Edited Books by Hanne Jacobs
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The Series in Continental Thought publishes scholarship that critically engages and extends twent... more The Series in Continental Thought publishes scholarship that critically engages and extends twentieth- and twenty-first-century European thought, especially phenomenology. The series provides a forum for innovative interpretations of influential figures within this tradition, such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Levinas, and Derrida. In addition, the series publishes contemporary work in phenomenology that enters into dialogue with other philosophical traditions and fields, including cognitive science, moral psychology, feminist theory, critical race theory, and environmental studies. The publication of translations of influential texts further supports work in both the history of phenomenology and contemporary phenomenology. Published in collaboration with the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, the series is committed to the development of Continental philosophy and the work of emerging scholars.
For queries and manuscripts:
Dr. Hanne Jacobs
Department of Philosophy
Tilburg University
PO Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
The Netherlands
[email protected]
Der vorliegende Band, der außer Husserls Freiburger Einleitung in die Philosophie von 1919/20 auc... more Der vorliegende Band, der außer Husserls Freiburger Einleitung in die Philosophie von 1919/20 auch die noch erhaltenen Teile seiner beiden ersten Freiburger Einleitungen in die Philosophie von 1916 und 1918 enthält, bietet eine sowohl historisch als auch systematisch orientierte Hinführung zur transzendentalphänomenologischen Philosophie auf dem Weg über die Ontologie und die Erkenntnistheorie. Im Ausgang von der Darstellung des Anstoßes durch die Sophisitk entwickelt Husserl ausführlich Platons Entdeckung des Apriori als den für die Folgezeit maßgeblichen Schritt zu einer wissenschaftlichen Philosophie und verfolgt in kritischen Analysen deren neuzeitliche Entwicklung seit Descartes über die rationalistischen und empiristischen Systeme bis hin zu Kant.
In den systematisch orientierten Abschnitten der Vorlesung stellt Husserl zunächst die grundlegenden Disziplinen der theoretischen Philosophie dar: die Erkenntnistheorie, die formale Wissenschaftslehre und die Ontologie, die sich in formale Ontologie, die materialen Ontologien und die von Aristoteles begründete Ontologie der realen Welt differenziert. Die praktische Philosophie behandelt Husserl in einer detaillierten Skizze der apriorischen Wertlehre und der in dieser fundierten apriorischen Ethik; diese beiden Prinzipienwissenschaften bilden für ihn die Grundlagen einer wissenschaftlichen Ethik. Diese aus der Göttinger Zeit stammende, unter dem Einfluss Brentanos stehende Konzeption von Ethik erfährt in der Vorlesung von 1919/20 bzw. in den wenig später in diese eingefügten kritischen Reflexionen gewichtige Korrekturen. Diese Korrekturen sowie die detailierte Analyse und Entfaltung des von Platon und Aristoteles grundgelegten, durch den Siegeszug der ateleologischen Naturwissenschaft verdrängten Gedankens einer teleologischen Welterklärung deuten vor auf Husserls späte Ethik und seine metaphysische Weltdeutung.
This volume brings together essays by leading phenomenologists and Husserl scholars in which they... more This volume brings together essays by leading phenomenologists and Husserl scholars in which they engage with the legacy of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy. It is a broad anthology addressing many major topics in phenomenology and philosophy in general, including articles on phenomenological method; investigations in anthropology, ethics, and theology; highly specialized research into typically Husserlian topics such as perception, image consciousness, reality, and ideality; as well as investigations into the complex relation between pure phenomenology, phenomenological psychology, and cognitive science.
