Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades

In this paper, I intend to argue that a conception of philosophy as a way of life needs two elements: persuasion and love. Faced a false conception of philosophy very specialized, professional, and modern that has condemned to oblivion philosophy itself, we propose a therapeutic conception (of philosophy) as a way of life, a philosophy that is not reduced to a conceptual content, but that is related to the way of life of the philosopher. The pairing of the word " persuasion " with the concept " love " may at first appear arbitrary or, worse still, wholly inept. Persuasion or seduction through words is associated with an infinite range of wiles and stratagems of a highly practical nature; to be valid, it must be directed at the other. Love, by contrast, betokens boundless purity, for its ideation requires a single individual; its theoretical task accomplished, its practical application has to be constructed. This paper argues that the concept of philosophy as a way of life requires both elements: persuasion and love. Eschewing the nakedly parasitic seduction of a specialised or modern view of philosophy which has consigned the discipline to oblivion, it sets out a therapeutic view of philosophy as a model for living, a philosophy not reduced to conceptual content, but bearing inextricably on the philosopher's way of life.

Education 1 seems doomed to be a field plagued with paradoxes and contradictions. On the one hand, the conviction that education is important and school resources must be improved is, fortunately, on the rise. On the other hand, bewilderment and discontent grow before the undeniable failure of teaching institutions on too many occasions. It has become increasingly evident that there are more and more things that should be taught, but also that ever more students are unable to learn them or even comprehend the interest that their studies hold. While general, compulsory education should be the great equalizer of the social opportunities for young people, it instead reinforces inequalities; acting as a discriminatory filter. One of the most significant problems-that of integration-finds in the school its most sensitive arenas. The general crisis occurring in education at the present is set within the framework of a greater crisis of values. This current crisis of values is characterized by the creation of a type of human being that-as Ortega would say-no longer knows what to hold to, but rather than anguishing over his dilemma or becoming distressed, accepts it as a natural fact of modern destiny 2 and the inconsistency of values. The excellent historian, Daniel J. Boorstin, has stressed the significance of the change from the singular to the plural of the word " value ". Whereas dictionaries used to read: VALUE...Ethic: " That which is worthy of esteem in its own right: that which possesses an intrinsic reason for esteem. In contrast, modern dictionaries now state: VALUE: pl. in sociology: Acts, customs, institutions, etcetera, especially favored by a people, ethnic group, etc... 3 " No longer does a belief in moral progress exist; now it is a question of quietly resigning to insecurity and inconsistency, The question is not a rhetorical one, we are living at a time when two visions of the world overlap. One is that of the positive, optimistic neo-liberal economists for whom everything is going extraordinarily well. The existing problems are merely minor difficulties that will not take long to overcome. On the other hand, some authors and political observers (Alain Minc, Bordieu, Touraine) caution that we have never lived in such an uncertain world, a world which is on the verge of collapse, a collapse that would be absolute in such an interrelated world as ours. PAGE 1 1 I will first consider the problems that educators encounter in the school when they are confronted with difficult students, how these problems come about and the reasons for conflict. I will then go on to defend the theory that schools must concern themselves with issues relating to education and not dysfunctional or problematic behaviors that are social issues and not educational or school-related ones. 2 ARANGUREN, J.L. Propuestas morales, Ed. Tecnos, Madrid, 1983, p.102-103 3 There exists a socialization of value that overrides its ethical meaning. What is important is not moral perfection or the improvement of our true reality but rather the image that we project of it. This is the only thing that is important because it is what others perceive, cf. BOORSTIN, D.J. The Image, in ARANGUREN, ibid.

