Carlos Muñoz-Suárez
Welcome!
I'm professor of Social Neuroscience at the Universidad Icesi (Colombia). I'm a PhD. student (Cognitive Science and Language Program) at the University of Barcelona and member of LOGOS, Research Group in Analytic Philosophy (University of Barcelona, Spain). Since 2007 I've taught courses about different topics in Analytic Philosophy and Empirical Psychology (cognitive, evolutionary and neurobiological). I've been visiting researcher at UNAM, México (Instituto de investigaciones filosóficas, 2008), RUB, Germany (Center for Mind and Cognition, 2015), and UDE, Germany (Research Group in Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics, 2017).
I have interests that range from the realm of Cogntive Science into three fields: senso-perceptual activity, cognitive and metacognitive activity, and social cognition. In particular, within the first one, I'm interested in visual experience and visual representation; within the second one, I'm interested in the mechanisms that underlie intuitive, theorethical reasoning, as well as in the possibility of naturalizing conceptual engineering. In the third field I'm interested, on the one hand, in the integration between cuantitative and qualitative models of analysis for the computational study of social phenomena and, on the other hand, in the informational integration and overlapping between cognitive systems.
Currently, I lead Project Oasis (in response to the impact in Colombia of the ongoing global pandemic of COVID-19). I'm finishing the writting-up period of my PhD. Thesis, entitled The Engines of Intuition, under the supervision of Manuel García-Carpintero, which I'll finally submit on the first semester of 2021. I'm also editing the first companion on Predictive Processing in Spanish, entitled Ciencia Cognitiva y Procesamiento Predictivo (which includes translations of (published and original) papers by Andy Clark, Jakob Hohwy, Sussana Siegel, Fiona Macpherson, Michael Madary, Julian Kiverstein, Zoe Drayson, Matteo Colombo, and others).
Please feel free to contact me:
[email protected]
Supervisors: BA Philosophy: Mauricio Zuluaga, MPhil Philosophy: Mauricio Zuluaga, PhD (in progress), Manuel García-Carpintero, and BA Psychology: Oscar Sierra-Fitzgerald
I'm professor of Social Neuroscience at the Universidad Icesi (Colombia). I'm a PhD. student (Cognitive Science and Language Program) at the University of Barcelona and member of LOGOS, Research Group in Analytic Philosophy (University of Barcelona, Spain). Since 2007 I've taught courses about different topics in Analytic Philosophy and Empirical Psychology (cognitive, evolutionary and neurobiological). I've been visiting researcher at UNAM, México (Instituto de investigaciones filosóficas, 2008), RUB, Germany (Center for Mind and Cognition, 2015), and UDE, Germany (Research Group in Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics, 2017).
I have interests that range from the realm of Cogntive Science into three fields: senso-perceptual activity, cognitive and metacognitive activity, and social cognition. In particular, within the first one, I'm interested in visual experience and visual representation; within the second one, I'm interested in the mechanisms that underlie intuitive, theorethical reasoning, as well as in the possibility of naturalizing conceptual engineering. In the third field I'm interested, on the one hand, in the integration between cuantitative and qualitative models of analysis for the computational study of social phenomena and, on the other hand, in the informational integration and overlapping between cognitive systems.
Currently, I lead Project Oasis (in response to the impact in Colombia of the ongoing global pandemic of COVID-19). I'm finishing the writting-up period of my PhD. Thesis, entitled The Engines of Intuition, under the supervision of Manuel García-Carpintero, which I'll finally submit on the first semester of 2021. I'm also editing the first companion on Predictive Processing in Spanish, entitled Ciencia Cognitiva y Procesamiento Predictivo (which includes translations of (published and original) papers by Andy Clark, Jakob Hohwy, Sussana Siegel, Fiona Macpherson, Michael Madary, Julian Kiverstein, Zoe Drayson, Matteo Colombo, and others).
Please feel free to contact me:
[email protected]
Supervisors: BA Philosophy: Mauricio Zuluaga, MPhil Philosophy: Mauricio Zuluaga, PhD (in progress), Manuel García-Carpintero, and BA Psychology: Oscar Sierra-Fitzgerald
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Papers by Carlos Muñoz-Suárez
y novedoso de investigación acerca de las condiciones y de los factores que dan lugar a la innovación teórica mediante la ingeniería conceptual.