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
Preface by U. Melle
PART I The Nature and Method of Phenomenology
1 Husserl on First Philosophy by R. Sokolowski
2 Le sens de la phénoménologie by M. Richir
3 Transzendentale Phänomenologie? by R. Bernet
4 Husserl and the ‘absolute’ by D. Zahavi
5 Husserls Beweis für den transzendentalen Idealismus by U. Melle
6 Phenomenology as First Philosophy: A Prehistory by S. Luft
7 Der methodologische Transzendentalismus der Phänomenologie by L. Tengelyi
PART II Phenomenology and the Sciences
8 Husserl contra Carnap : la démarcation des sciences by D. Pradelle
9 Phänomenologische Methoden und empirische Erkenntnisse by D. Lohmar
10 Descriptive Psychology and Natural Sciences: Husserl’s early Criticism of Brentano by D. Fisette
11 Mathesis universalis et géométrie : Husserl et Grassmann by V. Gérard
III Phenomenology and Consciousness
12 Tamino’s Eyes, Pamina’s Gaze: Husserl’s Phenomenology of Image-Consciousness Refashioned by N. de Warren
13 Towards a Phenomenological Account of Personal Identity by H. Jacobs
14 Husserl’s Subjectivism: The “thoroughly peculiar ‘forms’” of Consciousness and the Philosophy of Mind by S. Crowell
15 “So You Want to Naturalize Consciousness?” “Why, why not?” – “But How?” Husserl meeting some offspring by E. Marbach
16 Philosophy and ‘Experience’: A Conflict of Interests? by F. Mattens
PART IV Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy
17 Self-Responsibility and Eudaimonia by J. Drummond
18 Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer phänomenologischen Theorie des Handelns: Überlegungen zu Davidson und Husserl by K. Mertens
19 Husserl und das Faktum der praktischen Vernunft:Anstoß und Herausforderung einer phänomenologischen Ethik der Person by S. Loidolt
20 Erde und Leib: Ort der Ökologie nach Husserl by H.R. Sepp
PART V Reality and Ideality
21 The Universal as “What is in Common”: Comments on the Proton-Pseudos in Husserl’s Doctrine of the Intuition of Essence by R. Sowa
22 Die Kulturbedeutung der Intentionalität: Zu Husserls Wirklichkeitsbegriff by E.W. Orth
23 La partition du réel : Remarques sur l’eidos, la phantasia, l’effondrement du monde et l’être absolu de la conscience by C. Majolino
24 Husserl’s Mereological Argument for Intentional Constitution by A. Serrano de Haro
25 Phenomenology in a different voice: Husserl and Nishida in the 1930s by T. Sakakibara
26 Thinking about Non-Existence by L. Alweiss
27 Gott in Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie by K. Held"
Published Papers by Hanne Jacobs
Forthcoming in Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, edited by Nicolas de Warren and Ted Toadvine.
In phenomenology, attention refers to the structuring of the experiential field into a foreground... more In phenomenology, attention refers to the structuring of the experiential field into a foreground and a background. There are different phenomenological accounts for what brings about this structure, which are discussed in this entry.
In American Philosophy and the Intellectual Migration: Pragmatism, Logical Empiricism, Phenomenology, Critical Theory (edited by Sander Verhaegh in De Gruyter’s History of Philosophy and Sciences series), 2025
This chapter provides a historical reconstruction of how Alfred Schutz’s American writings were c... more This chapter provides a historical reconstruction of how Alfred Schutz’s American writings were critically engaged by the feminist sociologists Dorothy E. Smith and Patricia Hill Collins. Schutz’s articulation of a phenomenological sociology in relation to, among others, the sociology of Talcott Parsons and the philosophies of science of Ernest Nagel and Carl G. Hempel proved fruitful to Smith in the development of her feminist standpoint theory in her 1987 The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology. Collins likewise draws on Schutz’s writing in the development of her own standpoint theory in her 1986 paper “Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought,” but in a way that addresses some of her own concerns with Smith’s feminist sociology. As I hope to show with the recovery of this underappreciated history, the critical insights of Smith and Collins with regard to the possible uses and limits of phenomenology for feminist theorizing, are still valuable today.
journal of speculative philosophy, vol. 36, no. 2, 2022
With the aim of showing what it takes to see the world and others as they are, this article provi... more With the aim of showing what it takes to see the world and others as they are, this article provides a phenomenological account of what Iris Murdoch has memorably called “the work of attention.” I first show that Aron Gurwitsch’s analyses of attention provide a basis on which to reject a voluntaristic account of attention according to which seeing things as they are is as simple as directing one’s attention to something. Then, in order to elucidate the work that is involved in paying attention, I draw on Edmund Husserl’s descriptions of the activity characteristic of attentive consciousness. I then show how a Husserlian account of the work of attention can help make sense of Murdoch’s pessimistic claim that our consciousness is not “a transparent glass through which it views the world” while also indicating how we, by paying attention, can do better.
