Asian Studies

Abstract
The binary of martial and civil virtues (wen-wu) is one of the oldest and most pervasive concepts in East Asian thought.  This paper examines the transmission of Chinese wen-wu thought to Japan, and its subsequent independent development in that country.  Whereas in China and Korea, primacy has traditionally been given to civil virtues over martial ones, the unique warrior-centered social and governmental structure that developed in Japan led its thinkers to more strongly emphasize the martial.  As a result, at least in the context of wen-wu, many Japanese were willing to accept, rather than invert, the China/barbarian binary that marked continental interpretations.  In comparison, many Japanese Confucians and related schools of thought had otherwise tended to revise ideas imported from China in ways that removed them from their source and relocated the moral center to Japan.  The identification of Japan as the “martial country” and China/Korea as the “civil countries” came to be broadly accepted by intellectuals in all three societies.  At the same time, the exact nature of Japanese “martiality” varied greatly among different thinkers, often to the extent that definitions of the concept could be polar opposites.  This paper argues that it was this vagueness and flexibility of the wen-wu binary that ensured its continued prominence as the concepts were adapted to new situations, and further led to movements by Chinese and Korean thinkers to introduce Japanese martiality into their own nations around the turn of the twentieth century.  In this process, Japanese bun-bu (wen-wu) theories were variously packaged with the teachings of Wang Yangming and the modern martial ethic of bushido (the way of the warrior), and this paper considers the roles of the reformers Liang Qichao and Pak Un-sik in the dissemination of bun-bu thought in China and Korea, respectively.

摘要
文、武二分法是東亞思想中最古老且最為普遍的概念之一。本文檢視中國文武思想傳至日本，及其在該國的後續獨立發展。「文」在中國和韓國傳統上位於「武」之上，居首位，而日本因發展出以武士為中心的獨特社會與政治結構，使其思想家特別強調「武」。因此，至少在文、武的脈絡下，許多日本人願意接受，而非轉化，標誌著大陸解釋的華夷之辨。相較而言，許多日本儒家及相關學派的思想卻傾向於將自中國傳入的思想以將其與源頭分離，並將道德中心重置於日本的方式，加以修訂。日本等同「武國」，中國和韓國等同「文國」為三個社會的知識分子廣泛接受。與此同時，各思想家對於日本「武」的真正內涵卻有極為不同的見解，其間的歧異往往到對該概念的定義可以完全相反的程度。本文主張，便是這種對文武二分法的含糊不清與彈性，確保其在適應新形勢時能持續突顯，並進而導致中國和韓國思想家於二十世紀初將日本的「武」介紹給其祖國的運動。在此過程中，日本的文武理論與王陽明的學說、武士道的現代武術倫理有各種不同程度的結合。本文分別討論改革家梁啟超和朴殷植於文武思想在中國與韓國傳布上的角色。

The characterization of Japan as a martial country, as opposed to a China that emphasizes civil virtues, has colored views of the two societies for centuries. This was reinforced by apparent differences in their traditional governments, with Japan ruled by warriors while China was marked by a scholarly examination system. The underlying conception of a martial Japan was carried into the modern age, where it flowed into the emerging discourse on bushido, or “the way of the warrior,” which began to be popularized around the time of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Rather than a continuation of an ancient tradition or a manifestation of a “national character,” however, bushido is largely a modern invention, interpretations of which have tended to primarily reflect the conditions under which they were formulated. The samurai spirit has at times been credited for Japan’s economic success and technological progress, but also associated with militaristic imperialism.

In China, bushido, or wushidao, has played an important role in shaping views of Japan from the late nineteenth century onward, as the period of bushido’s greatest growth and popularization coincided with an unprecedented influx of Chinese students, reformers, and exiles to Japan. Chinese intellectuals credited bushido with driving the Meiji Restoration and subsequent reforms, while students at Japanese civilian and military schools were exposed to the pervasive bushido ideology. As relations between Japan and China worsened, attitudes towards wushidao became increasingly negative, although there remained a significant diversity among interpretations. Discourse on the subject declined in both Japan and China after 1945, but was revived in Japan in different forms relatively soon after the war. In China, interest in wushidao began to grow in the 1980s, and recent diplomatic tensions contributed to a tremendous increase in Chinese studies of the subject over the last two decades. Wushidao is often put forth as a possible explanation for supposedly “traditional” Japanese militarism, and is one of the most common themes in Chinese cultural and historical studies of Japan. By placing its examination of Chinese views into the broader historical context of bushido discourses in Japan and other countries, this study considers their influence and implications for reconciliation and inter-cultural relations.

As two of the most romanticized symbols of traditional Japan, samurai and castles feature prominently in popular culture and tourist promotions, and serve as important markers of both regional and national identities. In spite of their ancient roots, popular images of them were largely formed during and after the late nineteenth century. After the Meiji restoration of 1868, samurai and castles faced the new order as relics of the discredited old regime. Viewed as backward and “feudal” in an age of “civilization and enlightenment, ” they suffered similar fates in the 1870s and 1880s as victims of popular apathy and even resentment. It was only after this time that attitudes towards Japan’s “feudal” heritage began to change, with modern concerns and ideas playing a vital role in the rehabilitation of Japan’s past.

