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Esa Diaz-Leon

Universitat de Barcelona, Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència, Faculty Member

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I am an Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Barcelona. Before this, I was an Assistant and then Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manitoba.
Phone: +34 934037904
Address: Department of Philosophy, University of Barcelona, C/ Montalegre, 6-8, 4th floor, room 4026, Barcelona 08001, Spain

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Sally Haslanger

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Johannes Zachhuber

University of Oxford

Daniel D. Hutto

University of Wollongong

University of Delaware

University of California, Merced

University of Cologne

Louis de Saussure

University of Neuchâtel

Armando Marques-Guedes

UNL - New University of Lisbon

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Jose-Manuel Barreto

Universidad Javeriana

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Papers by Esa Diaz-Leon

Epistemic Contextualism and Conceptual Ethics

Actors are not like Zombies

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Apr 1, 2012

Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that comparing the zombie argument against physicalism with an... more Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that comparing the zombie argument against physicalism with another influential argument in philosophy of mind, namely, the actor argument against behaviourism, can help to show why recent objections to the zombie argument fail. In this note I want to argue that the zombie argument and the actor argument have important differences, and, because of that, Stoljar's objections to some recent critiques of the zombie argument are not successful.

On how to achieve reference to covert social constructions

What does it mean to say that some features, such as gender, race and sexual orientation, are soc... more What does it mean to say that some features, such as gender, race and sexual orientation, are socially constructed? Many scholars claim that social constructionism about a kind is a version of realism about that kind, according to which the corresponding kind is a social construction, that it, it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructionism, then, is a version of realism about a kind that asserts that the kind is real, and puts forward a particular view about the nature of the kind, namely, that it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructivists about human kinds such as gender, race and sexual orientation oen make an additional claim, namely, that these kinds are social constructions but they are typically believed to be biological kinds (that is, people are typically wrong about the nature of these kinds). Ron Mallon (2017) calls social constructions that are (falsely) taken to be biological kinds covert social constructions. is pa...

On Haslanger's meta-metaphysics: Social structures and metaphysical deflationism

Disputatio

The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphys... more The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphysics, with many different views about the nature of gender and race being submitted and discussed. 1 But what are these debates about? What questions are these accounts trying to answer? And is there real disagreement between advocates of different views about race or gender? If so, what are they really disagreeing about? In this paper I want to develop a view about what the debates in the metaphysics of gender and race are about, namely, a version of metaphysical deflationism, according to which these debates are about how we actually use or should use the terms 'gender' and 'race' (and other related terms), where moral and political considerations play a central role. I will also argue that my version of the view can overcome some recent and powerful objections to metaphysical deflationism offered by Elizabeth Barnes (2014, 2016). We can then conclude that this view is a serious contender and deserves further attention. Barnes (2016) focuses on Sally Haslanger's work on gender and race as a case study, and argues that the best way of understanding her views about the nature of gender and race is in terms of a version of ontological realism about these debates. In particular, Barnes argues that metaphysical deflationism cannot capture what those debates are really about, and what Haslanger's views are trying to accomplish. In response, I will argue that we can understand the debates in the metaphysics of gender and race in general, and Haslanger's accounts of gender and race in particular, within the framework of metaphysical deflationism. For instance, Haslanger (2000) offers a characterization of gender and race in terms of social structures, and more recently she has offered a characterization of social structures in terms of networks of social relations, where social relations are constituted through social practices, which are in turn understood in terms of interdependent schemas and resources (2016: 125-6). Here I will not focus on the question of whether Haslanger herself is committed to either ontological realism or deflationism. Instead, I will focus on the question of whether understanding Haslanger's accounts of gender and race and other social structures within the framework of metaphysical deflationism can capture what those accounts aim to do and why they matter.

Sexual Orientations: The Desire View

Talk about sexual orientations is widespread in our society and our culture, but very few analyti... more Talk about sexual orientations is widespread in our society and our culture, but very few analytic philosophers have paid attention to questions about the nature of sexual orientations, such as what sexual orientations are and what ‘sexual orientation’ means. In this paper I aim to examine the main theories about the nature and the ordinary concept of sexual orientation that are available in the recent and growing literature on this issue, including behaviorism, ideal and ordinary versions of dispositionalism, structuralism, and views according to which sexual orientations are mental states such as sexual desires. I will discuss several objections to these views, and I will develop and defend a new version of the view that characterizes sexual orientations in terms of sexual desires.

