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Ruth Boeker

University College Dublin, Philosophy, Faculty Member

University of St Andrews, Philosophy, Alumna

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I am Associate Professor at University College Dublin. I received my PhD from the University of St Andrews in 2013 and held positions at the University of Melbourne, the University at Albany, State University of New York, and at Bowling Green State University before moving to Dublin in 2017.
Address: School of Historical and Philosophical Studies
The University of Melbourne
Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia

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Emilio Maria De Tommaso

IUL

Patricia Sheridan

University of Guelph

Jessica Gordon-Roth

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities

University of Melbourne

Monash University

Northeastern University

Nathan Rockwood

Brigham Young University

Bar-Ilan University

Jacqueline Broad

Monash University

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Books by Ruth Boeker

Catharine Trotter Cockburn

Cambridge University Press , 2023

This Element offers the first detailed study of Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s philosophy and cover... more This Element offers the first detailed study of Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s philosophy and covers her contributions to philosophical debates in epistemology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion. It examines not only Cockburn’s view that sensation and reflection are the sources of knowledge, but also how she draws attention to the limitations of human understanding and how she approaches metaphysical debates through this lens. In the area of moral philosophy, this Element argues that it is helpful to take seriously Cockburn’s distinction between questions concerning the metaphysical foundation of morality and questions concerning the practice of morality. Moreover, this Element examines Cockburn’s religious views and considers her understanding of the relation between morality and religion and her religious views concerning the resurrection and the afterlife.

Locke on Persons and Personal Identity

Oxford University Press, 2021

Ruth Boeker offers a new perspective on Locke’s account of persons and personal identity by consi... more Ruth Boeker offers a new perspective on Locke’s account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Her interpretation emphasizes the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view. By taking seriously Locke’s general approach to questions of identity, Boeker shows that we should consider his account of personhood separately from his account of personal identity over time. On this basis, she argues that Locke endorses a moral account of personhood, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, and that his particular thinking about moral accountability explains why he regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity over time. In contrast to some neo-Lockean views about personal identity, Boeker argues that Locke’s account of personal identity is not psychological per se, but rather his underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs are relevant for understanding why he argues for a consciousness-based account of personal identity. Taking his underlying background beliefs into consideration not only sheds light on why many of his early critics do not adopt Locke’s view, but also shows why his view cannot be as easily dismissed as some of his critics assume.

Papers by Ruth Boeker

Thomas Reid on Promises and Social Operations of the Human Mind

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

My paper offers a new interpretation of Reid's account of social operations of the human mind. I ... more My paper offers a new interpretation of Reid's account of social operations of the human mind. I argue that it is important to acknowledge the counterpart structure of social operations. By this I mean that for Reid every social operation is paired with a counterpart operation. On the view that I ascribe to Reid, at least two intelligent beings take part in a social operation and the social operation does not come into existence until both the social operation and its counterpart operation have been exercised and the relevant mental thoughts made known to the other being by words or signs.

Introduction to Locke on Persons and Personal Identity

Oxford University Press, 2021

This introductory chapter outlines Locke’s innovative contributions to debates about persons and ... more This introductory chapter outlines Locke’s innovative contributions to debates about persons and personal identity. His view builds, first, on moral and legal conceptions of a person, which can be found in natural law theory, second, on metaphysical debates about individuation and identity, and, third, on metaphysical and religious debates about the afterlife and the state of the soul between death and resurrection. The chapter shows that he not only builds on these debates, but also how he systematically brings the different debates together in new ways and how his distinction between the ideas of person, man, and substance makes it possible to advance the debates of his day. Moreover, this chapter presents the aims and scope of the book and offers a summary of the subsequent chapters.