Bringing together themes from Benesch’s recent book, Inventing the Way of the Samurai, and his current research project, this talk explores the development of Bushido in modern Japan, comparing the ideological “revival” of the samurai spirit with the growing appreciation for castles, as efforts increased to “save” both of these “national” symbols in an era of growing national strength and confidence.

As two of the most romanticized symbols of traditional Japan, samurai and castles feature prominently in popular culture and tourist promotions, and serve as important markers of both regional and national identities. In spite of their ancient roots, popular images of both samurai and castles were largely formed during and after the late nineteenth century. Bringing together themes from my recent book, Inventing the Way of the Samurai, and my current research project on Japanese castles, this talk explores the modern origins of some of Japan’s most famous traditions, and how these were shaped by domestic and international agendas.

After 1868, samurai and castles faced the new Meiji order as relics of the discredited old regime. Viewed as backward and “feudal” in an age of “civilization and enlightenment,” samurai and castles suffered similar fates in the 1870s and 1880s as victims of popular apathy and even resentment. The eventual rehabilitation of the popular image of the samurai was a long and complicated process. Influenced by Western, especially Victorian, ideals of gentlemanship and medieval chivalry, a number of Japanese thinkers proposed similar moral guidelines for the new Japan. The “way of the samurai,” or bushidō, that emerged from this discourse rapidly gained in popularity after victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, and was soon widely portrayed as an ancient ethic and even the very “soul of Japan.”

This talk will explore the development of bushidō in modern Japan, comparing the ideological “revival” of the samurai spirit with the growing appreciation for castles, as efforts increased to “save” both of these “national symbols” in an era of growing national strength and confidence. The talk will further consider parallels in their subsequent histories up to the present day.

, a massive fire tore through the UNESCO World Heritage site of Shuri Castle in Okinawa, sparking a global reaction and comparisons with the recent fire at Notre Dame, another World Heritage site. As in the case of Notre Dame, government officials immediately declared their intention to rebuild, and donations flooded in from throughout Japan and other countries. The scale of the response to Shuri Castle is also a reflection of the position of castles as some of Japan's most popular and important heritage sites. This could recently be seen in the Aukema, "Cultures of (Dis)remembrance," pp. 73-74.

This paper aims to give a comprehensive outline of the evolving idea of metaphorical thinking and embodied cognition. While more people are familiar with the conceptual metaphor theory and embodiment, it is often thought of as a recent move in religious studies that came out of nowhere and appeared first in Lakoff and Johnson's book "Metaphors We Live by" (1980). Few people realize that at least a hundred years ago philosophers raised the question of metaphorical thinking and it's relationship to religion and general person's worldview. In this paper I discuss how metaphor and embodiment was viewed by some of "traditional" philosophers, and how it shaped their view on humanity and religion. Metaphor, sometimes mentioned as part of language and thought (Durkheim, Rappaport, Geertz), or as related to anthropomorphism (Durkheim, Weber, Freud), in one way or another was thought to shape the worldview of a person.

This paper discusses the issue of Chinese minority representation. Minorities are generally viewed as Chinaʼs "own internal Other". While the concept of family is often applied to present the relationship between the minorities and a probably illusory 1 , Han majority, this "family" relationship does not mean equality. This paper focuses on representation of Chinese minorities in Zhang Yangʼs film "Shower" ("Xi Zao"

From the 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa to Korea’s annexation in 1910, the last thirty-five years of the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910) were witness to some of the most impactful events in Korea’s modern history. Through encounters with Western powers and the influence, both direct and indirect, of a rapidly modernizing Japan, many Koreans began to reappraise their country’s Sino-centric past and the once-shared knowledge, symbols, and practices of the traditional East Asian cosmopolitan order. A major consequence of this reappraisal was the demotion of Literary Sinitic (commonly known as Classical Chinese) from its long-held status as the de facto official written standard of state and its removal from the center of the curriculum of state-sponsored education to the periphery in the guise of a newly created classroom subject hanmunkwa.

This thesis details how shifts in the terminology for both Literary Sinitic and the vernacular script, the educational activities of Western missionaries, the abolition of Korea’s traditional civil service examination system, the establishment of a Western-style educational system, the proliferation of new Literary Sinitic teaching materials and methodologies, and the influence of Japan combined at the end of the Chosŏn dynasty to demote the learning and use of Literary Sinitic. Furthermore, this thesis shows that Literary Sinitic’s demise was not simply the collateral damage of a predestined and unavoidable rise of Korea’s native script, but was, by the time of annexation, already a long though still unfinished process.