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, 2022
A number of critical social epistemologists have argued that a form of ignorance makes up the epi... more A number of critical social epistemologists have argued that a form of ignorance makes up the epistemic dimension of existing relations of oppression based on racial and/or gender identity. Recent phenomenological accounts of the habitual nature of perception can be understood as describing the bodily, tacit, and affective character of this form of ignorance. At the same time, as I aim to show in this article, more could be phenomenologically said and made of both the active and pervasive character of said ignorance. Drawing on the phenomenological concept of receptivity, I propose a way to further understand the active character of ignorance both in and beyond perception. By doing so, we also get a better view on what it would take to overcome this kind of ignorance.
Husserlian Mind, 2021
In this chapter I aim to show that Husserl’s descriptions of the nature and role of activity in t... more In this chapter I aim to show that Husserl’s descriptions of the nature and role of activity in the epistemic economy of our conscious lives imply a nondeflationary account of epistemic agency. After providing the main outlines of this account, I discuss how it compares to contemporary accounts of epistemic agency and respond to some potential objections. In concluding I indicate that according to this Husserlian account of epistemic agency we can be said to be intrinsically responsible for holding the beliefs we do as well as for the absence of belief.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2020
In “On what matters: Personal identity as a phenomenological problem” (2020), Steven Crowell enga... more In “On what matters: Personal identity as a phenomenological problem” (2020), Steven Crowell engages a number of contemporary interpretations of Husserl’s account of the person and personal identity by noting that they lack a phenomenological elucidation of the self as commitment. In this article, in response to Crowell, I aim to show that such an account of the self as commitment can be drawn from Husserl’s work by looking more closely at his descriptions from the time of Ideas and after of the self as ego or I and egoic experience as attentive experience. I specifically aim to sketch the beginning of a response to three questions I take Crowell to be posing to a Husserlian account of the person and personal identity: (1) What more than pre-reflective self-awareness can be attributed to the self on phenomenological grounds so that we can understand, phenomenologically speaking, how selves become persons? (2) How can what characterizes the self in addition to pre-reflective self-awareness be discerned in both our commitment to truth and our feeling bound by love and other emotive commitments that cannot be fully rationally justified, which Husserl acknowledges are both sources of personal self-constitution? And (3), do all selves become persons? In the paper I elaborate how my answers to the first two questions turn on the self not just being self-aware but active in a particular sense. And to begin to address the third question, I suggest that while any form of wakeful conscious experience is both self-aware and active, this activity of the self makes a difference for those who are socio-historically embedded in the way we are. Specifically, on the proposed Husserlian account, selves that are socio-historically embedded become persons in and through their active relating to what they attentively experience. In concluding, I indicate how this Husserlian account might compare to Crowell’s claim that “self-identity (ipseity) is not mere logical identity (A=A) but a normative achievement […] which makes a ‘personal’ kind of identity possible” (2020).
Oxford Handbook for the History of Phenomenology, edited by Dan Zahavi, 2018
This chapter focuses on a number of respects in which Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, and Merleau-Ponty’s... more This chapter focuses on a number of respects in which Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of the world differ, despite other significant commonalities. Specifically, it discusses how both Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of our experience of the world challenge Husserl’s assertion of the possibility of a worldless consciousness; how Heidegger’s discussion of the world entails a rejection of Husserl’s claim that the world is at bottom nature; and how Merleau-Ponty puts pressure on Husserl’s account of the necessary structure of the world. In concluding, and as a propaedeutic to adjudicating these disputes, this chapter aims to show why Husserl makes these contested claims. Specifically, it suggests that it is Husserl’s phenomenological conception of reason and his commitment to (this conception of) reason that motivate him to make the claims about our experience and world with which the later phenomenologists take issue.