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Shaftesbury on Persons, Personal Identity and Character Development

Philosophy Compass, 2020

Francis Hutcheson on Liberty

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2020

This paper aims to reconstruct Francis Hutcheson's thinking about liberty. Since he does not offe... more This paper aims to reconstruct Francis Hutcheson's thinking about liberty. Since he does not offer a detailed treatment of philosophical questions concerning liberty in his mature philosophical writings I turn to a textbook on metaphysics. We can assume that he prepared the textbook during the 1720s in Dublin. This textbook deserves more attention. First, it sheds light on Hutcheson's role as a teacher in Ireland and Scotland. Second, Hutcheson's contributions to metaphysical disputes are more original than sometimes assumed. To appreciate his independent thinking, I argue, it is helpful to take the intellectual debates in Ireland into consideration, including William King's defence of free will and discussions of Shaftesbury's views in Robert Molesworth's intellectual circle. Rather than taking a stance on the philosophical disputes about liberty, I argue that Hutcheson aims to shift the focus of the debates towards practical questions concerning control of desire, cultivation of habits, and character development.

New Perspectives on Agency in Early Modern Philosophy

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2019

This introductory article outlines the themes and aims of this special issue, which offers new pe... more This introductory article outlines the themes and aims of this special issue, which offers new perspectives on early modern debates about agency in two ways: First, it recovers writings on agency and liberty that have been widely neglected or that have received insufficient attention, including writings by Anne Conway, Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, William King, Gabrielle Suchon, Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet, Mary Astell, and Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury. Second, it reveals the richness of early modern debates about agency and liberty.

Shaftesbury on Liberty and Self-Mastery

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2019

The aim of this paper is to show that Shaftesbury's thinking about liberty is best understood in ... more The aim of this paper is to show that Shaftesbury's thinking about liberty is best understood in terms of self-mastery. To examine his understanding of liberty, I turn to a painting that he commissioned on the ancient theme of the choice of Hercules and the notes that he prepared for the artist. Questions of human choice are also present in the so-called story of an amour, which addresses the difficulties of controlling human passions. Jaffro distinguishes three notions of self-control that are present in the story of an amour. Although I agree with many aspects of Jaffro's interpretation, I question his conclusion that self-control in the Stoic sense is best reserved for 'moral heroes.' I propose an alternative developmental interpretation, according to which all human beings are on an intellectual journey aimed at personal and moral improvement. My interpretation takes seriously that for Shaftesbury philosophy is meant to be practical and help improve our lives. I end by arguing that rather than trying to situate Shaftesbury's concept of liberty within debates among compatibilists and incompatibilists it is more promising to understand it in terms of self-mastery and thus regard it as a version of positive liberty.

Locke on Being Self to My Self

The Self: A History, edited by Patricia Kitcher (New York: Oxford University Press), 2021

John Locke accepts that every perception gives me immediate and intuitive knowledge of my own exi... more John Locke accepts that every perception gives me immediate and intuitive knowledge of my own existence. However, this knowledge is limited to the present moment when I have the perception. If I want to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions of my continued existence over time, Locke argues that it is important to clarify what ‘I’ refers to. While we often do not distinguish the concept of a person from that of a human being in ordinary language, Locke emphasizes that this distinction is important if we want to engage with questions of identity over time. According to Locke, persons are thinking intelligent beings who can consider themselves as extended into the past and future and who are concerned for their happiness and accountable for their actions. Moreover, for Locke a self is a person, considered from a first-personal point of view. I show that the concept of self that he develops in the context of his discussion of persons and personal identity is richer and more complex than the I-concept that he invokes in his version of the cogito. I further argue that Locke’s moral and religious views explain why he emphasizes the need for a conceptual distinction between persons and human beings. In the final section I turn to the reception of Locke’s view by some of his early critics and defenders, including Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet, an anonymous author, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn.

