Papers by Brooke Rudow
Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology, 2025
In this paper, I consider how our engagement with the technological materiality of our homes can ... more In this paper, I consider how our engagement with the technological materiality of our homes can either promote or disrupt healthy relationships with natural and built environments and argue that committing to certain home maintenance practices has the potential to overcome, what Albert Borgmann (1984) calls, "the device paradigm," thereby allowing us to better adopt an ethic of home. In the first few sections of the paper, I provide a background beginning with Martin Heidegger's (1971) fears about modern technologies and how he sees them undermining our relationships with a dynamic, morethan-human world. I use the work of Val Plumwood (1993) to reconceive Heidegger's technological divide through the lens of pernicious dualisms, especially those relating to activities characterized as creative/productive and reparative/nonproductive. I then trace the development of focal practices to focal places, moving from Borgmann to Paul Thompson (2000). Embracing the concept of focal places, I argue that the home is the quintessential focal site where our maintenance practices can create embeddedness in our material environments and overcome dangerous technological patterns of being.
Environment, Space, Place, 2022
In this paper, I argue that our lives are situated in territories of natural and built environmen... more In this paper, I argue that our lives are situated in territories of natural and built environments that should be included in our conceptions of home. I maintain that this expanded conception is indispensable for an environmental ethic that is both well-grounded and practically efficacious. Thus, I take a serious look at the things, places, and others that ought to be included in our concept of home.
In the first section I discuss persistent problems for dominant theories of environmental ethics, namely that they fail to connect or give equal weight to value in nature and valuing nature. In the second section, I rely on the work of Hans Jonas to show that ethical responsibility is central to any robust theory of ethics. Ethical theory requires both a source of value and a feeling of responsibility toward that value to be appropriately grounded. Sections three and four contain my arguments for a conception of home in an expanded sense. There I also argue that homes act as primal sites of responsibility, ones that establish both value in nature and a feeling that grounds an environmental ethic. The final section builds on this ground by providing a set of values or ideals to which individuals can commit in order to make their homes good ones in an ethically-charged sense.
The Philosophy of Forgiveness Series: Underrepresented Perspectives on Forgiveness , 2021
Forgiveness is often understood as an individual process and decision. I forgive you so that I ca... more Forgiveness is often understood as an individual process and decision. I forgive you so that I can find peace and move on. I forgive you so that you don’t have to feel guilty. I forgive you so that we can get on with life. But in each of these cases, it seems that I forgive you, strictly on the basis of my reasons and choices. In this paper, we question both 1) if forgiveness is an individual’s decision to move on or get over some transgression and 2) if forgiveness is simply an individual’s decision?
In the first section, we provide a brief overview of emotional accounts of forgiveness, which are almost exclusively negative emotional accounts, meaning that forgiveness is typically understood as a process of removing certain emotions such as resentment and anger, Likewise, forgiveness is often conceived negatively as a removal of the harm -- forgive and forget, they say. Furthermore, these emotional accounts are largely rationalistic. On these views, forgiveness is the rational activity of removing emotions or evaluations based on reasons. These might be practical reasons or moral reasons, but even emotional accounts of forgiveness prioritize this rational activity and conceive of forgiveness as a form of individual decision-making.
In the second section, we question this negative, rationalistic account of forgiveness as “getting over” something. Though we concede that this negative account has a place in considerations of forgiveness, we see “getting over” as largely a consequence of forgiveness rather than its substantive content. Our core claim is that forgiveness is better understood relationally, as something dynamic and ongoing, and as a process constituted by a revised worldview (or other-view, as it were). This revised worldview 1) incorporates the harmful act of the wrongdoer into the forgiver’s conception of that person and then 2) accepts this new conception as conducive to the existing relationship or revises the relationship in light of the other-view.
The third section highlights the connections between our conception of forgiveness with feminist care ethics. Care ethics insists on the central importance of interconnectedness and interpersonal relationships, sensitivity to context, and emotional motivation. Our view incorporates these insights and proposes a model of forgiveness that recognizes that though rational activity is indeed a crucial component, the process of forgiveness cannot be reduced to it. Importantly, it is not an isolated individual’s rational activity but a process that takes place in the relationship between the wronged and wrongdoer. As such, our account gives forgiveness positive content and conceives it as not merely the removal of emotion but a robust emotional process in its own right.
