Papers by Sasha Mudd
New York Times Opinion Column, 2020
The other day, my 7-year-old, having gotten wind of President Trump's Covid-19 diagnosis, asked m... more The other day, my 7-year-old, having gotten wind of President Trump's Covid-19 diagnosis, asked me point blank, "Mommy, are you glad that Trump got the coronavirus?"
New York Times Opinion Column, 2021
The Olympic Games in Tokyo have been even more fraught than usual with ethical issues. Alarm over... more The Olympic Games in Tokyo have been even more fraught than usual with ethical issues. Alarm over the rising number of Covid-19 cases and the Games' deep unpopularity with Japanese people sit atop perennial concerns about corruption, cheating, the abuse of athletes and the environmental impact of mounting such an enormous event. These problems have fueled debate, hand-wringing and even demands to end the Olympics altogether.
Natur und Freiheit, 2018
In Groundwork I Kant seems to derive his conception of the moral law from a prior claim about the... more In Groundwork I Kant seems to derive his conception of the moral law from a prior claim about the value of the good will, contrary to the argument he puts forward elsewhere to the effect that any conception of moral worth must be derived from an antecedent recognition of the law. This suggests to some interpreters that a moral conception of worth in fact underlies the Categorical Imperative, securing its validity and providing its content. In this paper I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Kant's conception of the good will is not derived from an assumed moral value in Groundwork I, but rather follows analytically from the concept of a categorical imperative.
The Cambridge Kant Lexicon, Edited by Julian Wuerth, 2021
Whereas critique examines the claims to objective validity by the subjective sources of our cogni... more Whereas critique examines the claims to objective validity by the subjective sources of our cognition, doctrine is directly concerned with the objects of cognition. Critique has "no domain with regard to the object, for it is not a doctrine, but has only to investigate whether and how a doctrine is possible, given the way [the object] is situated with respect to our faculties" (CPJ, 5:176 [1790]/CECPJ:64; cf. R3964, 17:368 [1769]/CENF:106; CPJFI, 20:242 [1789]/CECPJ:42). Generally speaking, Kant understands critique as the preparation which must be completed before we can proceed to philosophy's doctrinal part (see especially CPJ, 5:170/ CECPJ:58). The latter includes the twofold metaphysics that constitutes the doctrinal system of material philosophy: the doctrine of nature (Naturlehre) and the doctrine of morals (
Kantian Review, 2017
Kant’s notoriously unclear attempt to defend the regulative principle of systematic unity as the ... more Kant’s notoriously unclear attempt to defend the regulative principle of systematic unity as the supreme principle of theoretical reason in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic has left its status a source of controversy. According to the dominant interpretation, the principle ought to be understood as a methodologically necessary device for extending our understanding of nature. I argue that this reading is flawed. While it may correctly affirm that the principle is normative in character, it wrongly implies that it binds with mere hypothetical necessity. I offer novel grounds for thinking that if reason’s principle is normative, then it binds agents categorically instead.
In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant portrays the supreme moral principl... more In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant portrays the supreme moral principle as an unconditional imperative that applies to all of us because we freely choose to impose upon ourselves a law of pure practical reason. Morality is revealed to be a matter of autonomy. Today, this approach to ethical theory is as perplexing, controversial and inspiring as it was in 1785, when the Groundwork was first published. The essays in this volume, by international Kant scholars and moral philosophers, discuss Kant's philosophical development and his rejection of earlier moral theories, the role of happiness and inclination in the Groundwork, Kant's moral metaphysics and theory of value, and his attempt to justify the categorical imperative as a principle of freedom. They reflect the approach of several schools of interpretation and illustrate the lively diversity of Kantian ethics today.
Theory and Research in Education, 2013
Catherine Elgin proposes a novel principle for identifying epistemic virtue. Based loosely on Kan... more Catherine Elgin proposes a novel principle for identifying epistemic virtue. Based loosely on Kant’s Categorical Imperative, it identifies autonomy as our fundamental epistemic responsibility, and defines the epistemic virtues as those traits of character needed to exercise epistemic autonomy. I argue that Elgin’s principle fails as a criterion of epistemic virtue because the instrumental conception of autonomy on which it relies leads to an untenable relativism. Despite this, I suggest that autonomy may yet furnish a plausible criterion for epistemic virtue, provided we construe autonomy as Kant does, as grounded in categorical rather than instrumental reason.