When Arcesilaus entered the Academy circa 281 BC, the philosophers of the Porch and the Garden were immersed in an intense and impetuous dialectical battle. Both sides attempted to prove that they possessed an evident truth, but given that two truths of this kind cannot stand in opposition to one another, one of them had to be false. Thus the two schools set about to demonstrate that the false truth was that of their rival. These new schools existed alongside the Old Academy and the Liceo which, while much less active, continued to survive upon the pillars erected by their founders, Plato and Aristotle. Thus the philosophic stance of Arcesilaus and Carneades emerged chiefly from a Platonic point of view as a response to Stoicism and in an attempt to recover the hegemony that had been lost 1. In Hellenistic philosophy, gnoseological problems gave rise to the majority of controversies. The philosophers of that time were no longer as concerned with the search for transcendence as were their immediate predecessors. Instead, their concerns had to do with matters which, while simpler, were at the same time more technical, namely the conditions that make the knowledge of things possible. One of the classic problems posed by Hellenistic philosophy is that of the " criterion of truth ". This problem was widely discussed in the schools of Athens in the time of Arcesilaus, especially by the Stoics, for whom this matter was of crucial importance as they considered logic the basis of their philosophy 2. Furthermore, the question of criterion was important because it marked the degree of dogmatism or skepticism inherent to the doctrine. Thus, we can say that Arcesilaus' philosophic stance is radically modern for it does not only attempt to challenge Stoic dogmatism but advances a positive argument which lies somewhere between the resignation of knowing that absolute truth cannot be attained and the confidence that the search for philosophy fills life with enough small certainties for us to exist in this world and accept that life is but fleeting and apparent in character. STOIC CRITERION Arcesilaus' Skepticism, as we have already noted, was constructed in opposition to Stoicism. His criticism was directed at the certainty with which the Stoics believed to have encountered truth by means of an indubitable criterion. According to the Stoics, perception cannot occur without sensory affection. That is, any impression must be a pathos of the subjective perception that is representative of itself and of the object that causes it. It follows, then, that any criterion of truth, if there is such a thing, must be sought in

My article is not an attempt to return to old positions; it does not seek the lost paradise of feelings and sentiments that comprehend human relationships, but it does hope to scratch below the surface of consumption that shrouds the city today. Since the time of the ancient Greeks, one of the fundamental aims of philosophers has been to attain happiness. Today, however, that purpose is threatened. Happy people do not consume, but suffering, what is known in the advertising jargon as " post-shopping depression " has become the raw material for consumption.

George Santayana (1863-1952) appears emotionally distant and personally uncommitted in many of his writings. In what may have been a related phenomenon, he does not seem to have committed to any school of philosophy, but rather to draw from many of the available schools when it suited him. In this article, we assess his constantly changing use of different philosophies and its implications for both philosophy and politics.

The discontinuity of matter was originally postulated with an explicit purpose: to demonstrate the reality of movement. However, a deterministic and necessary movement eliminated the possibility of explaining freedom. Epicurus first, and Lucretius later, modified the doctrine of Democritus (founder of Greek atomism) in regard to a very important point, since they both admitted the spontaneous movement of swerving or clinamen of some atoms, as opposed to their stable fall, situating matter between reality and possibility. For its part, quantum mechanics also teaches that, since

Resumen: En este artículo se aportan claves y razones sobre un supuesto escepticismo de Diógenes Laercio. Para ello hay que atender al plan general de la obra sobre Las Vidas de los Filósofos Ilustres. Y en este caso, si buscamos una confirmación sólo en el libro IX, sin atender al plan global de la obra, creo que erraríamos sin remisión. Además, se ofrece una explicación convincente de una de las frases más enigmáticas y más estudiadas de esta obra. ¿Qué quiso decir Dió-genes al afirmar que Apolónides de Nicea es oJ par v hJ mw~ n (uno de los nuestros)? Abstract: In this article we provide some clues and reasons about an alleged scepticism of Diogenes Laertius. This requires addressing the general plan of the work on The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers. And in this case, if we seek confirmation only in the ninth book without dealing with the global plan of the work, we are deeply wrong. In addition, we offer a convincing explanation of one of the most enigmatic and widely studied sentences in this work. What did Diogenes mean by saying that Apollonides of Nicaea is oJ par v hJ mw~ n (one of us)?

The end of academic skepticism and conversion to Stoicism the Platonic Academy was leading authors such as Aenesidemus to seek and establish a new line that would replace skeptical better and guarantees the academic skepticism platonic. This paper seeks to advance the hypothesis that the Academy was kept alive by the moderate scepticism of Plato and Carneades, and that an unswerving dogmatism could only lead – as indeed it did – to its demise. Thus, in examining the rise and fall of scepticism in Plato's Academy, one might justifiably speak of murder rather than of natural causes. Resumen El final del escepticismo académico y la conversión de la Academia platónica al estoicismo, fue lo que llevó a autores como Enesidemo a buscar e instaurar una nueva línea escéptica que pudiese sustituir mejor y con más garantías el escepticismo académico platónico. La hipótesis que mantendremos es que la Academia se mantuvo gracias a ese escepticismo moderado platónico-carneadiano, ya que un dogmatismo férreo hubiese sido, como así ocurrió, su disolución. Y por eso hablamos de homicidio y no de muerte natural en el proceso, desarrollo y decadencia del pensamiento de Platón en la Academia.