Radical Philosophy Review, 2020
I argue that environmental ignorance is a group-based form of substantive ignorance that is analo... more I argue that environmental ignorance is a group-based form of substantive ignorance that is analogous to race-based ignorance, showing that they are structurally and functionally similar and sometimes overlap. While race theorists offer promising solutions toward eliminating race-based ignorance, I argue that something far more is needed in the environmental case. I turn to panpsychism as a possible solution. Though I conclude that it is too radical for most Americans to willingly embrace, I incorporate a notion of “encounter” to argue that an expanded conception of home helps with the conceptual overhaul needed to overcome environmental ignorance.
This paper explores Hawaiian racial identity formation using María Lugones’s metaphor of curdling... more This paper explores Hawaiian racial identity formation using María Lugones’s metaphor of curdling as a guiding theme. I aim to show that the accepted definition of “native Hawaiian” is based on a purity model of race that serves to undermine the unity of the Hawaiian Nation. I begin by outlining the pre-contact understanding of Hawaiian identity. This conception of identity was subsequently altered through various political agendas to fit within a Western/European notion of “pure” racial identity. I argue that continuing to use the imposed definition of “native Hawaiian” makes the fragmentation of Hawaiian identity and society difficult to overcome. Additionally, I offer a discussion of the gendered rhetoric of some Hawaiian activists that complicates the effort to regain a precolonial cultural identity that was largely egalitarian. Finally, I suggest that a rejection of racial purity and a rearticulation of Hawaiian identity that recaptures pre-contact, strategic notions of belonging by way of Lugones’s “impure resistance” can set the stage for a more inclusive Hawaiian Nation.
It is seemingly an accepted fact that no Sanskrit poets or playwrights wrote tragedies akin to th... more It is seemingly an accepted fact that no Sanskrit poets or playwrights wrote tragedies akin to those of the Greeks or Elizabethans. Indeed, the absence of tragedy is considered a marked characteristic of Sanskrit literature. There are three primary reasons in support of this view. First, there is no specific literary genre demarcated by Sanskrit critics as tragic, whereas comedies and romances are characterized as such. Second, the mood, or rasa, of śoka (grief) can never dominate the Sanskrit poem or play. A Sanskrit literary work must always have a happy ending. Indeed, śoka is not included among the generally accepted eight rasas. Rather, a derivative of grief is sometimes deployed in its place: karuṇa – compassion, pity. Finally, literary critics point out that there are no individuals in Sanskrit, only types which are ready-made and eternal, and the lack of individuality precludes potential tragedy.
In this paper I argue that śoka (grief) transformed into the karuṇa rasa (aesthetic emotion of compassion) does not preclude the possibility for tragedy in Sanskrit literature, but is one of two appropriate aesthetic responses to tragic circumstances. I will use the Rāmāyana as my exemplary case. I suggest that Rāma, though he is oft regarded as merely an avatar for the god Viṣṇu, is also a deeply problematic human character indicated by many of the decisions he makes which are not clearly aligned with his godly-being. Further, I will argue that Sītā only comes to be Sītā by the tragic choice that we see her make and that through this act she opens the possibility for a new ethical and political world. While critics admit that a Sanskrit work might have a tragic sentiment, they assert that it does not have tragic action. I argue that the Rāmāyana has both.
in Philosophical Inquiries into Pregnancy, Childbirth, and Mothering: Maternal Subjects, 2012
Blade Runner 2049 and Philosophy, 2019
Wikileaking: The Ethics of Secrecy and Exposure , 2018
Based on case studies from Georgia and Tennessee, several recommendations are made for improving ... more Based on case studies from Georgia and Tennessee, several recommendations are made for improving access to affordable, quality child care and improving the programs’ effectiveness in the U.S., based on surveys, focus groups, interviews and economic analyses employed by the study’s authors. Recommendations are made regarding the potential for increased public funding to positively impact eligibility, access, and most importantly, quality:
Eligibility:
1. Raise income caps to allow more low-income working parents to receive benefits.
2. Reduce the work-hour requirement so that part-time employment is sufficient to qualify for child care subsidies.
3. Allow eligibility for people in job training and for all students pursuing a post-secondary education.
4. Provide child care subsidies that are not linked to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
Access:
1. Improve communication to families about the application process.
2. Make provisions for children with special needs, and improve the flexibility of care coverage to support parents who work non-traditional hours.