Phenomenal Concepts: Neither Circular Nor Opaque

In this paper I focus on an influential account of phenomenal concepts, namely, the recognitional... more In this paper I focus on an influential account of phenomenal concepts, namely, the recognitional account, and defend it from some recent challenges. According to this account, phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts that we use when we recognize some experiences as " another one of those ". Michael Tye has argued that this account is viciously circular, because the relevant recognitional abilities involve descriptions of the form " another experience of the same type " , which is also a phenomenal concept. Tye argues that we could avoid the circularity worry if we explain the reference-fixing of phenomenal concepts in terms of dispositions to re-identify tokens of the same type, without appealing to any further phenomenal concept. However, he argues, this account is incompatible with the intuitive claim that phenomenal concepts seem to involve rich modes of presentation of their referents. Philip Goff and others have similarly argued that a recognitional account of phenomenal concepts would make phenomenal concepts opaque, that is, they cannot reveal anything about the referents, which seems problematic. In this paper I present a new version of the recognitional account so that it can avoid the circularity worry without entailing that phenomenal concepts are opaque.

Epistemic Contextualism and Conceptual Ethics

Reflections on Same-Sex Marriage, Amatonormativity, and the Discrimination of Singles

What Is Social Construction?

In this paper I discuss the question of what it means to say that a property is socially construc... more In this paper I discuss the question of what it means to say that a property is socially constructed. I focus on an influential project that many social constructivists are engaged in, namely, arguing against the inevitability of a trait, and I examine several recent characterizations of social construction, with the aim of assessing which one is more suited to the task.

Do A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?

A posteriori physicalism is the combination of two appealing views: physicalism (i.e. the view th... more A posteriori physicalism is the combination of two appealing views: physicalism (i.e. the view that all facts are either physical or entailed by the physical), and conceptual dualism (i.e. the view that phenomenal truths are not entailed a priori by physical truths). Recently, some philosophers such as Goff (2011), Levine (2007) and Nida-Rümelin (2007), among others, have suggested that a posteriori physicalism cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties. In this paper, I wish to defend a posteriori physicalism from this new and interesting challenge, by arguing that a posteriori physicalists have the resources to explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal at least something of what it would take for the corresponding phenomenal property to be instantiated.

Norms of Judgement, Naturalism, and Normativism about Content

David Papineau (1999) argues that norms of judgement pose no special problem for naturalism, beca... more David Papineau (1999) argues that norms of judgement pose no special problem for naturalism, because all such norms of judgement are derived from moral or personal values. Papineau claims that this account of the normativity of judgement presupposes an account of content that places normativity outside the analysis of content, because in his view any accounts of content that place normativity inside the analysis of content cannot explain the normativity of judgement in the derivative way he proposes. Furthermore, he argues that normative accounts of content along those lines are independently problematic. In this paper I aim to respond to both objections, by arguing that normative accounts of content can be seen as naturalist accounts, even if they place normativity inside the analysis of content; and that normative accounts of content are compatible with a derivative account of norms of judgement of the sort Papineau advocates.

In defence of historical constructivism about races

Social constructivism about races holds that races are socially real, that is, they are identical... more Social constructivism about races holds that races are socially real, that is, they are identical with socially constructed properties, or social kinds. One particular version of social constructivism, namely, historical constructivism, claims that the properties that make a group of people a race are certain historical properties of the individuals that belong to that group (e.g., the life histories of the members of the group, or their ancestors). Joshua Glasgow has recently argued, following Appiah, Gooding-Williams and others, that historical constructivism faces several problems. In particular, he argues, it faces a trilemma: either the characterization of races provided is circular, or, if it wants to avoid circularity, it will turn out to be either redundant or indeterminate. In this paper, my main aim is to explore this interesting challenge to historical constructivism about races, and argue that it can escape Glasgow’s trilemma. I will focus on historical constructivism about races, but I hope my discussion will shed some light on the question of whether social constructivist accounts in general are tenable.

'Woman' as a politically significant term: A solution to the puzzle

What does ‘woman’ mean? According to two competing views, it can be seen as a sex term or as a ge... more What does ‘woman’ mean? According to two competing views, it can be seen as a sex term or as a gender term. Recently, Jennifer Saul has put forward a contextualist view, according to which ‘woman’ can have different meanings in different contexts. The main motivation for this view seems to involve moral and political considerations, namely, that this view can do justice to the claims of trans women. Unfortunately, Saul argues, on further reflection the contextualist view fails to do justice to those moral and political claims that motivated the view in the first place. In this paper I argue that there is a version of the contextualist view which can indeed capture those moral and political aims, and in addition, I use this case to illustrate an important and more general claim, namely, that moral and political considerations can be relevant to the descriptive project of finding out what certain politically significant terms actually mean.

Actors are not like Zombies

Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that comparing the zombie argument against physicalism with an... more Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that comparing the zombie argument against physicalism with another influential argument in philosophy of mind, namely, the actor argument against behaviourism, can help to show why recent objections to the zombie argument fail. In this note I want to argue that the zombie argument and the actor argument have important differences, and, because of that, Stoljar's objections to some recent critiques of the zombie argument are not successful.

Reductive Explanation, Concepts and A Priori Entailment

In this paper I examine Chalmers and Jackson’s defence of the a priori entailment thesis, that is... more In this paper I examine Chalmers and Jackson’s defence of the a priori entailment thesis, that is, the claim that microphysical truths a priori entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths such as ‘water covers 60% of the Earth surface’, which they use as a premise for an argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness. Their argument relies on a certain view about the possession conditions of macroscopic concepts such as WATER, known as ascriptivism. In the paper I distinguish two versions of ascriptivism: reductive versus non-reductive ascriptivism. According to reductive ascriptivism, competent users of a concept have the ability to infer truths involving such concept from lower-level truths, whereas according to non-reductive ascriptivism, all that is required in order to be a competent user of a concept is to be able to infer truths involving that concept from other truths, which need not be lower-level truths. I argue, first, that the a priori entailment thesis is committed to reductive ascriptivism, and secondly, that reductive ascriptivism is problematic because it trivializes the notion of a priori knowledge. Therefore, I conclude that Chalmers and Jackson have not presented a convincing case for the claim that microphysical truths entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths a priori, especially when we understand this claim in the sense that is relevant for their argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness.

Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy

One of the main strategies against conceivability arguments is the so-called phenomenal concept s... more One of the main strategies against conceivability arguments is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which aims to explain the epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths in terms of the special features of phenomenal concepts. Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that the phenomenal concept strategy has failed to provide a successful explanation of this epistemic gap. In this paper my aim is to defend the phenomenal concept strategy from his criticisms. I argue that Stoljar has misrepresented the resources of the strategy, which can indeed accomplish the required explanatory task, once it is properly understood.

How Many Explanatory Gaps Are There?

Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain the Epistemic Gap?

The inference from conceivability to possibility has been challenged in numerous ways. One of the... more The inference from conceivability to possibility has been challenged in numerous ways. One of these ways is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which has become one of the main strategies against the conceivability argument against physicalism. However, David Chalmers has recently presented a dilemma for the phenomenal concept strategy, and he has argued that no version of the strategy can succeed. In this paper, I examine the dilemma, and I argue that there is a way out of it. I conclude that Chalmers has not posed any serious problem for the phenomenal concept strategy to succeed in blocking the conceivability argument. In doing so, my aim is not only to show that Chalmers’ argument has not refuted the phenomenal concept strategy, but also to clarify what any version of the strategy should achieve in order to be successful.

We Are Living in a Material World (and I am a Material Girl)

Social Kinds, Conceptual Analysis, and the Operative Concept: A Reply to Haslanger

Epistemic Contextualism and Conceptual Ethics

Actors are not like Zombies

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Apr 1, 2012

Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that comparing the zombie argument against physicalism with an... more Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that comparing the zombie argument against physicalism with another influential argument in philosophy of mind, namely, the actor argument against behaviourism, can help to show why recent objections to the zombie argument fail. In this note I want to argue that the zombie argument and the actor argument have important differences, and, because of that, Stoljar's objections to some recent critiques of the zombie argument are not successful.

