Papers by Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira
Dotov, Nie and Chemero (2010) conducted a set of experiments to demonstrate how phenomenology, pa... more Dotov, Nie and Chemero (2010) conducted a set of experiments to demonstrate how phenomenology, particularly the work of Martin Heidegger, interfaces with experimental research in embodied cognitive science. Specifically, they drew a parallel between Heidegger's notion of readiness-to-hand and the concept of an extended cognitive system (Clark 2008) by looking for the presence or absence of interaction-dominant dynamics (Holden, van Orden, and Turvey 2009; Ihlen and Vereijken 2010) in a hand/mouse system. We share Dotov, Nie and Chemero's optimism about the potential for cross-pollination between phenomenology and cognitive science, but we think that it can be better advanced through a shift in focus. First, we argue in favor of using Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological theory as the philosophical foundation for experimental research in embodied cognitive science. Second, we describe an audio-visual tracking task in virtual reality that we designed and used to empirically investigate human-environment coupling and interactivity. In addition to providing further support for phenomenologically-inspired empirical cognitive science, our research also offers a more generalizable scientific treatment of the interaction between humans and their environments.
Unpublished letter in response to Hafri, A., & Firestone, C. (2021). The perception of relations.... more Unpublished letter in response to Hafri, A., & Firestone, C. (2021). The perception of relations. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2021.01.006
Synthese, 2019
A persistent criticism of radical embodied cognitive science is that it will be impossible to exp... more A persistent criticism of radical embodied cognitive science is that it will be impossible to explain “real cognition” without invoking mental representations. This paper provides an account of explicit, real-time thinking of the kind we engage in when we imagine counter-factual situations, remember the past, and plan for the future. We first present a very general non-representational account of explicit thinking, based on pragmatist philosophy of science. We then present a more detailed instantiation of this general account drawing on nonlinear dynamics and ecological psychology.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 2015
The question whether cognition ever extends beyond the head is widely considered to be an empiric... more The question whether cognition ever extends beyond the head is widely considered to be an empirical issue. And yet, all the evidence amassed in recent years has not sufficed to settle the debate. In this paper we suggest that this is because the debate is not really an empirical one, but rather a matter of definition. Traditional cognitive science can be identified as wedded to the ideals of “smallism” and “localism”. We criticize these ideals and articulate a case in favor of extended cognition by highlighting the historical pedigree and conceptual adequacy of related empirical and theoretical work.
Cognitive Science, 2018
Folk psychology takes perception and cognition to be two distinct processes. It seems that when w... more Folk psychology takes perception and cognition to be two distinct processes. It seems that when we perceive the world we are engaged in one kind of activity and when we think about it we are engaged in a different one. This conception underlies various discussions within the cognitive sciences, such as on the architecture and modularity of the mind, and the cognitive penetrability of perception. But is the distinction justified? This paper looks for an answer in two opposing paradigms in the sciences of the mind: traditional cognitivism and ecological psychology. Even though cognitivism is the dominant paradigm, we argue that it has thus far failed to give a definite account of the relation between perception and cognition, and to support or to deny their separation. Ecological psychology, on the other hand, rejects the distinction and integrates cognition with perception. We discuss previous work within the ecological view and sketch directions for future research.
Topics in Cognitive Science
Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the prope... more Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the proper level(s) of explanation. Views range from reductionist, favoring only neuroscience explanations, to mechanist, favoring the integration of multiple levels, to pluralist, favoring the preservation of even the most general, high-level explanations, such as those provided by embodied or dynamical approaches. In this paper, we challenge this framing. We suggest that these are not different levels of explanation at all but, rather, different styles of explanation that capture different, cross-cutting patterns in cognitive phenomena. Which pattern is explanatory depends on both the cognitive phenomenon under investigation and the research interests occasioning the explanation. This reframing changes how we should answer the basic questions of which cognitive science approaches explain and how these explanations relate to one another. On this view, we should expect different approaches to offer independent explanations in terms of their different focal patterns and the value of those explanations to partly derive from the broad patterns they feature. Cognitive science is a big tent, housing a variety of scientific disciplines relevant to the study of cognition. As tends to happen in big tents, there are disputes about who has priority and who may not belong at all. In particular, there is regular debate about the explanatory value of the various scientific disciplines comprising the cognitive sciences. At root, the questions are: which cognitive science approaches explain cognitive phenomena, and how do these explanations relate to one another? This debate is often put in terms of identifying the proper level(s) of explanation. There is an intuitive sense in which, say, neuroscience targets entities located at a lower level than does
Topics in Cognitive Science, 2019
Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the prop... more Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the proper level(s) of explanation. Views range from reductionist, favoring only neuroscience explanations, to mechanist, favoring the integration of levels, to pluralist, favoring the preservation of even the most general, high-level explanations. We challenge this framing. We suggest that these are not different levels of explanation at all but, rather, different styles of explanation that capture different, cross-cutting patterns in cognitive phenomena. Which pattern is explanatory depends on both the cognitive phenomenon under investigation and the research interests occasioning the explanation. This reframing changes how we should answer the basic questions of which cognitive science approaches explain and how these explanations relate to one another. On this view, we should expect different approaches to offer independent explanations in terms of their different focal patterns and the value of those explanations to partly derive from the broad patterns they feature.