3. Ensure safe transportation for children to and from their care providers.
4. Develop guidelines for pricing so that centers that receive assistance to improve quality do not raise their fees, effec- tively pricing out the lowest income consumers.
Quality:
1. Develop national guidelines on minimum safety requirements.
2. Invest in the training of the child care workforce.
3. Identify and disseminate best practices for improving the quality of child care.
Book Reviews by Brooke Rudow
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Papers by Brooke Rudow
In the first section I discuss persistent problems for dominant theories of environmental ethics, namely that they fail to connect or give equal weight to value in nature and valuing nature. In the second section, I rely on the work of Hans Jonas to show that ethical responsibility is central to any robust theory of ethics. Ethical theory requires both a source of value and a feeling of responsibility toward that value to be appropriately grounded. Sections three and four contain my arguments for a conception of home in an expanded sense. There I also argue that homes act as primal sites of responsibility, ones that establish both value in nature and a feeling that grounds an environmental ethic. The final section builds on this ground by providing a set of values or ideals to which individuals can commit in order to make their homes good ones in an ethically-charged sense.
In the first section, we provide a brief overview of emotional accounts of forgiveness, which are almost exclusively negative emotional accounts, meaning that forgiveness is typically understood as a process of removing certain emotions such as resentment and anger, Likewise, forgiveness is often conceived negatively as a removal of the harm -- forgive and forget, they say. Furthermore, these emotional accounts are largely rationalistic. On these views, forgiveness is the rational activity of removing emotions or evaluations based on reasons. These might be practical reasons or moral reasons, but even emotional accounts of forgiveness prioritize this rational activity and conceive of forgiveness as a form of individual decision-making.
In the second section, we question this negative, rationalistic account of forgiveness as “getting over” something. Though we concede that this negative account has a place in considerations of forgiveness, we see “getting over” as largely a consequence of forgiveness rather than its substantive content. Our core claim is that forgiveness is better understood relationally, as something dynamic and ongoing, and as a process constituted by a revised worldview (or other-view, as it were). This revised worldview 1) incorporates the harmful act of the wrongdoer into the forgiver’s conception of that person and then 2) accepts this new conception as conducive to the existing relationship or revises the relationship in light of the other-view.
The third section highlights the connections between our conception of forgiveness with feminist care ethics. Care ethics insists on the central importance of interconnectedness and interpersonal relationships, sensitivity to context, and emotional motivation. Our view incorporates these insights and proposes a model of forgiveness that recognizes that though rational activity is indeed a crucial component, the process of forgiveness cannot be reduced to it. Importantly, it is not an isolated individual’s rational activity but a process that takes place in the relationship between the wronged and wrongdoer. As such, our account gives forgiveness positive content and conceives it as not merely the removal of emotion but a robust emotional process in its own right.
In this paper I argue that śoka (grief) transformed into the karuṇa rasa (aesthetic emotion of compassion) does not preclude the possibility for tragedy in Sanskrit literature, but is one of two appropriate aesthetic responses to tragic circumstances. I will use the Rāmāyana as my exemplary case. I suggest that Rāma, though he is oft regarded as merely an avatar for the god Viṣṇu, is also a deeply problematic human character indicated by many of the decisions he makes which are not clearly aligned with his godly-being. Further, I will argue that Sītā only comes to be Sītā by the tragic choice that we see her make and that through this act she opens the possibility for a new ethical and political world. While critics admit that a Sanskrit work might have a tragic sentiment, they assert that it does not have tragic action. I argue that the Rāmāyana has both.
Eligibility:
1. Raise income caps to allow more low-income working parents to receive benefits.
2. Reduce the work-hour requirement so that part-time employment is sufficient to qualify for child care subsidies.
3. Allow eligibility for people in job training and for all students pursuing a post-secondary education.
4. Provide child care subsidies that are not linked to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
Access:
1. Improve communication to families about the application process.
2. Make provisions for children with special needs, and improve the flexibility of care coverage to support parents who work non-traditional hours.