Philosophical discourse results from a life-choice and an existential option, rather than giving rise to them.  In the modern University, philosophy is no longer viewed (as it was by the ancients) as a way of life, unless by that we mean the philosophy lecturer’s way of life (generally rather a dull one). Some years ago I began to perceive in Hellenistic philosophy a view of philosophy as an aid to living, as therapy of the soul. I intend to show, with the help of Hellenistic Philosophy, it is necessary to recover the idea that philosophy is a medicine that fights the ignorance.

Resumen. Siempre se ha reconocido en Pirrón de Élide el inicio puntual del escepticismo griego. Sabemos ya hoy que esta información, sesgada, proviene más de la necesidad de Enesidemo de refundar el movimiento, que de la realidad filosófica. En este artículo demostramos que Pirrón, ni tuvo consciencia de ser un escéptico, ni, en rigor, inició ninguna nueva corriente. Su deslizamiento, y posterior reconocimiento, hacia el escepticismo, debe más bien encuadrarse en el natural desarrollo de la filosofía abderita, a través de Metrodoro de Quíos, discípulo de Demócrito, Anaxarco maestro de Pirrón y Nausífanes su discípulo. Y todo debido al afán aventurero del personaje de Élide al enrolarse en el séquito de Alejandro Magno. [en] The skeptic Pyrrho of Elis: the last pre-Socratic and his connection with the Abdera school. Abstract. Pyrrho of Elis is known as the beginning of Greek skepticism. We already know today that this information, biased, comes more from the need of Enesidemo to refound the movement, than from the philosophical reality. In this paper we show that Pyrrho was not aware of being a skeptic, nor did he initiate any new philosophical doctrine. His later recognition as a skeptic should rather be framed in the natural development of the Abderite philosophy, through Metrodoro of Chios, disciple of Democritus, Anaxarco master of Pyrrho and Nausifans his disciple. And all due to the adventurous desire of the character to enroll in the entourage of Alexander the Great.

The discontinuity of matter was originally postulated with an explicit purpose: to demonstrate the reality of movement. However, a deterministic and necessary movement eliminated the possibility of explaining freedom. Epicurus first, and Lucretius later, modified the doctrine of Democritus (founder of Greek atomism) in regard to a very important point, since they both admitted the spontaneous movement of swerving or clinamen of some atoms, as opposed to their stable fall, situating matter between reality and possibility. For its part, quantum mechanics also teaches that, since it is impossible to simultaneously fix the position and the moment of a particle it is impossible, in practice, to measure the position of atomic particles without intervening in the process, again situating matter between reality and possibility. Nonetheless, what is ironic about this situation is that even after 21 centuries this superstitious fear has not been eliminated. Science is still unable to explain all the principles of matter. It is true that the discovery of the Higgs Boson closes a chapter in the history of this discipline, but there remains much history to write. All the matter we know of (about which I am speaking in this talk), from the earth to the most distant galaxies, has the same 1*This article is a deliverable of the Research Project I+D+i FFI2016-32989 on skepticism financed by the Ministry of Economics and Competitivity.

Nunca un artículo ha sido pensado, y escrito, con un referente tan claro y evidente para mí como este. Por ello, en este libro Homenaje a su labor, se lo dedico a José Luis Cantón Alonso, espíritu sabio, libre y sosegado, ajeno a las his-terias propias de nuestra profesión, que nos cie-gan con una luz artificial, pero que oscurecen naturalmente la vida que es lo más importante. Resumen Si algo caracteriza a la filosofía helenística (cínicos, escépticos, epicúreos y estoicos), es que reconoce en 'cada uno' un sentido de lo justo y de lo injusto, de lo bueno y de lo malo, ajeno al espíritu de colmena más propio de la Polis. Con la filosofía helenística se rompe esa antropología comunitaria pre-helenística, y se perfila el sentido de 'indi-viduo', un yo autónomo-moral susceptible de responsabilidad ante sí mismo, y no ante la sociedad que lo configura. Sócrates fue el ejemplo perfecto con su vida y su juicio de ruptura del 'nosotros' y la sustitución por el 'cada uno de nosotros'. Pero ni Sócrates, ni Platón supieron extraer las consecuencias de esta idea revolucionaria. La filosofía helenística entendió el pensamiento como una técnica para vivir mejor, una terapia para el alma, que debía curar la enfermedad: la ignorancia del no-filósofo, del que no decide como sujeto reflexivo y autónomo. Esta actividad no estaba exenta de cierta tensión entre la soledad de la actividad intelectual y el compromiso de la ac-ción política. Cada escuela soñó una solución diferente al dilema, pero todas fueron coherentes, para conseguir la felicidad y aplicarse a uno mismo. Palabras clave Sócrates, Pirrón, Epicuro, Séneca, ética, escepticismo, epicureísmo y estoicismo.

This paper presents the keys and reasons for Diogenes Laërtius' alleged scepticism, based on an analysis of the general design of his work The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers. I believe that it would be manifestly erroneous to seek confirmation of this scepticism solely in Book IX without taking into account the overall structure of the work. A convincing explanation is also provided of one of the most enigmatic and most studied phrases in this work. What did Diogenes mean when he said that Apollonides of Nicaea was ὁ παρ' ἡμῶν ("one of us")?

George Santayana (1863-1952) appears emotionally distant and personally uncommitted in many of his writings. In what may have been a related phenomenon, he does not seem to have committed to any school of philosophy, but rather to draw from many of the available schools when it suited him. In this article, we assess his constantly changing use of different philosophies and its implications for both philosophy and politics.

Resumen. Siempre se ha reconocido en Pirrón de Élide el inicio puntual del escepticismo griego. Sabemos ya hoy que esta información, sesgada, proviene más de la necesidad de Enesidemo de refundar el movimiento, que de la realidad filosófica. En este artículo demostramos que Pirrón, ni tuvo consciencia de ser un escéptico, ni, en rigor, inició ninguna nueva corriente. Su deslizamiento, y posterior reconocimiento, hacia el escepticismo, debe más bien encuadrarse en el natural desarrollo de la filosofía abderita, a través de Metrodoro de Quíos, discípulo de Demócrito, Anaxarco maestro de Pirrón y Nausífanes su discípulo. Y todo debido al afán aventurero del personaje de Élide al enrolarse en el séquito de Alejandro Magno. [en] The skeptic Pyrrho of Elis: the last pre-Socratic and his connection with the Abdera school. Abstract. Pyrrho of Elis is known as the beginning of Greek skepticism. We already know today that this information, biased, comes more from the need of Enesidemo to refo...

Siempre se ha reconocido en Pirrón de Élide el inicio puntual del escepticismo griego.Sabemos ya hoy que esta información, sesgada, proviene más de la necesidad de Enesidemo derefundar el movimiento, que de la realidad filosófica. En este artículo demostramos que Pirrón, nituvo consciencia de ser un escéptico, ni, en rigor, inició ninguna nueva corriente. Su deslizamiento,y posterior reconocimiento, hacia el escepticismo, debe más bien encuadrarse en el natural desarrollode la filosofía abderita, a través de Metrodoro de Quíos, discípulo de Demócrito, Anaxarco maestro dePirrón y Nausífanes su discípulo. Y todo debido al afán aventurero del personaje de Élide al enrolarseen el séquito de Alejandro Magno.  

El escepticismo filosófico es identificado por varios signos o nombres: Aporētikoí (ἀπoρητικoὶ), Ephektikoí (ἐφεκτικoὶ), Pyrrhōneioi (Πυρρώvειoι), Skeptikoí (σκεπτικoὶ) y Zētētikoí (ζητητικoὶ), con significantes todos ellos válidos y una cierta confusión en el significado. El objetivo de este trabajo es triple: primero, aclarar por qué alguno de estos nombres han tenido más éxito que otros, segundo, cuáles son las razones por las que uno de ellos (escéptico) ha quedado fijado como nombre, en general para todos los pertenecientes a este movimiento filosófico, y tercero a qué se debe que reconociendo la tradición un iniciador claro, Pirrón de Elis, y siendo el nombre “Pirrónicos” uno de los más populares y uno de los más utilizados por los escritores que hablan sobre este movimiento, no haya sido el más exitoso, como sí ha sido tradicional (pitagóricos, platónicos, aristotélicos, epicúreos, etc.,) en la mayoría de las demás doctrinas.

* Este trabajo se inscribe en el marco del Proyecto de Investigación I+D+i FFI2012-32989 sobre el escepticismo financiado por el Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad. Resumen: Con Arcesilao y Carnéades la Academia platónica alcanzó uno de sus rostros más sugerente debido al escepticismo moderado; con sus seguidores, la Academia reorientará su filosofía hacia un llamativo dogmatismo que paulatinamente la llevará a su ruina. Poco a poco, el escepticismo se atenuará, dando paso a posiciones semi-dogmáticas primero y a un dogmatismo feroz después. Esta fue la razón de la desaparición del escepticismo académico primero,-recuperado con posterioridad por Enesidemo en una nueva línea escéptica más radical y técnica-, y de la Academia misma.