Conference Presentations by Francesca Akhtar
Over the last four decades, much has been written about the Cuban Missile Crisis - those thirteen... more Over the last four decades, much has been written about the Cuban Missile Crisis - those thirteen days in October 1962, during which the world came chillingly close to nuclear war. With the passage of time and release of classified documents, it is now possible to have a thorough understanding of the dilemmas faced, and decisions taken by the Kennedy administration, in their handling of the crisis. Numerous books have been written from the American perspective, detailing President John F. Kennedy’s attempts to peacefully resolve the threat to the U.S. caused by Russian placement of missiles in Cuba, only 50 miles from U.S. shores.
However, much less has been written by scholars about the response of the United States’ closest neighbour and ally – Canada. This might be viewed as surprising, when you consider the bi-national U.S. - Canadian air defence arrangement of NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defence Command). Canada is in effect, the only country that the United States trusts enough to let into its airspace. All too frequently however, in books written by non-Canadians, one finds that the Canadian response to the October crisis barely merits a line.
This study examines the crisis’ response of key members of the Canadian government and the armed forces, against the backdrop of the notoriously inharmonious relationship between President Kennedy and Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. Diefenbaker’s delay in giving his full support to the United States appears to be demonstrative both of his ambiguous stance regarding nuclear weapons, and of his anger at a perceived lack of consultation by Kennedy. This paper explores whether this was due to Diefenbaker’s oft perceived Anti-Americanism , or whether his stance was demonstrative of his ‘Red Tory’ beliefs. Finally, this paper considers whether Diefenbaker’s election defeat the following year could be attributable to the negative fallout from his handling of the crisis.
Papers by Francesca Akhtar
Often referred to as a 'perfect failure,' at the time, the Bay of Pigs invasion was called the US... more Often referred to as a 'perfect failure,' at the time, the Bay of Pigs invasion was called the US' worst defeat since the war of 1812 1 , and widely acknowledged as a case study in how not to conduct foreign policy. In the 53 years since, the operation has been the subject of intense debate, particularly since the archival records began to be released in the 1990's. However, as the number of books on the subject demonstrates, the focus has largely been on trying to assign blame for the failed invasion, rather than a more nuanced analysis of the way in which domestic policy concerns influenced the decisions taken by President Kennedy, both before and during, the operation. This is due in part to the fact that examining the impact of domestic considerations upon foreign policy is a relatively new field of study. 2 However, as Professor James D. Fearon notes, the effect of domestic politics upon states' foreign policy is becoming an increasingly significant part of the study of international relations. 3 He cites as evidence, the growing number of articles that "invoke domestic politics or domestic-political factors in explanations for foreign policy choices." 4 Therefore, as Mervyn Leffler also argues, by examining how domestic ideas and interests shape foreign policy, a greater understanding of US foreign policy can be reached, which also helps to bridge the gap between American diplomatic history, and IR theory. 5 Cuba was a hot-button issue for the Kennedy administration in 1961, and as such, dominated both foreign policy objectives and domestic concerns over the existence of a communist dictatorship only ninety miles from US shores. Whilst criticism of the handling of Operation Zapata has been justifiably directed against both President Kennedy and supporting government agencies, scholars have identified several points or crucial mechanisms by which the decisionmaking process was weakened, thus leading to faulty decisions taken and the plan's ultimate failure. Rebecca Friedman, Kurt M. Campbell and James Steinberg both see the failure as largely the result of the transitional dynamics that often affect new and inexperienced administrations, together with a
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Conference Presentations by Francesca Akhtar
However, much less has been written by scholars about the response of the United States’ closest neighbour and ally – Canada. This might be viewed as surprising, when you consider the bi-national U.S. - Canadian air defence arrangement of NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defence Command). Canada is in effect, the only country that the United States trusts enough to let into its airspace. All too frequently however, in books written by non-Canadians, one finds that the Canadian response to the October crisis barely merits a line.
This study examines the crisis’ response of key members of the Canadian government and the armed forces, against the backdrop of the notoriously inharmonious relationship between President Kennedy and Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. Diefenbaker’s delay in giving his full support to the United States appears to be demonstrative both of his ambiguous stance regarding nuclear weapons, and of his anger at a perceived lack of consultation by Kennedy. This paper explores whether this was due to Diefenbaker’s oft perceived Anti-Americanism , or whether his stance was demonstrative of his ‘Red Tory’ beliefs. Finally, this paper considers whether Diefenbaker’s election defeat the following year could be attributable to the negative fallout from his handling of the crisis.
Papers by Francesca Akhtar
However, much less has been written by scholars about the response of the United States’ closest neighbour and ally – Canada. This might be viewed as surprising, when you consider the bi-national U.S. - Canadian air defence arrangement of NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defence Command). Canada is in effect, the only country that the United States trusts enough to let into its airspace. All too frequently however, in books written by non-Canadians, one finds that the Canadian response to the October crisis barely merits a line.
This study examines the crisis’ response of key members of the Canadian government and the armed forces, against the backdrop of the notoriously inharmonious relationship between President Kennedy and Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. Diefenbaker’s delay in giving his full support to the United States appears to be demonstrative both of his ambiguous stance regarding nuclear weapons, and of his anger at a perceived lack of consultation by Kennedy. This paper explores whether this was due to Diefenbaker’s oft perceived Anti-Americanism , or whether his stance was demonstrative of his ‘Red Tory’ beliefs. Finally, this paper considers whether Diefenbaker’s election defeat the following year could be attributable to the negative fallout from his handling of the crisis.