Can Contemporary Cognitive Science Coherently Accommodate Itself?, 2024
It should seem obvious that any purportedly comprehensive account of human cognition should be ab... more It should seem obvious that any purportedly comprehensive account of human cognition should be able to coherently accommodate itself-qua an instance of human cognition-where that means accommodating not just the specific tenets that distinguish it from competing accounts, but also the fundamental presuppositions that constitute the framework within which it has been developed and argued for. That seemingly obvious requirement of selfaccommodation becomes problematic, I argue, when the cognitive scientist is committed, as most contemporary cognitive scientists are, to a broadly naturalist-physicalist perspective, or framework, and at the same time is moved by empirical findings and theoretical considerations to recognize our active and ineliminable contribution, not only to the sense the world makes to us cognitively, but already to the sense it makes to us at the level of ('pre-objective') perception. For the sake of clarity of exposition, this paper presses that difficulty of contemporary cognitive science by looking closely at how it manifests itself in Andy Clark's Surfing Uncertainty (Clark 2016); but the difficulty is principled and general. To avoid it, without denying the active role we play in the constitution of the world as pre-objectively perceived and as cognitively, objectively represented, contemporary cognitive scientists would need, at the very least, to acknowledge that their commitment to the naturalist-physicalist framework may not itself be justified from within that framework. Having taken that step, they might as well take another, and recognize that a truly satisfying understanding of human perception and cognition can only be attained from a perspective that, though fully attentive to empirical findings, transcends the naturalist-physicalist framework and affords a critical examination of it.
The chapter examines Timothy Williamson’s and Herman Cappelen’s attempts to defend the method of ... more The chapter examines Timothy Williamson’s and Herman Cappelen’s attempts to defend the method of cases in its traditional, “armchair” form, against the “cognitive diversity” and “calibration” objections. The aim of the chapter is to continue the work of Chapter One of exposing the internal difficulties that have presented themselves for those wishing to defend the method, and to begin to work toward establishing the book’s basic contention that the method of cases rests on substantive and (therefore) challengeable presuppositions about language. More specifically, the chapter argues that Williamson’s and Cappelen’s defense of the method rests entirely on the claim of continuity between our employment of words outside philosophy and what we do with them when we ask the theorist’s questions and give our answers to them.
There is, in my view, a striking combination in Edouard Machery’s Philosophy Within Its Proper Bo... more There is, in my view, a striking combination in Edouard Machery’s Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds of philosophical modesty and philosophical presumptiveness. Its call upon philosophers to give up their ambitious pursuits of metaphysical necessities, or essences, and to content themselves instead with the elucidation or analysis of our concepts, is made from within a pre-Kantian framework that takes the world expressed in human discourse and captured in our concepts to be a world as it is in itself, altogether independent of how it comes into view in our discursive practices. And this, I will propose, means that Machery’s critique of much of the work that has been carried out within mainstream analytic philosophy in the last few decades, as well as his proposal for philosophical reform, end up partaking in what has been most fundamentally problematic about that work.
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, Oct 8, 2014
I start with two basic lines of response to Cartesian skepticism about the ‘external world’: in t... more I start with two basic lines of response to Cartesian skepticism about the ‘external world’: in the first, which is characteristic of Analytic philosophers to this day, the focus is on the meaning of ‘know’—what it ‘refers’ to, its ‘semantics’ and its ‘pragmatics’; in the second, which characterizes Continental responses to Descartes, the focus is on the philosophizing or meditating subject, and its relation to its body and world. I argue that the first approach is hopeless: if the Cartesian worry that I could be dreaming right now so much as makes sense, the proposal that—under some theory of knowledge (or of ‘knowledge’)—my belief that I am sitting in front of the computer right now may still be (or truly count as) a piece of knowledge, would rightfully seem to the skeptic to be playing with words and missing the point. I then argue that the practice of Ordinary Language Philosophy, which has mostly been linked to the first line of response to Cartesian skepticism, may be seen as actually belonging with the second line of response; and I show how a form of what may be called “Existentialist Ordinary Language Philosophy” can be used to reveal the nonsensicality of the Cartesian skeptical worry. My argument takes its cue from Thompson Clarke’s insight—an insight that Clarke himself has not pursued far or accurately enough—that our concept of Dream is not a concept of the “standard type.”