Locke and William Molyneux

William Molyneux (1656–1698) was an Irish experimental philosopher and politician, who played a m... more William Molyneux (1656–1698) was an Irish experimental philosopher and politician, who played a major role in the intellectual life in seventeenth-century Dublin. He became Locke’s friend and correspondent in 1692 and was probably Locke’s philosophically most significant correspondent. Locke approached Molyneux for advice for revising his Essay concerning Human Understanding as he was preparing the second and subsequent editions. Locke made several changes in response to Molyneux’s suggestions; they include major revisions of the chapter ‘Of Power’ (2.21), the addition of the chapter ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ (2.27), and the addition of the so-called Molyneux Problem (2.9.8). Molyneux repeatedly requested that Locke develops his views on morality. Additionally, their correspondence turned to questions concerning education and Molyneux’s keen interest in the topic likely prompted Locke to publish Some Thoughts Concerning Education in 1693. Moreover, Molyneux drew on Locke’s anonymously published Two Treatises of Government in his The Case of Ireland’s Being Bound by Acts of Parliament in England, Stated, which was first published in the spring of 1698. Molyneux revealed Locke’s authorship of Two Treatises against Locke’s will, yet their friendship continued until Molyneux’s untimely death in October 1698.

Shaftesbury on Persons, Personal Identity and Character Development

Philosophy Compass, 2018

Shaftesbury's major work Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times was one of the most in... more Shaftesbury's major work Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times was one of the most influential English works in the eighteenth century. This paper focuses on his contributions to debates about persons and personal identity and shows that Shaftesbury regards metaphysical questions of personal identity as closely connected with normative questions of character development. I argue that he is willing to accept that persons are substances and that he takes their continued existence for granted. He sees the need to supplement metaphysical debates of personal identity and believes that we have to turn to the character that is realized by a substance if we want to understand who we are. For Shaftesbury, persons have a particular character, can act and govern themselves. I propose that Shaftesbury's approach to persons has a developmental dimension, which is meant to encourage personal development and improvement of character. The developmental dimension can be understood as an intellectual journey that invites us to search for our true self, to develop our character and to seek happiness, which ultimately involves understanding our place as persons in the order of the universe. I show that my developmental interpretation is preferable to other existing interpretations.

Locke and Hume on Personal Identity: Moral and Religious Differences

Hume Studies, 2015

Hume’s theory of personal identity is developed in response to Locke’s account of personal identi... more Hume’s theory of personal identity is developed in response to Locke’s account of personal identity. Yet it is striking that Hume does not emphasize Locke’s distinction between persons and human beings. It seems even more striking that Hume’s account of the self in Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise has less scope for distinguishing persons from human beings than his account in Book 1. This is puzzling, because Locke originally introduced the distinction in order to answer questions of moral accountability and Hume’s discussion of the self in Book 2 provides the foundation of his moral theory in Book 3. In response to the puzzle I show that Locke and Hume hold different moral and religious views and these differences are important to explain why their theories of personal identity differ.

Locke on Personal Identity: A Response to the Problems of his Predecessors

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2017

In this paper I argue that understanding John Locke’s account of personal identity in the context... more In this paper I argue that understanding John Locke’s account of personal identity in the context of the metaphysical and religious debates of his day, especially the debates concerning the possibility of the afterlife and the resurrection, reveals the strengths of his theory. I follow Locke in classifying the views of his predecessors into material, Cartesian and non-Cartesian immaterial views of the soul, and views, according to which human beings are mind-body unions. I identify metaphysical problems for each view respectively and argue that the strength of Locke’s account of personal identity is not only that it provides a response to the various problems that arise for the views of his predecessors, but also that he offers a theory that does not require him to prove their views to be mistaken and is thereby consistent with their mutually exclusive views.

The Moral Dimension in Locke's Account of Persons and Personal Identity

History of Philosophy Quarterly, Jul 2014

I offer an interpretation of John Locke's account of persons and personal identity that gives ful... more I offer an interpretation of John Locke's account of persons and personal identity that gives full credit to Locke's claim that "person" is a forensic term, sheds new light on the relation between Locke's characterizations of a person in sections 9 and 26, and explains how Locke links his moral and legal account of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of consciousness. I show that Locke's claim that sameness of consciousness is necessary for personal identity depends on two components: first, his particular moral and legal conception of a person and, second, his particular understanding of the conditions of just accountability for past actions. Had Locke given a different account of personhood, or thought differently about the conditions of just accountability, he might have given a nonpsychological account of personal identity.

John Locke: Identity, Persons, and Personal Identity

Review of Galen Strawson, "Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment"

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2013

The Role of Appropriation in Locke's Account of Persons and Personal Identity

According to Locke, appropriation is a precondition for moral responsibility and thus we can expe... more According to Locke, appropriation is a precondition for moral responsibility and thus we can expect that it plays a distinctive role in his theory. Yet it is rare to find an interpretation of Locke's account of appropriation that does not associate it with serious problems. To make room for a more satisfying understanding of Locke's account of appropriation we have to analyse why it was so widely misunderstood. The aim of this paper is fourfold: First, I will show that Mackie's and Winkler's interpretations that have shaped the subsequent discussion contain serious flaws. Second, I will argue that the so-called appropriation interpretation -that is the view that appropriation is meant to provide alternative persistence conditions for persons-lacks support. Third, I will re-examine Locke's texts and argue that we can come to a better understanding of his notion of appropriation in the Essay if we interpret it in analogy to his account of appropriation in Two Treatises. Fourth, I will offer a more fine-grained interpretation of the role of appropriation in relation to persistence conditions for persons. I conclude by showing that the advantage of this proposal is that it reconciles interpretations that have commonly been thought to be inconsistent.

Other by Ruth Boeker

Workshop on Topics in Early Modern Moral Philosophy and Moral Psychology

A Workshop hosted by the UCD School of Philosophy, 28 February 2020.

Agency in Early Modern Philosophy Workshop: Stipends for prospective PhD students

The UCD School of Philosophy invites prospective PhD students to attend the Agency in Early Moder... more

CFP: Agency in Early Modern Philosophy Workshop at University College Dublin

Keynote Speaker: Jacqueline Broad (Monash) This workshop aims to bring together scholars who wor... more Keynote Speaker: Jacqueline Broad (Monash)
This workshop aims to bring together scholars who work on agency in early modern philosophy from a variety of different perspectives, including but not restricted to moral, social, political, cultural, metaphysical and phenomenological approaches to agency. It aims to to rethink existing narratives about agency and early modern philosophy and to rediscover the works of relatively widely neglected philosophers, and women philosophers in particular.

Catharine Trotter Cockburn

Cambridge University Press , 2023

This Element offers the first detailed study of Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s philosophy and cover... more This Element offers the first detailed study of Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s philosophy and covers her contributions to philosophical debates in epistemology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion. It examines not only Cockburn’s view that sensation and reflection are the sources of knowledge, but also how she draws attention to the limitations of human understanding and how she approaches metaphysical debates through this lens. In the area of moral philosophy, this Element argues that it is helpful to take seriously Cockburn’s distinction between questions concerning the metaphysical foundation of morality and questions concerning the practice of morality. Moreover, this Element examines Cockburn’s religious views and considers her understanding of the relation between morality and religion and her religious views concerning the resurrection and the afterlife.

Locke on Persons and Personal Identity

Oxford University Press, 2021

Ruth Boeker offers a new perspective on Locke’s account of persons and personal identity by consi... more Ruth Boeker offers a new perspective on Locke’s account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Her interpretation emphasizes the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view. By taking seriously Locke’s general approach to questions of identity, Boeker shows that we should consider his account of personhood separately from his account of personal identity over time. On this basis, she argues that Locke endorses a moral account of personhood, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, and that his particular thinking about moral accountability explains why he regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity over time. In contrast to some neo-Lockean views about personal identity, Boeker argues that Locke’s account of personal identity is not psychological per se, but rather his underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs are relevant for understanding why he argues for a consciousness-based account of personal identity. Taking his underlying background beliefs into consideration not only sheds light on why many of his early critics do not adopt Locke’s view, but also shows why his view cannot be as easily dismissed as some of his critics assume.

Thomas Reid on Promises and Social Operations of the Human Mind

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

My paper offers a new interpretation of Reid's account of social operations of the human mind. I ... more My paper offers a new interpretation of Reid's account of social operations of the human mind. I argue that it is important to acknowledge the counterpart structure of social operations. By this I mean that for Reid every social operation is paired with a counterpart operation. On the view that I ascribe to Reid, at least two intelligent beings take part in a social operation and the social operation does not come into existence until both the social operation and its counterpart operation have been exercised and the relevant mental thoughts made known to the other being by words or signs.

Introduction to Locke on Persons and Personal Identity

Oxford University Press, 2021

This introductory chapter outlines Locke’s innovative contributions to debates about persons and ... more This introductory chapter outlines Locke’s innovative contributions to debates about persons and personal identity. His view builds, first, on moral and legal conceptions of a person, which can be found in natural law theory, second, on metaphysical debates about individuation and identity, and, third, on metaphysical and religious debates about the afterlife and the state of the soul between death and resurrection. The chapter shows that he not only builds on these debates, but also how he systematically brings the different debates together in new ways and how his distinction between the ideas of person, man, and substance makes it possible to advance the debates of his day. Moreover, this chapter presents the aims and scope of the book and offers a summary of the subsequent chapters.

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Shaftesbury on Persons, Personal Identity and Character Development

Philosophy Compass, 2020

Francis Hutcheson on Liberty

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2020

This paper aims to reconstruct Francis Hutcheson's thinking about liberty. Since he does not offe... more This paper aims to reconstruct Francis Hutcheson's thinking about liberty. Since he does not offer a detailed treatment of philosophical questions concerning liberty in his mature philosophical writings I turn to a textbook on metaphysics. We can assume that he prepared the textbook during the 1720s in Dublin. This textbook deserves more attention. First, it sheds light on Hutcheson's role as a teacher in Ireland and Scotland. Second, Hutcheson's contributions to metaphysical disputes are more original than sometimes assumed. To appreciate his independent thinking, I argue, it is helpful to take the intellectual debates in Ireland into consideration, including William King's defence of free will and discussions of Shaftesbury's views in Robert Molesworth's intellectual circle. Rather than taking a stance on the philosophical disputes about liberty, I argue that Hutcheson aims to shift the focus of the debates towards practical questions concerning control of desire, cultivation of habits, and character development.

New Perspectives on Agency in Early Modern Philosophy

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2019

This introductory article outlines the themes and aims of this special issue, which offers new pe... more This introductory article outlines the themes and aims of this special issue, which offers new perspectives on early modern debates about agency in two ways: First, it recovers writings on agency and liberty that have been widely neglected or that have received insufficient attention, including writings by Anne Conway, Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, William King, Gabrielle Suchon, Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet, Mary Astell, and Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury. Second, it reveals the richness of early modern debates about agency and liberty.

Shaftesbury on Liberty and Self-Mastery

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2019

The aim of this paper is to show that Shaftesbury's thinking about liberty is best understood in ... more The aim of this paper is to show that Shaftesbury's thinking about liberty is best understood in terms of self-mastery. To examine his understanding of liberty, I turn to a painting that he commissioned on the ancient theme of the choice of Hercules and the notes that he prepared for the artist. Questions of human choice are also present in the so-called story of an amour, which addresses the difficulties of controlling human passions. Jaffro distinguishes three notions of self-control that are present in the story of an amour. Although I agree with many aspects of Jaffro's interpretation, I question his conclusion that self-control in the Stoic sense is best reserved for 'moral heroes.' I propose an alternative developmental interpretation, according to which all human beings are on an intellectual journey aimed at personal and moral improvement. My interpretation takes seriously that for Shaftesbury philosophy is meant to be practical and help improve our lives. I end by arguing that rather than trying to situate Shaftesbury's concept of liberty within debates among compatibilists and incompatibilists it is more promising to understand it in terms of self-mastery and thus regard it as a version of positive liberty.

Locke on Being Self to My Self

The Self: A History, edited by Patricia Kitcher (New York: Oxford University Press), 2021

John Locke accepts that every perception gives me immediate and intuitive knowledge of my own exi... more John Locke accepts that every perception gives me immediate and intuitive knowledge of my own existence. However, this knowledge is limited to the present moment when I have the perception. If I want to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions of my continued existence over time, Locke argues that it is important to clarify what ‘I’ refers to. While we often do not distinguish the concept of a person from that of a human being in ordinary language, Locke emphasizes that this distinction is important if we want to engage with questions of identity over time. According to Locke, persons are thinking intelligent beings who can consider themselves as extended into the past and future and who are concerned for their happiness and accountable for their actions. Moreover, for Locke a self is a person, considered from a first-personal point of view. I show that the concept of self that he develops in the context of his discussion of persons and personal identity is richer and more complex than the I-concept that he invokes in his version of the cogito. I further argue that Locke’s moral and religious views explain why he emphasizes the need for a conceptual distinction between persons and human beings. In the final section I turn to the reception of Locke’s view by some of his early critics and defenders, including Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet, an anonymous author, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn.

Locke and William Molyneux

William Molyneux (1656–1698) was an Irish experimental philosopher and politician, who played a m... more William Molyneux (1656–1698) was an Irish experimental philosopher and politician, who played a major role in the intellectual life in seventeenth-century Dublin. He became Locke’s friend and correspondent in 1692 and was probably Locke’s philosophically most significant correspondent. Locke approached Molyneux for advice for revising his Essay concerning Human Understanding as he was preparing the second and subsequent editions. Locke made several changes in response to Molyneux’s suggestions; they include major revisions of the chapter ‘Of Power’ (2.21), the addition of the chapter ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ (2.27), and the addition of the so-called Molyneux Problem (2.9.8). Molyneux repeatedly requested that Locke develops his views on morality. Additionally, their correspondence turned to questions concerning education and Molyneux’s keen interest in the topic likely prompted Locke to publish Some Thoughts Concerning Education in 1693. Moreover, Molyneux drew on Locke’s anonymously published Two Treatises of Government in his The Case of Ireland’s Being Bound by Acts of Parliament in England, Stated, which was first published in the spring of 1698. Molyneux revealed Locke’s authorship of Two Treatises against Locke’s will, yet their friendship continued until Molyneux’s untimely death in October 1698.

Shaftesbury on Persons, Personal Identity and Character Development

Philosophy Compass, 2018

Shaftesbury's major work Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times was one of the most in... more Shaftesbury's major work Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times was one of the most influential English works in the eighteenth century. This paper focuses on his contributions to debates about persons and personal identity and shows that Shaftesbury regards metaphysical questions of personal identity as closely connected with normative questions of character development. I argue that he is willing to accept that persons are substances and that he takes their continued existence for granted. He sees the need to supplement metaphysical debates of personal identity and believes that we have to turn to the character that is realized by a substance if we want to understand who we are. For Shaftesbury, persons have a particular character, can act and govern themselves. I propose that Shaftesbury's approach to persons has a developmental dimension, which is meant to encourage personal development and improvement of character. The developmental dimension can be understood as an intellectual journey that invites us to search for our true self, to develop our character and to seek happiness, which ultimately involves understanding our place as persons in the order of the universe. I show that my developmental interpretation is preferable to other existing interpretations.

Locke and Hume on Personal Identity: Moral and Religious Differences

Hume Studies, 2015

Hume’s theory of personal identity is developed in response to Locke’s account of personal identi... more Hume’s theory of personal identity is developed in response to Locke’s account of personal identity. Yet it is striking that Hume does not emphasize Locke’s distinction between persons and human beings. It seems even more striking that Hume’s account of the self in Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise has less scope for distinguishing persons from human beings than his account in Book 1. This is puzzling, because Locke originally introduced the distinction in order to answer questions of moral accountability and Hume’s discussion of the self in Book 2 provides the foundation of his moral theory in Book 3. In response to the puzzle I show that Locke and Hume hold different moral and religious views and these differences are important to explain why their theories of personal identity differ.