On how to achieve reference to covert social constructions

What does it mean to say that some features, such as gender, race and sexual orientation, are soc... more What does it mean to say that some features, such as gender, race and sexual orientation, are socially constructed? Many scholars claim that social constructionism about a kind is a version of realism about that kind, according to which the corresponding kind is a social construction, that it, it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructionism, then, is a version of realism about a kind that asserts that the kind is real, and puts forward a particular view about the nature of the kind, namely, that it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructivists about human kinds such as gender, race and sexual orientation oen make an additional claim, namely, that these kinds are social constructions but they are typically believed to be biological kinds (that is, people are typically wrong about the nature of these kinds). Ron Mallon (2017) calls social constructions that are (falsely) taken to be biological kinds covert social constructions. is pa...

On Haslanger's meta-metaphysics: Social structures and metaphysical deflationism

Disputatio

The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphys... more The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphysics, with many different views about the nature of gender and race being submitted and discussed. 1 But what are these debates about? What questions are these accounts trying to answer? And is there real disagreement between advocates of different views about race or gender? If so, what are they really disagreeing about? In this paper I want to develop a view about what the debates in the metaphysics of gender and race are about, namely, a version of metaphysical deflationism, according to which these debates are about how we actually use or should use the terms 'gender' and 'race' (and other related terms), where moral and political considerations play a central role. I will also argue that my version of the view can overcome some recent and powerful objections to metaphysical deflationism offered by Elizabeth Barnes (2014, 2016). We can then conclude that this view is a serious contender and deserves further attention. Barnes (2016) focuses on Sally Haslanger's work on gender and race as a case study, and argues that the best way of understanding her views about the nature of gender and race is in terms of a version of ontological realism about these debates. In particular, Barnes argues that metaphysical deflationism cannot capture what those debates are really about, and what Haslanger's views are trying to accomplish. In response, I will argue that we can understand the debates in the metaphysics of gender and race in general, and Haslanger's accounts of gender and race in particular, within the framework of metaphysical deflationism. For instance, Haslanger (2000) offers a characterization of gender and race in terms of social structures, and more recently she has offered a characterization of social structures in terms of networks of social relations, where social relations are constituted through social practices, which are in turn understood in terms of interdependent schemas and resources (2016: 125-6). Here I will not focus on the question of whether Haslanger herself is committed to either ontological realism or deflationism. Instead, I will focus on the question of whether understanding Haslanger's accounts of gender and race and other social structures within the framework of metaphysical deflationism can capture what those accounts aim to do and why they matter.

Sexual Orientations: The Desire View

Talk about sexual orientations is widespread in our society and our culture, but very few analyti... more Talk about sexual orientations is widespread in our society and our culture, but very few analytic philosophers have paid attention to questions about the nature of sexual orientations, such as what sexual orientations are and what ‘sexual orientation’ means. In this paper I aim to examine the main theories about the nature and the ordinary concept of sexual orientation that are available in the recent and growing literature on this issue, including behaviorism, ideal and ordinary versions of dispositionalism, structuralism, and views according to which sexual orientations are mental states such as sexual desires. I will discuss several objections to these views, and I will develop and defend a new version of the view that characterizes sexual orientations in terms of sexual desires.

Phenomenal Concepts: Neither Circular Nor Opaque

In this paper I focus on an influential account of phenomenal concepts, namely, the recognitional... more In this paper I focus on an influential account of phenomenal concepts, namely, the recognitional account, and defend it from some recent challenges. According to this account, phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts that we use when we recognize some experiences as " another one of those ". Michael Tye has argued that this account is viciously circular, because the relevant recognitional abilities involve descriptions of the form " another experience of the same type " , which is also a phenomenal concept. Tye argues that we could avoid the circularity worry if we explain the reference-fixing of phenomenal concepts in terms of dispositions to re-identify tokens of the same type, without appealing to any further phenomenal concept. However, he argues, this account is incompatible with the intuitive claim that phenomenal concepts seem to involve rich modes of presentation of their referents. Philip Goff and others have similarly argued that a recognitional account of phenomenal concepts would make phenomenal concepts opaque, that is, they cannot reveal anything about the referents, which seems problematic. In this paper I present a new version of the recognitional account so that it can avoid the circularity worry without entailing that phenomenal concepts are opaque.

Epistemic Contextualism and Conceptual Ethics

Reflections on Same-Sex Marriage, Amatonormativity, and the Discrimination of Singles

What Is Social Construction?