This chapter revisits Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspects, as well as my earlier disagreement with ... more This chapter revisits Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspects, as well as my earlier disagreement with Mulhall on how to read those remarks, but its focus is on Wittgenstein’s general approach—as exemplified in his remarks on aspects—to the elucidation and dissolution of philosophical difficulties. In the second part of the chapter, I apply that approach, as I understand it, to Mulhall’s proposed ‘dissolution’ of the ‘paradox’ of aspect-dawning. This critical engagement with Mulhall was my first sustained attempt to practice what I then thought of as Wittgensteinian therapy, and later also came to think of as a form of ordinary language philosophy.
Using aspect perception as a point of entry, this chapter argues that the phenomenal world—the wo... more Using aspect perception as a point of entry, this chapter argues that the phenomenal world—the world as perceived and responded to prior to being thought, or thought about—is repressed in both Travis’s work on perception and McDowell’s. In focusing exclusively on perception as providing us with objects of judgments, or Fregean thoughts, both Travis and McDowell ignore altogether the world as it presents itself to us apart from any particular judgment or (objective) thought about it. And yet, it is that world that solicits, or elicits, movements and words from us—including what may be called ‘judgments’—and provides the background apart from which they would not have whatever sense they have for us.
My plan in this article is to begin by raising the question of the point of judgements of beauty,... more My plan in this article is to begin by raising the question of the point of judgements of beauty, and then to examine Kant's account of beauty in the third Critique from the perspective opened up by that question. Having raised the question of the point, I will argue, first, that there is an implied answer to it in Kant's text, and, second, that the answer is ultimately unsatisfying in that it falsely assumes that there is a ‘need’, or ‘task’, or ‘purpose’, that we all necessarily share, to conceptualize all that encounters us in our experience, and fit it into one unified and comprehensive system. It is only against this assumption of our transcendental cognitive interest that Kant can so much as seem to have a real story to tell about where the value that we (‘disinterestedly’) claim for things in calling them ‘beautiful’ derives from. This, in effect, means that to the extent that Kant offers us any answer at all to the question of the point of judgements of beauty, that answer testifies to his general neglect of the question of the point of judgements. And my purpose is to draw attention to that neglect, and to begin to assess its significance for Kant's transcendental project in general and for his conception of beauty in particular.
(hardback). Reviewed by Derek A. McDougall Equally at home either in the kindergarten or in the p... more (hardback). Reviewed by Derek A. McDougall Equally at home either in the kindergarten or in the philosopher's study, sentences like 'the cat is on the mat' or 'the pillar box is red' have, on Avner Baz's reckoning, something of importance to tell us about the approach that we ought to adopt to a philosophical understanding of language. His main reason for believing this is that one natural and popular response to these examples is to say that they have a meaning dependent upon the meaning of their component parts and how these are strung together. Yet this meaning is independent of any context of use. If, however, context of use is neglected, it will seem obvious that this meaning will be carried into all the multifarious situations in which they might be used to make different possible statements. One will then be inclined to conclude that although these sentences are not saying anything in isolation from context about any particular cats, mats or pillar boxes, we do know the kinds of circumstances in which they might be used to assert true propositions. This point can appear so obvious that it must be perverse to question it. According, however, to William Child, this is only one of a set of ideas that Wittgenstein is subjecting to attack: Wittgenstein's view ties the sense of a sentence on an occasion to the point or purpose of uttering it. That contrasts with the traditional, and more orthodox, view that there is a sharp distinction between a sentence's semantic features (features having to do with its meaning) and its pragmatic features (features of its use that are not part of its literal meaning)....On this way of seeing things, there is a sharp distinction between the literal meaning of a sentence and the point or purpose of uttering it. But Wittgenstein rejects that distinction. In his view...there is no single standard of what a proposition means; and there is no clear, non-arbitrary division between a sentence's
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Dec 1, 2008
ABSTRACT This paper presents a critique of a prevailing conception of the relation between moral ... more ABSTRACT This paper presents a critique of a prevailing conception of the relation between moral reasoning and judgment on the one hand, and moral goodness on the other. I argue that moral reasoning is inescapably vulnerable to moral, as opposed to merely theoretical, failure. This, I argue, means that there is something deeply misleading in the way that Kant's moral theory, and some of its main rivals, have invited us to conceive of their subject matter.