Husserl-Handbuch. Leben-Werk-Wirkung. Herausgegeben von Sebastian Luft und Maren Wehrle.
Betrachtet man die Geschichte des Begriffs ‚Phänomenologie‘, ist nicht auf den ersten Blick klar,... more Betrachtet man die Geschichte des Begriffs ‚Phänomenologie‘, ist nicht auf den ersten Blick klar, was darunter zu verstehen ist. Wie Schuhmann (1984 ) herausgearbeitet hat, tritt dieser Begriff in der Philosophiegeschichte auf, noch lange bevor Edmund Husserl sich ihn zu Eigen machte, um sein eigenes philosophisches Projekt zu beschreiben. Auch hinderte Husserls Versuch, diesen Begriff für die Beschreibung seines eigenen einmaligen Projekts zu beanspruchen, seine Zeitgenossen (z.B. Pfänder, Reinach, Stein) keineswegs daran, denselben Begriff ebenfalls zur Beschreibung ihrer jeweiligen Projekte und Methoden zu verwenden. Es versteht sich also, dass Husserl selbst beträchtlichen Aufwand betrieb, um zu definieren, was der Begriff ‚Phänomenologie‘ in seinen Augen zu bedeuten hatte. Zum Zeitpunkt der Publikation des ersten Buches seiner Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie im Jahre 1913 charakterisiert Husserl Phänomenologie als eine neue Wissenschaft, die sich von jeder anderen, bereits geschichtlich verankerten Wissenschaft wie Physik, Psychologie oder Kulturwissenschaft unterscheidet (Hua III/1, 1). Diese Darstellung von Phänomenologie lässt auf Anhieb eine wichtige Abweichung von seiner einstigen Gleichsetzung von Phänomenologie und deskriptiver Psychologie in den Logischen Untersuchungen (1901) erkennen. In der breiteren philosophischen Landschaft wären angesichts Husserls positiver Bestimmung dessen, was diese phänomenologische Wissenschaft ist, möglicherweise auch heute noch viele genauso irritiert wie einige der damaligen Teilnehmer des VI. Kongresses für experimentelle Psychologie, denen Husserl 1914 erklärte: „Analog wie die reine Geometrie Wesenslehre des ‚reinen‘ Raumes bzw. Wissenschaft von den ideal möglichen Raumgestalten ist, ist die reine Phänomenologie Wesenslehre des ‚reinen‘ Bewusstseins, Wissenschaft von den ideal möglichen Bewusstseinsgestalten (mit ihren ‚immanenten Korrelaten‘)“ (Schumann 1914, 144-5). Was heute wie damals für ein Verständnis dieser Darstellung von Phänomenologie der Klärung bedarf, ist Husserls Beschreibung der Phänomenologie als einer Wesenslehre, d.h. einer reinen oder eidetischen Wissenschaft, ebenso wie seine Aussage, deren Untersuchungsgegenstand sei das von ihm sogenannte reine Bewusstsein. Nur indem man die beiden Bedeutungen von ‚rein‘ erhellt, die hiermit angesprochen sind, wird auch deutlich, inwiefern Husserl behaupten kann, Phänomenologie unterscheide sich von anderen Wissenschaften: sowohl von empirischen wie Physik oder experimenteller Psychologie als auch von anderen eidetischen Wissenschaften wie Geometrie und deskriptiver Psychologie. Diese Erläuterung zeigt nicht nur, inwiefern Phänomenologie von all diesen Disziplinen verschieden ist, sondern auch, inwiefern sie mit ihnen zusammenhängt – und damit ist gerade die Idee der Phänomenologie begründet.