En este artículo se esboza una concepción general acerca de las funciones neurobiológicas. Particularmente, la manera en que se describen normativamente y las estrategias mediante las cuales se definen. Así, se clarificará, por un lado, la distinción entre implementar y ejecutar una función y, por otro, la distinción entre definir y especificar una función. Adicionalmente, se presentará un esquema detallado de cómo las funciones neurobiológicas (que pueden ser múltiplemente implementables y ejecutables) pueden ser comprendidas. Finalmente, se introducirá el concepto de “supercluster” como una unidad de modelización de funciones neurobiológicas de nivel superior.
Palabras Claves
descripción para la implementación, conceptualizaciones modales y teleológicas, descripción composicional de las funciones, análisis composicional del funcionamiento, implementación y ejecución múltiple
Abstract
In this paper I will sketch a general conception about neurobiological functions. Particularly, the way in which we normatively de-scribe them and the strategies by which we define them. So I will clarify, on the one hand, the distinction between to realize and to perform a function and, on the other hand, the distinction between to define and to specify a function. Furthermore, I will present a fine-grained scheme of how neurobiological functions (which can be multiple realizable and performable) can be grasped. Finally, I will introduce the concept of ‘supercluster’ as a modeling unit of higher-level neurobiological functions.
Keywords
description to realization, modal and teleological conceptualizations, compositional description of functions, compositional analysis of performing, multiple realization and performance
Edited Books by Carlos Muñoz-Suárez
Content and Consciousness Revisited is devoted to reconsider the ideas and ideals introduced in Dennett’s seminal book, by covering its fundamental concepts, hypotheses and approaches, and taking into account the findings and progress which have taken place during more than four decades. This book includes original and critical contributions about the relations between science and philosophy, the personal/sub-personal level distinction, intelligence, learning, intentionality, rationality, propositional attitudes, among other issues of scientific and philosophical interest. Each chapter embraces an updated approach to several disciplines, like cognitive science, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive psychiatry.
__________
About this book
- Re-visits the ideas and ideals introduced in Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness (1969)
- Includes critical and original contributions to diverse fields, such as cognitive science, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive psychiatry
- Provides fundamental lessons relevant to the areas of philosophy of mind, psychology, cognitive science and related disciplines
- Suggests avenues for future research in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science and related disciplines
Book chapters by Carlos Muñoz-Suárez
In conference proceedings by Carlos Muñoz-Suárez
Classic approaches to the problem of the relation between subjective choices & intentional motor acts assume that the latter are a direct effect of the former. According to Libet, intentional actions are direct effects of a brain event preceding them (called Readiness Potential). We propose a dual-domain analysis: (I) We claim from a naturalized standpoint that subjective choice is another neurocognitive event that intervenes in the making of intentional actions rather than being just an epiphenomenal event, since subjective choice is intrinsically related to the fixation of the focus of attention; (ii) We claim that the relevant concept of agent must be grasped starting from the relevant domain in which our conception of will make sense (in which we commonly use the concept). Wittgenstein's remarks in his early work seem to coincide with most of our general conclusions.
Reviews by Carlos Muñoz-Suárez
Interviews by Carlos Muñoz-Suárez
La cognición, la tecnología y la racionalidad hacen constituyen tres dominios de estudio que se encuentran directamente entrelazados. En el presente documento se pretende esclarecer algunas de las principales relaciones generales que posibilitan este enlace. Así mismo, se busca puntualizar algunos tópicos relevantes que permitan afianzar una comprensión no reduccionista de sus relaciones.
Palabras clave: Cognición, tecnología, racionalidad, perspectiva de primera persona, perspectiva de tercera persona.
Cognition, Technology and Rationality
Cognition, technology and rationality are directly bound and constitute three domains of study. In the present paper we pretend to clarify some of the main general relationships which allow such binding. Thus, it specifies some relevant topics to frame a non-reductionist comprehension of such relationships.
Key words: Cognition, Technology, Rationality, First-person perspective, Third-person perspective.
y novedoso de investigación acerca de las condiciones y de los factores que dan lugar a la innovación teórica mediante la ingeniería conceptual.