In this paper I discuss the question of what it means to say that a property is socially construc... more In this paper I discuss the question of what it means to say that a property is socially constructed. I focus on an influential project that many social constructivists are engaged in, namely, arguing against the inevitability of a trait, and I examine several recent characterizations of social construction, with the aim of assessing which one is more suited to the task.

Do A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?

A posteriori physicalism is the combination of two appealing views: physicalism (i.e. the view th... more A posteriori physicalism is the combination of two appealing views: physicalism (i.e. the view that all facts are either physical or entailed by the physical), and conceptual dualism (i.e. the view that phenomenal truths are not entailed a priori by physical truths). Recently, some philosophers such as Goff (2011), Levine (2007) and Nida-Rümelin (2007), among others, have suggested that a posteriori physicalism cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties. In this paper, I wish to defend a posteriori physicalism from this new and interesting challenge, by arguing that a posteriori physicalists have the resources to explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal at least something of what it would take for the corresponding phenomenal property to be instantiated.

Norms of Judgement, Naturalism, and Normativism about Content

David Papineau (1999) argues that norms of judgement pose no special problem for naturalism, beca... more David Papineau (1999) argues that norms of judgement pose no special problem for naturalism, because all such norms of judgement are derived from moral or personal values. Papineau claims that this account of the normativity of judgement presupposes an account of content that places normativity outside the analysis of content, because in his view any accounts of content that place normativity inside the analysis of content cannot explain the normativity of judgement in the derivative way he proposes. Furthermore, he argues that normative accounts of content along those lines are independently problematic. In this paper I aim to respond to both objections, by arguing that normative accounts of content can be seen as naturalist accounts, even if they place normativity inside the analysis of content; and that normative accounts of content are compatible with a derivative account of norms of judgement of the sort Papineau advocates.

In defence of historical constructivism about races

Social constructivism about races holds that races are socially real, that is, they are identical... more Social constructivism about races holds that races are socially real, that is, they are identical with socially constructed properties, or social kinds. One particular version of social constructivism, namely, historical constructivism, claims that the properties that make a group of people a race are certain historical properties of the individuals that belong to that group (e.g., the life histories of the members of the group, or their ancestors). Joshua Glasgow has recently argued, following Appiah, Gooding-Williams and others, that historical constructivism faces several problems. In particular, he argues, it faces a trilemma: either the characterization of races provided is circular, or, if it wants to avoid circularity, it will turn out to be either redundant or indeterminate. In this paper, my main aim is to explore this interesting challenge to historical constructivism about races, and argue that it can escape Glasgow’s trilemma. I will focus on historical constructivism about races, but I hope my discussion will shed some light on the question of whether social constructivist accounts in general are tenable.

'Woman' as a politically significant term: A solution to the puzzle

What does ‘woman’ mean? According to two competing views, it can be seen as a sex term or as a ge... more What does ‘woman’ mean? According to two competing views, it can be seen as a sex term or as a gender term. Recently, Jennifer Saul has put forward a contextualist view, according to which ‘woman’ can have different meanings in different contexts. The main motivation for this view seems to involve moral and political considerations, namely, that this view can do justice to the claims of trans women. Unfortunately, Saul argues, on further reflection the contextualist view fails to do justice to those moral and political claims that motivated the view in the first place. In this paper I argue that there is a version of the contextualist view which can indeed capture those moral and political aims, and in addition, I use this case to illustrate an important and more general claim, namely, that moral and political considerations can be relevant to the descriptive project of finding out what certain politically significant terms actually mean.

Actors are not like Zombies

Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that comparing the zombie argument against physicalism with an... more Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that comparing the zombie argument against physicalism with another influential argument in philosophy of mind, namely, the actor argument against behaviourism, can help to show why recent objections to the zombie argument fail. In this note I want to argue that the zombie argument and the actor argument have important differences, and, because of that, Stoljar's objections to some recent critiques of the zombie argument are not successful.

Reductive Explanation, Concepts and A Priori Entailment

In this paper I examine Chalmers and Jackson’s defence of the a priori entailment thesis, that is... more In this paper I examine Chalmers and Jackson’s defence of the a priori entailment thesis, that is, the claim that microphysical truths a priori entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths such as ‘water covers 60% of the Earth surface’, which they use as a premise for an argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness. Their argument relies on a certain view about the possession conditions of macroscopic concepts such as WATER, known as ascriptivism. In the paper I distinguish two versions of ascriptivism: reductive versus non-reductive ascriptivism. According to reductive ascriptivism, competent users of a concept have the ability to infer truths involving such concept from lower-level truths, whereas according to non-reductive ascriptivism, all that is required in order to be a competent user of a concept is to be able to infer truths involving that concept from other truths, which need not be lower-level truths. I argue, first, that the a priori entailment thesis is committed to reductive ascriptivism, and secondly, that reductive ascriptivism is problematic because it trivializes the notion of a priori knowledge. Therefore, I conclude that Chalmers and Jackson have not presented a convincing case for the claim that microphysical truths entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths a priori, especially when we understand this claim in the sense that is relevant for their argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness.

Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy

One of the main strategies against conceivability arguments is the so-called phenomenal concept s... more One of the main strategies against conceivability arguments is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which aims to explain the epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths in terms of the special features of phenomenal concepts. Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that the phenomenal concept strategy has failed to provide a successful explanation of this epistemic gap. In this paper my aim is to defend the phenomenal concept strategy from his criticisms. I argue that Stoljar has misrepresented the resources of the strategy, which can indeed accomplish the required explanatory task, once it is properly understood.

How Many Explanatory Gaps Are There?

Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain the Epistemic Gap?

The inference from conceivability to possibility has been challenged in numerous ways. One of the... more The inference from conceivability to possibility has been challenged in numerous ways. One of these ways is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which has become one of the main strategies against the conceivability argument against physicalism. However, David Chalmers has recently presented a dilemma for the phenomenal concept strategy, and he has argued that no version of the strategy can succeed. In this paper, I examine the dilemma, and I argue that there is a way out of it. I conclude that Chalmers has not posed any serious problem for the phenomenal concept strategy to succeed in blocking the conceivability argument. In doing so, my aim is not only to show that Chalmers’ argument has not refuted the phenomenal concept strategy, but also to clarify what any version of the strategy should achieve in order to be successful.

We Are Living in a Material World (and I am a Material Girl)

Social Kinds, Conceptual Analysis, and the Operative Concept: A Reply to Haslanger

Amatonormatividad e Injusticia Hermenéutica

Introducción: En esta charla quiero discutir algunas cuestiones sobre el valor de las relaciones ... more Introducción: En esta charla quiero discutir algunas cuestiones sobre el valor de las relaciones de afecto no normativas, es decir, las que no siguen el modelo de relación sexo-afectiva de la pareja romántica, diádica y monógama. Por ejemplo: relaciones de amistad, relaciones sexo-afectivas no monógamas, tribus urbanas, o relaciones sexo-afectivas de pareja que no conllevan compartir bienes, vivienda, o vida doméstica. La filósofa Elizabeth Brake (de Arizona) ha argumentado que el matrimonio como institución, y el tipo de relación que el matrimonio reconoce legalmente, a saber, relaciones de pareja románticas, monógamas y supuestamente de larga duración (relaciones románticas normativas), no tienen más valor que las relaciones de afecto no reconocidas por la institución de matrimonio, tales como la amistad, las tribus urbanas, relaciones sexo-afectivas no monógamas, etc. Es decir, tanto la ceremonia de matrimonio en sí, como el tener una relación sexo-afectiva con amor romántico, monógama y de larga duración, no tienen más valor que otros tipos de relación donde también haya afectos y cuidados. Para Brake, las características que le dan valor a una relación afectiva son dos: las actitudes afectivas (es decir, las emociones de afecto y amor que hay presentes), y las relaciones de cuidado (es decir, la atención, asistencia, cuidado y apoyo material y emocional). Estas dos propiedades están relacionadas, aunque pueden darse separadamente. Si queremos a alguien, es más probable que estemos dispuestos a proporcionarle cuidados de manera desinteresada, aunque no siempre es así. Y también podemos dar cuidados de manera remunerada, o de manera desinteresada sin relación de afecto (por ejemplo en el voluntariado). Para Brake, el afecto y los cuidados pueden estar igualmente presentes en relaciones románticas normativas, y en relaciones de afecto fuera de este modelo, tales como amistad, tribus urbanas, parejas no monógamas, relaciones románticas sin compartir vivienda, etc. Según Brake, el afecto presente en ambos tipos de relaciones tiene exactamente el mismo tipo de valor.
Barcelona Pensa 15 Noviembre 2018