Research in Phenomenology, 2016
In this paper I spell out Husserl’s account of the exercise of rationality and show how this exer... more In this paper I spell out Husserl’s account of the exercise of rationality and show how this exercise is tied to the capacity for critical reflection. In the first section I discuss Husserl’s views on what rationally constrains our intentionality. Then, I localize the exercise of rationality in the positing that characterizes attentive forms of intentionality and argue that when attentive to something we are also pre-reflectively aware of what speaks for and against our taking something to be a certain way (section 2). I further argue that the rare occasions in which this pre-reflective awareness gives way to reflective deliberation are due to what Husserl calls the sedimentation of sense and what one might call the overdetermination of sense that follows from it (section 3). After having presented what I take to be Husserl’s account of the exercise of rationality, I contrast this account to a compelling Kantian inspired account of the activity of reason that has recently been developed by Matthew Boyle (section 4). I argue that Husserl delimits the scope of the exercise of rationality differently, and I show how this implies different accounts of the self.
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Analytic and Continental Philosophy Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium
According to a predominant view, reflection is constitutive of personhood. In this paper I first ... more According to a predominant view, reflection is constitutive of personhood. In this paper I first indicate how it might seem that such an account cannot do justice to the socially embedded nature of personhood. I then present a phenomenologically-inspired account of reflection as critical stance taking and show how it accommodates the social embeddedness of persons. In concluding, I outline how this phenomenological account is also not vulnerable to a number of additional challenges that have been raised against accounts that consider reflection to be constitutive of personhood and what matters for responsibility.
Andrea Staiti (Editor). Commentary on Husserl's "Ideas I", pp. 95-118
[Section II, Chapter 2, ‘Consciousness and Natural Actuality.’]
In the paragraphs immediately fo... more [Section II, Chapter 2, ‘Consciousness and Natural Actuality.’]
In the paragraphs immediately following the introduction of the method of phenomenological epoché (§§34-46) in Ideas, rather than applying this new method, Husserl provides a series of psychological descriptions on the basis of psychological reflection. This is surprising for at least two reasons. First, since Husserl has already distinguished phenomenology from psychology (both empirical and eidetic), it is not clear why he would engage in psychological reflection and description at this point in the book. Further, the psychological descriptions that Husserl provides in these paragraphs are of consciousness — specifically, of our consciousness of something. But, as Husserl indicates at several points in the first book of Ideas, and as he more fully develops in the 1912 pencil manuscript of the second book of Ideas, the object of psychology is, strictly speaking, not consciousness but the soul (Seele) considered as reality (Realität). In this chapter, I first develop how these two interpretative difficulties can be overcome if we consider the overall aim of the second chapter — namely, to establish that consciousness has its own kind of being and hence essence. Then, I elucidate how exactly Husserl establishes this in this chapter and show how it entails a radical rethinking of the distinction between and relation of consciousness and world.
This article addresses an ambiguity in Edmund Husserl’s account of the human being. On the one ha... more This article addresses an ambiguity in Edmund Husserl’s account of the human being. On the one hand, Husserl often characterizes the human being in natural scientific terms as a psychophysical unity. On the other hand, Husserl also describes how we experience ourselves as embodied persons that experience and communicate with others within a socio-historical world. The main aim of this article is to show that if one overlooks this ambiguity then one will misunderstand the relation between the subject that constitutes a world (and that Husserl terms transcendental) and the human being within the world. Specifically, I argue that we can understand self-constitution in two different ways (naturalistically or personalistically) because Husserl has a dual conception of the human being. In his major works, Husserl usually describes how the transcendental subject constitutes itself as a human being in naturalistic terms—that is, a psychophysical entity. However, as I aim to show, the constitution of oneself as a psychophysical entity in nature presupposes a more fundamental and primary constitution of oneself as an embodied person in the world. What is more, it is only when we restore the primacy of this personalistic form of self-constitution that it becomes clear that the subject that is for the world and that Husserl terms transcendental is indeed an embodied, personal, and historical subject in the world.
