Any discussion of lying either is about the problem of Nazis at the door or is some minutes away from it. As a rule, the problem places us immediately at the door, facing the commandant, having just heard the question. But obviously, for us in the Nazi-less world of abstract moral contemplation, the moral discussion imposes the obligation to prepare for a relevantly similar moment. So how do we prepare?
If we resolve that the lie is the right thing to tell, we are going to have to prepare ourselves for that. Humans have difficulty telling convincing lies, and so we should practice lying in small things to prepare ourselves. To be sure, we’ll lie in times when it assists life or at least causes no great harm to it. In addition, we’ll have to train ourselves to judge whether persons have a right to the truth or not. It’s probably the case that there is a presumptive right to it, but we’ll have to develop our criterion of when it applies and when it doesn’t.
Most significantly, however, we’ll have to order the mind’s orientation to reception and manifestation of truth to some higher goal. If lies are not evil when they preserve life, then manifesting truth is subordinated to preserving life. One has to recognize trickster figures as ideals, and see Odysseus as one paradigm of virtue (as he clearly was for pre-Christians.)
This whole discussion probably reeks of the tendentious, however. Say I resolve all lies are at least venial sins. How do I prepare to be faithful to that? Do I have to practice sacrificing any good to avoiding even venial sin? Do people have to die so that I can avoid any stain on my conscience? It’s in this context that Newman’s repeated remark about sin arises to give offense in a particularly intolerable way: it is better for the sun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions on it to die of starvation in extremest agony, as far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul… should commit one single venial sin, should tell one wilful untruth…
Again, however, this also seems to some extent to place us at the door facing the commandant. It’s better to raise the question of what our obligations would be if we found ourselves in such a regime that made lies such an irrefusable temptation. Seen from this angle, it’s better to take the Nazis at the door as a justification, not of lying, but of revolution and martyrdom.