This article traces a new line of thought through, or actually to, Ludwig Wittgenstein's writ... more This article traces a new line of thought through, or actually to, Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings on aspect perception. Its point of bearing is the second part of the Brown Book. It show that the trail of philosophical reflection that apparently naturally leads Wittgenstein in the Brown Book from questions concerning how we ought to conceive of our various mental states (and processes) — that is, from what is arguably one of the underlying overall concerns of the first part of Philosophical Investigations — to the topic of aspect perception, is in fact philosophically interesting. It is also different from what previous attempts to relate the remarks on aspects to the first part of the Investigations would have made one expect. An important point of departure for Wittgenstein's work was that he found literally incredible the dominating conception of philosophy. This article explores aspect perception, aspect-blindness, and philosophical difficulty. It discusses the ‘illusion’ or ‘delusion’ that Wittgenstein detects in those moments in which we attend to instances of Φing in order to find out what Φing is.
The purpose of this paper is to use Kant's Critique of Judgement in order to raise and motiva... more The purpose of this paper is to use Kant's Critique of Judgement in order to raise and motivate the question of the point of judgements of beauty, to illustrate the philosophical tendency to neglect or even repress it, and to begin to look for an answer to that question. On the way, I will consider Kant's implied answer to the question and will argue that it is unsatisfactory in that it relies on a false picture of the everyday subject's relation to his or her world.
The game, one would like to say, has not only rules but also a point. (Wittgenstein, Philosophica... more The game, one would like to say, has not only rules but also a point. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 564) 1
Philosophers like to use cases to work out theories. The point of using cases is to distill the r... more Philosophers like to use cases to work out theories. The point of using cases is to distill the relevant features of some phenomenon (e.g., human knowledge) in order to investigate it, with the goal of yielding generalizable conclusions (e.g., "human knowledge proceeds through agreement in criteria"). The similarity between the philosopher's method of cases and the scientist's benchwork research is intended. Philosophers want to feel as confident about their methods and conclusions as they, apparently, feel about scientists' methods and conclusions. Mimicking the methods of science would-the thinking goesmake philosophical judgment verifiable in a way that, say, theological judgment is not. The heavy emphasis on cases and the idea that philosophy is more like science than it is like theology is meant to alleviate the worry that philosophy is-again, according to this thinking-"just making stuff up" like theology just "makes stuff up." This proves relieving, especially for philosophers. According to Avner Baz, this relief comes only for philosophers. The worry that philosophical claims rest on nothing more than unverifiable conjecture (about human knowledge and many other things besides) is a worry that only philosophers have, and for that matter only philosophers of a certain stripe, and so whatever they come up with to satisfy those concerns will allay only them. It is not so much that others doubt philosophical claims; it is more that philosophers mostly speak to themselves. The stakes in play for the philosophical method of cases are primarily philosophical ones. None of this is an indictment of philosophy, which, like any of the faculties, is and should be possessed of intrinsic goods internal to its commitments. What is a problem for philosophy is that their solution to their self-imposed problem will turn up empty even on its own terms. Baz's The Crisis of Method in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy sets out to show how, and why. His critique also tells us about something shared between philosophy and theology. Baz's book can be tough sledding, especially in its first half. Those outside the guild of analytic philosophy will not always know what he is talking about. But his critical thesis turns out to be pretty straightforward. The cases that analytic philosophers construct in order to test their theories utilize words that only have sense within those constructed cases. This means that whatever conclusions the cases turn out will not be generalizable. A rough equivalent is that of the lab scientist who takes a highly specialized strain of the HIV virus as representative of all strains of the HIV virus. A scientist would be wrong to do that, but she might do so anyway because that particular strain, insofar as it is specialized, proves especially conducive to the conditions of her lab. This of course gets things backward, and effectively "cooks the books" on the results. The scientist's saving grace is that at least she is aware that she's doing this and can go back and rework the experiment in the face of objections. The problem with the analytic philosopher is that she does not catch her mistake. Nor, according to Baz, could she. Baz thinks that the cases constructed by analytic philosophers utilize words as if their sense were not context-dependent. And they do so necessarily. Hence the constructed nature of the analytic philosopher's case. Experiments control for some aspect of a phenomenon in order to test certain of its variables. In the method characteristic of analytic philosophy, the control comes in the use of words. Namely, the words (e.g., "know") are taken to mean but one thing (e.g., knowing whether or not some descriptive statement accurately describes reality). This in itself is not a problem because in every sentence each word should only mean but one thing (unless its meaning more than one thing is understood as meaning more than one thing). However, one cannot both specialize a word (i.e., make it context-dependent) and generalize its use. To do so would be to rip the word out of the context that gives it its sense. It is like experimenting
The chapter considers the bearing of contemporary semantic “contextualism”—as championed by philo... more The chapter considers the bearing of contemporary semantic “contextualism”—as championed by philosophers such as David Lewis and Charles Travis—on the philosophical method of cases. In maintaining that the contribution a word makes to the overall sense of an utterance depends in part on the context of the utterance, contemporary contextualism already challenges the philosophical method of cases as commonly practiced. The chapter argues, however, that in holding on to the representationalist conception of language, contemporary contextualism does not go far enough in revealing the misguidedness of the philosophical method of cases. The chapter also argues that, though J. L. Austin has commonly been identified as a forefather of contextualism, his work actually points away from the representationalist conception of language to which contemporary contextualists are still committed.