Proceedings of the 41st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society , pp. 1008-1013. A.K. Goel, C.M. Seifert, & C. Freksa (Eds.) . ISBN: 0-9911967-7-5., 2019
Dotov, Nie and Chemero (2010) conducted a set of experiments to demonstrate how phenomenology, pa... more Dotov, Nie and Chemero (2010) conducted a set of experiments to demonstrate how phenomenology, particularly the work of Martin Heidegger, interfaces with experimental research in embodied cognitive science. Specifically, they drew a parallel between Heidegger's notion of readiness-to-hand and the concept of an extended cognitive system (Clark 2008) by looking for the presence or absence of interaction-dominant dynamics (Holden, van Orden, and Turvey 2009; Ihlen and Vereijken 2010) in a hand/mouse system. We share Dotov, Nie and Chemero's optimism about the potential for cross-pollination between phenomenology and cognitive science, but we think that it can be better advanced through a shift in focus. First, we argue in favor of using Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological theory as the philosophical foundation for experimental research in embodied cognitive science. Second, we describe an audio-visual tracking task in virtual reality that we designed and used to empirically investigate human-environment coupling and interactivity. In addition to providing further support for phenomenologically-inspired empirical cognitive science, our research also offers a more generalizable scientific treatment of the interaction between humans and their environments.
Australasian Philosophical Review, 2019
Are the theoretical frameworks of phenomenology and of science compatible? And, if so, what would... more Are the theoretical frameworks of phenomenology and of science compatible? And, if so, what would a reconciliation entail for science as it is practiced? Gallagher [2019] poses these two questions, answering the first in the affirmative and leaving the second unaddressed. I argue that treating the two as separate questions presupposes an inadequate distinction between theory and practice that Gallagher's non-reductive framework motivates rejecting. Recognizing the intertwining of theory and practice allows us to answer Gallagher's two questions about phenomen-ology and science all at once, but it also motivates a less conciliatory conclusion than the one he offers.
Synthese
Representationalism—the view that scientific modeling is best understood in representational term... more Representationalism—the view that scientific modeling is best understood in representational terms—is the received view in contemporary philosophy of science. Contributions to this literature have focused on a number of puzzles concerning the nature of representation and the epistemic role of misrepresentation, without considering whether these puzzles are the product of an inadequate analytical framework. The goal of this paper is to suggest that this possibility should be taken seriously. The argument has two parts, employing the “can’t have” and “don’t need” tactics drawn from philosophy of mind. On the one hand, I propose that representationalism doesn’t work: different ways to flesh out representationalism create a tension between its ontological and epistemological components and thereby undermine the view. On the other hand, I propose that representationalism is not needed in the first place—a position I articulate based on a pragmatic stance on the success of scientific research and on the feasibility of alternative philosophical frameworks. I conclude that representationalism is untenable and unnecessary, a philosophical dead end. A new way of thinking is called for if we are to make progress in our understanding of scientific modeling.
CogSci 2018 Proceedings, ISBN: 978-0-9911967-8-4, 2018
What is ecological about Gibsonian Ecological Psychology? Well-known senses in which Gibson's sci... more What is ecological about Gibsonian Ecological Psychology? Well-known senses in which Gibson's scientific program is 'ecological' have to do with its theoretical, ontological and methodological foundations. But, besides these, the Gibsonian framework is 'ecological' in an additional sense that has remained understudied and poorly understood—a sense of " ecological " that connects Gibson's view to the environmentalism of environmental psychology and environmental ethics. This paper focuses on the latter sense of 'ecological', and explores the relevance of Gibson's notion of " affordance " for thinking about environmental issues like deforestation, pollution and climate change. One existing account is criticized and an alternative is proposed.