In this article, I consider whether and how Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological method can ... more In this article, I consider whether and how Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological method can initiate a phenomenological way of life. The impetus for this investigation originates in a set of manuscripts written in 1926 and published in Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion where Husserl suggests that the consistent commitment to and performance of phenomenological reflection can change one’s life to the point where a simple return to the life lived before this reflection is no longer possible. Husserl identifies this point of no return with becoming a transcendental idealist. I propose a way of understanding Husserl’s claim that transcendental idealism makes a simple return to life before phenomenological reflection impossible. I then suggest that a phenomenological way of life is characterized by an epistemic modesty that follows from Husserl’s transcendental idealism and consider whether and how such a phenomenological way of life is a life worth living.
In this article, I develop how the phenomenological understanding of the intentionality of consci... more In this article, I develop how the phenomenological understanding of the intentionality of consciousness allows us to formulate a theory of personal identity that can at least (1) account for the continuity of consciousness through time, (2) provide an account of a certain aspect of what it means to be a person, namely to be able to appropriate one’s past as one’s own, and (3) give an original answer to the question of personal identity and state in what the identity of a person through time consists. After having developed the outlines for such a phenomenological theory of personal identity, I conclude that the provided account of the person is the correlate of the phenomenological concept of world.
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Edited Books by Hanne Jacobs
For queries and manuscripts:
Dr. Hanne Jacobs
Department of Philosophy
Tilburg University
PO Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
The Netherlands
[email protected]
In den systematisch orientierten Abschnitten der Vorlesung stellt Husserl zunächst die grundlegenden Disziplinen der theoretischen Philosophie dar: die Erkenntnistheorie, die formale Wissenschaftslehre und die Ontologie, die sich in formale Ontologie, die materialen Ontologien und die von Aristoteles begründete Ontologie der realen Welt differenziert. Die praktische Philosophie behandelt Husserl in einer detaillierten Skizze der apriorischen Wertlehre und der in dieser fundierten apriorischen Ethik; diese beiden Prinzipienwissenschaften bilden für ihn die Grundlagen einer wissenschaftlichen Ethik. Diese aus der Göttinger Zeit stammende, unter dem Einfluss Brentanos stehende Konzeption von Ethik erfährt in der Vorlesung von 1919/20 bzw. in den wenig später in diese eingefügten kritischen Reflexionen gewichtige Korrekturen. Diese Korrekturen sowie die detailierte Analyse und Entfaltung des von Platon und Aristoteles grundgelegten, durch den Siegeszug der ateleologischen Naturwissenschaft verdrängten Gedankens einer teleologischen Welterklärung deuten vor auf Husserls späte Ethik und seine metaphysische Weltdeutung.
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
Preface by U. Melle
PART I The Nature and Method of Phenomenology
1 Husserl on First Philosophy by R. Sokolowski
2 Le sens de la phénoménologie by M. Richir
3 Transzendentale Phänomenologie? by R. Bernet
4 Husserl and the ‘absolute’ by D. Zahavi
5 Husserls Beweis für den transzendentalen Idealismus by U. Melle
6 Phenomenology as First Philosophy: A Prehistory by S. Luft
7 Der methodologische Transzendentalismus der Phänomenologie by L. Tengelyi
PART II Phenomenology and the Sciences
8 Husserl contra Carnap : la démarcation des sciences by D. Pradelle
9 Phänomenologische Methoden und empirische Erkenntnisse by D. Lohmar
10 Descriptive Psychology and Natural Sciences: Husserl’s early Criticism of Brentano by D. Fisette
11 Mathesis universalis et géométrie : Husserl et Grassmann by V. Gérard
III Phenomenology and Consciousness
