John Mee

University College Cork, Law, Faculty Member

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Professor John Mee is a graduate of UCC (BCL 1986; LLM 1987), Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto (LLM 1989) and Trinity College Dublin (PhD 1997) and was called to the Irish Bar in 1990. He began lecturing in the UCC Law Department in 1989 and was Dean of the Faculty of Law at UCC from 1999-2000. His research interests are in the areas of Land Law, Equity and Trusts and Family Property, with a special interest in law reform in these areas (and a developing interest in legal history). He has published three books, The Property Rights of Cohabitees (1999), Law and Taxation of Trusts (with Keogan and Wylie, 2007) and Land Law (with Pearce, 3rd ed, 2011), as well as articles and chapters in Irish and international journals and edited collections. He is a trustee director of the British and Irish Legal Information Institute (BAILII) and leads the IRLII (Irish Legal Information Institute) project: www.irlii.org and www.legalperiodicals.org.
Address: Law Faculty
Aras na Laoi
Western Road
Cork
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Books by John Mee

Land Law

Land Law is a readable, understandable and comprehensive text on Land Law for students, practisin... more Land Law is a readable, understandable and comprehensive text on Land Law for students, practising lawyers and others wishing to grasp the essentials of this important subject. It covers the law of the Republic of Ireland and of Northern Ireland. It deals with the radical reforms in the Republic of Ireland, accomplished primarily by the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009, and also addresses the comparable set of reforms proposed for Northern Ireland. Chapters include: The Nature and Classification of Property; The Diversity of RIghts in Land; Equity and Priorities, The Subject Matter of Ownership; Limits to the Ownership of Land, Fragmentation of Ownership Through Tenure; The DIvision of Ownership Over Time; Future Interests, Co-ownership; Acquisition and Transfer of Land Inter Vivos; Creation and Transfer of Leasehold Interests, Succession on Death; Adverse Possession; Trusts of Land and Settled Land, Licences, Rights of Residence and Estoppel; Servitudes, Covenants, Mortgages.

The Law and Taxation of Trusts

This book covers the Irish law of trusts, as well as Irish law in relation to the taxation of tru... more

The Property Rights of Cohabitees: An Analysis of Equity's Response in Five Common Law Jurisdictions

Although disputes upon the termination of a marriage are usually resolved in accordance with a le... more Although disputes upon the termination of a marriage are usually resolved in accordance with a legislatively determined scheme, similar disputes between unmarried cohabitees generally fall to be determined on the basis of rules developed by the courts. Much of the difficulty surrounding the area is attributable to the fact that it straddles a number of the traditional legal compartments, falling somewhere between equity, property, family, contract and restitution. The present book makes a determined effort to isolate each strand of the doctrinal tangle and to trace it back to its source. To this end, it considers developments in the established doctrines of resulting trust and estoppel before moving on to consider, in turn, the English "common intention" trust; the modified resulting trust analysis favoured in Ireland; Lord Denning's abortive "constructive trust of a new model"; the Canadian unjust enrichment approach; the Australian "unconscionability" doctrine; and, finally, New Zealand's "reasonable expectations" model. A comparative approach is taken throughout the book, culminating in a concluding chapter which draws together a number of themes that recur across the various doctrinal approaches.

Papers by John Mee

Reforming the Law of Prescription: A Cautionary Tale from Ireland in Warren Barr (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law, Volume 8; pp 31-48 (Hart Publishing 2015)

The law on the prescriptive acquisition of easements and profits, as it evolved in England and Wa... more The law on the prescriptive acquisition of easements and profits, as it evolved in England and Wales and was inherited by other common law jurisdictions, has long been considered unsatisfactory. ‘Clouds and darkness [had] settled down over the whole subject’ even before the ‘fitting addition to the chaos’ represented by the Prescription Act 1832. It is not surprising, therefore, that reform is under consideration in a number of jurisdictions. As part of a wide-ranging reform of land law in the Republic of Ireland, the law of prescription was radically recast by Part 8 of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 (the LCLRA). The three existing forms of prescription—common law prescription, prescription under the doctrine of lost modern grant, and statutory prescription under the Prescription Act 1832—were abolished and replaced by a new form of statutory prescription. The period for the acquisition by prescription was reduced to 12 years, creating what one commentator has described as ‘The most liberal system of prescription ever proposed’. The new regime was due to come into effect after a three-year transition period but, before this period had elapsed, the scheme was modified by the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011. Unfortunately, even after the 2011 amendments, there appear to be significant difficulties with the new Irish scheme. This chapter analyses the problems that have arisen in Ireland in relation to the reform of the law of prescription and considers the possible lessons for reformers in other jurisdictions, giving special attention to comparisons with the proposals made by the Law Commission for England and Wales in 2011.

Presumed Resulting Trusts, Intention and Declaration

(2014) 73 Cambridge Law Journal 86-112

ABSTRACT. Rejecting the competing positions of Swadling and Chambers, this article argues that th... more ABSTRACT. Rejecting the competing positions of Swadling and Chambers, this article argues that the law of presumed resulting trusts reflects a very old rule that, upon a voluntary transfer, the fate of the beneficial interest in the property depends on the intention of the transferor. The case law shows that the presumption is of an intention to create a trust for the transferor or provider of the purchase money. It makes no difference if, reflecting the historically important concept of “retention”, this is phrased in negative terms as a presumption that the intention of the transferor was not to pass the beneficial interest to the transferee.
KEYWORDS: resulting trusts, presumptions, equity, legal history, declaration, intention, restitution

"Proprietary Estoppel and Inheritance: Enough is Enough?"

Published [2013] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 280-297

In recent years, as illustrated by Thorner v Major (2009) UKHL 18, the law of proprietary estoppe... more In recent years, as illustrated by Thorner v Major (2009) UKHL 18, the law of proprietary estoppel has become more favourable to claimants in the inheritance context. Focusing on two recent English Court of Appeal decisions, Suggitt v Suggitt (2012) EWCA Civ 1140 and Bradbury v Taylor (2012) EWCA Civ 1208, this article questions whether the courts are being too generous – both in terms of the type of representation that can form the basis of a claim and in terms of the extent of the remedy afforded to a successful claimant. The article also reflects on the role of the appellate courts in cases of this nature.

An easement by estoppel

This note examines the Court of Appeal decision in Joyce v Epsom and Ewell BC [2012] EWCA Civ 139... more This note examines the Court of Appeal decision in Joyce v Epsom and Ewell BC [2012] EWCA Civ 1398. The case concerned a claim in the law of proprietary estoppel to an easement. The issues raised by the judgment include whether it is necessary to a claim that the defendant have been aware of the claimant’s detrimental reliance; whether there had been an unconscionable denial by the defendant of the claimant’s entitlement; the significance of the fact that the claimant was a successor in title of the person who had been led to act to his detriment by the Council; the question of the appropriate remedy for the claimant; and, finally, the impact of countervailing benefits enjoyed by the claimant.

Ambulation, Severance, and the Common Intention Constructive Trust

In the context of the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Jones v Kernott [2012] UKSC 53; [2012] ... more In the context of the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Jones v Kernott [2012] UKSC 53; [2012] 1 AC 776, this note looks at the way in which the interests under a common intention constructive trust can vary over time. It considers the role of s.53(1)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925, which requires that any disposition of the beneficial interest under an existing trust must be in writing. It also looks at why, in cases where the disputed family home was originally held in a beneficial joint tenancy, the courts have not concerned themselves with the issue of severance. The answer is that each new division of the beneficial ownership occurs under a new, or newly refreshed, constructive trust: note the exemption in respect of “the creation or operation” of non-express trusts in s.53(2) of the 1925 Act. The change is not the result of a conventional disposition of an equitable interest, or (if the change is away from a beneficial joint tenancy) a conventional act of severance, by a beneficiary under the trust that formerly existed. The note also offers an explanation of the nature of the “ambulation” in operation in Jones v Kernott itself, where the parties initially held the beneficial interest in a joint tenancy but ultimately were entitled in the proportions of 9 to 1.

Resulting Trusts and Voluntary Conveyances

This article considers the question of whether a resulting trust can arise upon a voluntary conve... more This article considers the question of whether a resulting trust can arise upon a voluntary conveyance of land. It suggests that much of the modern debate on the meaning of s.60(3) of the Law of Property Act 1925 has been hampered by a mistaken assumption that the key question is whether or not a supposed pre-1926 presumption of resulting trust survived the enactment of s.60(3). Instead, the central question relates to the impact of the provision on the pre-1926 doctrine of resulting uses. The article suggests that the purpose of s.60(3) was to simplify conveyancing by making it possible to make conveyances of land “to”, rather than “unto and to the use of”, the grantee. This means that it must have been directed against the old doctrine whereby a resulting use was presumed upon a voluntary conveyance of land. While the drafting is not ideal, it is reasonable to interpret s.60(3) as sufficient to remove this doctrine, while preserving the distinct principle that a trust can be enforced in favour of the grantor where it would be fraudulent for him to rely on the absence of signed evidence in writing in order to defeat an oral agreement to hold the land on trust (and also preserving the rule that a resulting trust can arise where there is a gap in the beneficial interests in a voluntary conveyance to the grantee on trust). Although this is not the current author's preferred view, a case can also be made for an alternative interpretation, leading to a broadly similar result, whereby the subsection merely reverses the burden of proof in respect of the creation of a resulting use (which would operate as a resulting trust given the repeal of the Statute of Uses). There are clear advantages to the position favoured in the modern case law and essentially supported in this article. There is no justification in modern times for presuming a resulting trust upon a voluntary conveyance of land and, in light of the existence of s.60(3), such a presumption would operate as "a trap for the unwary conveyancer".

Pettitt v Pettitt and Gissing v Gissing

This chapter considers the landmark family property decisions of the House of Lords in Pettitt v ... more This chapter considers the landmark family property decisions of the House of Lords in Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777 and Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 through the prism of imputed common intention, an idea advanced by Lord Diplock in Pettitt and (on one view) implemented in a different form by him in his speech in Gissing. The conclusion is that the common intention trust analysis, as first put forward in the speech of Lord Diplock in Gissing, did not directly involve the imputation of common intentions. The notion of imputation has, following Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432 and Jones v Kernott [2012] 1 AC 776, crept back into the modern law on the common intention trust in respect of the secondary issue of quantification. However, as is argued in the chapter, it seems unnecessary to present the modern approach to quantification in terms of the imputation of a non-existent common intention. The chapter places Pettitt and Gissing in the context of the earlier case law – e.g. looking closely at the overrated ‘imputed common intention’ approach of the minority in Pettitt and its relationship with more overtly discretionary approaches of the Court of Appeal in earlier cases. The chapter also links this analysis to a consideration of the impact of the more recent cases of Stack v Dowden and Jones v Kernott.

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Jones v Kernott: inferring and imputing in Essex

Comments on the Supreme Court decision in Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 on the respective shares... more Comments on the Supreme Court decision in Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 on the respective shares in the family home of former cohabitees some years after the breakdown of their relationship. Examines the facts of the case and considers whether the right result was achieved on the facts, given the trial judge's basis for inferring a common intention that the beneficial interests would differ from the legal title and the mathematics underlying the decision. Discusses the significance of the case in relation to the concepts of inference and imputation, and identifies the remaining areas of uncertainty. Criticises the artificial approach to inference favoured by the majority of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in the case.

Resulting Trusts and Voluntary Conveyances 1674-1925

This article considers whether a resulting trust could arise upon a voluntary conveyance of land ... more This article considers whether a resulting trust could arise upon a voluntary conveyance of land prior to 1926, a question which was the subject of much controversy amongst leading judges and writers in past centuries. Based on an analysis of the case law, which starts in the seventeenth century, the article argues that the better view is that no resulting trust could arise in the relevant situation prior to 1926. Arguments are advanced to explain why this interpretation is consistent with principle, emphasising the complexity inherent in the proposition that a resulting trust doctrine existed alongside the presumption of resulting use in the context of voluntary conveyance.

Burns v Burns: The Villain of the Piece?

The argument in this chapter is that, even if many do not like the implications of the decision, ... more The argument in this chapter is that, even if many do not like the implications of the decision, it is difficult to argue that Burns v Burns - which concerned a claim by a cohabitant to share in the beneficial interest of a family home based on work in the home - was wrongly decided on its own terms (although the Court of Appeal did present a rather limited version of the common intention constructive trust analysis in respects unrelated to the actual facts of the case). Unlike the position following Gissing v Gissing in respect of married couples, no legislative reform in respect of cohabitants has followed in the wake of Burns v Burns. It is arguable that Waller LJ was correct to suggest that the problem in cases such as Burns is not ‘one which could readily be dealt with by legislation’.The Law Commission’s proposed legislative model seems very complex and, though perhaps not for this reason, may not be enacted in the near future. This chapter doubts the legitimacy, in democratic terms, of radical judicial reform in this area and has also suggested that the current common intention trust analysis is not a promising avenue for future development on an incremental basis. This may seem a pessimistic outlook, but where is it decreed that every type of dispute that can arise in society can easily be dealt with by legal means? It may be, however, that something will eventually give – if legislative reform does not occur, then some creative or accidental misreading of existing equitable doctrine may supply the opportunity for the courts to widen the circumstances in which they give a remedy in disputes in the cohabitation (or the wider family) context. Stack v Dowden does not represent this sort of turning point, though perhaps the hyperbole surrounding the case may create a suitable climate for a more radical new departure. Such a departure would probably not be defensible in democratic terms – especially if it occurs against the background of a conscious decision by the legislature not to implement legislative reform – but, if the courts were to choose to ignore this obstacle, it is difficult to see who could effectively call them to account. Nonetheless, the clear insistence by Fox and May LJJ that this kind of reform is more appropriately a matter for Parliament establishes Burns v Burns as a landmark to guide future judges, if they are willing to heed it.

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Cohabitation Law Reform in Ireland

This article considers the new Irish legislative scheme for cohabitants, contained in Part 15 of ... more This article considers the new Irish legislative scheme for cohabitants, contained in Part 15 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010. The article discusses the background to the legislation, noting the increase in the prevalence of cohabitation in Ireland and the complexity created by the decision to proceed with reform without attempting to update the provisions of the Irish Constitution related to the family. The Irish scheme provides for a range of possible remedies for ‘qualifying cohabitants’, who must have lived together for at least 5 years, or for at least 2 years if they have a dependent child. The scheme also regulates the making of ‘cohabitants’ agreements’. A key limitation on the scheme is that the claimant must establish ‘financial dependency’ as a prerequisite of a remedy. This significantly limits the scope of the scheme and is likely to generate anomalous results, whereby a remedy will be denied to claimants who have suffered serious loss as a result of a relationship but who have not become ‘financially dependent’. The article concludes that, in light of the scheme’s limited nature and the various problems with its provisions, it is questionable whether its enactment represents a positive development.

Keywords: cohabitation, reform, Ireland, Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010, Irish Constitution, financial remedies

Proprietary Estoppel, Promises and Mistaken Belief

"This chapter considers the restrictive vision of proprietary estoppel put forward by Lord Scott ... more "This chapter considers the restrictive vision of proprietary estoppel put forward by Lord Scott and Lord Walker in the House of Lords in Yeoman’s Row v Cobbe [2008] UKHL 55. It explains that the impact of taking their arguments seriously would be the elimination (or, at least, the severe restriction) of one of the three distinct principles subsumed within proprietary estoppel, ie the promise principle stated by Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v Dyson. The chapter suggests that, although the approach in Cobbe runs counter to the current of equitable development over the last forty years, it does highlight important issues of principle surrounding the scope of proprietary estoppel. Despite the tendency to downplay the role of promise within the doctrine, the pre-Cobbe version of proprietary estoppel ventures into the territory of the law of contract, doing so only in respect of promises related to land/property (without any convincing justification as a matter of principle for this restriction). Rather than seek to deal comprehensively with the very large question as to the merits or otherwise of Lord Kingsdown’s promise principle, this chapter seeks to address a more modest set of questions. First, it points out that the particular concern which seems to have animated the judges in Cobbe – that it is wrong to allow C to succeed on the basis of a promise which C knows is binding only in honour – can be accommodated within the conventional modern understanding of proprietary estoppel, without any need to eliminate or severely curtail Lord Kingsdown’s principle. Secondly, the chapter addresses the seductive suggestion that a distinction should be drawn between the commercial and the domestic contexts, with the restriction upon proprietary estoppel suggested in Cobbe applying only in the commercial context. It concludes on the basis of a number of different arguments, that this suggestion does not represent a desirable avenue of development for the law. One of the points made against any application of a mistake requirement in the context of the promise principle is that this requirement makes sense only in the context of the acquiescence principle; the suggestion that it should be applied more broadly appears reminiscent of attempts in the past to apply the probanda to all proprietary estoppel cases.

In terms of the future development of the law of estoppel, what is needed is a willingness to separate out for analysis the distinct principles which have, for historical reasons, been grouped together under the heading of proprietary estoppel. The emphasis on ‘unconscionability’ and ‘synthesis’, encouraged by the overrated judgment of Oliver J in Taylor Fashions, have contributed to the current confused state of the law. Following the debacle represented by Cobbe, it is time for a somewhat more reflective approach."

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''Automatic' Resulting Trusts: Retention, Restitution or Reposing Trust?

This chapter considers the justification for the 'automatic' resulting trust. It points out that,... more This chapter considers the justification for the 'automatic' resulting trust. It points out that, as a historical matter, the dominant explanation has been that the settlor 'retains' any beneficial interest of which he has not disposed. It is suggested, by reference to the “doctrine of the old use” in the law of succession, that this explanation is far more deeply rooted in the law than has been generally recognised. However, some commentators have argued that the retention idea is flawed at the level of principle, providing support for the idea that the existing rules should be altered to allow resulting trusts to operate as an instrument to reverse unjust enrichment in a wide variety of cases. The relevant issues are investigated in this chapter and it is concluded that the retention explanation, though deeply rooted in authority, is not fully satisfactory at the level of principle. It is also noted that the proposition that all resulting trusts should be regarded as being based on unjust enrichment is not supported by authority and, at the level of principle, is vulnerable to some of the same criticisms as the retention idea.
This chapter identifies an alternative rationalisation of the existing rules (which does not involve any modification in the content of those rules). It suggests that, in the context of the ‘automatic’ resulting trust, equity is confronted with the question of what should happen when property is given on trust to a trustee but the particular trusts indicated do not exhaust the beneficial interest or are invalid. The rule chosen by equity in this situation, that there should be a resulting trust for the settlor, is difficult to fault as a matter of justice. It proceeds on the basis of a logically prior decision by equity that, once property has been conveyed to a trustee in whom the settlor has reposed trust to hold it according to the settlor’s instructions, the trust will not ‘fail’, even where there is a failure in the particular trusts declared or a failure to declare any such trusts. Once one is willing to accept that a trust has been brought into existence by the conveyance to the trustee, so that someone must become entitled to the beneficial interest under that trust, it is difficult to justify anyone besides the settlor taking any unallocated beneficial interest.

Mortgages, Repeals and the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009

This article points out a serious error in the landmark legislation reforming the Irish law of re... more This article points out a serious error in the landmark legislation reforming the Irish law of real property, the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act. The problem relates to the provisions in relation to the enforcement of mortgages created prior to the commencement of the 2009 Act. The new legislation repealed the provisions which had governed such earlier mortgages but failed to enact replacement provisions. This approach was chosen in reliance on the Interpretation Act 2005, which, it was believed, would preserve the impact of the repealed provisions. The article argues that this reliance was unnecessarily risky and urges that the gap in the legislation should be filled. [Since the publication of the article, the author's concerns have been vindicated: see Start Mortgages Ltd v Gunn [2011] IEHC 275 and note also Kavanagh v Lynch [2011] IEHC 348]

The Role of Expectation in the Determination of Proprietary Estoppel Remedies

This paper analyses the various roles which expectation could play in relation to the determinati... more This paper analyses the various roles which expectation could play in relation to the determination of proprietary estoppel remedies. It argues, by a process of eliminating the various alternatives, that the only appropriate role for expectation is as a cap on a remedy determined on the basis of other factors. The first possible approach to be analysed is that the remedy would invariably be determined by reference to the expectation. It is pointed out that this runs into difficulties in the context of countervailing benefits and also requires a willingness, in certain cases, to grant a remedy which is disproportionate to the detriment suffered by the claimant. The second approach, supported by Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159, is that the fulfillment of the expectation should be the prima facie remedy, to be granted unless such a remedy would be disproportionate to the detriment suffered by C. The paper argues that such an approach does not stand up to close scrutiny and leads to demonstrably illogical results. It then looks at the possibility of treating the expectation as one factor in the determination of the remedy, as appears to be advocated by Gardner; the possibility of regarding the fulfilment of the expectation as a proxy for erasing the detriment, as argued by Robertson; and the possibility of linking the expectation and the detriment by reference to a bargain, as suggested by Robert Walker LJ in Jennings v Rice. By way of conclusion, some observations are offered in respect of the possible future development of equity's approach to proprietary estoppel remedies.

The Limits of Proprietary Estoppel: Thorner v Major

In Thorner v Major, the House of Lords upheld the proprietary estoppel claim of a Somerset farmer... more In Thorner v Major, the House of Lords upheld the proprietary estoppel claim of a Somerset farmer who had worked without pay on his cousin’s farm on the strength of oblique assurances that he would inherit the property. The decision raises complex issues relating to the requirement of a representation in the law of proprietary estoppel. In addition, Thorner is of wider significance in that it appears to indicate a retreat from the restrictive approach to proprietary estoppel favoured by the House of Lords in Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe in 2008. However, in Thorner, Lord Scott did not explicitly resile from the views he had expressed in Cobbe and, in fact, made certain observations on the relationship between proprietary estoppel and ‘the remedial constructive trust’ which appear likely to create further confusion.

A Critique of the Cohabitation Provisions of the Civil Partnership Bill 2009

This article discusses the cohabitation provisions of Ireland's Civil Partnership Bill 2009.

Land Law

The Law and Taxation of Trusts

This book covers the Irish law of trusts, as well as Irish law in relation to the taxation of tru... more

The Property Rights of Cohabitees: An Analysis of Equity's Response in Five Common Law Jurisdictions

Reforming the Law of Prescription: A Cautionary Tale from Ireland in Warren Barr (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law, Volume 8; pp 31-48 (Hart Publishing 2015)

Presumed Resulting Trusts, Intention and Declaration

(2014) 73 Cambridge Law Journal 86-112

"Proprietary Estoppel and Inheritance: Enough is Enough?"

Published [2013] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 280-297

An easement by estoppel

Ambulation, Severance, and the Common Intention Constructive Trust

Resulting Trusts and Voluntary Conveyances

Pettitt v Pettitt and Gissing v Gissing

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Jones v Kernott: inferring and imputing in Essex

Resulting Trusts and Voluntary Conveyances 1674-1925

Burns v Burns: The Villain of the Piece?

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Cohabitation Law Reform in Ireland

Proprietary Estoppel, Promises and Mistaken Belief

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''Automatic' Resulting Trusts: Retention, Restitution or Reposing Trust?

Mortgages, Repeals and the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009

The Role of Expectation in the Determination of Proprietary Estoppel Remedies

The Limits of Proprietary Estoppel: Thorner v Major

A Critique of the Cohabitation Provisions of the Civil Partnership Bill 2009

This article discusses the cohabitation provisions of Ireland's Civil Partnership Bill 2009.

Succession and the Civil Partnership Bill 2009

This article offers a critique of the proposals in relation to the law of succession in Ireland's... more

'Marriage, Civil Partnership and the Prohibited Degrees of Relationship'

This paper points out a specific difficulty with the Irish Civil Partnership Bill 2009. This rela... more This paper points out a specific difficulty with the Irish Civil Partnership Bill 2009. This relates to the fact that the rules for the recognition of foreign relationships, as set out in the Bill, require that the foreign jurisdiction have the same rules in terms of prohibited relationships. Since, in fact, there is some variation across jurisdictions on this matter, a serious problem would arise whereby, for example, it would not be possible to recognise civil partnerships even from the United Kingdom. [Following the publication of the article, this issue has been addressed in the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010. However, the more general discussion in the article of the range of prohibited relationships in relation to marriage and civil partnership in Ireland remains relevant].

Cohabitation, Civil Partnership and the Constitution

This paper examines the issues surrounding the law reforms proposed in Ireland in relation to the... more This paper examines the issues surrounding the law reforms proposed in Ireland in relation to the introduction of civil partnership, as well as a legislative regime to provide certain rights for cohabiting couples. It examines key law reform documents, including the Report on the Family by the Oireachtas (Parliamentary) All-Party Committee on the Constitution, the Irish Law Reform Commission's Report on the Rights and Duties of Cohabitants and the Report of the Working Group on Domestic Partnership. It analyses the impact of the Irish Constitution, Bunreacht na Heireann 1937, on possible law reform, in respect of the rights of both opposite sex and same sex couples. It also offers some observations on the general approach to law reform in this area in Ireland.

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