Papers by Jonathan Dickstein
This article presents the textual basis for unconditional vegetarianism in Pātañjala or Classical... more This article presents the textual basis for unconditional vegetarianism in Pātañjala or Classical Yoga. Since the early twentieth century, the Yogasūtra of Patañjali has remained a prominent work of Indian Philosophy inside the Western academy and among modern practice communities. For this reason, the text's stance on harming, the treatment of animals, and diet are all highly relevant for living yoga scholars and practitioners. This article is a textual study, examining the Pātañjala Yogaśāstra (sūtras and bhāṣya) with only minimal inclusion of additional commentaries and scholarly interpretations. It ultimately concludes that non-harming (ahiṃsā) in Pātañjala Yoga is exemplified by the unshakable resolve to refrain from any and all acts of animal slaughter and consumption.
SAGAR: a South Asia Research Journal xxiii, pp. 2-34., 2015
This paper examines the work of Richard Garbe (1857-1927), a German Protestant indologist who stu... more This paper examines the work of Richard Garbe (1857-1927), a German Protestant indologist who studied the history and theology of Indian religious traditions. Garbe was one of many German scholars intent on uncovering the ‘genuine’ authorship of seminal indian texts such as the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata, and the Bhagavad Gītā. his work would impact intellectual debates with socio-political consequences, as evident in the “pantheistic controversy” and various indo-Aryan hypotheses. In particular, my investigation probes Garbe’s problematic depiction of Sāṃkhya philosophy as an ancient, atheistic, Indian rationalism. Garbe posited that this tradition was eventually surpassed by a Gītā-attested monotheism, but the establishment of Sāṃkhya as ‘scientific’ or ‘rational’ was still central to his religious and ethnically charged agenda. In the decades to follow, indological ‘findings’ of this sort would contribute to the intimate relationship between German Indology and National Socialist rhetoric. From a wider perspective, though Garbe’s influence waned considerably in late twentieth century scholarship, his impact on the Western reception of Sāṃkhya has largely remained intact. Sāṃkhya’s presupposed atheistic base has led to the continued trivialization and elimination of the theistic dimension of Sāṃkhya and especially “classical” Yoga.
Conference Presentations by Jonathan Dickstein
"Abuse in Yoga and Beyond: Cultural Logics and Pathways for the Future," a digital conference held by Yoga Studies at Loyola Marymount University on June 13th, 2020 , 2020
Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, 2019
Read on Medium: https://medium.com/@jonathandickstein/before-they-were-food-wasting-and-weaponizi... more Read on Medium: https://medium.com/@jonathandickstein/before-they-were-food-wasting-and-weaponizing-animals-in-yoga-gastropolitics-15a1dcc17027
Modern Postural Yoga (MPY) has routinely tethered itself to Patañjalian metaphysics and ethics, however curiously and nominally. In response to this enduring trend, the paper first summarizes the Pātañjalayogaśāstra’s stance on non-harming and its concern for the infliction of pain on any and all sentient beings. Second, the paper details how the Patañjalian ethic conflicts with an allegedly progressive MPY food politics that, while justifiably resisting patriarchal, ableist, and other dogmatic mechanisms of 'traditional' yoga, itself perpetuates a harmful, speciesist egoism. Third, the paper asserts that animals should be recognized as subaltern populations. I conclude that a yoga gastropolitics that ignores the moral standing of nonhuman animals fails to satisfy Patañjalian ethics, species-inclusive justice, and subaltern solidarity.
The Annual Conference on South Asia at UW-Madison, 2018
This paper presents key conclusions from Christopher Framarin’s Hinduism and Environmental Ethics... more This paper presents key conclusions from Christopher Framarin’s Hinduism and Environmental Ethics (2014) and suggests alternatives to thinking and teaching about the reality of mass harm to nonhuman animals in ancient and contemporary India.
No undergraduate course on South Asian religions omits a module on ahiṃsā. Students learn that harming generates bad karma. They learn, at least from a Hindu perspective, that human beings should avoid harming others due to the presence of other ātmans or souls. While the instrumentalist nature of the first claim about karma is very relevant to this topic, in this paper I target the second claim’s emphasis on the ethical relevance of the “spiritual” aspects of entities, such as the existence of ātman. Following Framarin, I highlight the flaws with ātman/ brahman-centric “Sameness interpretations,” and underscore the conclusion that nonhuman animals, and perhaps also plants, do not command direct moral consideration because of ātman or brahman, but rather because “they are sentient, they are alive, and they possess a range of other relevant attributes and abilities.”
Admitting the direct prima facie duty to avoid harming nonhuman animals, how may we better present the oft-ahiṃsā-washed histories of the domesticated animal in South Asia? If domestication and manipulation constitute harms, to say nothing of eventual slaughter, what are we to make of present-day India maintaining the world’s largest standing herd of bovines and nearly leading the world in the export of bovine flesh?