CogSci 2018 Proceedings, ISBN: 978-0-9911967-8-4, 2018
Two main views have informed the literature on the psychology of emotion in the past few decades.... more Two main views have informed the literature on the psychology of emotion in the past few decades. On one side, cognitivists identify emotions with processes such as judgments , evaluations and appraisals. On the other side, advocates of non-cognitive approaches leave the " intellectual " aspects of emotional experience out of the emotion itself, instead identifying emotions with embodied processes involving physiological changes. Virtually everyone on either side of the cognitive/non-cognitive divide identify William James' view, also known as the James-Lange theory, fully on the non-cognitivist side. But this is a mistake. Re-interpreting James' writings in its scientific context, this paper argues that he actually rejected the cognitive/non-cognitive divide, such that his view of emotions did not fit either side—that is, James was not a " Jamesian " in the sense the term is used in the literature.
CogSci 2018 Proceedings, ISBN: 978-0-9911967-8-4, 2018
Folk psychology takes perception and cognition to be two distinct processes. It seems that when w... more Folk psychology takes perception and cognition to be two distinct processes. It seems that when we perceive the world we are engaged in one kind of activity and when we think about it we are engaged in a different one. This conception underlies various discussions within the cognitive sciences, such as on the architecture and modularity of the mind, and the cognitive penetrability of perception. But is the distinction justified? This paper looks for an answer in two opposing paradigms in the sciences of the mind: traditional cognitivism and ecological psychology. Even though cognitivism is the dominant paradigm, we argue that it has thus far failed to give a definite account of the relation between perception and cognition, and to support or to deny their separation. Ecological psychology, on the other hand, rejects the distinction and integrates cognition with perception. We discuss previous work within the ecological view and sketch directions for future research.
Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society
Representational views of the mind traditionally face a skeptical challenge on perceptual knowled... more Representational views of the mind traditionally face a skeptical challenge on perceptual knowledge: if our experience of the world is mediated by representations built upon perceptual inputs, how can we be certain that our representations are accurate and our perceptual apparatus reliable? J. J. Gibson's ecological approach provides an alternative framework, according to which direct perception of affordances does away with the need to posit internal mental representations as intermediary steps between perceptual input and behavioral output. Gibson accordingly spoke of his framework as providing " reasons for realism. " In this paper I suggest that, granting Gibson his reasons for perceptual realism, the Gibsonian framework motivates anti-realism when it comes to scientific theorizing and modeling. If scientists are Gibsonian perceivers, then it makes sense to take their use of models in indirect investigations of real-world phenomena not as representations of the phenomena, but rather as autonomous tools with their own affordances.
Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology: Logical, Epistemological, and Cognitive Issues
Recent contributions to the philosophical literature on scientific modeling have tended to follow... more Recent contributions to the philosophical literature on scientific modeling have tended to follow one of two approaches, on the one hand addressing conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological questions about models, or, on the other hand, emphasizing the cognitive aspects of modeling and accordingly focusing on model-based reasoning. In this paper I explore the relationship between these two approaches through a case study of model-based research on the behavior of infant rats, particularly thigmotaxis (movement based on tactile sensation) and temperature regulation in groups. A common assumption in the philosophical literature is that models represent the target phenomena they simulate. In the modeling project under investigation, however, this assumption was not part of the model-based reasoning process, arising only in a theoretical article as, I suggest, a post hoc rhetorical device. I argue that the otherwise nonexistent concern with the model-target relationship as being representational results from a kind of objectification often at play in philosophical analysis, one that can be avoided if an alternative form of objectification is adopted instead.
The question whether cognition ever extends beyond the head is widely considered to be an empiric... more The question whether cognition ever extends beyond the head is widely considered to be an empirical issue. And yet, all the evidence amassed in recent years has not sufficed to settle the debate. In this paper we suggest that this is because the debate is not really an empirical one, but rather a matter of definition. Traditional cognitive science can be identified as wedded to the ideals of “smallism” and “localism”. We criticize these ideals and articulate a case in favor of extended cognition by highlighting the historical pedigree and conceptual adequacy of related empirical and theoretical work.
Actas del Primer Congreso de la Sociedad Filosofica del Uruguay
Book Reviews by Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira
Metascience, 2020
Review of Isabelle F. Peschard and Bas C. Van Fraassen (Eds.): The experimental side of modeling.... more Review of Isabelle F. Peschard and Bas C. Van Fraassen (Eds.): The experimental side of modeling. University of Minnesota Press, 2018, 336pp, $40 PB
Review of the Springer Handbook of Model-Based Science (2017)
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Papers by Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira
Book Reviews by Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira