Filosofia

Debora Arango fue la primera artista colombiana famosa internacionalmente. Su trabajo se desarrollo entre 1930 y 1989; este exploro temas controversiales de su epoca. Por esto, sus obras fueron retiradas de museos locales. En defensa propia, ella dijo: “Estoy convencida de que el arte, como una manifestacion cultural, no tiene relacion alguna con codigos morales. El arte no es ni moral ni inmoral. Simplemente, su campo no interfiere en ningun principio etico.” Hay diferentes puntos de vista sobre la relacion entre los valores esteticos y los valores morales: moralismo o eticismo, inmoralismo, moralismo oportunista y autonomismo. En este texto quiero i) discutir las semejanzas y diferencias entre estas, y ii) encontrar una forma alternativa de pensar este asunto.

Como resultado del renacimiento de la ética de la virtud se generaron por lo menos dos grandes reacciones: una que afirma que esta ética es redundante, porque las teorías morales modernas incluyen —o pueden incluir— las virtudes, y otra que afirma que ésta es más amplia y completa, porque aborda la vida moral de mejor manera al poner el énfasis en lo más importante: el carácter moral. En el presente trabajo examino tanto el renacimiento del tema como el debate posterior, y planteo una posible razón para preferir la ética de la virtud.

Most theories about the cultivation of virtue fall under the general umbrella of the role model approach, according to which virtue is acquired by emulating role models, and where those role models are usually conceived of as superior in some relevant respect to the learners. I will argue here that although we need role models to cultivate virtue, they are not sufficient. We also need good and close relationships with people who are not our superiors. I draw special attention to the notion of character friendship as conceived by Aristotle, as an antidote for the common misleading overemphasis on role models. My primary goal is to show how much we stand to gain by including character friendship in our account of virtue cultivation. Friendship is a close relationship characterized by mutual appreciation, well-wishing, and mutual acknowledgment of such appreciation and well-wishing. Character friendship is a friendship grounded in the mutual appreciation of the friends' good characters, and a basic agreement and concern for the good. I hope to show here that such a relationship (a) constitutes a unique form of experience in which we share or inhabit a substantial way of seeing with a close other; (b) facilitates a unique form of knowledge, the knowledge of a should be placed on the role of friendship within educational contexts. We, as adults, should acknowledge, care, and facilitate children's and adolescent's friendships within schools and homes, and implement some practical strategies to help them foster character friendships.

Most theories about virtue cultivation fall under the general umbrella of the role model approach, according to which virtue is acquired by emulating role models, and where those role models are usually conceived of as superior in some relevant respect to the learners. I argue that although we need role models to cultivate virtue, we also need good and close relationships with people who are not our superiors. The overemphasis on role models is misguided and misleading, and a good antidote draws on the Aristotelian concept of character friendship. Character friendship (a) constitutes a unique form of experience in which we share a substantial way of seeing with a close other; (b) facilitates a unique form of knowledge, the knowledge of a particular person (my‐self and the other's self); (c) develops other emotions important for virtue cultivation besides admiration, such as love, shame, trust, and hope; and (d) is a praxis in which cooperative interactions and discussions functi...

As a strategy to better understand Buddhist ethics, this work seeks to answer the question: with which family of western moral theories could we relate this theory? Against interpretations that characterize it as deontic, consequentialist, or more recent interpretations that consider it as a form of ethics of care, I will argue in favor of interpret it as closer to virtue ethics. My main argument in favor of this thesis is that both –Buddhist ethics and Virtue ethics- have to do fundamentally with the notion of self-cultivation or self-care.

Objetivo. El objetivo de este trabajo es explorar tres enfoques sobre las nociones de felicidad, bienestar y florecimiento humano desde Latinoamérica, en respuesta a la discusión académica y al interés global sobre tales nociones. Metodología. El artículo sigue una ruta metodológica interpretativa y un enfoque analítico. Así, se ofrece primero un estado del arte sobre la discusión filosófica acerca del bienestar humano, y luego una argumentación que señala la particularidad de los enfoques de nociones filosóficas sobre el bienestar, el florecimiento humano y la felicidad pensadas desde Latinoamérica. Resultados. Los resultados se presentan en tres partes; en la primera parte se discute la tesis del mexicano Julio Boltvinik, quien sostiene que el florecimiento humano debe fundamentarse en una concepción sobre la esencia de la vida humana. En la segunda parte se ofrece una comparación entre la noción aristotélica de Eudaimonia y la noción nativa de Sumak Kawsay (traducida como Buen Vi...