En este artículo se esboza una concepción general acerca de las funciones neurobiológicas. Particularmente, la manera en que se describen normativamente y las estrategias mediante las cuales se definen. Así, se clarificará, por un lado, la distinción entre implementar y ejecutar una función y, por otro, la distinción entre definir y especificar una función. Adicionalmente, se presentará un esquema detallado de cómo las funciones neurobiológicas (que pueden ser múltiplemente implementables y ejecutables) pueden ser comprendidas. Finalmente, se introducirá el concepto de “supercluster” como una unidad de modelización de funciones neurobiológicas de nivel superior.
Palabras Claves
descripción para la implementación, conceptualizaciones modales y teleológicas, descripción composicional de las funciones, análisis composicional del funcionamiento, implementación y ejecución múltiple
Abstract
In this paper I will sketch a general conception about neurobiological functions. Particularly, the way in which we normatively de-scribe them and the strategies by which we define them. So I will clarify, on the one hand, the distinction between to realize and to perform a function and, on the other hand, the distinction between to define and to specify a function. Furthermore, I will present a fine-grained scheme of how neurobiological functions (which can be multiple realizable and performable) can be grasped. Finally, I will introduce the concept of ‘supercluster’ as a modeling unit of higher-level neurobiological functions.
Keywords
description to realization, modal and teleological conceptualizations, compositional description of functions, compositional analysis of performing, multiple realization and performance
Content and Consciousness Revisited is devoted to reconsider the ideas and ideals introduced in Dennett’s seminal book, by covering its fundamental concepts, hypotheses and approaches, and taking into account the findings and progress which have taken place during more than four decades. This book includes original and critical contributions about the relations between science and philosophy, the personal/sub-personal level distinction, intelligence, learning, intentionality, rationality, propositional attitudes, among other issues of scientific and philosophical interest. Each chapter embraces an updated approach to several disciplines, like cognitive science, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive psychiatry.
__________
About this book
- Re-visits the ideas and ideals introduced in Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness (1969)
- Includes critical and original contributions to diverse fields, such as cognitive science, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive psychiatry
- Provides fundamental lessons relevant to the areas of philosophy of mind, psychology, cognitive science and related disciplines
- Suggests avenues for future research in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science and related disciplines
Classic approaches to the problem of the relation between subjective choices & intentional motor acts assume that the latter are a direct effect of the former. According to Libet, intentional actions are direct effects of a brain event preceding them (called Readiness Potential). We propose a dual-domain analysis: (I) We claim from a naturalized standpoint that subjective choice is another neurocognitive event that intervenes in the making of intentional actions rather than being just an epiphenomenal event, since subjective choice is intrinsically related to the fixation of the focus of attention; (ii) We claim that the relevant concept of agent must be grasped starting from the relevant domain in which our conception of will make sense (in which we commonly use the concept). Wittgenstein's remarks in his early work seem to coincide with most of our general conclusions.
La cognición, la tecnología y la racionalidad hacen constituyen tres dominios de estudio que se encuentran directamente entrelazados. En el presente documento se pretende esclarecer algunas de las principales relaciones generales que posibilitan este enlace. Así mismo, se busca puntualizar algunos tópicos relevantes que permitan afianzar una comprensión no reduccionista de sus relaciones.
Palabras clave: Cognición, tecnología, racionalidad, perspectiva de primera persona, perspectiva de tercera persona.
Cognition, Technology and Rationality
Cognition, technology and rationality are directly bound and constitute three domains of study. In the present paper we pretend to clarify some of the main general relationships which allow such binding. Thus, it specifies some relevant topics to frame a non-reductionist comprehension of such relationships.
Key words: Cognition, Technology, Rationality, First-person perspective, Third-person perspective.
[Note: This is a version-without-typos of the commentary published in the MindsOnline website.]
Se presentan dos sentidos en los que Searle usa la etiqueta ‘realismo externo’: (i) como presuposición del trasfondo y (ii) como tesis filosófica a favor de que existen hechos independientes de la intencionalidad. Se afirma que Searle no ofrece argumentos para derivar (ii) a partir de (i). A continuación, se diferencia la tesis de que existe una realidad ontológicamente objetiva de (i) y de (ii) y se argumenta que tener argumentos a favor de (i) y/o de (ii) no es razón suficiente para aceptar que existe una realidad ontológicamente objetiva. Se concluye que la plausibilidad de (i) no es una razón suficiente para la verdad de (ii) y que ni la plausibilidad de (i) ni la verdad de (ii) son razones suficientes para aceptar que existe una realidad ontológicamente objetiva. Con lo anterior se desarticulan los principales pilares de la metafísica searleana.
Abstract:
Two senses in which Searle uses the label ‘external realism’ are presented: (i) as a background presupposition and (ii) as a philosophical thesis according to which there are intentionality-independent facts. I argue that Searle does not present a conclusive argument in order to infer (ii) from (i). Furthermore, I argue that the thesis according to which the ontologically objective reality exists is dissociated from (i) and (ii). I argue that warranting (i) and/or (ii) not suffice to accept that there is and ontologically objective reality. I conclude that the plausibility of (i) is not a sufficient reason to assume (ii). Also, neither the plausibility of (i) nor the truth of (ii) are sufficient reasons to endorse the thesis that exists of an ontologically objective reality. Thus, the main pillars of Searle’s metaphysics are disarticulated.
"
Under certain conditions, by having visual experiences (namely, a kind of sensory phenomenal state) conscious creatures have access to certain things, e.g. the blue sky, a red circle or the movement of a hand. In other terms, when a phenomenally conscious creature has a visual experience of the blue sky, the blue sky is somehow present to that creature in a visual format. This is an intuitive judgment. Appearances notwithstanding, there isn't theoretical agreement regarding the nature of what is present by having visual experiences.
Clarifying the nature of what is phenomenally present goes hand in hand with clarifying the nature of what is phenomenally absent. On the basis of this desideratum in this paper I will motivate the following conjecture: ontologically neutral analysis of the Argument from Transparency and the Argument for Revelation (and their relations) provides explanatory principles for elucidating the explananda of theory of visual phenomenal content, which is a fundamental part of a general theory of visual experiences. I will identify and describe versions of these arguments that don't required strong ontological commitments regarding the intentional objects of visual experiences, thereby understanding their conceptual relations as providing a basic characterization of what should be explained by a theory of visual phenomenal presence.
In the first part I will describe some standard interpretations of the arguments, as well as their logical structures and their ontologically neutral alternatives. In this way, I will provide an analysis of each argument for identifying some metaphysical and epistemological assumptions associated with non-neutral versions. In the second part I will make explicit strong relations between these arguments and specify the working concepts ‘transparent’ and ‘revealed’. Furthermore, I will introduce what I'll call the Hybrid Argument – an argument that leads to three claims that jointly provide an ontologically neutral (i.e., unbiased) characterization of visual phenomenal content.
Todas las áreas del conocimiento se cimientan de diversas formas en una multiplicidad de productos derivados de la ingeniería conceptual. Este artículo tiene un espíritu programático: busca introducir un modelo del funcionamiento de la ingeniería conceptual y, en particular, de cómo ocurre la innovación conceptual en contextos de indagación teórica. En la primera sección, se describe el vecindario dialéctico en que nació el estudio explícito de la relevancia, el alcance, los mecanismos y los objetivos propios de la ingeniería conceptual. En la segunda sección, se introduce una distinción entre ingeniería conceptual evaluativa e ingeniería conceptual instrumental a partir de la distinción entre uso conceptual comprometido y uso conceptual instrumental. A partir de esto, se muestra que los casos descritos de ingeniería conceptual evaluativa y de ingeniería conceptual instrumental pueden ser formalmente entendidos como derivados de una misma función, que, dado un problema conceptual, mapea soluciones conceptuales posibles para generar valores de éxito o de fracaso. En la siguiente sección, se introduce un tercer tipo de ingeniería conceptual: la ingeniería conceptual constructiva, cuyo núcleo es una función (de innovación conceptual) que mapea soluciones dentro de un espacio representacional de alternativas no consideradas y genera nuevo contenido conceptual. El modelo introducido abre un campo fructífero y novedoso de investigación acerca de las condiciones y de los factores que dan lugar a la innovación teórica mediante la ingeniería conceptual.