European Journal of Philosophy, 2013
Throughout the critical period Kant enigmatically insists that reason is a ‘unity’, thereby sugge... more Throughout the critical period Kant enigmatically insists that reason is a ‘unity’, thereby suggesting that both our theoretical and practical endeavors are grounded in one and the same rational capacity. How Kant's unity thesis ought to be interpreted and whether it can be substantiated remain sources of controversy in the literature. According to the strong reading of this claim, reason is a ‘unity’ because all our reasoning, including our theoretical reasoning, functions practically. Although several prominent commentators endorse this view, it is widely thought to lack exegetical support. This paper seeks to strengthen the case for this reading by showing how theoretical reason's positive function, as Kant presents it in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, may be construed as fundamentally practical. I argue that reason's supreme regulative principle ought to be understood as a categorical practical imperative. This interpretation, I suggest, resolves the apparent inconsistencies that blight Kant's account of the principle in the Appendix, while bringing greater overall coherence to his account of theoretical reason's regulative function.
Book Reviews by Sasha Mudd
Philosophical Reviews, 2015
In her strikingly ambitious book, Kristi Sweet offers a synoptic overview of Kant's practical tho... more In her strikingly ambitious book, Kristi Sweet offers a synoptic overview of Kant's practical thought, arguing that it constitutes an organic unity, despite Kant's own failure to exhibit it as such. Few attempts of this kind have been made to articulate the unity and meaning of Kant's practical philosophy as a whole, and for good reason. Kant's diverse and far-ranging discussions of duty, the moral law and virtue, on the one hand, and the state, religion and culture, on the other-to name just a few, evince no obvious overall coherence. Indeed, Kant's practical thought contains deontological and teleological elements that many have found difficult to reconcile. This lack of a clear sense of "how it all hangs together" is the lacuna Sweet's book aims to address (7). It does so by offering a novel account of practical reason's essential nature, and by interpreting the various elements of practical life Kant examines as distinct, mutually conditioning expressions of this nature.
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2016
The Philosophical Review, 2021
In Kant on Reflection and Virtue, Melissa Merritt offers a detailed interpretation of what she ca... more In Kant on Reflection and Virtue, Melissa Merritt offers a detailed interpretation of what she calls "the Kantian reflective ideal," bringing together Kant's most important claims concerning the value of reflection and our putative obligation to reflect. At its most minimal, Merritt takes the ideal to be implicit in Kant's claims that every judgment requires reflection (Überlegung) (A/B: 260-61/316-17), and that such reflection is a duty (A/B: 263/319). 1 But for Merritt the reflective ideal goes beyond a supposed duty to reflect. It also points to the "supreme value Kant accords to being rationally reflective" (2). The ideal therefore covers both the axiological and deontological theses Kant advances with respect to reflection and its place in human life. Merritt's aim is to offer a novel interpretation of this ideal that will help dispel its caricatured misinterpretation. The widely accepted caricature presents reflection not only as impossibly demanding but also "precious, hyper-deliberate and repugnantly moralistic" (2), requiring agents to step back from each and every judgment so to scrutinize its grounds. On Merritt's account, Kant's ideal reflective agent judges "in the right spirit" or "right frame of mind," where this ultimately means following the three maxims of the healthy understanding (52): 'to think for oneself'; 'to think in the position of everyone else'; and 'always to think consistently'. One who has cultivated their cognitive capacities in conformity with these maxims has, according to Merritt's novel reconstruction, developed general cognitive virtue or, equivalently, good cognitive character. While Kant has no explicit conception of cognitive virtue as such, Merritt argues that such a conception is implied by the principles of healthy understanding, which specify a categorically required way of thinking for beings like us. By developing good cognitive character in accordance with these principles, argues Merritt, we exercise the self-determination proper to a rational being in the most basic sense. This self-determination does not involve our stepping back from every judgment to scrutinize its grounds; rather, good cognitive character just is the practical know-how we express whenever we make good use of our cognitive capacities at all. In part 1 of the book, Merritt lays the groundwork for her account by distinguishing between normative and constitutive requirements to reflect, which are often muddled together in Kant's own discussions and in secondary literature. This clarifies the normative reflection (reflection-n) at issue in the 1. The works of Immanuel Kant are cited according to the standard citation practice associated with the Akademie edition of his writings.
Uploads
Papers by Sasha Mudd
Book Reviews by Sasha Mudd