The philosophical “method of cases” has been the subject of intense discussion. In a recent paper... more The philosophical “method of cases” has been the subject of intense discussion. In a recent paper, Frank Jackson attempts to vindicate the method by proposing that it is underwritten by the “representational view of language.” Jackson's proposal is potentially very significant. For if it is true, then the method of cases stands, but quite possibly also falls, with the representational view of language as characterized by Jackson. The aim of this paper is to question the philosophical method of cases by showing that it does in fact presuppose a particular view of language that is at the very least questionable, both philosophically and empirically.
Can Contemporary Cognitive Science Coherently Accommodate Itself?, 2024
It should seem obvious that any purportedly comprehensive account of human cognition should be ab... more It should seem obvious that any purportedly comprehensive account of human cognition should be able to coherently accommodate itself-qua an instance of human cognition-where that means accommodating not just the specific tenets that distinguish it from competing accounts, but also the fundamental presuppositions that constitute the framework within which it has been developed and argued for. That seemingly obvious requirement of selfaccommodation becomes problematic, I argue, when the cognitive scientist is committed, as most contemporary cognitive scientists are, to a broadly naturalist-physicalist perspective, or framework, and at the same time is moved by empirical findings and theoretical considerations to recognize our active and ineliminable contribution, not only to the sense the world makes to us cognitively, but already to the sense it makes to us at the level of ('pre-objective') perception. For the sake of clarity of exposition, this paper presses that difficulty of contemporary cognitive science by looking closely at how it manifests itself in Andy Clark's Surfing Uncertainty (Clark 2016); but the difficulty is principled and general. To avoid it, without denying the active role we play in the constitution of the world as pre-objectively perceived and as cognitively, objectively represented, contemporary cognitive scientists would need, at the very least, to acknowledge that their commitment to the naturalist-physicalist framework may not itself be justified from within that framework. Having taken that step, they might as well take another, and recognize that a truly satisfying understanding of human perception and cognition can only be attained from a perspective that, though fully attentive to empirical findings, transcends the naturalist-physicalist framework and affords a critical examination of it.
The chapter examines Timothy Williamson’s and Herman Cappelen’s attempts to defend the method of ... more The chapter examines Timothy Williamson’s and Herman Cappelen’s attempts to defend the method of cases in its traditional, “armchair” form, against the “cognitive diversity” and “calibration” objections. The aim of the chapter is to continue the work of Chapter One of exposing the internal difficulties that have presented themselves for those wishing to defend the method, and to begin to work toward establishing the book’s basic contention that the method of cases rests on substantive and (therefore) challengeable presuppositions about language. More specifically, the chapter argues that Williamson’s and Cappelen’s defense of the method rests entirely on the claim of continuity between our employment of words outside philosophy and what we do with them when we ask the theorist’s questions and give our answers to them.
There is, in my view, a striking combination in Edouard Machery’s Philosophy Within Its Proper Bo... more There is, in my view, a striking combination in Edouard Machery’s Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds of philosophical modesty and philosophical presumptiveness. Its call upon philosophers to give up their ambitious pursuits of metaphysical necessities, or essences, and to content themselves instead with the elucidation or analysis of our concepts, is made from within a pre-Kantian framework that takes the world expressed in human discourse and captured in our concepts to be a world as it is in itself, altogether independent of how it comes into view in our discursive practices. And this, I will propose, means that Machery’s critique of much of the work that has been carried out within mainstream analytic philosophy in the last few decades, as well as his proposal for philosophical reform, end up partaking in what has been most fundamentally problematic about that work.