3. Ensure safe transportation for children to and from their care providers.
4. Develop guidelines for pricing so that centers that receive assistance to improve quality do not raise their fees, effec- tively pricing out the lowest income consumers.
Quality:
1. Develop national guidelines on minimum safety requirements.
2. Invest in the training of the child care workforce.
3. Identify and disseminate best practices for improving the quality of child care.
Book Reviews by Brooke Rudow
In the first section I discuss persistent problems for dominant theories of environmental ethics, namely that they fail to connect or give equal weight to value in nature and valuing nature. In the second section, I rely on the work of Hans Jonas to show that ethical responsibility is central to any robust theory of ethics. Ethical theory requires both a source of value and a feeling of responsibility toward that value to be appropriately grounded. Sections three and four contain my arguments for a conception of home in an expanded sense. There I also argue that homes act as primal sites of responsibility, ones that establish both value in nature and a feeling that grounds an environmental ethic. The final section builds on this ground by providing a set of values or ideals to which individuals can commit in order to make their homes good ones in an ethically-charged sense.
In the first section, we provide a brief overview of emotional accounts of forgiveness, which are almost exclusively negative emotional accounts, meaning that forgiveness is typically understood as a process of removing certain emotions such as resentment and anger, Likewise, forgiveness is often conceived negatively as a removal of the harm -- forgive and forget, they say. Furthermore, these emotional accounts are largely rationalistic. On these views, forgiveness is the rational activity of removing emotions or evaluations based on reasons. These might be practical reasons or moral reasons, but even emotional accounts of forgiveness prioritize this rational activity and conceive of forgiveness as a form of individual decision-making.
In the second section, we question this negative, rationalistic account of forgiveness as “getting over” something. Though we concede that this negative account has a place in considerations of forgiveness, we see “getting over” as largely a consequence of forgiveness rather than its substantive content. Our core claim is that forgiveness is better understood relationally, as something dynamic and ongoing, and as a process constituted by a revised worldview (or other-view, as it were). This revised worldview 1) incorporates the harmful act of the wrongdoer into the forgiver’s conception of that person and then 2) accepts this new conception as conducive to the existing relationship or revises the relationship in light of the other-view.
The third section highlights the connections between our conception of forgiveness with feminist care ethics. Care ethics insists on the central importance of interconnectedness and interpersonal relationships, sensitivity to context, and emotional motivation. Our view incorporates these insights and proposes a model of forgiveness that recognizes that though rational activity is indeed a crucial component, the process of forgiveness cannot be reduced to it. Importantly, it is not an isolated individual’s rational activity but a process that takes place in the relationship between the wronged and wrongdoer. As such, our account gives forgiveness positive content and conceives it as not merely the removal of emotion but a robust emotional process in its own right.
In this paper I argue that śoka (grief) transformed into the karuṇa rasa (aesthetic emotion of compassion) does not preclude the possibility for tragedy in Sanskrit literature, but is one of two appropriate aesthetic responses to tragic circumstances. I will use the Rāmāyana as my exemplary case. I suggest that Rāma, though he is oft regarded as merely an avatar for the god Viṣṇu, is also a deeply problematic human character indicated by many of the decisions he makes which are not clearly aligned with his godly-being. Further, I will argue that Sītā only comes to be Sītā by the tragic choice that we see her make and that through this act she opens the possibility for a new ethical and political world. While critics admit that a Sanskrit work might have a tragic sentiment, they assert that it does not have tragic action. I argue that the Rāmāyana has both.
Eligibility:
1. Raise income caps to allow more low-income working parents to receive benefits.
2. Reduce the work-hour requirement so that part-time employment is sufficient to qualify for child care subsidies.
3. Allow eligibility for people in job training and for all students pursuing a post-secondary education.
4. Provide child care subsidies that are not linked to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
Access:
1. Improve communication to families about the application process.
2. Make provisions for children with special needs, and improve the flexibility of care coverage to support parents who work non-traditional hours.
3. Ensure safe transportation for children to and from their care providers.
4. Develop guidelines for pricing so that centers that receive assistance to improve quality do not raise their fees, effec- tively pricing out the lowest income consumers.
Quality:
1. Develop national guidelines on minimum safety requirements.
2. Invest in the training of the child care workforce.
3. Identify and disseminate best practices for improving the quality of child care.