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Papers by Jonathan Dickstein
Conference Presentations by Jonathan Dickstein
Progressive yoga practitioners commonly regard, and discard, dietary prohibitions as yet another form of abuse perpetrated by dogmatic texts, gurus, and communities. Omitted is a serious reflection on “food animals” as victims of abuse themselves, and whether an abuse-conscious yoga culture can justifiably halt its concern at the "species barrier." This presentation asserts that avoiding the topic and implications of participation in animal abuse directly conflicts with the professed values of a progressive and inclusive yoga culture.
Modern Postural Yoga (MPY) has routinely tethered itself to Patañjalian metaphysics and ethics, however curiously and nominally. In response to this enduring trend, the paper first summarizes the Pātañjalayogaśāstra’s stance on non-harming and its concern for the infliction of pain on any and all sentient beings. Second, the paper details how the Patañjalian ethic conflicts with an allegedly progressive MPY food politics that, while justifiably resisting patriarchal, ableist, and other dogmatic mechanisms of 'traditional' yoga, itself perpetuates a harmful, speciesist egoism. Third, the paper asserts that animals should be recognized as subaltern populations. I conclude that a yoga gastropolitics that ignores the moral standing of nonhuman animals fails to satisfy Patañjalian ethics, species-inclusive justice, and subaltern solidarity.
No undergraduate course on South Asian religions omits a module on ahiṃsā. Students learn that harming generates bad karma. They learn, at least from a Hindu perspective, that human beings should avoid harming others due to the presence of other ātmans or souls. While the instrumentalist nature of the first claim about karma is very relevant to this topic, in this paper I target the second claim’s emphasis on the ethical relevance of the “spiritual” aspects of entities, such as the existence of ātman. Following Framarin, I highlight the flaws with ātman/ brahman-centric “Sameness interpretations,” and underscore the conclusion that nonhuman animals, and perhaps also plants, do not command direct moral consideration because of ātman or brahman, but rather because “they are sentient, they are alive, and they possess a range of other relevant attributes and abilities.”
Admitting the direct prima facie duty to avoid harming nonhuman animals, how may we better present the oft-ahiṃsā-washed histories of the domesticated animal in South Asia? If domestication and manipulation constitute harms, to say nothing of eventual slaughter, what are we to make of present-day India maintaining the world’s largest standing herd of bovines and nearly leading the world in the export of bovine flesh?
Progressive yoga practitioners commonly regard, and discard, dietary prohibitions as yet another form of abuse perpetrated by dogmatic texts, gurus, and communities. Omitted is a serious reflection on “food animals” as victims of abuse themselves, and whether an abuse-conscious yoga culture can justifiably halt its concern at the "species barrier." This presentation asserts that avoiding the topic and implications of participation in animal abuse directly conflicts with the professed values of a progressive and inclusive yoga culture.
Modern Postural Yoga (MPY) has routinely tethered itself to Patañjalian metaphysics and ethics, however curiously and nominally. In response to this enduring trend, the paper first summarizes the Pātañjalayogaśāstra’s stance on non-harming and its concern for the infliction of pain on any and all sentient beings. Second, the paper details how the Patañjalian ethic conflicts with an allegedly progressive MPY food politics that, while justifiably resisting patriarchal, ableist, and other dogmatic mechanisms of 'traditional' yoga, itself perpetuates a harmful, speciesist egoism. Third, the paper asserts that animals should be recognized as subaltern populations. I conclude that a yoga gastropolitics that ignores the moral standing of nonhuman animals fails to satisfy Patañjalian ethics, species-inclusive justice, and subaltern solidarity.
No undergraduate course on South Asian religions omits a module on ahiṃsā. Students learn that harming generates bad karma. They learn, at least from a Hindu perspective, that human beings should avoid harming others due to the presence of other ātmans or souls. While the instrumentalist nature of the first claim about karma is very relevant to this topic, in this paper I target the second claim’s emphasis on the ethical relevance of the “spiritual” aspects of entities, such as the existence of ātman. Following Framarin, I highlight the flaws with ātman/ brahman-centric “Sameness interpretations,” and underscore the conclusion that nonhuman animals, and perhaps also plants, do not command direct moral consideration because of ātman or brahman, but rather because “they are sentient, they are alive, and they possess a range of other relevant attributes and abilities.”
Admitting the direct prima facie duty to avoid harming nonhuman animals, how may we better present the oft-ahiṃsā-washed histories of the domesticated animal in South Asia? If domestication and manipulation constitute harms, to say nothing of eventual slaughter, what are we to make of present-day India maintaining the world’s largest standing herd of bovines and nearly leading the world in the export of bovine flesh?