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, Oct 8, 2014
I start with two basic lines of response to Cartesian skepticism about the ‘external world’: in t... more I start with two basic lines of response to Cartesian skepticism about the ‘external world’: in the first, which is characteristic of Analytic philosophers to this day, the focus is on the meaning of ‘know’—what it ‘refers’ to, its ‘semantics’ and its ‘pragmatics’; in the second, which characterizes Continental responses to Descartes, the focus is on the philosophizing or meditating subject, and its relation to its body and world. I argue that the first approach is hopeless: if the Cartesian worry that I could be dreaming right now so much as makes sense, the proposal that—under some theory of knowledge (or of ‘knowledge’)—my belief that I am sitting in front of the computer right now may still be (or truly count as) a piece of knowledge, would rightfully seem to the skeptic to be playing with words and missing the point. I then argue that the practice of Ordinary Language Philosophy, which has mostly been linked to the first line of response to Cartesian skepticism, may be seen as actually belonging with the second line of response; and I show how a form of what may be called “Existentialist Ordinary Language Philosophy” can be used to reveal the nonsensicality of the Cartesian skeptical worry. My argument takes its cue from Thompson Clarke’s insight—an insight that Clarke himself has not pursued far or accurately enough—that our concept of Dream is not a concept of the “standard type.”
This chapter revisits Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspects, as well as my earlier disagreement with ... more This chapter revisits Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspects, as well as my earlier disagreement with Mulhall on how to read those remarks, but its focus is on Wittgenstein’s general approach—as exemplified in his remarks on aspects—to the elucidation and dissolution of philosophical difficulties. In the second part of the chapter, I apply that approach, as I understand it, to Mulhall’s proposed ‘dissolution’ of the ‘paradox’ of aspect-dawning. This critical engagement with Mulhall was my first sustained attempt to practice what I then thought of as Wittgensteinian therapy, and later also came to think of as a form of ordinary language philosophy.
Using aspect perception as a point of entry, this chapter argues that the phenomenal world—the wo... more Using aspect perception as a point of entry, this chapter argues that the phenomenal world—the world as perceived and responded to prior to being thought, or thought about—is repressed in both Travis’s work on perception and McDowell’s. In focusing exclusively on perception as providing us with objects of judgments, or Fregean thoughts, both Travis and McDowell ignore altogether the world as it presents itself to us apart from any particular judgment or (objective) thought about it. And yet, it is that world that solicits, or elicits, movements and words from us—including what may be called ‘judgments’—and provides the background apart from which they would not have whatever sense they have for us.
My plan in this article is to begin by raising the question of the point of judgements of beauty,... more My plan in this article is to begin by raising the question of the point of judgements of beauty, and then to examine Kant's account of beauty in the third Critique from the perspective opened up by that question. Having raised the question of the point, I will argue, first, that there is an implied answer to it in Kant's text, and, second, that the answer is ultimately unsatisfying in that it falsely assumes that there is a ‘need’, or ‘task’, or ‘purpose’, that we all necessarily share, to conceptualize all that encounters us in our experience, and fit it into one unified and comprehensive system. It is only against this assumption of our transcendental cognitive interest that Kant can so much as seem to have a real story to tell about where the value that we (‘disinterestedly’) claim for things in calling them ‘beautiful’ derives from. This, in effect, means that to the extent that Kant offers us any answer at all to the question of the point of judgements of beauty, that answer testifies to his general neglect of the question of the point of judgements. And my purpose is to draw attention to that neglect, and to begin to assess its significance for Kant's transcendental project in general and for his conception of beauty in particular.