12 Tamino’s Eyes, Pamina’s Gaze: Husserl’s Phenomenology of Image-Consciousness Refashioned by N. de Warren
13 Towards a Phenomenological Account of Personal Identity by H. Jacobs
14 Husserl’s Subjectivism: The “thoroughly peculiar ‘forms’” of Consciousness and the Philosophy of Mind by S. Crowell
15 “So You Want to Naturalize Consciousness?” “Why, why not?” – “But How?” Husserl meeting some offspring by E. Marbach
16 Philosophy and ‘Experience’: A Conflict of Interests? by F. Mattens
PART IV Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy
17 Self-Responsibility and Eudaimonia by J. Drummond
18 Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer phänomenologischen Theorie des Handelns: Überlegungen zu Davidson und Husserl by K. Mertens
19 Husserl und das Faktum der praktischen Vernunft:Anstoß und Herausforderung einer phänomenologischen Ethik der Person by S. Loidolt
20 Erde und Leib: Ort der Ökologie nach Husserl by H.R. Sepp
PART V Reality and Ideality
21 The Universal as “What is in Common”: Comments on the Proton-Pseudos in Husserl’s Doctrine of the Intuition of Essence by R. Sowa
22 Die Kulturbedeutung der Intentionalität: Zu Husserls Wirklichkeitsbegriff by E.W. Orth
23 La partition du réel : Remarques sur l’eidos, la phantasia, l’effondrement du monde et l’être absolu de la conscience by C. Majolino
24 Husserl’s Mereological Argument for Intentional Constitution by A. Serrano de Haro
25 Phenomenology in a different voice: Husserl and Nishida in the 1930s by T. Sakakibara
26 Thinking about Non-Existence by L. Alweiss
27 Gott in Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie by K. Held"
Published Papers by Hanne Jacobs
In the paragraphs immediately following the introduction of the method of phenomenological epoché (§§34-46) in Ideas, rather than applying this new method, Husserl provides a series of psychological descriptions on the basis of psychological reflection. This is surprising for at least two reasons. First, since Husserl has already distinguished phenomenology from psychology (both empirical and eidetic), it is not clear why he would engage in psychological reflection and description at this point in the book. Further, the psychological descriptions that Husserl provides in these paragraphs are of consciousness — specifically, of our consciousness of something. But, as Husserl indicates at several points in the first book of Ideas, and as he more fully develops in the 1912 pencil manuscript of the second book of Ideas, the object of psychology is, strictly speaking, not consciousness but the soul (Seele) considered as reality (Realität). In this chapter, I first develop how these two interpretative difficulties can be overcome if we consider the overall aim of the second chapter — namely, to establish that consciousness has its own kind of being and hence essence. Then, I elucidate how exactly Husserl establishes this in this chapter and show how it entails a radical rethinking of the distinction between and relation of consciousness and world.
For queries and manuscripts:
Dr. Hanne Jacobs
Department of Philosophy
Tilburg University
PO Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
The Netherlands
[email protected]
In den systematisch orientierten Abschnitten der Vorlesung stellt Husserl zunächst die grundlegenden Disziplinen der theoretischen Philosophie dar: die Erkenntnistheorie, die formale Wissenschaftslehre und die Ontologie, die sich in formale Ontologie, die materialen Ontologien und die von Aristoteles begründete Ontologie der realen Welt differenziert. Die praktische Philosophie behandelt Husserl in einer detaillierten Skizze der apriorischen Wertlehre und der in dieser fundierten apriorischen Ethik; diese beiden Prinzipienwissenschaften bilden für ihn die Grundlagen einer wissenschaftlichen Ethik. Diese aus der Göttinger Zeit stammende, unter dem Einfluss Brentanos stehende Konzeption von Ethik erfährt in der Vorlesung von 1919/20 bzw. in den wenig später in diese eingefügten kritischen Reflexionen gewichtige Korrekturen. Diese Korrekturen sowie die detailierte Analyse und Entfaltung des von Platon und Aristoteles grundgelegten, durch den Siegeszug der ateleologischen Naturwissenschaft verdrängten Gedankens einer teleologischen Welterklärung deuten vor auf Husserls späte Ethik und seine metaphysische Weltdeutung.
