
Jesús Adrián
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Papers by Jesús Adrián
The idea that Husserl’s phenomenology is a kind of reflective philosophy inspired by the Cartesian tradition has become a commonplace in the philosophical literature. Heidegger was one of the first thinkers who criticized the Husserlian emphasis on reflection. Since then it is easy to find the affirmation that Husserl and Heidegger developed two different, even antagonistic concepts of phenomenology. Here is not the place to continue embracing this discussion. One the one hand, the
present article shows the complex development process of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology in the course of his first lectures in Freiburg (1919-1923) and Marburg (1924-1928). On the other hand, it weighs up some of Heidegger’s critical remarks regarding the reflective nature of Husserlian phenomenology in the light of important textual evidences ignored not only by Heidegger, but also by a surprising number of specialists in the fields of philosophy, cognitive sciences, and philosophy
of mind.
Keywords: constitution, genetic, hermeneutics and reflective phenomenology,
passive and active synthesis.
The idea that Husserl’s phenomenology is a kind of reflective philosophy inspired by the Cartesian tradition has become a commonplace in the philosophical literature. Heidegger was one of the first thinkers who criticized the Husserlian emphasis on reflection. Since then it is easy to find the affirmation that Husserl and Heidegger developed two different, even antagonistic concepts of phenomenology. Here is not the place to continue embracing this discussion. One the one hand, the
present article shows the complex development process of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology in the course of his first lectures in Freiburg (1919-1923) and Marburg (1924-1928). On the other hand, it weighs up some of Heidegger’s critical remarks regarding the reflective nature of Husserlian phenomenology in the light of important textual evidences ignored not only by Heidegger, but also by a surprising number of specialists in the fields of philosophy, cognitive sciences, and philosophy
of mind.
Keywords: constitution, genetic, hermeneutics and reflective phenomenology,
passive and active synthesis.
Here, I would like to focus more on a philosophical question raised at the very beginning of the Black Notebooks –namely the question “Who are we?”
Three questions will be discussed:
1) What is the destiny of the German people? I will answer this question by looking at the way Heidegger poetizes Hölderlin’s notion of a Secret Germany (Geheimes Deutschland).
2) What are the basic elements that define Germanness (Deutschtum)? Here, I will situate Heidegger´s reflections in the broader context of the German conservative right wing.
3) What role do play the others, those that are not Germans –for instance, Americans, British, Russians and particularly Jews? I will conclude with some remarks on Heidegger´s philosophical description of “the Jew” as metaphysical other and a brief consideration regarding the question of anti-Semitism.