(hardback). Reviewed by Derek A. McDougall Equally at home either in the kindergarten or in the p... more (hardback). Reviewed by Derek A. McDougall Equally at home either in the kindergarten or in the philosopher's study, sentences like 'the cat is on the mat' or 'the pillar box is red' have, on Avner Baz's reckoning, something of importance to tell us about the approach that we ought to adopt to a philosophical understanding of language. His main reason for believing this is that one natural and popular response to these examples is to say that they have a meaning dependent upon the meaning of their component parts and how these are strung together. Yet this meaning is independent of any context of use. If, however, context of use is neglected, it will seem obvious that this meaning will be carried into all the multifarious situations in which they might be used to make different possible statements. One will then be inclined to conclude that although these sentences are not saying anything in isolation from context about any particular cats, mats or pillar boxes, we do know the kinds of circumstances in which they might be used to assert true propositions. This point can appear so obvious that it must be perverse to question it. According, however, to William Child, this is only one of a set of ideas that Wittgenstein is subjecting to attack: Wittgenstein's view ties the sense of a sentence on an occasion to the point or purpose of uttering it. That contrasts with the traditional, and more orthodox, view that there is a sharp distinction between a sentence's semantic features (features having to do with its meaning) and its pragmatic features (features of its use that are not part of its literal meaning)....On this way of seeing things, there is a sharp distinction between the literal meaning of a sentence and the point or purpose of uttering it. But Wittgenstein rejects that distinction. In his view...there is no single standard of what a proposition means; and there is no clear, non-arbitrary division between a sentence's
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Dec 1, 2008
ABSTRACT This paper presents a critique of a prevailing conception of the relation between moral ... more ABSTRACT This paper presents a critique of a prevailing conception of the relation between moral reasoning and judgment on the one hand, and moral goodness on the other. I argue that moral reasoning is inescapably vulnerable to moral, as opposed to merely theoretical, failure. This, I argue, means that there is something deeply misleading in the way that Kant's moral theory, and some of its main rivals, have invited us to conceive of their subject matter.
This article traces a new line of thought through, or actually to, Ludwig Wittgenstein's writ... more This article traces a new line of thought through, or actually to, Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings on aspect perception. Its point of bearing is the second part of the Brown Book. It show that the trail of philosophical reflection that apparently naturally leads Wittgenstein in the Brown Book from questions concerning how we ought to conceive of our various mental states (and processes) — that is, from what is arguably one of the underlying overall concerns of the first part of Philosophical Investigations — to the topic of aspect perception, is in fact philosophically interesting. It is also different from what previous attempts to relate the remarks on aspects to the first part of the Investigations would have made one expect. An important point of departure for Wittgenstein's work was that he found literally incredible the dominating conception of philosophy. This article explores aspect perception, aspect-blindness, and philosophical difficulty. It discusses the ‘illusion’ or ‘delusion’ that Wittgenstein detects in those moments in which we attend to instances of Φing in order to find out what Φing is.
The purpose of this paper is to use Kant's Critique of Judgement in order to raise and motiva... more The purpose of this paper is to use Kant's Critique of Judgement in order to raise and motivate the question of the point of judgements of beauty, to illustrate the philosophical tendency to neglect or even repress it, and to begin to look for an answer to that question. On the way, I will consider Kant's implied answer to the question and will argue that it is unsatisfactory in that it relies on a false picture of the everyday subject's relation to his or her world.
The game, one would like to say, has not only rules but also a point. (Wittgenstein, Philosophica... more The game, one would like to say, has not only rules but also a point. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 564) 1
Philosophers like to use cases to work out theories. The point of using cases is to distill the r... more Philosophers like to use cases to work out theories. The point of using cases is to distill the relevant features of some phenomenon (e.g., human knowledge) in order to investigate it, with the goal of yielding generalizable conclusions (e.g., "human knowledge proceeds through agreement in criteria"). The similarity between the philosopher's method of cases and the scientist's benchwork research is intended. Philosophers want to feel as confident about their methods and conclusions as they, apparently, feel about scientists' methods and conclusions. Mimicking the methods of science would-the thinking goesmake philosophical judgment verifiable in a way that, say, theological judgment is not. The heavy emphasis on cases and the idea that philosophy is more like science than it is like theology is meant to alleviate the worry that philosophy is-again, according to this thinking-"just making stuff up" like theology just "makes stuff up." This proves relieving, especially for philosophers. According to Avner Baz, this relief comes only for philosophers. The worry that philosophical claims rest on nothing more than unverifiable