes a la mente animal y hacer del animal el punto de referencia central de la investigación. PALABRAS CLAVE: mente animal, escepticismo, etología, ética animal.

La ética animal ha presentado una serie de cuestiones desafiantes en lo que respecta a la relación entre humanos y animales. Para algunos filósofos, los animales no humanos tienen valor en sí mismos. Esta afirmación se basa en la mayor parte de los casos en una apelación a la sintiencia o a la conciencia en el sentido fenoménico: puesto que hay algo lo cual es ser un animal, los animales no pueden ser tratados como mera materia biológica. Sin embargo, esta afirmación ha sido objeto de crítica. Este artículo analiza tres de los argumentos más comunes contra lo que aquí se llama el "valor individual" de los animales no-humanos. Tales argumentos son el argumento de la capacidad, el argumento humanista y el argumento de las relaciones especiales. Se ha mantenido que todos ellos se enfrentan a problemas, que dejan la puerta abierta a la posibilidad de que los animales no-humanos puedan tener, y de hecho posean, valor individual. Palabras clave: Antropocentrismo, argumento de los casos marginales, derechos animales, ética animal, agencia moral.

The paper introduces "personhood" as a dynamic concept that rests on aware interaction or "intersubjectivity". Following Juan Carlos Gomez, it is argued that personhood is based on the ability to enter into interactions, within which one relates to another creature as a second person "you", and within which one comprehends that the other relates to oneself in a similar manner. Introspective self-awareness and propositional language thus lose their status as criteria for personhood, and are replaced with dynamic interplay between two creatures, which again opens the door for the possibility that also many non-human animals are included in the sphere of "personhood". The paper explores what the type of "immediacy" this model presumes could be rested on, and brings forward embodied empathy, as used in phenomenology, as one fruitful ground. It is furthermore argued that the normative dimension of the suggested model springs from recognition of fragility in others, and here avoidance of preconceptions -as emphasized by Levinas and Derridabecomes crucial. The paper also investigates what aware interaction would mean from the viewpoint of individuality and language, and finally argues that the model rests on the presumption that skepticism is, by default, a misconstrued way of approaching animal minds.

Empathy has become a common point of debate in moral psychology. Recent developments in psychiatry, neurosciences and social psychology have led to the revival of sentimentalism, and the ‘empathy thesis’ has suggested that affective empathy, in particular, is a necessary criterion of moral agency. The case of psychopaths – individuals incapable of affective empathy and moral agency, yet capable of rationality – has been utilised in support of this case. Critics, however, have been vocal. They have asserted that the case of autism proves the empathy thesis wrong; that psychopathy centres on rational rather than empathic limitations; that empathy is not relevant to many common normative behaviours; and that rationality is required when empathy fails. The present paper analyses these four criticisms. It will be claimed that they each face severe difficulties, and that moral agency ought to be approached via a multi-tier model, with affective empathy as a baseline.