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
Preface by U. Melle
PART I The Nature and Method of Phenomenology
1 Husserl on First Philosophy by R. Sokolowski
2 Le sens de la phénoménologie by M. Richir
3 Transzendentale Phänomenologie? by R. Bernet
4 Husserl and the ‘absolute’ by D. Zahavi
5 Husserls Beweis für den transzendentalen Idealismus by U. Melle
6 Phenomenology as First Philosophy: A Prehistory by S. Luft
7 Der methodologische Transzendentalismus der Phänomenologie by L. Tengelyi
PART II Phenomenology and the Sciences
8 Husserl contra Carnap : la démarcation des sciences by D. Pradelle
9 Phänomenologische Methoden und empirische Erkenntnisse by D. Lohmar
10 Descriptive Psychology and Natural Sciences: Husserl’s early Criticism of Brentano by D. Fisette
11 Mathesis universalis et géométrie : Husserl et Grassmann by V. Gérard
III Phenomenology and Consciousness
12 Tamino’s Eyes, Pamina’s Gaze: Husserl’s Phenomenology of Image-Consciousness Refashioned by N. de Warren
13 Towards a Phenomenological Account of Personal Identity by H. Jacobs
14 Husserl’s Subjectivism: The “thoroughly peculiar ‘forms’” of Consciousness and the Philosophy of Mind by S. Crowell
15 “So You Want to Naturalize Consciousness?” “Why, why not?” – “But How?” Husserl meeting some offspring by E. Marbach
16 Philosophy and ‘Experience’: A Conflict of Interests? by F. Mattens
PART IV Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy
17 Self-Responsibility and Eudaimonia by J. Drummond
18 Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer phänomenologischen Theorie des Handelns: Überlegungen zu Davidson und Husserl by K. Mertens
19 Husserl und das Faktum der praktischen Vernunft:Anstoß und Herausforderung einer phänomenologischen Ethik der Person by S. Loidolt
20 Erde und Leib: Ort der Ökologie nach Husserl by H.R. Sepp
PART V Reality and Ideality
21 The Universal as “What is in Common”: Comments on the Proton-Pseudos in Husserl’s Doctrine of the Intuition of Essence by R. Sowa
22 Die Kulturbedeutung der Intentionalität: Zu Husserls Wirklichkeitsbegriff by E.W. Orth
23 La partition du réel : Remarques sur l’eidos, la phantasia, l’effondrement du monde et l’être absolu de la conscience by C. Majolino
24 Husserl’s Mereological Argument for Intentional Constitution by A. Serrano de Haro
25 Phenomenology in a different voice: Husserl and Nishida in the 1930s by T. Sakakibara
26 Thinking about Non-Existence by L. Alweiss
27 Gott in Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie by K. Held"
In the paragraphs immediately following the introduction of the method of phenomenological epoché (§§34-46) in Ideas, rather than applying this new method, Husserl provides a series of psychological descriptions on the basis of psychological reflection. This is surprising for at least two reasons. First, since Husserl has already distinguished phenomenology from psychology (both empirical and eidetic), it is not clear why he would engage in psychological reflection and description at this point in the book. Further, the psychological descriptions that Husserl provides in these paragraphs are of consciousness — specifically, of our consciousness of something. But, as Husserl indicates at several points in the first book of Ideas, and as he more fully develops in the 1912 pencil manuscript of the second book of Ideas, the object of psychology is, strictly speaking, not consciousness but the soul (Seele) considered as reality (Realität). In this chapter, I first develop how these two interpretative difficulties can be overcome if we consider the overall aim of the second chapter — namely, to establish that consciousness has its own kind of being and hence essence. Then, I elucidate how exactly Husserl establishes this in this chapter and show how it entails a radical rethinking of the distinction between and relation of consciousness and world.
The manner in which we perceive and judge situations, the way that we emotively respond to events, and the kinds of projects we undertake often derive from the society in which we live our lives. At the same time, however, most of us have convictions, evaluative preferences, and practical commitments that we would consider deeply personal and characteristic of our unique point of view on the world. In what follows I aim to inquire whether and how Husserl's phenomenology provides us with the resources to understand how we can be or, better, become our own persons while also being fundamentally shaped by determinate and indeterminate others in the way that we experience the world.