conjecture (about human knowledge and many other things besides) is a worry that only philosophers have, and for that matter only philosophers of a certain stripe, and so whatever they come up with to satisfy those concerns will allay only them. It is not so much that others doubt philosophical claims; it is more that philosophers mostly speak to themselves. The stakes in play for the philosophical method of cases are primarily philosophical ones. None of this is an indictment of philosophy, which, like any of the faculties, is and should be possessed of intrinsic goods internal to its commitments. What is a problem for philosophy is that their solution to their self-imposed problem will turn up empty even on its own terms. Baz's The Crisis of Method in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy sets out to show how, and why. His critique also tells us about something shared between philosophy and theology. Baz's book can be tough sledding, especially in its first half. Those outside the guild of analytic philosophy will not always know what he is talking about. But his critical thesis turns out to be pretty straightforward. The cases that analytic philosophers construct in order to test their theories utilize words that only have sense within those constructed cases. This means that whatever conclusions the cases turn out will not be generalizable. A rough equivalent is that of the lab scientist who takes a highly specialized strain of the HIV virus as representative of all strains of the HIV virus. A scientist would be wrong to do that, but she might do so anyway because that particular strain, insofar as it is specialized, proves especially conducive to the conditions of her lab. This of course gets things backward, and effectively "cooks the books" on the results. The scientist's saving grace is that at least she is aware that she's doing this and can go back and rework the experiment in the face of objections. The problem with the analytic philosopher is that she does not catch her mistake. Nor, according to Baz, could she. Baz thinks that the cases constructed by analytic philosophers utilize words as if their sense were not context-dependent. And they do so necessarily. Hence the constructed nature of the analytic philosopher's case. Experiments control for some aspect of a phenomenon in order to test certain of its variables. In the method characteristic of analytic philosophy, the control comes in the use of words. Namely, the words (e.g., "know") are taken to mean but one thing (e.g., knowing whether or not some descriptive statement accurately describes reality). This in itself is not a problem because in every sentence each word should only mean but one thing (unless its meaning more than one thing is understood as meaning more than one thing). However, one cannot both specialize a word (i.e., make it context-dependent) and generalize its use. To do so would be to rip the word out of the context that gives it its sense. It is like experimenting
The chapter considers the bearing of contemporary semantic “contextualism”—as championed by philo... more The chapter considers the bearing of contemporary semantic “contextualism”—as championed by philosophers such as David Lewis and Charles Travis—on the philosophical method of cases. In maintaining that the contribution a word makes to the overall sense of an utterance depends in part on the context of the utterance, contemporary contextualism already challenges the philosophical method of cases as commonly practiced. The chapter argues, however, that in holding on to the representationalist conception of language, contemporary contextualism does not go far enough in revealing the misguidedness of the philosophical method of cases. The chapter also argues that, though J. L. Austin has commonly been identified as a forefather of contextualism, his work actually points away from the representationalist conception of language to which contemporary contextualists are still committed.
The philosophical “method of cases” has been the subject of intense discussion. In a recent paper... more The philosophical “method of cases” has been the subject of intense discussion. In a recent paper, Frank Jackson attempts to vindicate the method by proposing that it is underwritten by the “representational view of language.” Jackson's proposal is potentially very significant. For if it is true, then the method of cases stands, but quite possibly also falls, with the representational view of language as characterized by Jackson. The aim of this paper is to question the philosophical method of cases by showing that it does in fact presuppose a particular view of language that is at the very least questionable, both philosophically and empirically.
This is the Introduction for a forthcoming collection of papers on aspect perception (Springer, A... more This is the Introduction for a forthcoming collection of papers on aspect perception (Springer, April 2020).
With Prof Gabriele Mras, co-editor (Routledge, 2016). Richard Wollheim famously tried to found a... more With Prof Gabriele Mras, co-editor (Routledge, 2016). Richard Wollheim famously tried to found a theory of pictorial representation on the notion of seeing-in, or earlier, seeing-as (which we call both indifferently aspect-perception). The notion or cluster of notions captured Wittgenstein's attention throughout his philosophical life, especially towards its end. What exactly is the role and status of aspect-perception? Is it unusual, or is it in some sense present in all seeing? Can Wittgenstein's ruminations illuminate Wollheim's approach, or do they show what is wrong with it? If the latter, can the substance of Wollheim's ideas be saved? In the book, these questions and related ones are addressed in papers by: Avner Baz, Charles Travis, Richard Heinrich, Hanjo Glock,Garry Hagberg, Joachim Schulte, Fabian Dorsch, David Hills, Volker Munz, Michael Levine, Gabriele Mras. and myself.