Locke on Personal Identity: A Response to the Problems of his Predecessors

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2017

In this paper I argue that understanding John Locke’s account of personal identity in the context... more In this paper I argue that understanding John Locke’s account of personal identity in the context of the metaphysical and religious debates of his day, especially the debates concerning the possibility of the afterlife and the resurrection, reveals the strengths of his theory. I follow Locke in classifying the views of his predecessors into material, Cartesian and non-Cartesian immaterial views of the soul, and views, according to which human beings are mind-body unions. I identify metaphysical problems for each view respectively and argue that the strength of Locke’s account of personal identity is not only that it provides a response to the various problems that arise for the views of his predecessors, but also that he offers a theory that does not require him to prove their views to be mistaken and is thereby consistent with their mutually exclusive views.

The Moral Dimension in Locke's Account of Persons and Personal Identity

History of Philosophy Quarterly, Jul 2014

I offer an interpretation of John Locke's account of persons and personal identity that gives ful... more I offer an interpretation of John Locke's account of persons and personal identity that gives full credit to Locke's claim that "person" is a forensic term, sheds new light on the relation between Locke's characterizations of a person in sections 9 and 26, and explains how Locke links his moral and legal account of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of consciousness. I show that Locke's claim that sameness of consciousness is necessary for personal identity depends on two components: first, his particular moral and legal conception of a person and, second, his particular understanding of the conditions of just accountability for past actions. Had Locke given a different account of personhood, or thought differently about the conditions of just accountability, he might have given a nonpsychological account of personal identity.

John Locke: Identity, Persons, and Personal Identity

Review of Galen Strawson, "Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment"

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2013

The Role of Appropriation in Locke's Account of Persons and Personal Identity

According to Locke, appropriation is a precondition for moral responsibility and thus we can expe... more According to Locke, appropriation is a precondition for moral responsibility and thus we can expect that it plays a distinctive role in his theory. Yet it is rare to find an interpretation of Locke's account of appropriation that does not associate it with serious problems. To make room for a more satisfying understanding of Locke's account of appropriation we have to analyse why it was so widely misunderstood. The aim of this paper is fourfold: First, I will show that Mackie's and Winkler's interpretations that have shaped the subsequent discussion contain serious flaws. Second, I will argue that the so-called appropriation interpretation -that is the view that appropriation is meant to provide alternative persistence conditions for persons-lacks support. Third, I will re-examine Locke's texts and argue that we can come to a better understanding of his notion of appropriation in the Essay if we interpret it in analogy to his account of appropriation in Two Treatises. Fourth, I will offer a more fine-grained interpretation of the role of appropriation in relation to persistence conditions for persons. I conclude by showing that the advantage of this proposal is that it reconciles interpretations that have commonly been thought to be inconsistent.

Workshop on Topics in Early Modern Moral Philosophy and Moral Psychology

A Workshop hosted by the UCD School of Philosophy, 28 February 2020.

Agency in Early Modern Philosophy Workshop: Stipends for prospective PhD students

The UCD School of Philosophy invites prospective PhD students to attend the Agency in Early Moder... more

CFP: Agency in Early Modern Philosophy Workshop at University College Dublin

Keynote Speaker: Jacqueline Broad (Monash) This workshop aims to bring together scholars who wor... more Keynote Speaker: Jacqueline Broad (Monash)
This workshop aims to bring together scholars who work on agency in early modern philosophy from a variety of different perspectives, including but not restricted to moral, social, political, cultural, metaphysical and phenomenological approaches to agency. It aims to to rethink existing narratives about agency and early modern philosophy and to rediscover the works of relatively widely neglected philosophers, and women philosophers in particular.

Personal Identity in the History of Philosophy Conference Program

http://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/pihp-conference/

Review of Shelley Weinberg, Consciousness in Locke

In Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2017).

Practising Philosophical Skills

Poster Presentation at APA/AAPT Teaching Hub, Pacific Division Meeting, April 2019.

Teaching Early Modern Philosophy Collaboratively with Team-Based Learning

Poster presentation at APA/AAPT Teaching Hub at 2018 APA Pacific