The reappraisal and demotion of Literary Sinitic in Korea is important for more than merely understanding the precolonial moment in Korea. It is vital to improving our understanding of Korea’s part in the disintegration of a once vibrant East Asian cosmopolitanism, while further exploring the early development of hanmunkwa will also help us apprehend the lingering effects and influences exercised by once transcultured practices, even after those practices are reimagined and reconfigured according to new, nationalized frameworks.

Literary Sinitic literacy long sustained the ritual, cultural, and political modes of belonging that positioned Korea firmly within the Sinographic Cosmopolis. The promotion of vernacular literacy and the marginalization of Literary Sinitic that accompanied the social and political upheavals of the final decades of the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910), were a key element in Korea’s departure from this traditional cosmopolitan order.

This study shows that the changes to Korean literary and inscriptional practices in the three decades prior to Japanese colonization in 1910 were not the inevitable outcome of natural vernacularization processes. Rather, they were the result of deliberate education activities and policy decisions by interested parties, including the Korean court, Western missionaries, Korean traditionalist and nationalist scholars, and Japanese imperial officials.

Modern schools founded by the various interested parties above were a primary facilitator of inscriptional change. Though parents insisted that these schools include Literary Sinitic instruction, this instruction was limited to a single subject within a multi-subject curriculum. The aims, content, and methods of instruction within this new classroom subject, known as Hanmunkwa, departed significantly from those of traditional Literary Sinitic instruction. Nevertheless, Korean educators developed approaches to Hanmunkwa that still treated Literary Sinitic as the vehicle of a living, dynamic tradition. These approaches were greatly narrowed, however, through a program of textbook censorship implemented by Japanese education officials in the final years of the protectorate period (1905–1910). Shaped to meet political more than pedagogical ends, the content and methods of the Hanmunkwa instruction that resulted from this censorship reduced instruction to mere training in no more than a passive reading comprehension of excerpts from classical texts.

Japanese-controlled Hanmunkwa greatly limited the scope and application of Literary Sinitic literacy and was the beginning of the end of a living Literary Sinitic tradition in Korea, transforming it into a legacy literacy useful only in limited domains and providing nothing more than a level of backward compatibility with old knowledge. This study, therefore, offers a corrective to the common historiography of Korean language and literature that treats vernacularity as natural and Korean vernacularization as foreordained.

This study shows that the changes to Korean literary and inscriptional practices in the three decades prior to Japanese colonization in 1910 were not the inevitable outcome of natural vernacularization processes. Rather, they were the result of deliberate education activities and policy decisions by interested parties, including the Korean court, Western missionaries, Korean traditionalist and nationalist scholars, and Japanese imperial officials. Literary Sinitic literacy long sustained the ritual, cultural, and political modes of belonging that positioned Korea firmly within the Sinographic Cosmopolis. The promotion of vernacular literacy and the marginalization of Literary Sinitic that accompanied the social and political upheavals of the final decades of the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910), were a key element in Korea's departure from this traditional cosmopolitan order. Modern schools founded by the various interested parties above were a primary facilitator of inscriptional change. Though parents insisted that these schools include Literary Sinitic instruction, this instruction was limited to a single subject within a multi-subject curriculum. The aims, content, and methods of instruction within this new classroom subject, known as Hanmunkwa, departed significantly from those of traditional Literary Sinitic instruction. Nevertheless, Korean educators developed approaches to Hanmunkwa that still treated Literary Sinitic as the vehicle of a living, dynamic tradition. These approaches were greatly narrowed, however, through a program of textbook censorship implemented by Japanese education officials in the final years of the protectorate period (1905-1910). Shaped to meet political more than pedagogical ends, the content and methods of the Hanmunkwa instruction that resulted from this censorship reduced instruction to mere training in no more than a passive reading comprehension of excerpts from classical texts. 8 The term "Literary Sinitic" was coined by Victor Mair as a translation for the Modern Standard Mandarin term wenyan(wen) 文言(文). For his rationale for this term,

This study examines how Neo-Confucian scholars of the Chosŏn dynasty used diagrams, focusing on diagrams that depict the structure of the Doctrine of the Mean. Ever since it was extracted from the Record of Rites by Zhu Xi, the Doctrine of the Mean proved to be an important subject of scholarship. Debates about the division of the text were often related to other important issues at hand. Thus, the diagrams concerned with this problem can be seen as a nexus where various issues meet. This study provides detailed information of two particular diagrams: Kwŏn Kŭn's late 14 th century -Diagram of the Opening Section of Doctrine of the Mean,‖ and Yi Chin-sang's late 19 th century -Diagram of Four Branches and Six Sections of the Doctrine of the Mean.‖ With five centuries between them, the two diagrams are surprisingly similar, sharing both visual language and many pre-suppositions.

I argue that T'oegye gave Korean Confucianism a psychological orientation, moving away from Zhu Xi's emphasis on the investigation of things and Wang Yangming's reliance on the heart-and-mind to focus on the need to pay close attention to the origins of our emotions.