Table of Contents:
Introduction and Acknowledgements
Part I Wittgenstein and Seeing-as 1. The Room in a View Charles Travis
Part II Difficulties with Wollheim’s Borrowing from Wittgenstein 2. Seeing Aspects and Telling Stories about It Joachim Schulte 3. Aspects of Perception Avner Baz 4. Aspect-perception, Perception and Animals: Wittgenstein and Beyond Hans-Johann Glock 5. Wittgenstein’s Seeing as: A Survey of Various Contexts Volker A. Munz
Part III Benefits from Wollheim’s Borrowing from Wittgenstein 6. Leonardo’s Challenge: Wittgenstein and Wollheim at the Intersection of Perception and Projection Garry L. Hagberg 7. ‘Surface’ as an Expression of an Intention – On Richard Wollheim’s Conception of Art as a Form of Life Gabriele M. Mras 8. Richard Wollheim on Seeing-In: From Representational Seeing to Imagination Richard Heinrich
Part IV Rescuing Wollheim’s Account without the Support of Wittgenstein 9. A measure of Kant seen in Wollheim Gary Kemp 10. Seeing-In as Aspect Perception Fabian Dorsch
Part V Imagination and Emotion in Wollheim’s Account of Pictorial Experience 11. Wollheim: Emotion and its relation to art Michael Levine 12. Visions: Wollheim and Walton on the Nature of Pictures David Hills
This paper argues that, though contemporary 'contextualists' about linguistic sense have tended t... more This paper argues that, though contemporary 'contextualists' about linguistic sense have tended to be representationalist in how they think about language, they ought not to be: thought through, contextualism shows that, and how, our words may do their work for us, and may be beholden to the world in which we find ourselves, and speak, even apart from representing that world truly or falsely. Moreover, only by breaking away from the representationalist conception of language would we be able to truly appreciate the depth of insight, and reap the therapeutic benefits of, ordinary language philosophy as exemplified, however differently, in the works of Austin and Wittgenstein.
There is, in my view, a striking combination in Edouard Machery’s
Philosophy Within Its Proper Bo... more There is, in my view, a striking combination in Edouard Machery’s Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds of philosophical modesty and philosophical presumptiveness. Its call upon philosophers to give up their ambitious pursuits of metaphysical necessities, or essences, and to content themselves instead with the elucidation or analysis of our concepts, is made from within a pre-Kantian framework that takes the world expressed in human discourse and captured in our concepts to be a world as it is in itself, altogether independent of how it comes into view in our discursive practices. And this, I will propose, means that Machery’s critique of much of the work that has been carried out within mainstream analytic philosophy in the last few decades, as well as his proposal for philosophical reform, end up partaking in what has been most fundamentally problematic about that work.
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Table of Contents:
Introduction and Acknowledgements
Part I Wittgenstein and Seeing-as
1. The Room in a View
Charles Travis
Part II Difficulties with Wollheim’s Borrowing from Wittgenstein
2. Seeing Aspects and Telling Stories about It
Joachim Schulte
3. Aspects of Perception
Avner Baz
4. Aspect-perception, Perception and Animals: Wittgenstein and Beyond
Hans-Johann Glock
5. Wittgenstein’s Seeing as: A Survey of Various Contexts
Volker A. Munz
Part III Benefits from Wollheim’s Borrowing from Wittgenstein
6. Leonardo’s Challenge: Wittgenstein and Wollheim at the Intersection of Perception and Projection Garry L. Hagberg
7. ‘Surface’ as an Expression of an Intention – On Richard Wollheim’s Conception of Art as a Form of Life
Gabriele M. Mras
8. Richard Wollheim on Seeing-In: From Representational Seeing to Imagination
Richard Heinrich
Part IV Rescuing Wollheim’s Account without the Support of Wittgenstein
9. A measure of Kant seen in Wollheim
Gary Kemp
10. Seeing-In as Aspect Perception
Fabian Dorsch
Part V Imagination and Emotion in Wollheim’s Account of Pictorial Experience
11. Wollheim: Emotion and its relation to art
Michael Levine
12. Visions: Wollheim and Walton on the Nature of Pictures
David Hills
Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds of philosophical modesty and philosophical presumptiveness. Its call upon philosophers to give up their ambitious pursuits of metaphysical necessities, or essences, and to content themselves instead with the elucidation or analysis of our concepts, is made from within a pre-Kantian framework that takes the world expressed in human discourse and captured in our concepts to be a world as it is in itself, altogether independent of how it comes into view in our discursive practices. And this, I will propose, means that Machery’s critique of much of the work that has been carried out within mainstream analytic philosophy in the last few decades, as well as his proposal for philosophical reform, end up partaking in what has been most fundamentally problematic about that work.